CourtListener 10681875•In re E.R. CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 9/30/25 In re E.R. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B344323
In re E.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03004A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her
parental rights. Mother contends the court erred in failing to
apply the parental benefit exception to adoption. We find no
error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) detained E.R. from mother shortly after
E.R. was born with a positive toxicology for cocaine. In
September 2022, the juvenile court sustained a petition and
asserted dependency jurisdiction over E.R. based on mother’s
ongoing and unresolved substance abuse. The court removed
E.R. from the parents.1 DCFS placed E.R. with the maternal
grandparents.
Over approximately the next year and a half, mother
participated in reunification services and visited E.R. regularly.
For a brief period, E.R. was placed with mother under DCFS
supervision. During that time, E.R. and mother continued living
with the maternal grandparents. However, mother continued to
struggle with substance abuse.
On one occasion in late December 2023, mother arrived at
the maternal grandparents’ home at 2:00 a.m. Mother was
drunk. She attempted to take E.R. to a friend’s house. When the
maternal grandparents refused to allow mother to take E.R.,
mother called the police. Law enforcement officers managed to
1 Father is not a party to this appeal.
2
calm mother down and she did not take E.R. from the maternal
grandparents’ home. The maternal grandmother later told a
social worker that she wanted to kick mother out of the house
“due to the mother’s consistent irresponsible behavior, including
frequent late-night returns while intoxicated.” However, the
maternal grandmother was “scared because she does not want
the mother to take [E.R.] with her. [Mother] goes to work and
comes home and does not dedicate adequate time to her child.
The maternal grandmother shared that she and her husband
take care of [E.R.] like their own, and they want to continue to
protect her and provide her with a safe and stable home.”
In April 2024, the juvenile court again detained E.R. from
mother after she was repeatedly under the influence of alcohol
while E.R. was in her care. In May 2024, the juvenile court
removed E.R. once more from both parents and set a permanency
planning hearing.2
A September 2024 permanency planning report noted that
the maternal grandparents had been a consistent presence in
E.R.’s short life. She had a “healthy bond” with them. They
wanted to adopt her. E.R. called the grandparents “ ‘mama’ ” and
“ ‘papa,’ ” and had been observed following them around the
home. E.R. was affectionate with the grandparents, hugging
them and asking to be held.
The report also observed that mother had maintained
consistent and frequent visitation with E.R. for the pendency of
the case. Although the maternal grandparents had been more
2 The juvenile court had briefly released E.R. to father after
detaining her from mother. However, E.R. continued to live with
the maternal grandparents and father failed to make any
arrangements with them for E.R.’s care.
3
involved in obtaining developmental services for E.R., mother
was present during some of E.R.’s appointments and had a
“general understanding” of E.R.’s participation in services. When
describing the relationship between mother and E.R., the report
opined: “Generally, [E.R.] is content during her Family Time with
the mother. [E.R.] does not show fear, caution, or ambivalence
towards her mother. The caregiver believes that [E.R.] and the
mother are bonded. Notably, [E.R.] appears emotionally and
mentally stable when the mother ends Family Time.”
According to the report, the maternal grandmother believed
“mother does an acceptable job in meeting [E.R.’s] needs. She
does the bare minimum of feeding [E.R.] and when appropriate,
bathing [E.R.] They play and engage; however, the caregiver
would like the mother to be more affectionate and attentive. For
example, there are moments when [E.R.] is seeking comfort and
it would be appropriate for the mother to hold [E.R.] or speak
affectionately; however, she does not. The caregiver did make it
clear that she believes [E.R.] and the mother are bonded. She
just wishes that at times, the mother were more attentive. For
example, the mother spends time on her phone during Family
Time.” Although the maternal grandmother believed E.R. viewed
mother as her parent, E.R. went to the maternal grandmother for
her needs and referred to the maternal grandmother “as a
mother.” Nonetheless, the report opined that mother’s
relationship with E.R. did “not appear to have negative features.”
Overall, the report concluded that “[g]iven the mother’s
consistent presence in [E.R.]’s life, there is a significant positive
emotional attachment.”
In late September 2024, the maternal grandmother
reported that after mother finished a recent visit with E.R. at the
4
maternal grandparents’ home, the maternal grandmother found
mother in the dining room drinking a beer. Maternal
grandmother asked mother to leave. A November 2024 status
review report indicated that although the maternal grandparents
reported that mother was consistent with visits, “she constantly
needs to be reminded to get off her phone and spend[ ] more
quality time with the child, [E.R.] In addition, during the week,
she calls maternal grandparents to ask if she can drop off food for
[E.R.], and shows up home hours later and smelling like alcohol.”
