CourtListener 10686580•Kashanian v. National Enterprise Systems
Texto completo
Filed 9/8/25; Certified for Publication 10/1/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JIMMY KASHANIAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A171046
v.
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE (Lake County
SYSTEMS, INC., Super. Ct. No. CV-416920)
Defendant and Respondent.
Jimmy Kashanian is the named plaintiff in a consumer class action
against National Enterprise Systems, Inc. (National Enterprise). The action
alleges National Enterprise violated the Consumer Collection Notice law
(Civ. Code, § 1812.700 et seq.; Collection Notice law; undesignated statutory
references are to this code) and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (§ 1788 et seq.; Rosenthal Act) by providing consumer debt collection
notices that fail to conform to requirements concerning type size. The action
seeks statutory damages under the Rosenthal Act. The trial court granted
summary judgment to National Enterprise after determining Kashanian
failed to allege any actual injury and thus lacked standing to pursue
statutory damages. On appeal, Kashanian argues that standing for a
plaintiff seeking statutory damages under the Collection Notice law and
1
Rosenthal Act arises from a debt collector’s violation of those statutes, not
from the plaintiff’s suffering of actual injury. We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
Kashanian defaulted on credit payments, and his debt was assigned to
third party debt collector National Enterprise. National Enterprise sent
Kashanian a collection letter containing mandatory language — notifying
him of rights as a debtor under state and federal law — in eight-point type,
smaller than the type size used to inform him of his specific debt.1
Kashanian filed an amended complaint on behalf of himself and a
proposed class alleging the collection notices failed to comply with the type-
size requirements — use of at least the same type size used to inform him of
his specific debt — in the Collection Notice law, and hence violated the
Rosenthal Act. (§§ 1812.701, subd. (b), 1812.702.) He sought statutory
damages, attorney fees and costs, and an order enjoining National Enterprise
from violating the Collection Notice law.
National Enterprise moved for summary judgment, arguing Kashanian
and the class lacked standing because of a failure to allege or demonstrate
any actual injury resulting from the noncompliant notice. The trial court
1 Third party debt collectors must send a notice containing the
following language: “The state Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act require that, except under
unusual circumstances, collectors may not contact you before 8 a.m. or after 9
p.m. They may not harass you by using threats of violence or arrest or by
using obscene language. Collectors may not use false or misleading
statements or call you at work if they know or have reason to know that you
may not receive personal calls at work. For the most part, collectors may not
tell another person, other than your attorney or spouse, about your debt.
Collectors may contact another person to confirm your location or enforce a
judgment. For more information about debt collection activities, you may
contact the Federal Trade Commission at 1-877-FTC-HELP or www.ftc.gov.”
(§ 1812.700, subd. (a).)
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agreed. It acknowledged that failing to provide collection notices using
prescribed type size, as here, violates the Rosenthal Act. But it concluded
civil liability under 15 U.S.C. section 1692k (section 1692k) — the federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.)
provision that the Rosenthal Act incorporates — cannot be imposed when
there is no alleged harm, injury, or loss, or reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm, injury, or loss due to the violation. The court reasoned that damages
are “compensation derivative for an underlying injury, harm, or loss and not
simply based on the fact of a violation.” Because Kashanian and the class did
not allege or demonstrate any actual impacts from the violation of type-size
requirements, they lacked standing to pursue damages. The court granted
National Enterprise’s motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Kashanian contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because standing under the Rosenthal Act arises from National
Enterprise’s statutory violations rather than from the resulting actual injury.
We agree.
A trial court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows
there are no triable issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 232, 240–241; Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subds. (a), (c).)
Defendants may obtain summary judgment “by showing . . . the plaintiff
lacks standing,” “a fatal jurisdictional defect that requires judgment against
the plaintiff.” (Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 736; Scott v.
Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1510.) Standing “ensures that
‘courts will decide only actual controversies between parties with a sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor.’ ”
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(Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).)
Infringement of a statutory right “may qualify as a legitimate claim of
beneficial interest sufficient to confer standing” on a party. (Holmes v.
California Nat. Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 314–315.) Whether a
statutory provision confers standing is a question of law. (Neil S. v. Mary L.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 240, 249.) When interpreting a statute, we give its
words their plain, ordinary meaning and consider them in the context of the
entire statutory framework to effectuate the Legislature’s purpose. (Kim,
at p. 83.) We independently review a summary judgment ruling and issues of
statutory construction. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 531.)
