CourtListener 10687800•In re B.P. CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 10/2/25 In re B.P. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re B.P., A Person Coming B340153
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03286B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F.G., B347213
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES et
al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for extraordinary writ.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Sumako McCallum, Judge.
Petition denied.
Heather Tesdahl, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy County Counsel
for Plaintiff, Respondent and Real Party in Interest.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers; Law Office of Jolene
Metzger, Dominika Campbell and Jason Steinberg for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.
Children’s Law Center of California, Kristin Hallak and
Natalie Young, for Minor as Real Party in Interest.
__________________________
Appellant F.G. (Father), challenges the juvenile court’s
finding made at the six-month review hearing pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e),1 that Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) provided Father with reasonable reunification services as
to his infant son B.P., also known as R.P. (born Sept. 2023).2
Father also filed a petition for extraordinary review (writ)
challenging the juvenile court’s findings and order, issued at an 18-
month review hearing held pursuant to section 366.22, that DCFS
provided reasonable reunification services and terminating those
services. Father contends the record lacks sufficient evidence to
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 In an earlier appeal, R.P.’s mother N.P. (who is not a party to
the instant actions) challenged jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order removing R.P. from her care. We affirmed those
findings and order. (In re V.P. (Jan. 30, 2025, B334901)
[nonpub. opn.] (V.P.).)
2
support the court’s findings that (1) returning R.P. to father
created a substantial risk of detriment to the child, and (2) DCFS
provided reasonable reunification services. On August 26, 2025,
this court issued an order notifying the parties of its intent to
consider these matters together. Concluding the challenged orders
have sufficient evidentiary support, we affirm as to the appeal and
deny the writ.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the background of the case, so
we will not fully restate those details here. (See People v. Garcia
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion reviewing
correctness of a trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive
factual or legal statement”].) We discuss the background facts and
procedural history as needed to provide context for and resolve the
issues presented.
Newborn R.P. and his toddler half brother, V.P.3 were
removed from their mother, N.P. (mother), after DCFS received an
emergency referral that toxicology screens for mother and R.P.
revealed the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamine and
marijuana. (V.P., supra, B334901.) Mother admitted having used
those substances during her pregnancy, as recently as a few days
before R.P.’s birth. (Ibid.) Together with his half brother, R.P. was
placed in the care of his Maternal Grandmother, where he
remains.
In the section 300 petition filed on September 27, 2023,
jurisdiction as to Father was premised largely on allegations he
knew about mother’s substance abuse but failed to take action to
protect R.P. and had a history of substance abuse and an extensive
criminal history related primarily to drug-related crimes. (§ 300,
3 V.P. has no biological connection to Father and is not a
subject of this appeal or writ.
3
subd. (b).) At the detention hearing, R.P. was removed from
parental care and Father was given monitored visitation.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on November 27,
2023, the juvenile court sustained the petition. The court rejected
Father’s assertions that he could not have protected his unborn
child. Rather, the evidence showed Father permitted mother to live
in his home for a time before she gave birth. He knew mother was
using drugs and did not approve but took no action. Instead, to
avoid conflict, Father “just left when [mother] used.” The court also
rejected the assertion that Father’s extensive history of drug use,
recent relapse with methamphetamine and ongoing use of
marijuana posed no risk of serious harm to R.P. The court ordered
family reunification services (FRS) to include a parenting class for
Father (who was admittedly wholly unprepared to care for a child),
a full drug and alcohol program and aftercare, random weekly on-
demand drug testing and individual counseling to address case
issues and child protection. Father was given monitored visitation.
