CourtListener 10686945•Hameed v. Syed CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 10/1/25 Hameed v. Syed CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
RASHID HAMEED ET AL., 2d Civil No. B330981
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 00540991-CU-PN-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
KALEEM SYED, OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant. (No Change in Judgment)
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 4,
2025, be modified as follows:
The paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 7 with “A
shareholder’s derivative suit . . .”, the last sentence is modified to
read as follows:
We look to Hameed’s and Singh’s complaint against Syed
to determine if the gravamen of their cause of action is
injury to the corporation or to themselves individually.
(Jones, at p. 107.)
There is no change in judgment
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing is denied.
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
2
Filed 9/4/25 Hameed v. Syed CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
RASHID HAMEED ET AL., 2d Civil No. B330981
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 00540991-CU-PN-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
KALEEM SYED,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Kaleem Syed and respondents Rashid Hameed
and Gurmit Singh bought four Alaska Burger King restaurants
in 2018. They formed an Alaskan corporation, respondent HS&S
Restaurants, Inc., and agreed Syed would manage the day-to-day
activities of the company because of his prior experience in the
industry. The relationship quickly deteriorated. Hameed and
Singh questioned Syed’s handling of the finances; Syed grew
frustrated with his partners’ reluctance to invest in renovations
he believed would drive profits. Their dispute elicited an
ultimatum from Burger King’s corporate office: sell the
restaurants immediately or we will terminate your franchise
agreement. The parties lost much of their investment in the
resulting “fire sale.”
The parties filed cross-claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and other causes of action. The trial court found in favor of
respondents after a bench trial. It awarded Hameed and Singh
$210,000 each in compensatory damages plus $20,000 each in
punitive damages for Syed’s breach of fiduciary duty. It awarded
them nominal damages on their claims for intentional and
negligent misrepresentation. The court awarded the corporation
$121,000 against Syed. On appeal, Syed contends, among other
things, the individual respondents lacked standing to “pursue
damages that were incurred by HS&S directly.” We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alaska Burger King Venture
Syed learned of an opportunity to buy four Alaska Burger
King restaurants in 2016. He operated fast-food franchises in the
past and believed the restaurants would be a good investment.
Hameed and Singh agreed to help buy them. Syed retained his
son Habeeb to act as their corporate attorney. They negotiated a
purchase price of $1.5 million. Escrow closed in late 2018 after
Burger King Corporation (BKC) approved their newly formed
corporation, HS&S Restaurants, Inc. (HS&S), as the new Alaska
franchisee. A separate agreement with BKC required them to
begin remodeling one of the four restaurants. Hameed, Singh,
and Syed planned to invest $400,000 each but ultimately each
contributed over $600,000 because they could not obtain a loan to
cover the remaining acquisition and startup costs.
HS&S’s franchise agreement required a pre-approved
“managing owner” to run the restaurants’ day-to-day operations.
Syed filled this role from his home in California. Hameed and
Singh agreed he would receive a monthly salary and 40 percent of
2
the HS&S’s shares. Hameed and Singh each received 30 percent.
All three received promissory notes from HS&S for $420,000 and
treated the balance of their cash investments as unsecured
capital contributions.
Disputes Arise Over HS&S’s Finances
And Remodeling Obligations
Problems arose immediately. Syed complained his salary
was inadequate for the work needed to run the restaurants.
Hameed and Singh felt that Syed lacked transparency about
HS&S’s finances. They also disagreed about whether to join a
BKC program that offered cash incentives if they remodeled all
four locations instead of just one. Syed believed renovating the
restaurants would drive business. Hameed and Singh believed
the upfront costs of remodeling—which Singh estimated at
$800,000 to $900,000 per location—would bankrupt HS&S. Syed
signed the program agreement over their objection. Hameed and
Singh signed several months later after Syed told them they
would “lose everything” if they did not.
