People v. Giovacchini CA2/1

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Filed 9/30/25 P. v. Giovacchini CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B334033

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA092430)
v.

JASON GIOVACCHINI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Appellant Jason Giovacchini—who, in 2017, pleaded no
contest to two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 245,
subd. (a)(2))—contends the trial court erred at his December 2023
section 1172.75 resentencing hearing.
At the hearing, the court struck from Giovacchini’s sentence
three prison prior enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) invalidated
by the enactment of section 1172.75. (See § 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In addition, the court exercised its discretion under section 1385
to strike Giovacchini’s five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court declined, however, to
strike the 10-year firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5) imposed
in connection with one of the assault with a firearm counts.
Giovacchini argues the court abused its discretion by failing
to strike the firearm enhancement. He urges the court’s comments
at the resentencing hearing demonstrate it misunderstood the scope
of its discretion under section 1385. He further contends we must
remand for a new resentencing hearing because the recent decision
in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker)—issued eight
months after the resentencing here—provided new guidance
concerning how trial courts should exercise their discretion to strike
sentence enhancements.
We conclude, however, the record does not support that the
court misapprehended the scope of its discretion. And nothing in
Walker altered the nature of the court’s discretion in a way that
would benefit Giovacchini. We therefore affirm.

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In 2015, authorities arrested Giovacchini after he allegedly
attempted to shoot Richard Paine and Chad Henderson following
a verbal argument. Although Henderson reported minor injuries
to his neck from stray bullet fragments, both victims survived the
incident.
The district attorney filed an information charging
Giovacchini with 10 counts, including two counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) (counts 1 and 2), two counts of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (counts 3 and 4), and
one count of possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction
(§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)) (count 6). The information alleged firearm
use enhancements with respect to counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)) and counts 3 and 4 (§ 12022.5, subds. (a), (d)). The
information further alleged that Giovacchini previously had been
convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), and that he had served five prior prison terms
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In October 2017, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Giovacchini
pleaded no contest to the two counts of assault with a firearm
(counts 3 and 4) and to the section 29900, subdivision (a)(1) firearm
possession charge (count 6). In addition, Giovacchini admitted the
section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement charged in connection
with count 3. Giovacchini further admitted he had suffered a prior
conviction in 2012 for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)),
which brought him within the purview of the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). Finally, Giovacchini admitted

2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

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the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement and three of the
five alleged section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.
The trial court accepted Giovacchini’s plea and sentenced
him to an aggregate term of 29 years 4 months in prison. The term
included: (1) a four-year, high-term sentence on the assault with
a firearm charged in count 3, doubled to eight years pursuant to
the Three Strikes law, (2) 10 years on the section 12022.5 firearm
enhancement, (3) five years on the section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement, and (4) one-year terms on each of the three
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancements.
A little over two years later, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b) to eliminate sentence enhancements for prior prison
terms, with an exception for certain sexually violent offenses not at
issue here. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Then, via Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature enacted section 1172.75 to
provide a resentencing procedure that extends the prohibition on
prior prison term enhancements to all persons currently
incarcerated in jail or prison. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)
Section 1172.75 requires the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify for the trial court
any defendant eligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) The
court then must “recall” the defendant’s sentence and “resentence
the defendant” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)), applying “any . . . changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) In fashioning
the new sentence, “[t]he court may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record
of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence
that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for

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future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).)
The CDCR identified Giovacchini as eligible for resentencing,
and the court set the matter for hearing. In advance of the hearing,
Giovacchini’s appointed counsel filed a brief requesting that,
in addition to striking Giovacchini’s three 1-year section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements, the court (1) conduct a full
resentencing, (2) impose a three-year middle-term sentence on the
assault with a firearm charged in count 3 in lieu of the four-year
high term imposed originally, (3) strike Giovacchini’s prior strike,
(4) strike the five-year enhancement imposed under section 667,
subdivision (a), and (5) strike the 10-year section 12022.5 firearm
enhancement.
As relevant here, Giovacchini argued that section 1385
afforded the court discretion to strike the enhancements.
Section 1385 provides, in pertinent part, that a court “shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)), and that “the presence of one or more of ”
certain enumerated “mitigating circumstances” “weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing [an] enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Giovacchini argued two such
mitigating circumstances were present in his case—namely, that
(1) “[m]ultiple enhancements [were] alleged in a single case” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(B)), and (2) “application of [the] enhancement[s] could
result in a sentence of over 20 years” (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)).
Giovacchini further argued that his age (over 40 years old)
rendered him less likely to reoffend, and he submitted character
letters from his mother and aunt in support of his request for a

