CourtListener 10681916•People v. Taray J. CA2/5
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Filed 9/30/25 P. v. Taray J. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B340061
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. IJ0334A)
TARAY J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Pamela M. Villanueva, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, and Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
After his 2001 sentence for murder and attempted murder
was recalled and the matter certified to the juvenile court, the
People filed a motion to transfer the now-44-year-old Taray J. to
“adult court.” The juvenile court granted the motion. Defendant
argues that the court made procedural and substantive errors.
We conclude there was no such error, and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Defendant’s Early Criminal History
Defendant was born in 1981. Defendant committed several
crimes, and several attempts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful:
-- In 1992, defendant (while age 11) committed grand theft;
the case was closed after he was placed on probation.
-- In 1994, defendant (while age 13) committed battery; the
case was closed after he was placed on probation.
-- In 1995, defendant (while age 14) committed assault with
a firearm; defendant was placed in a juvenile camp for 35 weeks.
-- In 1996, defendant (while age 15), resisted, delayed or
obstructed a peace officer after he evaded an arrest that
necessitated 12 police units and an airship; defendant was placed
in a juvenile camp for 8 months.
During this time, defendant belonged to the Playboy
Hustler Crips street gang.
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II. The Underlying Crimes and Prosecution
A. The Crimes
While defendant was 17 years old and being closely
supervised by the Probation Office following his release from
juvenile camp for resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace
officer, defendant engaged in two homicides on behalf of the
Playboy Hustler Crips.
In the early morning hours of July 27, 1998, defendant
walked up to Robert Swain, who was dropping off his girlfriend in
a neighborhood claimed by the Fifty-Second Street Hoover gang.
This gang was a rival of the Playboy Hustler Crips. Defendant
asked Swain his gang affiliation. Swain denied any, but
defendant pulled out a gun and shot Swain six times, killing him.
Two days later, defendant, fellow Playboy Hustler Curtis
Canady, and Ronald Conley drove a stolen car into a
neighborhood claimed by the Fifty-Ninth Street Hoover gang.
This gang was also a rival of the Playboy Hustler Crips. Conley
was a member of an affiliate gang to the Playboy Hustler Crips.
Defendant and Conley were looking for a man named Dumar
Fisher. They found him in a parked car with three other
teenagers, including a pregnant 13-year-old. They drove by, then
circled back to pull up alongside Fisher’s car. Either defendant
or someone else in his car said, “This is for you, Dumar.” They
pulled out guns and opened fire on the cars’ occupants. They shot
Fisher in the arm, but killed a 17-year-old woman in the car.
They drove to the apartment of Canady’s girlfriend, changed out
of the clothes they used, and told the girlfriend about the
shooting; defendant tried to get Canady to stop telling his
girlfriend about their crimes.
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B. Prosecution, conviction and appeal
In June 1999, the People filed a petition in juvenile court
charging defendant with the murder of Swain (Pen. Code, § 187),1
the murder of the woman in Fisher’s car (§ 187) as well as the
attempted murder of the car’s three other occupants (§§ 187,
664). The petition also alleged firearm and gang enhancements
as well as two special circumstances—namely, that there were
multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that one of the
murders was committed by drive-by shooting (id., subd. (a)(21)).2
The juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer the
matter to adult court. A jury convicted defendant of these crimes,
with true findings on the gang and firearm enhancements and
special circumstances, as alleged. The trial court sentenced
defendant to prison consecutively for two life terms without the
possibility of parole (one for each murder), plus three life terms
(one for each attempted murder), plus four terms of 25 years to
life and a further term of 23 years (for the firearm
enhancements). A different panel of this Court affirmed the
convictions and sentence in 2002.3
III. Defendant’s Conduct While In Prison
Defendant committed several infractions while serving his
prison sentence in the underlying case:
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The petition also alleged defendant’s involvement in a third
murder/robbery, of which defendant was found not guilty.
3 The Court affirmed the conviction but modified the
sentence on one of the attempted murder counts to life with a
minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, plus a consecutive 20
years.
4
-- In June 2003, defendant was involved in a mutual
combat.
-- In April 2004, defendant participated in a riot.
-- In November 2003 and August 2005, defendant refused to
obey direct orders.
-- In June 2003, December 2003, May 2007, September
2009, April 2012, April 2014, November 2017, and April 2019,
defendant possessed various forms of contraband (from alcohol to
controlled substances to altered AA batteries).