At a hearing on May 24, 2024, DCFS reported Father had
been incarcerated since early February 2024 on drug charges at
the Pitchess Detention Center in California and sentenced to four
years in prison. Father told a DCFS children’s social worker (CSW)
he expected to remain in custody for about 18 months. He was
trying to enroll in a drug treatment program and parenting classes
in prison. Father had not participated in individual counseling but
was trying to enroll in a program that included group and
individual counseling. Father had had trouble having phone visits
with R.P. and requested to see R.P. in person. A paternal relative
had agreed to bring the child for biweekly visits at his place of
incarceration, beginning May 19, 2024. DCFS was ordered to assist
Father to enroll in services available at his place of incarceration
and to assess the possibility of virtual visitation while Father
remained incarcerated and in-person visits once the baby was fully
vaccinated. DCFS reported that R.P. was well-cared for by
4
Maternal Grandmother, and his symptoms of withdrawal from
prenatal drug exposure had abated.
I. The Six-month Review Hearing
After several continuances, the six-month review hearing
was conducted on August 16, 2024. During the intervening period,
Father presented to the juvenile court DCFS’s “Title XX’s” to
support his assertion that DCFS failed to provide him with
reasonable services. A “Title XX” is a “delivered service log” of all
contacts, services and visits by DCFS.
The matter proceeded in Father’s absence, and the Title XX’s
were admitted into evidence. By this time, Father had been
transferred to a prison in Corcoran, California. DCFS argued
Father’s projected release would be beyond the time for
reunification, his visitation had been inconsistent, and no
additional services or programs were available to Father at his
current place of incarceration.
Counsel for R.P. argued that, even after Father reached out
in April 2024, DCFS had failed to make reasonable efforts to
communicate with him and made no reasonable effort either to
investigate what programs were available to Father while
incarcerated or to assist him to enroll in such programs. Father’s
counsel argued the Title XX’s demonstrated DCFS failed to provide
him with any FRS, let alone reasonable services. Father asserted
DCFS failed to reach out to him for five consecutive months, failed
to facilitate visits with R.P., and failed to investigate any programs
available to him while incarcerated.
The juvenile court found Father had made a substantial
effort to comply with the case plan. The court also found that,
although DCFS made reasonable but ineffective efforts to provide
services to Father, its shortcomings were “harmless” as “[n]o one
[was] able to identify any programs that were available to Father.”
The court continued Father’s FRS for six months. DCFS was
ordered to contact Father and facilitate visitation. The court
5
calendared a section 366.21, subdivision (f) review hearing for
February 14, 2025. Father filed the instant appeal.
Father was not present at the February 14, 2025, 12-month
review hearing. R.P.’s counsel requested Father’s FRS be
continued because Father had made efforts to obtain services and
may have completed a parenting program, and any failure by
Father to participate in services or to contact DCFS was “out of his
control.” Counsel observed that, according to the Title XX’s,
DCFS’s last documented attempts to contact Father’s prison
facility or Father had been in October 2024, and January 2025.
R.P.’s counsel also pointed out Father’s transfer to Corcoran
impeded his ability to engage in visitation.
Father’s counsel argued DCFS failed to demonstrate it had
provided or assisted Father with reasonable services. Specifically,
counsel argued DCFS failed to present sufficient evidence of
Father’s calls to the agency, mailed him a letter requiring his
response just three weeks before the February 2025 hearing, which
was an insufficient time to obtain a reasonable response from an
incarcerated parent, and ignored his requests to contact two
individuals at his facility to help him identify and access programs,
or to identify programs he had already completed. Father’s counsel
also noted Father may have completed services about which the
court was not yet aware, because a “Substance Abuse Treatment”
program Father completed focused on treating substance
dependency. Father was on waiting lists for both AA and Criminal
Gangs Anonymous meetings. Attorneys for Father and R.P.
requested the juvenile court find that, based on Father’s efforts to
comply with his case plan, there was a substantial probability R.P.
could be returned to Father’s custody within 18 months. Father
requested the court find DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to
assist reunification, and continue his FRS.