Under the Collection Notice law, third party debt collectors must
provide debtors a notice informing them of certain rights. (§ 1812.700,
subd. (a).) Violations of that law also constitute violations of the Rosenthal
Act. (§ 1812.702.) In turn, that act requires debt collectors to comply with
certain provisions of the FDCPA. (§ 1788.17 [“every debt collector collecting
or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of
[15 U.S.C.] Sections 1692b to 1692j”]; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) The
Rosenthal Act also imposes liability for violations. (See, e.g., § 1788.30,
subds. (a)–(b).)2 Relevant here, debt collectors are subject “to the remedies in
Section 1692k.” (§ 1788.17; Timlick v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc.
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 674, 681; Alkan v. Citimortgage, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2004)
2 Although not at issue here, section 1788.30, subdivision (a) makes
debt collectors who violate the Rosenthal Act liable to the debtor “in an
amount equal to the sum of any actual damages sustained by the debtor as a
result of the violation.” Debt collectors who willfully and knowingly violate
the act are liable to the debtor for actual damages sustained due to the
violation as well as a penalty in an amount between $100 and $1000, to be
determined by the court. (§ 1788.30, subd. (b).)
4
336 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1065 [the Legislature “simply incorporated by reference
the text of certain federal provisions into the [Rosenthal Act], rather than
copying them verbatim into the California code”].)
Section 1692k renders a debt collector liable to individual persons “in
an amount equal to the sum of—[¶] (1) any actual damage sustained by such
person as a result of such failure; [¶] (2) (A) in the case of any action by an
individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not
exceeding $ 1,000.” (§ 1692k(a)(1)–(2)(A).) For class actions, a debt collector
is liable for “(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered
under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all
other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not
to exceed the lesser of $ 500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt
collector.” (§ 1692k(a)(2)(B).)
The Rosenthal Act “authorizes consumers who receive noncompliant
collection letters to sue for the violation of their statutory rights, and nothing
in the statute suggests that any injury beyond the noncompliance is required
to impose civil liability per named plaintiff.” (Chai v. Velocity Investments,
LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1040 (Chai) [construing similar provisions
of California’s Fair Debt Buying Practices Act (§ 1788.50 et seq.)].) The
Legislature has deemed a violation to be “an injury sufficient to confer
standing—independent of actual damages—and provide[d] a modest
monetary award as a remedy . . . for those motivated to pursue it.” (Ibid.;
Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 84 [standing based on violation of statute].)
Section 1692k distinguishes between “any actual damage” resulting from a
Rosenthal Act violation and statutory damages — additional damages that
the court may allow. (§ 1692k(a)(2)(A)–(B); Guracar v. Student Loan
Solutions, LLC (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 330, 348 (Guracar) [“the FDCPA
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provides for recovery of actual damages in addition to statutory damages”].)
Individuals are “entitled to actual damages if ‘[a]ny’—and without
limitation.” (Chai, at p. 1038; Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 915–
916 [same construction applies to identical or substantially similar statutory
language regarding the same or analogous subject].) That is, a debt collector
is only liable for actual damages if any exist. But by declaring a debt
collector liable for “the sum of” actual and statutory damages, section 1692k
“signifies that actual damages only add” to their liability, and “not that the
absence of actual damages negates” liability. (Chai, at p. 1038, italics added.)
The provision thus authorizes a court to award statutory damages to a
debtor, even in the absence of actual damage. (Ibid.)
The factors that section 1692k requires courts to consider when
awarding statutory damages in a class action — “the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such
noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons
adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance
was intentional” — undergird our conclusion. (§ 1692k(b)(2).) Rather than
assessing the extent of the debtor’s actual harm, these factors evaluate the
debt collector’s culpability. (Baker v. G.C. Services Corp. (9th Cir. 1982)
677 F.2d 775, 780–781.) And the range of available awards based on these
factors — “such amount as the court may allow,” but capped at the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 percent of the debt collector’s net worth — indicates that
statutory damages are not intended to reflect actual harm. (Ibid.)
