CourtListener 10681829•In re S.F. CA1/1
Texto completo
Filed 9/30/25 In re S.F. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re S.F. et al., Persons Coming A170028, A170728, A171093,
Under the Juvenile Court Law. A171461, A171571, & A171708
__________________________________
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN (San Francisco City & County
SERVICES AGENCY, Superior Ct. Nos. JD23-3361,
JD23-3361A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Y.F.,
Defendant and Appellant;
S.F. et al., a Minor, etc.,
Respondents.
After reports that appellant Y.F. (Father) was using harsh parenting
methods during his custodial time with his two older children, respondent
San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) intervened. The children
were placed with their mother (Father’s ex-wife, Mother), who ultimately
obtained a juvenile restraining order protecting both herself and the minors.
The juvenile court took jurisdiction of the minors and dismissed the case,
awarding custody to Mother. In these consolidated appeals, Father
challenges all appealable orders entered during the pendency of the
proceedings: the temporary restraining orders entered before the issuance of
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a permanent order, the final restraining order, and the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders. We reject his arguments and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Father and Mother were married and lived together from 2012 to 2019,
apparently mostly if not entirely in Santa Clara County. They had two
children, S.F. (Older Sister) and X.F. (Younger Brother). Mother later
reported that Father “spoke to himself a lot, every day.” According to
Mother, “Most of the time he [would] just call out random names, my name,
his manager’s name, whatever. Sometimes he [would] tell them things like, I
don’t like you, I love you, or I want to sleep with you, and he [would] call out
some name.” If Father ever said something bad about their two children,
Mother would ask him to stop, but he would usually ignore her. She later
told a social worker that she felt isolated when she was married to Father
because he did not want her to be with her friends and family and “didn’t like
other people,” which impacted her own mental health. She said Father also
did not want her to return to work after having children, and even after she
returned to work she was the one expected to clean and cook. She further
described “a lot of sexual demands, sexual coercion” (such as insisting on
having sex even when she did not want to or the kids were calling for her), as
well as at least one physical altercation.
Father left Mother at the end of 2019 and traveled to China. When he
returned in early 2020, he went to San Francisco and did not see his two
children for around two years, with the exception of a few phone calls.
During that time, he had a relationship with another woman, and that
woman in fall 2020 had Father’s third child (Younger Half Sibling), who is
not the subject of this appeal (post, fn. 1).
2
Family law proceedings regarding divorce and custody issues between
Mother and Father apparently took place over a period of around two years,
and they divorced in October 2023. The two older children started overnight
visits with Father around April 2022. According to Mother, Father would
yell at their children when there were disputes about issues in the divorce
proceedings. He also would say he would pick up the children at school on
the peninsula, but in fact he would direct the paternal grandparents to bring
them to his home in San Francisco by public transportation. That meant the
minors “had to walk in the night in San Francisco city, and they shared some
experience, they [felt] unsafe, they saw homeless, weird things happen on
their way to dad’s house.”
As visitation with Father increased, Younger Brother started to
accidentally wet himself more often, and in summer 2023 he was wetting
himself at least two to three times a day. As of late 2023, Father and Mother
shared equal custody of then 10-year-old Older Sister and then seven-year-
old Younger Brother. Father also sometimes had custody of then three-year-
old Younger Half Sibling.
All three minors came to the attention of the Agency in November 2023
when the paternal grandmother, who was then living with Father, reported
that Father was showing signs of obsessive compulsive disorder. According
to the grandmother, Father had started showing signs of anxiety and
obsessive-compulsive behaviors when he was a teenager, and they had gotten
worse since then. She told a social worker that Father “was not able to work
normally and [was] not able to live a normal life, that he had a high level of
anxiety, and that he was obsessive” (specifically, that he had obsessive-
compulsive disorder).