The juvenile court acknowledged that, although “more could
have been done” by DCFS, the agency made reasonable efforts to
return R.P. to a safe home environment, by communicating with
6
Father and making efforts to facilitate video visitation. The court
observed there did not appear to be any additional programs or
resources available to Father at his place of incarceration in which
DCFS could have helped him to enroll. The court extended FRS,
observing Father might be able to make an “appropriate” plan by
the time of the 18-month review. DCFS was ordered to verify
Father’s completion of a parenting program and participation in
any other programs. The court found Father had “partial[ly]
compli[ed]” with his case plan and set a section 366.22 review
hearing for March 26, 2025.4
II. The 18-month Review Hearing
In its status review report for the 18-month review hearing,
DCFS reported it had contacted Father’s last known prison in
Corcoran California in February 2025 to verify any programs in
which Father had participated. Prison staff told DCFS that Father
left Corcoran in November 2024 and his current place of
incarceration was unknown. On February 26, 2025, Father’s
girlfriend contacted DCFS to report Father was now incarcerated
in Florida “on a federal drug case.” Father had no pending court
date, was unable to make free calls or send or receive letters, and
no one knew how long he would remain incarcerated. DCFS set up
a three-way call with Father and his girlfriend which, for
unexplained reasons, never took place.
DCFS informed the juvenile court that it had contacted the
prison in Corcoran several times but was unable to reach Father’s
counselor or obtain information about any programs Father
completed at Corcoran. DCFS had had no contact with Father
since November 2024 and was unable to verify his claim that he
4 On February 19, 2025, Father filed a second appeal (case
No. B344419) challenging orders made at the 12-month review
hearing. Parts of our factual recitation are drawn from the record
filed in that appeal.
7
completed a “Parenting While Incarcerated” program. Father’s
attorney had given DCFS an incorrect password to access the
program to verify completion, and Father was unable to obtain the
correct password. DCFS reported Father had no visitation with
R.P. since October 2024 and had been unable to develop any
meaningful connection with R.P. DCFS also reported that, as of
November 2024, Father had not participated in individual
counseling required by his case plan, and DCFS was unaware
whether he obtained such counseling thereafter. DCFS
recommended Father’s FRS be terminated.
In a last-minute information, DCFS reported having engaged
in a three-way call with Father and his girlfriend on March 20,
2025. Father was in federal custody in Florida, lacked access to
free phone calls and was unable to send or receive letters. Father
told the CSW there were no programs available at his facility to
enable him to comply with his case plan, and he did not know how
long he would be there. By this time, DCFS had been able to log
into Father’s Corcoran account which reflected he had completed a
six-hour “Parenting While Incarcerated” program in mid-March
2025 and an eight-hour Substance Use Recovery program in early
April 2025, among others. The 18-month review hearing, originally
scheduled for April 25, 2025, was continued several times and
ultimately conducted on June 26, 2025.
In a last-minute information filed June 24, 2025, DCFS
reported Father remained incarcerated in Florida with no
anticipated date for release. At the hearing on June 26, R.P.’s
counsel joined DCFS in recommending Father’s FRS be terminated
due to his ongoing federal incarceration with no end date in sight,
and his inability to access services or arrange visitation.
At the 18-month review hearing, Father’s counsel requested
R.P. be returned to Father’s custody. Counsel argued Father had
made a good faith effort to comply with his case plan and should be
permitted to determine whether there was an appropriate interim
placement for R.P. pending his release, possibly with his girlfriend.
8
Counsel argued DCFS had presented insufficient evidence for the
court to find that return of R.P. to Father’s care posed a
substantial risk of detriment, given that Father had completed
many hours of educational programming, including an eight-hour
Substance Use Recovery course and a six-hour Parenting While
Incarcerated program. Counsel argued Father’s incarceration
prevented him from fully complying with his case plan and it was
unreasonable to terminate FRS given that his inability to complete
required programs was beyond his control.
Alternatively, Father’s counsel requested the juvenile court
extend Father’s FRS six months in light of DCFS’s failure to
present sufficient evidence that the agency had made reasonable
efforts to assist Father to complete his case plan or to provide
reasonable alternatives for programs unavailable in prison.
Counsel requested Father be permitted additional time to
determine whether an appropriate plan for R.P.’s care could be
arranged pending his release.
