CourtListener 10681876•Ezor v. Page CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 9/30/25 Ezor v. Page CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ARTHUR EDWARD EZOR, B339284
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 22STCV17343)
ELLIE PAGE, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Edward Ezor, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
The Burbank Firm and James G. Morris for Defendants
and Respondents.
******
Arthur Edward Ezor (Ezor) filed this action against
numerous defendants, including Ellie Page (Page), the Trustee of
the Jill Ilana Wizel Special Needs Trust (Special Needs Trust),
after the probate court ordered his property to be sold to satisfy a
judgment against him. The trial court granted Page’s motion for
summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Facts1
Ezor and Jill Wizel were co-trustees of the Lydia Wizel
Trust, dated June 12, 1991, and amended on August 3, 1993
(Trust). The Trust provided that the settlor’s principal residence
would be allocated to a separate sub-trust for Jill Wizel and that
certain specific gifts would be distributed.2 The Trust further
provided that the balance of the estate would be divided in half
between Lydia’s children, Jill and Robert Brown (Brown).
In September 2008, Brown filed a Petition for Instructions
seeking to have Ezor and Jill removed as co-trustees and
surcharged for breaching their fiduciary duties. Brown also
sought an accounting for the entire period of trust
administration, among other things. Brown had previously
raised concerns to Ezor about Jill’s competence to serve as co-
trustee based upon her substance abuse, gambling problem, and
psychiatric issues.
1 These facts are drawn from the nonpublished opinion
affirming the underlying judgment. (Ezor v. Brown (Sept. 16,
2013, B237990) [nonpub. opn.].)
2 For purposes of clarity, we refer to Lydia Wizel and Jill
Wizel by their first names.
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In August 2009, the probate court removed Jill as co-
trustee, suspended Ezor as co-trustee, and named Brown to
replace Jill. In January 2010, the probate court appointed Page
as the permanent conservator over Jill’s person and estate. Page
is a licensed professional fiduciary in the State of California who
serves as a trustee and conservator.
Following a bench trial in May 2010, the probate court
found that Ezor had breached his duties by delaying the
administration of the Trust, paying himself and his attorney
excessive fees, refusing to make any distributions to Brown,
failing to investigate Jill’s competence to serve as a trustee,
failing to pay Jill’s medical insurance premiums, and opposing
the beneficiaries’ objections to his accounting without reasonable
cause and in bad faith. The probate court entered judgment
against Ezor in the total amount of $511,125. On April 5, 2012,
the probate court entered an amended judgment in the total
amount of $486,233.50.
The Special Needs Trust for the benefit of Jill was created,
and Page became the trustee. Brown passed away on July 3,
2016. Therefore, the two judgment creditors are the Special
Needs Trust and Brown’s estate.
Ezor owned a residential property located on La Brea
Avenue in Los Angeles, California (Property). In 2016, Page
obtained an order from the probate court authorizing the sale of
the Property, but gave Ezor time to conduct a private sale. After
the order expired, Page again petitioned the probate court for an
order to sell the Property. On February 23, 2018, the probate
court identified Ezor as the judgment debtor and found that the
Property was not subject to the Homestead Exemption. The
probate court again ordered the Property to be sold to satisfy the
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amended judgment. The Property was sold at a Sheriff’s sale on
May 18, 2018.
II. Procedural Background
Ezor filed this action on May 26, 2022, and filed the
operative second amended complaint on July 17, 2023. Ezor
asserted nine causes of action, two of which were directed at
Page: (1) The fifth cause of action for violation of California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and (2) The
sixth cause of action for quiet title.
Page moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative,
summary adjudication.3 Ezor filed an opposition to the motion.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Page’s motion for
summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment on May 8,
2024. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
The judgment is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 437c,
subd. (m)(1), 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) A defendant moving for
summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there
are no triable issues of fact in order to meet its initial burden of
production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 861.) Once the defendant has satisfied that burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that
a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 850.) To do so,
3 Although the notice of motion references the first
amended complaint, the memorandum of points and authorities
makes clear that this motion was directed at the operative second
amended complaint. Ezor did not oppose the motion on this
basis.
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the plaintiff must produce substantial responsive evidence. (See
Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162–163.)
We independently assess whether summary judgment is
appropriate. (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th
248, 272.) Our task is to review the trial court’s ruling, not its
rationale, so we may affirm on any ground raised by the parties
below. (Atalla v. Rite Aid Corp. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 294, 307;
Scheer v. Regents of University of California (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 904, 913.)
II. The Fifth Cause of Action
California’s unfair competition law prohibits any unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200; see also Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605,
610.) Page relied on her own declaration, in which she states
that she is a professional fiduciary; she is not in the business of
selling or financing real estate; and the Sheriff’s sale was the only
one in which she has ever participated. This evidence is
sufficient to establish that Page does not engage in the alleged
business acts or practices. Moreover, Page relied on declarations
stating that she merely sought to enforce a valid judgment and
played no role in conducting the Sheriff’s sale or procuring
buyers. Ezor advanced no evidence giving rise to a triable issue
on these matters.
On appeal, Ezor argues that Page did not obtain
authorization from the probate court to enforce the judgment
following Brown’s death. In fact, Page obtained an order from
the probate court authorizing the sale of the Property. The order
was dated February 23, 2018, after Brown’s death on July 3,
2016.
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Ezor also argues that the Sheriff’s sale was “rigged,
fraudulent and illegal in fact and law,” but cites no evidence that
Page was involved in any illegality. Therefore, we agree with the
trial court that there is no triable issue on the fifth cause of
action.
III. The Sixth Cause of Action
A cause of action for quiet title generally has two elements:
(1) The plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the property at
issue; and (2) The defendant claims an interest in the property
that is adverse to the plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740.) In her declaration, Page states
that she never took title to, or possession of, the Property. This is
consistent with the probate court having to order a sale to enforce
the judgment. Our review of the record reveals no evidence
giving rise to a triable issue, and Ezor identifies none on appeal.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that there is no triable
issue on the sixth cause of action.
IV. Ezor’s Remaining Arguments
Ezor argues that the trial court erred in failing to address
each of his objections to Page’s evidence. The trial court need
only rule on those evidentiary objections that are material to its
disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
Although the trial court did not expressly address Ezor’s
(meritless) objections to Page’s dispositive evidence, we presume
they were overruled. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512,
534 [“if the trial court fails to rule expressly on specific
evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections have
been overruled . . . .”].) Ezor also argues that the trial court’s
order failed to address every issue. The brevity of the trial
court’s order reflects the straightforward nature of this case.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Page is entitled to her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GOORVITCH, J. *
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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