3
The grandmother reported how Father’s compulsive behaviors affected
his parenting style. Father was reported to be forcing Older Sister and
Younger Brother to spend hours cleaning the house, including sweeping the
floor; lifting up the sofa to clean underneath; and cleaning baseboards,
cupboards, the kitchen floor, the microwave, the oven, and the toilet. If the
children did not clean to Father’s satisfaction, he would point to those areas
and insist that the children clean them again. They also were expected to
take care of Younger Half Sibling (even if they themselves were sick),
including caring for her when she woke up in the night and potty training
her.
Father also reportedly made the older two minors undress in front of
him (and the paternal grandparents, if they were present) when they arrived
at his house and shower before they were allowed to touch anything in the
house. Since only one of the two bathrooms in Father’s home was designated
for showering, one of the children would have to wait naked―sometimes up to
40 minutes―while the other sibling showered, even if the waiting child was
“freezing cold.” Father would not allow the grandmother to wrap the waiting
child in clothing while waiting to shower. According to the grandmother, this
happened over the course of a year, as late as December 2023. And two or
three times when a child was done washing, the child would have to wait in
the bathtub for up to 30 minutes for Father to inspect the child, and Father
would not allow the grandmother to take the child out of the tub. She later
explained she believed that Father suffered from “severe mysophobia,” which
she described as “cleanness, cleanliness that is different from what every
other person does that he or she would have to clean up every spot there is.
[¶] He feels like . . . there are germs on to [sic] the children’s clothing, for
instance.”
4
The minors also apparently had to report to Father before and after
they used the bathroom for any reason, including describing to him the color
of their urine. In late November 2023 Younger Brother was sick and got up
in the middle of the night needing to relieve himself, but he felt he first
needed to report to Father. Younger Brother was not able to wake Father up
before he had diarrhea in his pants.
Father had a routine where the children would be required to run laps
(though he later denied that he forced them to run when they did not want
to). The maternal grandmother also reported that once when Younger
Brother complained of a stomach ache and sore throat, Father insisted
Younger Brother run laps as usual. He reportedly ignored the grandmother’s
protests that the boy be allowed to rest or he would end up in the hospital.
Later, the grandmother was allowed to buy over-the-counter medication to
treat what she believed were signs of food allergies, and Younger Brother felt
better after he was allowed to take the medicine. The paternal grandmother
felt “strongly” that the minors and Younger Half Sibling should be away from
Father, and that Father should receive mental-health services.
The children and the paternal grandmother also reported that Father
yelled frequently at the children, and one time when they were traveling on
Caltrain another passenger told Father to stop yelling at Younger Brother.
The grandmother said the yelling was not the “demeaning” type, but “his
volume is too high and the children, they were scared to the point of they are
about to cry and the sister, the older sister, is to the point of about to cry.”
Father had a “rigid schedule” for the minors, including a naptime when they
did not necessarily want to sleep, and they feared that Father would yell if
they did not comply with his demands.
5
When the minors would return to Mother after their time with Father,
the minors would cry and say they no longer wanted to visit Father. They
also looked anxious and nervous when Mother asked about their time with
Father. Further investigation revealed that Father told the children not to
discuss what happened when they were with him (something he later
denied), and that if anyone asked they should say to ask Father. The minors’
school reported that Younger Brother appeared sad and withdrawn, and one
time came to school with “very bad body odor” after spending time at
Father’s, possibly because he wet himself. Older Sister’s teacher said the girl
described living in what sounded like an “Army-like environment.” A social
worker interviewed both children at their school along with the school
principal and found both children’s description of incidents with Father to be
credible. Older Sister was “very clear” with the social worker that she was
scared of her father and that he yelled a lot. And when the worker asked
Younger Brother questions he did not want to answer, he would “repeatedly
blink[] his eyes nonstop,” consistent with what school officials had said he did
when he felt anxious.
Mother and Father argued over sharing physical custody of the
children around Christmas 2023. She later explained that Father texted her
multiple times and “[e]very message is pretty long. It’s usually like he’ll keep
sending me text[s], like five text messages. If I didn’t reply, he’ll call me.