In response, DCFS argued that, despite the difficulties
presented by Father’s incarceration, it maintained contact with
Father as well as possible given his transfers among various
facilities in California and Florida. DCFS acknowledged Father
had made an effort to do what he could. Nevertheless, after more
than 18 months, Father had yet to comply with the court’s orders.
DCFS argued there were no further reasonable services it could
provide to Father under the circumstances, and it would be
inappropriate to return R.P. to Father’s custody.
The juvenile court acknowledged Father made efforts to
participate in programs while incarcerated but was unable to
complete his case plan. Importantly, the sustained allegations
related to Father’s substance abuse, and there was no evidence
Father had undergone the required testing or participated in a
sufficient substance abuse program. The court found that, under
the circumstances, DCFS made reasonable efforts to maintain
communication with Father and the facilities in which he was
9
housed to determine what services were available to him and to
facilitate his compliance with his case plan. The court found return
of R.P. to Father’s custody would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the child, and it was in R.P.’s best interest to schedule
a section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan and terminated
FRS. On August 18, 2025, father filed the instant writ.5
DISCUSSION
I. General Principles and the Standard of Review
“When a child has been removed from a parent’s custody, the
court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to
facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citations.] Such services
may, depending on the case, include . . . counseling, parent
education, substance abuse treatment and testing, and other forms
of assistance.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,
624, fn. omitted (Michael G.).) Under section 361.5, subdivision
(a)(1)(B), “[p]arents of children under three [years of age] are
presumptively eligible for at least six months of reunification
services.” (Michael G., at p. 625.) “Reunification services are
ordinarily provided for a maximum of 18 months after a child has
been removed from parental custody.” (Ibid.) During the
reunification stage, the juvenile court must hold periodic review
hearings—typically at six-month intervals—at which the court
evaluates, among other things, the adequacy of reunification
services offered or provided, the extent of a parent’s progress and
appropriate next steps. (Ibid.; see also § 366.21.)
At the six-month status review hearing, the juvenile court
evaluates whether DCFS has proven, “by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
5 On September 5, 2025, counsel for real party in interest,
R.P., submitted a letter joining DCFS’s arguments in opposition to
the writ.
10
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(1).) Where, as here, the child is under age three, and the
court finds the child cannot safely be returned to parental custody,
the court must decide whether to continue reunification services an
additional six months, or to set the matter for a permanency
planning hearing under section 366.26. (See §§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (g).) If the court finds there is a
substantial probability the child will be returned to the physical
custody of their parent and safely maintained in the home within
the extended period of time or that the parent was not provided
reasonable services, the court may “[c]ontinue the case for up to
6 months for a permanency planning review hearing, provided that
the hearing shall occur within 18 months of the date the child was
originally taken from the physical custody of their parent . . . .”
(§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable
services were provided to determine whether any substantial
evidence, contradicted or not, supports that finding, drawing all
legitimate inferences in favor of the finding. (In re Melinda K.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158 (Melinda K.), abrogated on
another ground by In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537 (S.B.).) We
do not pass on credibility determinations, nor attempt to resolve
conflicts in or weigh the evidence. “[W]e draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the [juvenile court’s] findings, view[ing]
the record in favor of the . . . court’s order and affirm [that] order
even if other evidence supports a contrary finding.” (In re James R.
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135, abrogated on other grounds by In
re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) “ ‘The standard is not whether
the services provided were the best that might be provided in an
ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.’ ” (Melinda K., at p. 1159.) The adequacy of
reunification plans and reasonableness of DCFS’s efforts to provide
suitable services must be judged according to the unique
11
circumstances of the case. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011; Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 549, 554.)