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reduced sentence. He offered no other mitigation evidence,
however, such as his postconviction disciplinary or rehabilitation
records (see § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)).
In a written opposition, the prosecution objected to any
reductions in Giovacchini’s sentence beyond striking the invalidated
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements. The prosecution
argued any further reductions would be inappropriate because,
inter alia, Giovacchini (1) had been convicted of another assault
with a firearm only three years prior to the incident giving rise to
this case, and (2) “ha[d] provided no insight into how he ha[d] fared
in custody” or “proof of . . . positive changes in his life.”
At the December 12, 2023 resentencing hearing, the court
stated its tentative ruling was to strike each of the one-year
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancements and
the five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement—a result
that would reduce Giovacchini’s sentence by eight years. The court
explained, in pertinent part:
“The Legislature in California has set forth [section] 1172.75,
which requires this court . . . to reevaluate even negotiated
settlements in the intent of the Legislature for the court to impose
lesser sentences.
“The court’s tentative in this matter is as follows: To strike
the one-year priors as imposed. Under [section] 1172.75, I believe
I’m required to do that. I do believe that the high term of eight
years with the strike admission is still appropriate. The 10-year
enhancement under [section] 12022.5 . . . should be imposed. And
counts 4 and 6, the court would still impose one-third the midterm
consecutive as to each of those counts. Again the midterm one-third
doubled up pursuant to the strike admission.
“I would exercise my discretion to strike the five-year
prior under [section] 667[, subdivision] (a)(1). I do think it’s

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appropriate . . . . Under [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c), the
direction of the Legislature is the court should strongly consider
dismissing prior conduct allegations such that the sentences are—
when they’re in excess of 20 years, and that is the case here.
“I also just believe that, in the interest of justice, it is
appropriate for the court to strongly consider striking five-year
priors when the same prior is used to double the base punishment
against the defendant, and that is the case in this matter.”
Following the court’s announcement of its tentative
ruling, Giovacchini’s counsel reiterated his request that the court
reduce the 10-year term imposed on the section 12022.5 firearm
enhancement. The court denied the request, explaining:
“The court recognizes its discretion to impose anything less
than the high term. However, as the People correctly point out in
their brief, under [section] 1172.75[, subdivision] (d)(2), the court
can impose the high term when the high term had been previously
imposed, particularly in this case when Mr. Giovacchini had
entered into a plea disposition to avoid the greater sentence.
[¶] . . . [¶] The court is going to select [the] high term on the
allegation under [section] 12022.5[, subdivisions] (a) [and] (d) . . .
for [10] years to be served consecutively in state prison.”
The court then adopted its tentative ruling as its final
decision and resentenced Giovacchini to an aggregate term of
21 years 4 months.
Giovacchini timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Giovacchini contends the trial court abused its discretion at
the resentencing hearing by declining to strike the 10-year firearm
enhancement. In particular, he urges the record demonstrates the
court misunderstood the scope of its discretion under section 1385

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because (1) the court failed to make an express finding that
striking the enhancement would endanger public safety, and
(2) his resentencing took place before the decision in Walker,
supra, which resolved a disagreement in the appellate court over
standards for striking or imposing sentence enhancements. We
are not persuaded.
The first argument fails because—as Giovacchini concedes—
“it is typically presumed from a silent record that a trial court
properly exercised its informed discretion.” (See, e.g., People v.
Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725 [a “[d]efendant’s citation
to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate
an abuse of discretion”].)
Giovacchini nonetheless insists this “presumption cannot
apply here” because “[t]his was not a situation where the trial court
was silent altogether”; instead, the court “made a point of listing
the mitigating circumstances it did consider when striking [the
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement,] yet failed to do so
when reimposing the firearm enhancement.” But he cites no
authority supporting this proposition. Moreover, his argument
ignores that, although section 1385 requires a court to “state[ ]
orally on the record” its reasons for striking an enhancement
(§ 1385, subd. (a)), “ ‘[t]he trial court is not required to state
reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385’
[citations].” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637,
italics added.) Rather, the court “ ‘is presumed to have considered
all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record
to the contrary.’ ” (Ibid.) The court’s decision to explain only its
reasons for striking the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement
thus is entirely consistent with section 1385’s requirements.
The second argument fails because Walker did not alter
the scope of the trial court’s discretion in a way that would benefit

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Giovacchini. Walker held only that, in determining whether
to dismiss an enhancement, a trial court must engage in a
“ ‘holistic balancing,’ ” with no formal presumption for dismissing
enhancements. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) And as set
forth, ante, nothing in the record suggests the trial court failed to
balance all appropriate factors or applied any formal presumption
for dismissing enhancements. Indeed, if the court had applied
a formal presumption in favor of dismissing enhancements,
that would have favored Giovacchini, not disadvantaged him.
We therefore conclude Giovacchini has failed to demonstrate
the trial court abused its discretion by reimposing the 10-year
term on the section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. Accordingly,
we affirm.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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