Sometimes he said, if you don’t reply [to] me before, I will set a deadline I
will—he said he will go to the school and pick up the kids directly to his
house. [¶] But we already [had] verbally agree[d], I will send the kids to him
on Friday night because if he picks up the kids, they will take public
transportation, it’s hours of transportation, no food, no drinks. I feel like he
torture[s] the kids to punish me.”
6
The Agency in December 2023 filed a dependency petition as to both of
the older children1 under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2 The
petition was later amended multiple times.3 As later amended, the operative
petition alleged that the children were at a substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm or illness as a result of Father’s failure or inability to
adequately supervise or protect them (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)), as demonstrated by
various behaviors and parenting practices exhibited by Father. The petition
also alleged that the children had suffered serious emotional damage (§ 300,
subd. (c)) because of Father’s treatment.
Also in December 2023, Mother applied for an emergency protective
order in Santa Clara County family court. That court granted the request,
and a hearing on a temporary restraining order (TRO) was scheduled for
January 4, 2024, in family court. Then later in December, Mother also filed a
request in the juvenile court for a protective order to protect herself and the
minors.
At the detention hearing on December 21, 2023, Father’s counsel stated
he would submit on detention as to the older two children given that “there is
a TRO which is in existence,” presumably a reference to the TRO in effect in
the family law proceeding in Santa Clara County. The court asked about the
1 The Agency also filed a separate petition as to Younger Half Sibling,
and the two cases were joined in the juvenile court. The juvenile court
ultimately dismissed the petition filed as to the sibling before deciding
jurisdiction as to the older two siblings, and the younger sibling appealed the
dismissal. This court affirmed the dismissal in an nonpublished opinion. (In
re H.F. (Aug. 25, 2025, A171316).)
2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise specified.
3 Father filed a demurrer to the original petition, as well as to amended
versions. The juvenile court overruled the demurrers.
7
end date for the TRO and was told January 4, the date of the hearing set in
family court. The court stated it would take note of the TRO and that “I am
certain the Santa Clara Family Court will recognize that once a petition is
filed in a Juvenile Court, the Juvenile Court is the only one that has
jurisdiction over making orders regarding parents’ contact with children.
And I will address what we do on or about January 4th and with setting a
hearing and what we do with the temporary order that will expire on
January 4th.” The court ordered the minors detained and placed with
Mother. The court further directed that Father have no visitation pending
further proceedings regarding the court’s “ability to address the issues as
they were raised in front of the Santa Clara Court that resulted in the
granting of a [TRO].”
Later in the hearing, Mother’s attorney asked if Father would “waive
the extension of the temporary restraining order” until after a scheduled
settlement conference on February 15, 2024, and Father’s attorney agreed.
Mother’s counsel then “ask[ed] that the temporary restraining order be
issued and be valid effective until February 15th,” and the juvenile court
stated, “All right.” The court issued a TRO protecting Mother and the minors
until a hearing date of February 15 (later continued several times pending
the outcome of the hearing on the final protective order). The TRO previously
issued in family court expired on its own terms after the court was informed
of the order in these proceedings.
At some point after dependency proceedings began and the TRO had
issued, Father communicated through his mother to Mother that he would
accept $200,000 from Mother in exchange for her getting custody of their two
children.
8
Father in January 2024 filed a motion requesting that he be permitted
contact with the minors despite the TRO. At a January 31 hearing on the
request, the minors’ counsel objected to visitation and said that during
“extensive conversations,” the minors were “both quite articulate and very
clear that they have no desire to see their father at this time.” The court
denied the request and stated that Father should undergo a mental-health
assessment before visitation could begin.4
Father told a social worker that he “had ‘zero’ experience with mental
health issues” and that his regular doctor had never recommended he receive
therapy. He denied that he required the minors take off their clothes when
they entered his house and said that they took off their clothes to shower
after their daily outdoor exercise. Father also denied that the minors were
required to seek permission before using the bathroom. He said he focused
on giving his children more water after their pediatrician said during an
annual exam that the minors’ urine would be clear if they drank sufficient
amounts. Father also started tracking on a spreadsheet when Younger
Brother would pee and when he wet his pants because he was having issues
with urinating on himself. He said in the two weeks after he started tracking
the data points, Younger Brother had only one accident. Father continued to
track Younger Brother’s urine output and the color and frequency of his
accidents.