II. Appeal From the Six-month Review Hearing
After several continuances the six-month review hearing was
conducted in August 2024, eight months after R.P. was removed
from parental custody and the period for FRS began. Father
contends the juvenile court erred when it found DCFS provided
him with reasonable services during the initial reunification
period.6
Newborn R.P. was taken into protective custody and placed
with Maternal Grandmother in September 2023. Father
acknowledged he was a frequent user of marijuana and had
6 Relying on Melinda K., DCFS argues an appeal from a
finding at the six-month review hearing that reasonable services
were provided is not directly appealable, because Father was not
aggrieved by the order. (Melinda K., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1150.) Melinda K. acknowledged a reasonable services finding
“may have negative consequences at subsequent hearings.” (Ibid.)
The Melinda K. court concluded that such a finding could be
reviewed by writ petition but exercised its discretion to treat the
matter as an appeal. (Id. at pp. 1150, 1156–1157.)
Father maintains he may appeal the finding that DCFS
provided reasonable services because the finding, effectively put
him at a procedural disadvantage and may adversely have affected
his interest in reunification. We agree. Melinda K.’s reasoning on
this point was called into question by S.B., supra, 46 Cal.4th 529.
In S.B., a mother challenged the juvenile court’s finding—made in
an order after a section 366.26 hearing—that her children were
probably adoptable. (S.B., at p. 534.) The appellate court dismissed
the mother’s appeal, “reasoning that she was challenging only the
finding that her children were probably adoptable.” (Ibid.) The
high court held this to be error, explaining that “review of findings
is normally obtained by appeal from the ensuing . . . order.” (Ibid.)
The same rationale applies to permit appellate review of a
reasonable services finding.
12
recently used methamphetamine. Despite this admission, Father
refused to participate in drug testing until ordered to do so by the
juvenile court. Father had inconsistent visits with R.P. at Maternal
Grandmother’s home after November 27, 2023, and did not engage
with his son during visits. Maternal Grandmother suspected father
had continued to abuse drugs, because he “act[ed] weird[,] almost
falling asleep” during visits. After the adjudication hearing, Father
maintained only minimal contact with the CSW and did not
participate in a drug and alcohol program. The CSW signed him up
for drug testing in early January 2024.
By February 2024, Father was incarcerated at Pitchess on
drug charges. He did not apprise DCFS of his whereabouts until
April 2024, one month before the initially scheduled six-month
review hearing. At that point, he informed DCFS he had been
sentenced to four years in prison. Father said he was trying to
enroll in a drug treatment and counseling program, and a
parenting program. During his incarceration, Father had a few
telephonic visits with R.P. However, Maternal Grandmother told
Father to stop calling because he always spoke about mother and
said she would accept his calls if he confined them to speaking
about R.P.
Father argued DCFS never reached out to him after his
contact in April 2024, did not facilitate visitation, and did not
communicate with his place of incarceration to see what programs
were available to him or help him enroll in programs. Accordingly,
he argued DCFS had failed to provide reasonable services to
facilitate his reunification with R.P. The juvenile court noted that,
although DCFS’s efforts were not “as robust as [it] would have
liked,” the services DCFS nevertheless provided were reasonable
but “ineffective” services. The court found DCFS’s efforts harmless
as no one had identified any programs that may have been
available to Father. The court also found Father’s progress in
alleviating or mitigating the problems that had necessitated court
intervention was “unsubstantial.” The court exercised its discretion
13
to continue Father’s FRS, ordered DCFS to establish a visitation
schedule and scheduled a 12-month review hearing for February
2025.
We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the
juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided minimally reasonable
services during the initial reunification period, and that its failings
were harmless. From the time R.P. was initially detained, Father
understood his and Mother’s substance abuse were the principal
cause of his son’s detention. Despite that understanding and his
own admission of recent methamphetamine use and ongoing
substance use, Father refused to participate in drug testing until
ordered to do so. Even after that order was issued, Father failed to
test. Further, despite a court order to keep DCFS apprised of his
current address and phone number, Father failed to do so until
seven months after R.P.’s detention, and just one month shy of the
scheduled initial review hearing. It would be unreasonable to
permit Father to remain idle and place the blame entirely on
DCFS for its ineffective provision of FRS. Father was aware he had
a very limited amount of time to demonstrate his commitment to
his infant son, make a meaningful effort to obtain parenting skills
and address the problems that gave rise to this action. Certainly,
DCFS should have been more active in facilitating Father’s
compliance with his case plan. But Father himself, who had every
incentive to do whatever he could within the constraints of his
incarceration to justify reunification with R.P., made little effort to
do so.