-- In October 2011, February 2012, November 2016,
November 2017, December 2017, July 2019, and November 2020,
defendant possessed a cell phone.
-- In September 2017, defendant committed a battery on
another inmate.
-- In March 2018, defendant had possession of
paraphernalia to make tattoos.
Defendant obtained a number of new tattoos reflecting
gang affiliation while in prison. Defendant also made a number
of calls from prison indicating his continued affiliation and
identification as a gang member as well as his desire to do
violence against anyone who harms his fellow gang members,
even though the Playboy Hustlers gang was no longer an active
gang on the streets.
Starting in 2017, defendant participated in a number of
rehabilitative and other programs in prison.
IV. Recall of Sentence and Second Transfer Motion
In August 2023, the trial court granted defendant’s motion
to recall his sentence pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
Although defendant was at this time 42 years old, the matter was
certified to the juvenile court.
5
The People moved to transfer the matter to adult court. In
support, the People submitted an updated report on defendant by
the Probation Office. In that report, the Probation Officer
detailed defendant’s juvenile criminal history, recounted his
disciplinary history while in custody, and recommended transfer
to adult court due to the “great deal of criminal sophistication” in
the charged crimes, the absence of “time remaining to provide
[defendant] rehabilitation,” his “substantial delinquency history,”
the failure of previous attempts at rehabilitation that resulted in
the “escalat[ion]” of his criminal behavior, and the “very serious
and extremely high” “gravity of the offenses.”
Defendant filed a written opposition. In support of the
opposition, defendant offered the expert opinion of Erin Parker,
who opined that defendant is “amenable to rehabilitation”
because she perceived “a trend through the years of [his]
incarceration of coming to terms with the consequences of his
past misconduct, ceasing self-destructive behavior, and investing
in self-improvement” as evidenced by his remaining “disciplinary
free for over three years.” Parker urged that defendant’s prison
disciplinary history should be discounted because the nature of
his underlying crimes made it difficult for him to get
programming during the first three years of his incarceration.4
Defendant also submitted a detailed re-entry plan that could be
followed if he were released into the community.
The matter proceeded to a transfer hearing over the course
of 14 days in June and July 2024. The People called four
4 Defendant initially offered the opinions of two other
experts—Nicole Vienna and Gangaw Zaw. However, defendant
withdrew his reliance on those experts’ opinion during the
hearing.
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witnesses, including the (now-retired) probation officer who
supervised defendant after his release from the second camp and
at the time defendant committed the charged crimes. The officer
noted defendant’s pattern of appearing “amenable” to
rehabilitation by “saying the right things” to authority figures,
but that this appearance was deceiving because he would
simultaneously elude supervision and continue his gang lifestyle.
The officer recounted that defendant would regularly “disappear”
from his high-level supervision, which necessitated the officer
obtaining five bench warrants, and that defendant used a false
name and false date of birth to avoid detection. The officer
further testified that defendant was a “strong kid” and not a
“pushover.” The People also called a current probation officer
who testified that no juvenile facility could house a 43-year-old
man and that most adults who were re-sentenced as juveniles
were immediately “stepped down” and released into the
community.
Following several days of closing argument, the juvenile
court issued both an oral and written ruling granting transfer of
defendant’s case to adult court. The court acknowledged that its
chief task was to assess whether defendant was “amenable for
rehabilitation,” and proceeded to analyze each of the five
statutory factors set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707 that bear on amenability:
-- The court found that defendant exhibited a “criminal
sophistication” that made him “unamenable” to rehabilitation. In
making this finding, the court cited (1) defendant’s age, his
closeness to graduating high school, his good health and his
“demonstrated maturity by living on his own,” holding down
“several jobs,” and demonstrating sufficient maturity to be
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granted furlough from some of the juvenile camps; (2) defendant’s
ability to “appreciate[e] risk” by arming himself with a different
gun for each murder, committing the drive-by shooting in a stolen
car, “hiding evidence” of the drive-by shooting by “fleeing the
scene, hiding clothing in the trash,” establishing an alibi and
“instruct[ing] a co-defendant to stop talking about the murder”;
and (3) the absence of any “evidence of peer pressure” or family
condoning of the gang lifestyle that would apply pressure to
defendant.