Syed told Hameed and Singh in September of 2019 that
HS&S’s bank account was overdrawn. After depositing money to
pay bills, Hameed and Singh agreed to stop taking payments on
their promissory notes if Syed lowered his monthly salary from
$8,000 to $6,000. Syed disclosed in January of 2020 that he had
instead increased his salary to $12,500. Hameed and Singh
promptly removed Syed from HS&S’s bank accounts. They voted
as majority shareholders to retain Syed in his operational role
but to restrict his control over the corporation’s finances. They
prepared amended bylaws to this effect. Syed responded by
cancelling daily cash pickups from the restaurants by armored
car. He also directed credit card companies not to deposit funds
into HS&S’s corporate accounts. Hameed and Singh obtained an
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ex parte restraining order directing Syed to turn over control of
HS&S’s finances to them.
HS&S Sells Its Restaurants After BKC Threatens
to Terminate Their Franchise Agreement
Syed told BKC that his partners were thwarting his ability
to serve as managing owner. BKC issued a “notice of operational
default” in March of 2020 when it discovered HS&S was not
paying vendors and remodeling contractors. It directed HS&S to
reinstate Syed as managing owner or to appoint a new one “in
accordance with BKC’s standard procedures.” BKC rejected
Hameed’s application to replace Syed in this role. It issued a
second notice of default in April of 2020 warning it would
terminate HS&S’s franchise agreement if certain operational
issues were not cured within 30 days. This included among,
other things, improving performance metrics and
“demonstrat[ing] a plan to fulfil[l] its obligation to remodel” its
restaurants.
BKC agreed to refrain from terminating the franchise
agreement if Hameed, Singh, and Syed could find an acceptable
buyer. Three prospective buyers lowered their initial offers after
they learned about the remodeling obligations attached to the
franchises. BKC later exercised its contractual right of first
refusal and bought all four restaurants for $850,000.
Shareholder Litigation
Hameed and Singh sued Syed. They originally framed
their case as a shareholder derivative action against Syed. Syed
demurred on various grounds, one being Hameed and Singh
could not comply with Corporations Code section 8001 because
1 Corporations Code section 800, subdivision (b)(2) requires
a shareholder derivative complaint to allege “efforts to secure
4
they collectively owned a majority of HS&S’s shares. The trial
court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend to “revis[e] the
complaint to allege a direct corporate action rather than a
derivative action.” Hameed and Singh then filed a complaint
including causes of action for intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. HS&S
filed a complaint against Syed for breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Syed filed his
own action for corporate dissolution, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and declaratory relief.2 The trial court
consolidated the cases and converted Syed’s complaint to a cross-
complaint.
Trial
A bench trial took place over several days in November of
2022. The parties waived their rights to a court reporter.
Hameed, Singh, and Syed’s son Habeeb testified. Syed did not.
The court also heard testimony from, among others: the
accountant who prepared HS&S’s taxes; an attorney who
represented HS&S during the sale of its restaurants; two experts
who opined on franchise issues; and a man who invested in a
prior Burger King venture run by Syed that failed. The parties
submitted closing arguments in writing.
from the board such action as plaintiff desires, or the reasons for
not making such effort, and alleges further that plaintiff has
either informed the corporation or the board in writing of the
ultimate facts of each cause of action against each defendant or
delivered to the corporation or the board a true copy of the
complaint which plaintiff proposes to file.”
2 Syed v. Hameed (Super. Ct. Ventura County, 2020, No.
56-2020-00543981-CU-MC-VTA).
5
On Hameed and Singh’s claims, the trial court found Syed
made several intentional and negligent misrepresentations but
awarded only nominal damages because there was insufficient
evidence to “reasonably trace and calculate” the loss. The court
also found Syed had breached his fiduciary duty owed to Hameed
and Singh as a result of numerous instances of misconduct. The
court noted that Syed did not dispute that he owed fiduciary
duties or that the conduct described, if proved, would constitute a
breach of duty. The court awarded damages because Syed’s
“breaches created a toxic environment and caused a complete
breakdown among the corporate officers, directors and
shareholders necessitating a rushed sale of the franchise.” The
court found the damages suffered were not “readily
ascertainable” and thus it could not calculate the amount with
absolute certainty. It instead relied upon evidence
demonstrating the sale price of the franchise was reduced
because of Syed’s misconduct. It calculated the damages by
assigning 50 percent of franchise value loss, or $700,000, to
Syed’s conduct. The court then awarded Hameed and Singh each
$210,000, or 30 percent of $700,000, based on their 30 percent
interest in the company’s stock, plus punitive damages of $20,000
each.