DCFS’s February 2025 permanency planning report noted
that mother continued to consistently visit E.R. The maternal
grandmother now reported that “on occasion,” E.R. cried when
mother left a visit, but she quickly stopped when told mother
would return for another visit. Mother had been more
affectionate with E.R. During visits, she fed and bathed E.R.,
washed her clothes, played with her, and practiced words with
her. E.R. “also finds comfort falling asleep next to the mother.”
Yet, E.R. continued to seek out the maternal grandmother for her
needs. Sometimes, when mother attempted to help E.R., E.R.
would insist that the maternal grandmother help her instead.
E.R. referred to the maternal grandmother as “ ‘ma.’ ”
At the February 2025 permanency planning hearing,
mother argued the juvenile court should apply the parental
benefit exception to adoption and reject DCFS’s recommendation
that the court terminate mother’s parental rights. DCFS’s
counsel acknowledged that mother had maintained regular and
consistent visitation and that there was a beneficial relationship
between mother and E.R. Nonetheless, DCFS’s position was that
the permanence and stability E.R. would obtain through adoption
outweighed any detriment to her from severing the relationship
5
with mother. Mother’s counsel contended the evidence showed
there was a significant positive emotional attachment between
E.R. and mother and it would be detrimental to sever the
relationship.
Although DCFS suggested mother’s visits would continue
even if her parental rights were terminated, the juvenile court
began its ruling by stating that it was not considering any future
visitation in its consideration of the parental benefit exception.
The court found mother had maintained regular visitation and
there was a “significant positive emotional attachment” between
E.R. and mother. However, the court described the stability and
permanence that adoption would give E.R. and concluded the
exception did not apply. The court therefore terminated parental
rights. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Parental Benefit Exception to Adoption
At the permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26,3 the juvenile court must
select a permanent plan for a dependent child to provide the child
a “stable, permanent” home. (Id., subd. (b); In re S.G. (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1298, 1313.) If the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, the
court must terminate parental rights, unless the parent
establishes that termination would be detrimental to the child for
one of the reasons outlined in section 366.26, subdivision (c). (In
re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) The
“ ‘statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
6
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 631.)
Here, mother contends the juvenile court erred by declining
to apply the parental benefit exception to adoption. Under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the juvenile court may
choose a permanent plan other than adoption when it finds
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
because the parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.
The California Supreme Court has explained that a “parent
asserting the parental benefit exception must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, three things. The parent must
show regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into
account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent
must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. And the
parent must show that terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
The first two requirements are not at issue in this case.
The juvenile court found mother had regular visitation and
contact with E.R., and that E.R. had a substantial, positive
emotional attachment to mother. We review the third
requirement for an abuse of discretion. We will find an abuse of
discretion “only when ‘ “ ‘the . . . court has exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
7
absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 641.)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Concluding the
Parental Benefit Exception Did Not Apply
When evaluating the third element of the parental benefit
exception, courts must determine “whether the harm of severing
the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of
belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the
natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a
substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even
considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination
would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental
rights. [Citation.] That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the
statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a
new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would
experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional
relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Mother contends the juvenile court failed to properly weigh
the harm to E.R. from severing the relationship with mother and
the benefits she would gain from adoption. Mother points to the
evidence that she has a significant, positive relationship with
E.R. She also asserts that because the maternal grandparents
are the prospective adoptive parents, “E.R.’s stability was not at
risk, regardless of whether or not the court terminated parental
rights.” Mother thus argues that “from the perspective of E.R.’s
best interests . . . there was not much, if any, upside to severing
the parent-child relationship.”
Yet, it would be inappropriate for the juvenile court to
conclude that adoption would afford a child no significant benefit
8
because the prospective adoptive parents are likely to remain the
child’s caregivers, even if parental rights are not terminated. The
legislative preference for adoption does not arise merely from the
prospect of a permanent living situation. The preference also
does not depend on the identification of a particular caregiver.
(See, e.g., § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [if court determines the child is
likely to be adopted, court must terminate parental rights; “The
fact that the child is not yet placed in a preadoptive home nor
with a relative or foster family who is prepared to adopt the child
does not constitute a basis for the court to conclude that it is not
likely the child will be adopted.”].) Instead, adoption is the
Legislature’s first choice because of the new and permanent legal
and emotional relationships it creates. This is true even if the
child is not adopted by the individuals who are the caregivers
when parental rights are terminated.