-- The court found that defendant could not be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of juvenile court’s jurisdiction, which made
him “unamenable” to rehabilitation. In making this finding, the
court noted that “[t]wo camp commitments and 25 years in state
prison have not been shown to reform [defendant],” noted
defendant remained ranked as a moderate to high risk of
reoffending, and noted that he had obtained new gang tattoos in
prison and “engaged in gang jail calls showing his current
affiliation with the gang.”
-- The court found that defendant’s previous delinquent
history made him “unamenable” to rehabilitation. In making this
finding, the court recounted defendant’s “extensive” delinquent
history, and noted that two camp placements and intense
supervision did not stop defendant from “go[ing] back to the gang
neighborhood.”
-- The court found that defendant’s “previous attempts to
rehabilitate” made him “unamenable” to rehabilitation. In
making this finding, the court noted that “the camp commitments
and the furloughs” home from camp prompted by letters from
defendant showing “maturity and a desire to change” had been
unavailing because defendant thereafter “re-offended,” and noted
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that defendant’s quarter century in prison was marked by “pretty
extensive” misconduct within prison, “a lot” of new gang tattoos,
and “gang phone calls” “indicating a desire and willingness to
commit future crimes.”
-- The court found that the circumstances and gravity of the
offenses alleged in the petition made him “unamenable” to
rehabilitation. In making this finding, the court noted that
“murder” is “obviously the most grave crime that can come before
the court,” and that defendant stands convicted of “two special
circumstance murders” and “three attempted murders.”
The court summed up by noting that, although “[t]he
weight to any factor is within the court’s discretion,” that
defendant “has shown [a] lack of amenability as to all 5 criteria,”
such that the “prosecutor has shown by clear and convincing
evidence” that defendant “should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the criminal court.”
V. Appeal
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the juvenile court erred in granting
the People’s motion to transfer to adult court because (1) the
court did not analyze the five pertinent statutory factors bearing
on transfer “through the lens of amenability,” and (2) substantial
evidence does not otherwise support the juvenile court’s findings
as to the statutory factors or its overall finding that defendant is
not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile. Although the
ultimate transfer decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
(In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S.)), we review de
novo whether the court applied the proper legal standard and
review its subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence
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(Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187 (Kevin
P.); In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.)).
I. Application of Proper Legal Standard
As the law stands today, the People may move to transfer
to adult court any minor 16 years of age or older alleged to have
committed one of several enumerated offenses, which include
murder and attempted murder. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subds.
(a)(1), (b)(1) & (b)(13); D.W. v. Superior Cour (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 109, 116.) To prevail on this motion, the People
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor
is “not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3); In re
S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1282 (S.S.) [“‘amenab[ility] to
rehabilitation’” is the “ultimate determination”]; J.S., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) In making this determination, a juvenile
court “shall consider” five statutorily enumerated criteria—
namely (1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor,” (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,” (3) “[t]he
minor’s previous delinquent history,” (4) “[s]uccess of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor,” and (5)
“[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)(i), (a)(3)(B)(i), (a)(3)(C)(i), (a)(3)(D)(i),
& (a)(3)(E)(i).) The juvenile court is also to “give weight to any
relevant factor” bearing on each of the enumerated criteria, and
the governing statute now enumerates factors for each. (Id.,
subds. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (a)(3)(B)(ii), (a)(3)(C)(ii), (a)(3)(D)(ii),
(a)(3)(E)(ii).) A court ordering transfer must state “the reasons
supporting [its] finding that the minor is not amenable to
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rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”
(id., subd. (a)(3)), which “include[es] how it weighed the evidence
and identif[ies] the specific factors on which the court relied to
reach its decision” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(c)).
The trial court did not misapply this legal standard. The
court focused on the key question of whether defendant was
amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction, examined each of the five statutory criteria and
discussed the statutorily enumerated factors bearing on each
criteria, found that each of the five criteria supported its finding
of non-amenability (thus obviating any need to assign a
particular weight to any of the criteria), and ultimately found by
clear and convincing evidence that defendant was not amenable
to rehabilitation.
Defendant generally argues that the juvenile court’s
analysis did not examine the five criteria “through the lens of
amenability,” and more specifically asserts that the court’s
examination of the criminal sophistication, prior delinquent
history and gravity of offense criteria is deficient because the
court either did not “mention . . . amenability to rehabilitation”
or did not “explain how [the factors discussed by the court]
supported its finding that [defendant] was not amenable to
rehabilitation.”