The court also found in favor of HS&S on its breach of
fiduciary duty claim and awarded economic damages of $120,000
“for the amount of unauthorized payroll” the company paid Syed.
It found against Syed on all his claims against Hameed and
Singh.
The court later adopted these findings and entered
judgment. It denied Syed’s motion for new trial. Syed noticed his
intent to appeal and elected to use a settled statement in lieu of a
reporter’s transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) His
6
proposed statements and summaries of testimony were
“repeatedly rejected by the Court because they [did] not
accurately summarize the evidence, the objections or the events
that occurred during the trial.” The court then issued a final
summary of testimony and proceedings “based on its [own]
recollection and notes from the trial” which was incorporated into
the settled statement.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981; see Citizens Business Bank
v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613 [substantial
evidence standard of review applies to express and implied
findings of fact in a statement of decision].)
Respondents’ Standing to Pursue Individual
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Syed contends Hameed and Singh lacked standing to
pursue “claims that corporate assets were sold for less than they
were worth” because these damages were incurred by HS&S
directly. The appropriate remedy for them to pursue, he argues,
was a derivative action brought on behalf of the corporation. We
disagree.
“A shareholder’s derivative suit seeks to recover for the
benefit of the corporation and its whole body of shareholders
7
when injury is caused to the corporation that may not otherwise
be redressed because of failure of the corporation to act.” (Jones
v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106 (Jones).) “‘The
stockholder’s individual suit, on the other hand, is a suit to
enforce a right against the corporation which the stockholder
possesses as an individual.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 107; see
Schuster v. Gardner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 305, 311-312
[shareholders lacked standing to bring direct action against
corporation’s directors and officers where alleged injury, i.e., loss
of stock value, was incidental to corporation’s injury].) We look to
Hameed’s and Singh’s complaint against Syed to determine if the
gravamen of their breach of contract claim is injury to the
corporation or to themselves individually. (Jones, at p. 107.)
While the complaint generally alleges that Syed’s
mismanagement reduced the value of HS&S’s assets—harm
borne by all shareholders—it also alleges Syed breached his
fiduciary duty by acting in ways that harmed Hameed and Singh
individually. This includes, among other things:
misrepresenting that he invested an equal amount of money into
HS&S as them; depositing their investment funds into his
personal account instead of a company account; inducing them to
invest more in HS&S by promising them greater monthly
payouts, then refusing to do so; inducing them to personally cover
payroll expenses by falsely stating HS&S did not have sufficient
funds; and pressuring them to personally guarantee a remodeling
loan on threat of diluting their shares. “[W]here a defendant
commits torts against two distinct persons, he is presumptively
liable to each of them for the full amount of that plaintiff's losses,
even if both torts involve the same subject matter.” (Denevi v.
LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1223 (Denevi); see
Jones, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 106 [single course of action by a
8
majority shareholder might give rise to derivative claims,
individual claims, or both].)
The reduced value of the restaurants constitutes a
significant amount of the damages sought by respondents—but
not all. This distinguishes Hameed’s and Singh’s action from
those in which a shareholder’s individual claims are coextensive
with the corporation’s. (See, e.g., Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 111, 125 [“Because all of the acts alleged to have
caused Nelson’s injury amount to alleged misfeasance or
negligence in managing the corporation’s business, causing the
business to be a total failure, any obligations so violated were
duties owed directly and immediately to the corporation”].) “If
corporate executive D fraudulently induces P to convey an asset
to the corporation, and then through mismanagement causes the
corporation to forfeit the asset to a stranger, D is unquestionably
liable to P and to the corporation. And if P happens to be a
shareholder (perhaps because he conveyed the asset in exchange
for stock), there is no reason to require him to choose between his
personal right of action for fraud and his derivative right to sue
on behalf of the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.”
(Denevi, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219, italics omitted.)
Seeking damages that overlapped with HS&S’s companion
action did not divest Hameed and Singh of standing to pursue
direct claims against Syed. (See Denevi, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1221 [possibility of overlapping or duplicative awards does
not preclude plaintiff’s individual claims].) The court recognized
that although Hameed and Singh were entitled to damages, the
damages they suffered were not readily ascertainable. “‘The law
requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of
damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the
result reached is an approximation. [Citation.] This is especially
9
true where . . . it is the wrongful acts of the defendant . . . that
have caused the other party to not realize a profit to which that
party is entitled.’” (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
381, 397.) As a result, it decided to calculate damages based
upon the loss in value of the franchise due to the “rushed sale.”