The history of this case illustrates how adoption may
provide the greatest stability and permanence to a child, even
when the child is placed with relatives who might be willing to
remain the caregivers under a permanent plan other than
adoption. In December 2023, mother arrived at the maternal
grandparents’ home, drunk, and demanding to take E.R. When
the maternal grandparents refused to let her take E.R., mother
called law enforcement, ostensibly to enforce what she believed
was her right to take her own child as she saw fit. An order
terminating mother’s parental rights would not necessarily
prevent a similar occurrence in the future. But adoption would
provide E.R. legal certainty and stability. E.R. would have new,
adoptive parents, and mother would have no ability to insert
herself into the legal relationship between E.R. and her adoptive
parents. In contrast, legal guardianship would keep open the
9
possibility, however improbable, that mother may one day regain
custodial rights. Adoption forecloses that possibility.
As the California Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Adoption
is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best
chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible
caretaker.’ [Citation.] ‘Guardianship, while a more stable
placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short
of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind
for the dependent child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Further, the juvenile court was not merely tasked with
determining whether E.R. and mother had a positive
relationship. The court was required to determine whether the
relationship was “so important to [E.R.] that the security and
stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh” the loss of that
relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Thus, a
“parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or
pleasant visits.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)
Mother has not met this burden. For example, the facts
here are significantly different from those in Caden C., where an
expert opined that the child had such an “intense bond” with
mother that it would “impede Caden in forming relationships
with others,” and the loss of contact with mother would lead to
“emotional fluctuation, confusion, and acting out in the near term
and in adolescence,” as well as “difficulties in school, insomnia,
anxiety, or depression.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 628,
633.) Mother has not established that E.R.’s attachment to
mother was so “significant” that their continued relationship
would provide E.R. more than “some incidental benefit.” (In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
10
Mother failed to demonstrate that E.R. would suffer
substantial detriment if the juvenile court terminated parental
rights. The September 2024 permanency planning report
indicated mother’s visits were positive, and E.R. had a bond with
mother, yet mother was not always attentive or affectionate. She
chose to use her phone during visits and at times failed to hold
E.R. or show affection when E.R. was looking to mother for
comfort. Five months later, DCFS reported improvement, yet
continued to report that E.R. was not significantly distressed
when visits with mother ended. E.R. cried but was quickly
comforted.
As we understand her arguments, mother contends the
juvenile court failed to follow the Caden C. court’s direction that
when determining whether the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental, the juvenile court does not compare the
parent’s “attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any
potential adoptive parent(s).” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 634.) The record does not establish that the juvenile court
engaged in such improper weighing. The court could properly
consider the benefits E.R. had already received from the stability
provided by the current placement. In addition, the court was
required to consider “how and how much” the harm to E.R. from
losing a relationship with mother might be offset by a new family
relationship. (Id. at p. 639.) The court was thus permitted to
consider the “offsetting benefits of an adoptive home.” (Id. at
p. 638.)
Moreover, even if the juvenile court inappropriately
considered mother’s general instability, we do not reverse for
harmless error. (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 531.)
Even when a parent alleges the juvenile court considered an
11
improper factor in assessing an element of the parental benefit
exception test, we need not reverse if “the record in this case
would not support a finding in mother’s favor on the parental
benefit exception.” (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 532–533.)
On the record before us, we cannot find that “ ‘ “ ‘under all
the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s
action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he [or
she] did.’ ” ’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) E.R. was
very young at the time of the permanency planning hearing, “ ‘too
young to understand the concept of a biological parent.’
[Citation.]” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 816
(Andrew M.).) She had spent her entire life in the home of the
maternal grandparents. Even when she was briefly placed with
mother under DCFS supervision, she and mother continued
living with the maternal grandparents. E.R. had a positive
connection with mother, but experienced only minor distress
when mother’s visits ended. Mother identifies no specific harm
E.R. would suffer from the termination of parental rights.
The reasoning of the court in Andrew M. is persuasive here.
“There is no question that there are benefits in continued visits
with loving parents to which the child has some substantial
attachment. Yet to justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’
and ‘ “sense of belonging a new family would confer” ’ (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633), the parents must prove more than
‘ “some benefit” ’ [citation]. We do not suggest the parents must
prove that any particular kind of harm would flow from the
termination of parental rights. But they must prove some type of
harm beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease. (See
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [providing examples of
potential harms].) [¶] In appropriate cases, the strength of the
12
relationship alone can support a finding that its termination
would have a ‘destabilizing’ effect on the child. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) But as discussed, the circumstances here
do not support a conclusion that [mother’s] relationship with
[E.R.] was ‘so important’ as to outweigh the benefits of adoption.
(Id. at pp. 633–634.) In other words, this case cannot be deemed
the kind of ‘ “ ‘extraordinary case’ ” ’ in which preservation of
parental rights prevails over the Legislature’s preference for
adoptive placement.” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 820.)
We find no error in the trial court’s determination on the
third element of the parental benefit exception.
13
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order terminating parental rights is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
14
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.