Defendant’s argument lacks merit. Defendant’s assertion
that the court did not “mention amenability” as to each criterion
is unsupported by the record because the juvenile court explicitly
found that each of the five statutory criteria supported a finding
of non-amenability to rehabilitation. Defendant’s assertion that
the court was required to explain how each factor it examined
supported a finding of non-amenability is unsupported by the
11
law. The pertinent statute and Rule of Court obligate a court to
state its reasons, to describe how it weighed the evidence and to
identify the specific factors the court relied upon; they do not
invariably obligate a court to also explain why a particular factor
relates to or supports a finding of non-amenability. That makes
good sense. The link between various factors and amenability (or
lack of amenability) is often obvious: A juvenile with a more
serious delinquent history or who failed to succeed in prior
rehabilitation efforts despite receiving adequate probationary
services is obviously less likely to be amenable to rehabilitation.
In the absence of an explicit command, the law does not require
courts to restate the obvious. (See People v. Castillo (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1009, 1018 [no need for jury instructions that “stat[e] the
obvious”].) Defendant cites S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, in
support of his position, but S.S. held that a new transfer hearing
is required when a court focuses on “fitness” rather than
“amenability,” and concluded that the court in that case had
improperly analyzed some of the statutory criteria; S.S. did not
purport to fashion a new requirement for what findings must be
explicitly stated on the record. (Id. at pp. 1286-1294.)
II. Substantial Evidence
In evaluating whether a juvenile court’s finding that a
juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation is supported by
substantive evidence, we ask whether the record—construed in
the light most favorable to the court’s findings—rationally
supports a finding of non-amenability by clear and convincing
evidence. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings
that each of the five statutory criteria support a finding that
defendant is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
12
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, for the reasons the juvenile
court articulated in its oral and written rulings. Defendant urges
that other evidence supports a finding of amenability to
rehabilitation—namely, (1) evidence that, since 2017, defendant
obtained vocational training, earned two positive comments in his
chrono file, and was dropped from security level 4 to security
level 3; (2) the opinion of defendant’s expert witness that
defendant is amenable to rehabilitation; (3) his post-release re-
entry plans; (4) the absence of any evidence that defendant acted
on any of the gang-related comments he made on the jailhouse
calls (because he was instead engaged in “ill-advised bravado”);
and (5) the absence of any evidence that defendant committed
more heinous disciplinary violations while in prison, such as
assaulting staff, possessing weapons or promoting gang activity.5
Both explicitly and implicitly, defendant is asking us to reweigh
the evidence and to come to a different conclusion than the
juvenile court; this is beyond our purview under substantial
evidence review. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) To the
extent defendant is asserting that the evidence he cites in his
favor dictates a finding of amenability to rehabilitation as a
matter of law, he is incorrect: Defendant’s recent positive
progress is not dispositive in light of his documented pattern of
“saying the right things” to authority figures while continuing to
engage in and plan inappropriate activities; the opinion of
defendant’s expert witness may be disregarded in light of the
competing opinion from the People’s witness (J.S., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [“the juvenile court was not required to
5 Defendant also argues that he obtained gang tattoos not to
support gang activity or affiliation but out of necessity to blend
in, but he offers no evidence on these points.
13
credit the testimony of the defense experts”]); and the fact that
defendant has not engaged in more heinous behavior does not
negate his other violations. To the extent that defendant asserts
that the juvenile court erred in not mentioning all of defendant’s
evidence before implicitly finding it to be less persuasive than the
competing evidence, that assertion is unpersuasive where, as
here, the court has indicated that it has considered all of the
evidence presented; it is not obligated to recount all of it again.
(J.S., at p. 214 [court that indicates it relied on all evidence need
not address all adverse evidence in its ruling]; Kevin P., supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 193 [relying on implicit findings permitted]; see
People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1064.)6
6 For the first time in his reply brief, defendant suggests that
there is not substantial evidence to support the factor that
defendant cannot “be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction” because the People’s report indicates
that defendant may be subjected to a maximum of two years of
supervision, which defendant contends is incorrect because there
is no such time limit. This argument is both waived (because not
raised until the reply brief) and meritless (because Welfare and
Institutions Code section 607, subdivision (d) explicitly erects a
two-year maximum term).
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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