CourtListener 10690292•People v. Torres CA2/8
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Filed 10/3/25 P. v. Torres CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B327809
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA451597)
v.
VICTOR TORRES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with instructions.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, by appointment of the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S. Kim, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Victor Torres appeals the denial of his pretrial
motion for mental health diversion of his criminal prosecution.
He argues that amendments to the mental health diversion
statute, passed after the trial court denied his motion and while
this appeal has been pending, warrant remand and
reconsideration of his motion. We agree and reverse and remand
the matter to the trial court with instructions to reconsider the
motion under the standards set forth in the recent amendments
to the law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Underlying Facts
These facts are taken from one of our prior opinions in this
matter. On the evening of October 15, 2016, Torres approached
two brothers, Cesar and Harvin C. He asked them what
neighborhood they were from to which Harvin responded,
“Nicaragua.” Torres asked whether “Shorty” was in a van the
brothers had just exited. Cesar told Torres not to look into the
van. Torres then punched Cesar twice and threw him to the
ground. Torres left the scene.
The brothers then went over to their family’s apartment
building. They were standing in the building’s courtyard when
Torres returned with a gun. He pointed the gun at Cesar and
Cesar’s cousin. He then shot the gun once into the air. Unnamed
individuals asked Torres to leave, which he did. Torres was later
arrested and denied shooting anyone. (People v. Torres (Mar. 1,
2018, B282426) [nonpub. opn.].)
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II. The Charges and Jury Verdict
On February 2, 2017, the People filed a two-count amended
information charging Torres with assault with a semi-automatic
firearm and discharging that firearm with gross negligence.
(Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (b) & 246.3, subd. (a).)1 The
information also alleged Torres personally used a firearm in
violation of section 12022.5; committed the crime for the benefit
of a criminal street gang in violation of section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1); and had sustained a second degree Estes2
robbery strike prior, a serious felony prior, and a prison prior in
violations of sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1), (b)–(j); 1170.12; and
667.5, subdivision (b).
A jury convicted Torres of both counts, found true the
personal use of a firearm allegation, and acquitted Torres of the
gang allegations. At the sentencing hearing the trial court found
true the prison prior, strike prior, and serious felony conviction
allegations. Torres was sentenced to 22 years, four months in
prison.
Torres filed two successful rounds of appeals, resulting in a
remand of his conviction to the trial court to consider his
eligibility for mental health diversion. (People v. Torres, supra,
B282426; People v. Torres (Oct. 10, 2019, B292495) [nonpub.
opn.].)
On May 31, 2022, Torres formally moved for mental health
diversion. On August 15, 2022, the trial court denied the motion,
finding him not eligible or suitable for section 1001.36 diversion.
The trial court sentenced Torres to 16 years in state prison,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23.
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consisting of the midterm of six years on the assault count,
doubled for the strike, plus four years for the firearm
enhancement. A concurrent midterm sentence of four years was
imposed on the second count.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health
diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and factual findings
are reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449 (Moine); People v. Oneal (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 582, 588.) A trial court has “ ‘broad discretion to
determine whether a given defendant is a good candidate for
mental health diversion.’ ” (People v. Whitmill (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) “A court abuses its discretion when
it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the
wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” (Moine, at p. 449; People v. Bunas (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–849 (Bunas).)
II. Applicable Law
Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion
for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders. (People
v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626–627 (Frahs).) To qualify for
mental health diversion, a defendant must satisfy the eligibility
requirements set out in section 1001.36, subdivision (b) and then
satisfy the suitability requirements set out in section 1001.36,
subdivision (c). (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c).)
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It is one of the two eligibility requirements that changed
post-appeal that is relevant to Torres’s appeal. The two
requirements are set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)
and (2). First, the court must find defendant suffers from a
mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, including
but not limited to, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder, but excluding
antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(1).) “Evidence of the defendant’s mental disorder shall
be provided by the defense and shall include a diagnosis or
treatment for a diagnosed mental disorder within the last five
years by a qualified mental health expert. In opining that a
defendant suffers from a qualifying disorder, the qualified mental
health expert may rely on an examination of the defendant, the
defendant’s medical records, arrest reports, or any other relevant
evidence.” (Ibid.)
Second, the court must find “defendant’s mental disorder
was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) This is the requirement that changed
while this appeal has been pending. Effective January 1, 2023,
Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended the statute
to add a presumption that “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was
not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A court may
consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
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witness statements, statement by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
Even if a defendant meets the threshold eligibility
requirements, “a trial court may still exercise its discretion to
deny mental health diversion if it finds that the defendant or the
offense are not suitable for diversion.” (People v. Qualkinbush
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888, italics added (Qualkinbush).)
A defendant is suitable under the statute if the defendant’s
symptoms are amenable to treatment; defendant consents to
diversions and waives the right to a speedy trial; defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety by likely committing a “superstrike” if treated in the
community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
In determining a defendant’s suitability for mental health
diversion, a trial court may not rely on general sentencing
objectives set forth in rule 4.410 of the California Rules of Court3
3 The general objectives of sentencing include: protecting
society; punishing the defendant; encouraging the defendant to
lead a law-abiding life in the future and deterring him from
future offenses; deterring others from criminal conduct by
demonstrating its consequences; preventing the defendant from
committing new crimes by isolating him for the period of
incarceration; securing restitution for the victims of crime;
achieving uniformity in sentencing; and increasing public safety
by reducing recidivism through community-based corrections
programs and evidence-based practices. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.410(a).)