Syed’s cross-complaint, we note, also included direct claims
against Hameed and Singh for breach of fiduciary duty based on
allegations they “jeopardize[d] the viability of the HS&S
franchises” and precipitated a “fire sale” of those assets.
Moreover, the trial court structured the award to avoid any
windfall to respondents. After concluding Syed breached
fiduciary duties to HS&S, it found “many of those breaches are
either not traceable to any damages or are traceable to damages
that have already been awarded to Hameed and Singh
individually.” (Italics added.) It then limited the company’s
damages to amounts Syed received above his approved salary
“and other unauthorized monies” paid to him by HS&S.
Business Judgment Rule
Syed describes “the fulcrum of the damages award” as his
decision to commit HS&S to BKC’s remodeling program. He
contends the trial court erred when it failed to apply the business
judgment rule, which insulates directors and officers from
liability “for a mistake in business judgment which is made in
good faith and in what he or she believes to be the best interests
of the corporation, where no conflict of interest exists.” (Gaillard
v. Natomas Co. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1263; see Brooks v.
Horner (Alaska 2015) 344 P.3d 294, 2973.)
3 Syed cites the law of Alaska, not California, as controlling
because HS&S was incorporated in that state until February of
10
Syed raised this affirmative defense in his opening and
closing trial briefs but did not testify on the subject (or any
subject) at trial. He also oversimplifies the trial court’s
reasoning. The statement of decision explained as follows before
awarding damages to Hameed and Singh for breach of fiduciary
duty: “The Court finds that K. Syed is 50% responsible for the
remodeling commitment, the rushed sale and any losses resulting
therefrom. K. Syed engaged in a course of conduct during which
he ignored basic corporate protocols, failed to carefully,
accurately and transparently account for investments and
corporate funds, made decisions and commitments without
regard to the concerns of the other shareholders, attempted to
strong-arm their compliance with his wishes, and engaged in
retaliatory tactics when Hameed and Singh attempted to insist
on basic corporate compliance and transparency in the financials,
among other things.” The court also found Syed’s “malicious and
reckless” conduct supported an award of punitive damages.
Responding to Syed’s request for indemnification, the court
determined he had not shown he acted in good faith and or that
he reasonably believed his conduct “to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation.” These findings are supported
by substantial evidence.
Business Valuation Testimony
Syed contends the trial court erred when it calculated
damages based on purchase offers received by Hameed while
marketing the restaurants for sale. He describes the award as
based on “‘junk science’ back-of-the-envelope calculations” and
2020. The business judgment rule is applied similarly in both
states. We would reach the same result under either state’s law.
11
argues the issue required the testimony of a business valuation
expert. We disagree for two reasons.
First, Syed proposed the same “back-of-the envelope”
method of calculating damages for his own claims against
Hameed and Singh. His opening trial brief stated: “HS&S
received two different valuations related to the sale of the
franchises, which were valued at 2.2 million, then later lowered
to 1.8 million.” He sought “[l]oss related to sale price of HS&S
due to default caused by Hameed and Singh by unilateral change
in Bylaws and filing herein lawsuit prior to sale. 2.2 million -
$850,000=1,350,00 v 40% shares=$540,000.” The trial court
placed a slightly higher value on the restaurants—$2.25
million—but otherwise used the same formula in its statement of
decision. It then halved Hameed’s and Singh’s damages to adjust
for their own missteps.
Second, the trial court based the award on Hameed’s
testimony about potential buyers who later retracted or lowered
their offers after learning about the remodeling commitment they
would need to assume upon purchase. Calculating the difference
between their initial and revised offers did not require the court
to perform market analysis, cash flow projections, or other
functions requiring expert testimony—just arithmetic using
figures gleaned from Hameed’s testimony about the offers HS&S
received for the restaurants. “‘Where the fact of damages is
certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with
absolute certainty. [Citations.] The law requires only that some
reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the
damages may be computed even if the result reached is an
approximation. [Citation.] This is especially true where . . . it is
the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the
difficulty in proving the amount of loss of profits [citation] or
12
where it is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have caused
the other party to not realize a profit to which that party is
entitled.’ [Citation.]” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 774-775.)