Father is correct that reasonable visitation is an essential
component of any reunification plan, necessary to facilitate a
meaningful parent-child relationship. We do not condone DCFS’s
failure to facilitate Father’s visitation during the initial
reunification period. Nevertheless, Father was incarcerated for
14
much of the reunification period. R.P., who was only a few months
old and only saw or was contacted by Father a few times and was
unlikely to have been able to begin to develop any meaningful
relationship with Father. We conclude the juvenile court’s decision
to extend FRS and admonish DCFS to facilitate visitation and
assist Father’s compliance with his case plan within the
constraints of his incarceration, was reasonable under the
circumstances presented here. Accordingly, we reject Father’s
contention of error.
III. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding That
Return of R.P. to Father’s Custody Would Be
Detrimental to the Child and that No Extension of
FRS Was Justified
In his writ, Father challenges the juvenile court’s decision, at
the 18-month review hearing, to terminate FRS and set the matter
for a permanency planning hearing. He maintains the record lacks
sufficient evidence to support the finding that there was a
substantial risk of detriment if R.P. were released to him with an
appropriate plan and continues to argue that DCFS failed to
provide him with reasonable FRS while incarcerated. Father seeks
an order releasing R.P. to his custody with an appropriate plan of
care pending his release. Alternatively, Father asks this court to
find DCFS failed to provide him with reasonable services and order
he be provided an additional six months of FRS. We reject both
contentions.
A. Controlling Legal Principles and the Standard of
Review
Here, the 18-month permanency review hearing was not held
until 21 months after R.P.’s detention. The statute governing this
hearing states, in part, that, “[a]fter considering the admissible
and relevant evidence, the court shall order the return of the child
to the physical custody of their parent . . . unless the court finds, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to
15
their parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.
[DCFS] shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.”
(§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
If a child is not returned to his parent at the 18-month
hearing, the juvenile court must terminate FRS and schedule a
permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
(§ 366.22, subd. (a).) In making its determination in a case
involving an incarcerated parent, the court must consider the
parent’s efforts or progress and the extent to which the parent
availed himself of available services, taking into account any
barriers posed to the incarcerated parent’s access to court-
mandated services or programs, and the parent’s ability to
maintain contact with the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1); V.C. v.
Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 521, 527 (V.C.).) The court
evaluates whether the parent has made sufficient progress in
resolving the issues that led to the child’s removal. (A.H. v.
Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062 (A.H.).)
Although perfection is not required, a demonstration of progress is
pivotal, taking into account the length of incarceration and
severity of the problems that led to court intervention. “ ‘The
standard is not whether the services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were
reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Melinda K., supra,
116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) Even compliance with a case plan
does not guarantee a child’s return. (In re Dustin R. (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143; In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
890, 899–901.) Although evidence of a parent’s compliance is
relevant, it is neither the court’s only concern nor is it dispositive.
(Joseph B., at pp. 899–901.) The reasons justifying continued
removal need not be the same as the initial detriment. If return of
the child would create a substantial risk of detriment, the child’s
“placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment
16
mirrors the harm which initially required removing the child from
parental custody.” (Id. at p. 900.)
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s findings and resolving conflicts in favor of the prevailing
party, our job is to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s order. (In re Yvonne W. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400–1401.) As petitioner, it is Father’s
burden to show there is insufficiently substantial evidence to
support the court’s determination. (In re R.V. (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)
B. Application
The 18-month permanency review hearing in this case was
not conducted until 21 months after newborn R.P.’s detention.