Had “the Legislature intended to limit standing to plaintiffs who
had sustained actual damages, it could have done so.” (Chai, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) For example, some consumer protection statutes
only permit claims by those who sustain injuries from violations. (Compare
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§§ 1788 et seq., 1812.702 with §§ 1780, subd. (a) [authorizing any “consumer
who suffers any damage” to bring an action under the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act], 1789.35, subd. (g) [“[a]ny person who is injured by any
violation” of provisions governing check cashiers “may bring an action for the
recovery of damages”].) We presume the Legislature intentionally omitted
such language from the Rosenthal Act, and we will not read it back in.
(People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691.) Because a debt
collector’s violation of the Rosenthal Act makes them liable for statutory
damages — regardless of whether there were actual damages — we conclude
a statutory violation is sufficient to confer standing upon a consumer.
(Guracar, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348–349.)
National Enterprise disagrees, but their arguments are not well taken.
First, relying on Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 667 (Raines) and Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 671 (Limon), it notes section 1692k refers to damages —
which it argues are intended to compensate for injuries — rather than
penalties — which it suggests are intended to deter and punish wrongdoers.
(Raines, at pp. 679–680 [distinguishing between statutory and civil penalties
to determine a claim for civil penalties did not require proof of injury]; Limon,
at p. 700 [assessing standing under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.)].) According to National Enterprise,
availability of “penalties” would confer standing whether or not the plaintiff
suffered any actual injury, but use of the term “damages” requires plaintiffs
to have an injury in fact to have standing.3
3 The FCRA authorizes a federal agency to commence a civil action to
recover civil penalties — separate and distinct from provisions authorizing
actual or statutory damages. (Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 700–701;
15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(A).) Similarly, the Labor Code provision at issue in
7
We are dubious. National Enterprise — narrowly construing the word
“damages” in section 1692k without considering the broader statutory
context — asserts the statutory damages are compensatory. To the contrary,
this is one of “many instances, such as with exemplary or punitive damages,”
in which “ ‘statutory damages serve to motivate compliance with the law and
punish wrongdoers.’ ” (Guracar, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 345.) As
discussed above, the types of damages available in a FDCPA class action
include “actual damage” — those “intended to be compensatory, to make one
whole” — and “additional damages” — those “based on enumerated ‘relevant
factors’ untethered from economic injury to the class or any member.”
(§ 1692k(a)(1)–(2)(B); Raines, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 681; Chai, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) These “additional damages” were intended to
“ ‘deter violations by imposing a cost on the defendant even if his misconduct
imposed no cost on the plaintiff,’ ” thus affording consumers protection.
(Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 660 F.3d 1055,
1067.) Section 1692k “does not prescribe statutory damages as a disjunctive
alternative to ‘actual damages.’ ” (Chai, at p. 1042.) Instead, such damages
are punitive — “ ‘intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future
misconduct’ ” — rather than compensating for an actual injury. (Raines,
Raines subjects employers to civil penalties for wage statement violations in
addition to actual or statutory penalties. (Raines, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 679–680; Lab. Code, § 226.3.) Although section 1692k does not
separately provide for civil penalties, its statutory damages serve the same
purpose — the FDCPA “is a consumer protection statute and was intended to
permit, even encourage, attorneys . . . to act as private attorney[s] general[]
to pursue FDCPA claims.” (Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell (9th Cir.
2012) 688 F.3d 1015, 1031.)
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at p. 681; Chai, at p. 1039.)4 The Rosenthal Act does not require a debtor to
plead or prove injury to have standing to seek such damages.
Limon is inapposite. The FCRA provision at issue in that case
authorizes a court to award “any actual damages sustained by the consumer
as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000.” (15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), italics added.) By authorizing actual or
statutory damages rather than both, the court explained, the statutory
damages provision was “designed to provide redress where damages are
‘difficult or impossible to quantify or prove’ ” — compensation for hard to
ascertain but still concrete harm — and not additionally provide penalties for
FCRA violations. (Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.) Thus, the court
concluded the FCRA did not confer standing on persons who had not suffered
any injury. (Ibid.) In contrast, the statutory damages in section 1692k are
punitive, and a statutory violation is sufficient to confer standing.
That the Rosenthal Act imposes a “penalty” in individual actions for a
debt collector’s willful and knowing violation does not establish that the
Legislature intended — when incorporating section 1692k — a different
meaning for “damages.” (§ 1788.30, subd. (b) [debt collector liable “for a
penalty in such amount as the court may allow, which shall not be less than
4 Notably, in Raines the actual damages or statutory penalties for
individual plaintiffs under the Labor Code were tied to a defined injury — an
employee is injured if the employer fails to provide complete and accurate
information regarding the hourly rate, and “ ‘the employee cannot promptly
and easily determine from the wage statement alone’ ” the applicable hourly
rate. (Raines, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 676; Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (e)(1)–
(2)(B) [authorizing recovery of the greater of actual damages or statutory
penalties].) The court determined the plaintiff could not bring a claim for
those damages because she did not demonstrate injury. (Raines, at pp. 676–
677.) No comparable provision exists here.