Syed also contends the court should have excluded
Hameed’s testimony as hearsay. The settled statement does not
indicate whether he raised this objection at trial. Syed’s motion
for new trial argued the court erred when it admitted an exhibit
prepared by Hameed summarizing the offers and used the
document to calculate damages. The minute order denying the
motion states this exhibit “was not admitted, but Mr. Hameed
testified fully to its contents and no transcript has been provided
suggesting that an objection was raised to such testimony.” The
absence of a reporter’s transcript on appeal creates the same
problem for Syed. The argument is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353.)
Superseding Cause of Harm
Syed contends the trial court erred in allocating fault
among the parties because Hameed’s and Singh’s acts were a
superseding cause of their losses, i.e., the diminished value of the
restaurants. These acts included: (1) Hameed and Singh’s
ratifying the remodeling agreement despite their objections; and
(2) their amending HS&S’s bylaws, which Syed argues caused
BKC to issue notices of default. We are not persuaded.
The defense of superseding cause “absolves a tortfeasor,
even though his conduct was a substantial contributing factor,
when an independent event intervenes in the chain of causation,
producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the
original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it
unfair to hold him responsible.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573, fn. 9, italics omitted.) The trial court
found Syed breached his fiduciary duties to Hameed and Singh.
13
It reduced Hameed’s and Singh’s damages after finding they were
partially responsible “for the remodeling commitment, the rushed
sale and any losses resulting therefrom.” The trial court,
however, did not find they acted negligently or breached any
fiduciary duty to Syed when they signed the remodeling
agreement or took over the business. It ruled against Syed on all
cross-claims against them.
Syed’s description of their acts as “independent event[s] . . .
producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the
original tortfeasor should have foreseen” views the record too
narrowly. As discussed above, the statement of decision made
detailed factual findings about what caused the “fire sale” of
HS&S’s restaurants. Hameed’s and Singh’s decisions to sign the
remodeling agreement and to assert control over the business
were made in response to Syed’s many breaches of fiduciary duty,
which “created a toxic environment and caused a complete
breakdown among the corporate officers, directors and
shareholders.” Substantial evidence supported these findings.
Salary Overpayment Damages to HS&S
The trial court found Syed “paid himself an unauthorized
salary” and “monies outside of his salary.” It also found he “failed
to keep a proper accounting of the books and record of the
corporation . . . .” Syed contends the court’s award of $120,000 in
damages to HS&S for these payments is not supported by
substantial evidence. We again disagree.
Hameed testified the shareholders initially agreed to pay
Syed a monthly salary of $5,000 for his work as managing owner.
They raised this to $6,000 in January of 2019 and to $8,000 in
February of 2019. They reduced it to $6,000 in September of
2019, and, at the same time, agreed to stop taking payments on
their promissory notes. Singh testified the same. Hameed later
14
learned Syed paid himself a monthly salary of $12,500 between
November of 2019 and May of 2020. Hameed introduced an ADP
printout listing the payments as an exhibit, and well as an email
requesting Syed repay HS&S for unauthorized payroll payments
made to him and his wife. Hameed also testified about $93,000
in escrow funds Syed deposited into his personal account instead
of HS&S’s corporate account. Syed’s own witness, accountant
Maz Afridi, testified that Syed paid himself as both an employee
and a contractor. He stated Syed paid himself $66,000 outside of
payroll. This testimony and the supporting exhibits provides
substantial evidence for the court’s award. 4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J.
4 Hameed and Singh move to dismiss, requesting we
exercise our “inherent power to summarily dismiss any appeal
which is designed for delay or which is based on sham or frivolous
grounds.” (Zimmerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 153, 161.) We have considered and deny the motion.
15
Ronda J. McKaig, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Gusdorff Law, Janet Gusdorff, for Defendant and Appellant
Kaleem Syed.
Singer & Associates, Anne Singer, for Plaintiffs and
Respondents Rashid Hameed, Gurmit Singh, and HS&S
Restaurants, Inc.
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