Contrasting A.H., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at page 1056 and V.C.,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at page 525, in which the incarcerated
fathers had access to court-ordered programs, but chose not to
participate, Father maintains his completion of a six-hour
parenting program, and an eight-hour substance abuse program,7
demonstrates his commitment to taking responsibility for the
problems that led to juvenile court intervention. During his
incarceration, Father had several video visits with R.P., but no
contact at all between October 2024 and June 2025. Father argues
the juvenile court was required to return R.P. to his legal custody
to arrange for appropriate care pending his release and
demonstration of the ability safely to care for R.P. He is mistaken.
Father is correct that his incarceration, considered alone, is
not necessarily detrimental to a child and it was DCFS’s obligation
to show return of R.P. to his custody would be detrimental. (See In
re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 [addressing the
7 Father was unable to complete the individual counseling and
drug testing components of his case plan, neither of which was
available to him in any facility in which he was incarcerated.
17
detriment standard that must be shown to prevent release to an
incarcerated parent at status review hearings in the context of
jurisdictional and dispositional matters]; see also § 366.22,
subd. (a)(1).) He maintains that, because he completed the
programs he could, the juvenile court was obligated to return R.P.
and permit him to make arrangements for the child’s care during
his incarceration, but DCFS failed to explore viable options for
R.P.’s temporary placement. Specifically, Father points to DCFS’s
failure to investigate whether paternal relatives or his girlfriend
would be appropriate placements for R.P. pending Father’s release.
Here, the 18-month review hearing was continued three
times until June 2025. At a hearing in February 2025, the juvenile
court observed that, by the time of the 18-month review, Father
“[could] be in a place to make an appropriate plan . . . .”8 However,
it was not until late June 2025 that Father’s counsel mentioned
Father’s girlfriend as a possible appropriate interim placement.
The record contains no evidence of the length or nature of Father’s
relationship with his girlfriend, whose existence only became
known in February 2025, nor that such a possibility was posed
during the CSW’s call with Father and his girlfriend. Father never
identified his girlfriend or anyone as a potential interim caretaker
for R.P. before the June 2025 hearing, nor did he express a desire
to move R.P. from his placement with Maternal Grandmother.
Indeed, it was Father’s attorney who first posed the possibility at
the 18-month review hearing that Father’s girlfriend might be an
interim caretaker for R.P. The record contains no indication
Father’s girlfriend or anyone other than Maternal Grandmother
8 Father was not present for this hearing. Presumably, his
counsel communicated this information to him, as well as the short
timeline for reunification. There is no indication Father ever made
an effort to arrange a suitable placement for R.P., should the child
be returned to his custody before his release.
18
expressed an interest in caring for the child. DCFS cannot be
faulted for failing to investigate unknown alternative caretakers.
Accordingly, there was no viable basis to justify the juvenile court
releasing R.P. to Father’s custody in the absence of an appropriate
plan of care pending his release.
Father also argues the juvenile court should at least have
extended FRS six months due to DCFS’s ongoing failure to provide
reasonable services and because his completion of the substance
abuse and parenting programs available to him demonstrated his
commitment to address the issues that gave rise to DCFS’s
intervention. Father notes after receiving transcripts showing the
classes he had completed, DCFS failed to reach out to the service
provider to ascertain whether those classes satisfied the
requirements of his case plan,9 and never spoke with him to
evaluate what he had learned from those courses or gauge his
insight into the issues that gave rise to this action.
An unfortunate series of events prevented DCFS from
verifying Father’s participation in prison programs or contacting
Father in advance of the 18-month hearing. Having received an
incorrect password from Father’s attorney, DCFS was unable to
access prison records to confirm Father’s claim that he completed
parenting and substance abuse programs, and Father was unable
to reach his prior counselor to obtain the correct password. DCFS
was unable to reach Father for months before the 18-month review
hearing. An administrative or clerical error at Corcoran
mistakenly indicated Father was incarcerated at Corcoran until at
least November 2024, but prison officials were unaware of his
current location. DCFS obtained contact information for Father’s
counselor at Corcoran to discuss programs Father completed but
9 Given the severity of the problem, it is unlikely the juvenile
court would find that Father’s completion of an eight-hour
substance abuse class satisfied a case plan requiring that he
complete a “[f]ull drug and alcohol program, with aftercare.”