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and must consider the primary purposes of the mental health
diversion statute as set forth in section 1001.35. (Qualkinbush,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 890–892; Bunas, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865–866.)
The stated purpose of this legislation is to keep people with
mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal
justice system while protecting public safety, to give counties
discretion in developing and implementing diversion across a
continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health
rehabilitative services. (See Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 886 [discussing § 1001.36].) The Legislature intended the
mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.
(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court “must treat the
matter as if the charges against the defendant have not yet been
adjudicated; the court is not sentencing the defendant.”
(Qualkinbush, at p. 892, fn. 11.)
If the defendant successfully completes diversion, including
having in place a plan for long-term mental health care, the
criminal charges shall be dismissed. (§ 1001.36, subd. (h).)
However, if after diversion is granted, a qualified mental health
expert concludes the defendant “is performing unsatisfactorily in
the assigned program,” the court shall, after notice to defendant,
hold a hearing to determine whether criminal proceedings should
be reinstated or treatment modified. (Id., subd. (g)(4)(A).)
III. Analysis
Under the newly amended statute, the trial court was
required to find Torres’s mental disorder a substantial factor in
the commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Torres asks that we remand the matter
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for an evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new
presumption.
Because Torres’s judgment is not final, recently amended
section 1001.36 applies retroactively to his case. (Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 624; People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 6.)
Torres is entitled to the trial court’s informed discretion on his
motion for mental health diversion. (Doron, at p.10.) A court
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that informed discretion than one whose decision is or
may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant’s record. (People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
The trial court specifically denied Torres’s motion for
mental health diversion because it found, without considering the
presumption, his mental health diagnosis was not substantially
related to his criminal conduct. Torres is entitled to have his
motion heard and decided under the newly-enacted eligibility
standards.
We also find that the trial court was apparently
misinformed about the facts of the case when it found Torres
unsuitable for diversion. This finding as well must be
reconsidered. The court concluded the present offense was gang
related, demonstrating a high degree of dangerousness. The
court made this finding notwithstanding that the jury had
acquitted Torres of the gang enhancement. (People v. Henley
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1018 [trial court may not turn
acquittals and not-true enhancement findings into their opposites
at a post-conviction hearing].)
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Second, the trial court found that the present offense was
not “the kind of conduct that the mental health diversion
program is intended for.” Section 1001.36, subdivision (d) sets
out the offenses which are excluded from eligibility for diversion.
The offenses of conviction here—grossly negligent discharge of a
firearm and armed assault not resulting in injury—are not on
that disqualifying list. (See Wade v. Superior Court (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 694, 716–717 [court abused its discretion in
concluding DUI was disqualifying offense].)
Finally in finding Torres unsuitable, the court noted it was
operating under the misimpression that Torres had pistol
whipped the victim with a gun immediately before shooting that
same gun into the air. This was, indeed, unsupported by the
record. This glaring factual error establishes that the suitability
finding is based on an erroneous factual basis and must be
vacated. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
Finally, we conclude the court’s finding that Torres poses
an unreasonable risk to public safety or, put another way, that he
is too dangerous to be treated in the community because he would
commit a new violent super strike, also unsupported by the
evidence. Super strikes are murder, attempted murder,
solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a
police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any
serious or violent felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense
committed against minors under the age of 14. (People v.
Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242; § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)
Here, the trial court found Torres was likely to commit a
super strike offense. (See People v. Hoffman (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
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p. 450 [“a trial court necessarily must find the defendant is ‘likely
to commit a super-strike offense’ ” to deny diversion on this
ground; in other words, “the risk of danger is narrowly confined
to the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited subset of
violent felonies”].) There was no evidence in the record to
support such a finding. It is undisputed appellant’s prior
criminal history, consisting of driving under the influence, fraud,
forgery, possession and sales of drugs and theft, does not include
violent or sexually violent convictions, let alone a super strike.
(Hoffman at p. 1310 [finding that the record did not support a
finding of dangerousness under § 1170.18 where the defendant
had no prior criminal history and her recent charges for
18 counts of felony forgery and one count of grand theft of
property were not super-strike offenses].) His prior “strike”
offense was an Estes second degree robbery for stealing beer from
a grocery store.
Moreover, it is significant that the facts of this incident
include appellant leaving the scene when told to do so and firing
one shot into the air despite the number of people confronting
him. (See Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153 [court
abused its discretion in basing its finding of dangerousness on
firing a single shot into the air].) These facts are not substantial
evidence that appellant is likely to commit a super strike offense
in the future.
Because there was no substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that appellant posed an unreasonable risk of
committing a super strike if treated in the community, and
because the trial court imposed incorrect standards in denying
diversion, we conclude the court erred in denying appellant’s
motion for pretrial mental health diversion. We pause to note at
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this juncture that Torres has challenged the accuracy of the
abstract of judgment in reciting custody credits and fines and fees
not imposed at his sentencing hearing. Upon remand the trial
court shall take up these issues in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is conditionally reversed with
directions to the trial court to hold a new evidentiary hearing on
appellant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion and, if the
motion is denied, to hold a resentencing hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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