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one hundred dollars ($100) nor greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000)”].)
Section 1788.17, governing compliance with federal provisions, provides
that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title, every debt
collector . . . shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k.” The phrase
“ ‘ “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” ’ ” has a “ ‘broad and
unambiguous scope’ . . . ‘overrid[ing] the application, if any, of [contradictory
law].’ ” (Timlick v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th
at p. 686.) Consequently, the Legislature intended the section 1692k
remedies to have the same meaning under the Rosenthal Act as they do
under the FDCPA — statutory damages are intended as penalties to deter
violations and no injury is required to seek those damages. (Gonzales v.
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, supra, 660 F.3d at pp. 1065, 1067.)
We also decline National Enterprise’s invitation to graft the federal
standing requirements articulated in article III of the U.S. Constitution —
plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury rather than
simply invoking a statutory violation — onto this action. (TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez (2021) 594 U.S. 413, 426 [procedural violation of the FCRA does
not establish concrete harm required for article III standing]; Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins (2016) 578 U.S. 330, 342 [same].) California courts are not
constrained by article III standing. (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th
1100, 1117, fn. 13.) Our standing “requirements are less stringent than those
imposed by federal law.” (Langford v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 21, 36,
fn. 6 (conc. & dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.).) We are unpersuaded by National
Enterprise’s assertion that Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 456, 466–467 — requiring a statutory injury to have
standing regardless of the remedies sought — adopted standing requirements
consistent with Spokeo. Unlike here, the statute at issue in Boorstein
10
required proof of injury to establish standing. (Id. at p. 466 [“ ‘[a]ny customer
injured by a violation . . . may institute a civil action to recover damages’ ”];
§ 1798.84, subd. (b).) But as discussed above, the Legislature may instead, as
here, elect to authorize standing to sue absent concrete injury. (Kim, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 84.)
Finally, we observe that the Legislature added section 1788.17 —
incorporating section 1692k — in 1999, after federal courts had interpreted
the FDCPA to permit recovery of statutory damages absent concrete harm.
(E.g., Baker v. G. C. Services Corp., supra, 677 F.2d at p. 780 [“no indication
in the statute that award of statutory damages [under § 1692k] must be
based on proof of actual damages”]; Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services,
LLC, supra, 660 F.3d at p. 1068 [“Statutory damages under [the FDCPA and
the Rosenthal Act] are not tied in any way to actual losses suffered by the
plaintiff”]; Stats. 1999, ch. 319, § 2.) It was thus aware of the “existing laws
and judicial decisions” and enacted section 1788.17 based on that
understanding. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897; Guracar,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) National Enterprise fails to identify
anything indicating the Legislature “intended article III standing as the
touchstone for standing to vindicate these rights in this state’s courts.”
(Chai, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Kashanian is entitled to recover his costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A171046; Kashanian et al. v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc.
12
Filed 10/1/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JIMMY KASHANIAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A171046
v.
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE (Lake County
SYSTEMS, INC., Super. Ct. No. CV-416920)
Defendant and Respondent.
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT*:
The opinion in this appeal, filed on September 8, 2025, was not certified
for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause appearing, pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b) and (c), the opinion is certified for
publication. Accordingly, Attorney General’s request for publication is
GRANTED.
The order effects no change in the judgment.
Dated: 10/1/2025__ Tucher .P.J. , P. J.
* Tucher, P. J., Fujisaki, J., and Rodríguez, J. participated in the
decision.
1
Superior Court of Lake County, Hon. Michael S. Lunas.
Consumer Law Center, Inc, Fred W. Schwinn, Raeon R. Roulston and
Matthew C. Salmonsen for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates, Arthur D. Levy as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
UC Berkeley Center for Consumer Law & Economic Justice, Seth E. Mermin,
David S. Nahmias, and Jordan Hefcart as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Justin M. Penn, Sara E. Franks, and Brian E.
Wittemore for Defendant and Respondent.
2
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