19
was never able to reach the counselor. Both times the CSW tried to
call she received only a message indicating technical difficulties.
Eventually, DCFS was able to log into Father’s account and
confirm his participation in a six-hour parenting course and an
eight-hour substance abuse class. DCFS also learned Father had
not been in contact with R.P. since October 2024. DCFS did not
ascertain Father’s location until his girlfriend contacted the agency
in February 2025. A three-way call with Father, his girlfriend and
the CSW was scheduled but never occurred. DCFS eventually
spoke with Father who confirmed he was incarcerated in federal
custody in Florida and had no idea when he would be released.
DCFS made a good faith effort, but was hindered by its inability to
verify programs Father had completed and the limits of Father’s
out-of-state federal incarceration. The fact that DCFS’s efforts to
obtain information about and to contact Father were unsuccessful
did not render those efforts unreasonable.
Moreover, even if the juvenile court had found DCFS failed
to provide reasonable services, it was under no obligation to extend
FRS, delaying permanent placement for a child left in limbo for
almost two years. As our Supreme Court recently explained, “while
the dependency law does not categorically forbid courts from
extending services past 18 months, neither does it require them to
do so in every case in which they find reasonable services were not
offered in the most recent review period. Rather, once a child has
already been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months, the law
vests the juvenile court with responsibility for determining how to
proceed after considering the circumstances of the case and the
best interests of the child.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 627.)
Absent narrow exceptions not applicable here, where a child
has been out of a parent’s custody for 18 months and cannot safely
be returned, the juvenile court is ordinarily obligated to proceed to
schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.
20
(Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 627; see Earl L. v. Superior
Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 [identifying narrow
exceptions]; see also § 366.22, subds. (a)(3), (b).) “In enacting
dependency statutes, the Legislature sought to achieve a careful
balance between family reunification on the one hand and
permanency for the child on the other. [Citations.] Under this
scheme, the balance tips towards permanency as the time since
removal increases. [Citations.] . . . . [B]y establishing a
presumptive maximum reunification period of 18 months and
giving courts the discretion to extend services beyond that point in
extraordinary circumstances, the statutory scheme allows courts to
make case-specific determinations about how best to promote the
interests of the child while protecting against the erroneous
deprivation of parental rights.” (Michael G., at pp. 635–636.)
Under the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court
correctly determined that extending FRS would be fruitless.
Father had not maintained consistent and regular contact with
R.P., had not made significant progress in resolving the issues that
led to the court’s intervention, had not demonstrated the capacity
to complete the components of his case plan, had no expected date
of release and never identified a potential interim placement
pending his release, should R.P. be returned to his custody.
(See Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Providing expeditious
resolution for children is a core concern of dependency proceedings,
and, although a parent’s incarceration must be considered, the
statutory provisions do not suggest an incarcerated parent should
be excused from complying with a service plan. (A.H., supra,
182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1060–1061.)
“[T]he Legislature has recognized that in some
circumstances, it may be fruitless to provide additional
reunification services.” (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49,
64.) In many cases, the provision of services has little likelihood of
success and only serves to delay stability for the child. “This is
21
especially true when the parent will be incarcerated longer than
the maximum time periods for reunification efforts. It is also
frequently true when the parent is incarcerated in a facility that
has no services sufficient to help the parent work toward
reunification and there is no reasonable way to provide services to
that parent. Indeed, to attempt services in such circumstances may
be setting everyone up for failure, including the parent, agency,
and child.” (Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
1018, 1031, italics omitted.) “ ‘In such a case, the general rule
favoring reunification services is replaced by a legislative
assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of
governmental resources.’ ” (Jesse W., at pp. 64–65.) Accordingly, we
deny the petition.
DISPOSITION
The August 16, 2024 order from which Father appeals is
affirmed. The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
22
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