Father denied that the children were afraid of him and reported that
they were “very happy when they spend time with him.” When asked about
Younger Brother’s reported frequent blinking because of stress, Father
4 Father on March 18, 2024, filed a notice of appeal challenging the
issuance of a TRO on December 21, 2023, and the January 31, 2024 denial of
a “carve out” for visitation. (No. A170028.)
9
explained that the boy had lifelong allergies. A social worker later described
the contrast between Father’s and the minors’ description of time spent at
Father’s home. Father hung pictures the children had drawn and this was
“presented as they love drawing pictures for me,” whereas the minors
reported that Father “makes us do this and it’s—he asks us to present the
photos to him. [¶] So every task seems to have like a goal attached to it or a
performance, or a—just an aspect of structure, like this is what we’re going to
do now. Now you present it to me.” After Father started therapy, he
reportedly denied to his therapist all of the Agency’s allegations.
The Agency recommended in March 2024 that the juvenile court take
jurisdiction, then dismiss the matter with custody orders. The Agency also
recommended that Father undergo a psychological evaluation since there
were concerns that Father’s accounts of what occurred in his home with his
children and his relationships with the two mothers involved in the
proceedings were “not entirely genuine.”
At a brief hearing in March 2024, the juvenile court reissued its TRO,
to expire on April 15, 2024. Around this same time, Father filed a request to
end the restraining order as to him and the minors so that the court could
establish a visitation schedule for them. Father also filed a “Request for
Removal/Dismissal of Juvenile Court Restraining Order Issued 12/21/23.”
(Formatting omitted.)
Father engaged in supportive parenting services. He participated in
sessions at a child-trauma research program to work on his emotional
connection with his children. Father also took parenting classes and started
seeing a therapist. The therapist reported that Father “seem[ed] receptive to
learning new skills that will enhance his relationship with his children.” The
social worker reported that multiple providers observed that Father appeared
10
to love his children but needed to work on his understanding of their needs
and perspectives. The social worker later testified that Father was a “good
student” and “presents very well to everyone,” but she was concerned that “a
lot of the participation is on a more superficial level.” She explained that the
Agency was “not looking for a parent to check the boxes on a case plan. I
want him to be curious about his children’s experience. And thus far he
doesn’t believe them. He doesn’t believe that they’re feeling this way. He
doesn’t believe that they are fearful of him, that his behavior is doing
something to make them not want to spend time with him or feel comfortable
in his care.”
The Agency again recommended in an addendum report filed in
May 2024 that the court take jurisdiction over the minors, that joint legal
custody be granted to the parents with sole physical custody to Mother, and
that dependency be dismissed with visitation for Father. And the Agency
again recommended that Father participate in a psychological assessment to
determine whether there were any underlying mental-health needs to
address.
The juvenile court on May 7, 2024, addressed Father’s request to
dismiss the restraining order, among other motions. The deputy city
attorney stated that the Agency did not currently believe a restraining order
was necessary, but counsel for Mother and the minors disagreed and argued
the TRO should remain in place until evidence was presented. The juvenile
court denied the request to remove or dismiss the juvenile restraining order,
and it extended the TRO. But it modified the TRO “to provide an exception to
allow for brief and peaceful contact to communicate about the children for
Court ordered visits,” and it permitted Father to have contact with the
minors “during Court ordered contact or visits.” As for Father’s request that
11
he be allowed therapeutic visitation with the minors, the juvenile court
granted the request and ordered the Agency to arrange therapeutic,
supervised visitation with the minors. Father appealed from the order
continuing the TRO. (No. A170728.)
A combined hearing on jurisdiction and the restraining order began the
day after the hearing on motions. The social worker who conducted the
initial Agency response testified that her investigation revealed that Father
had a “very rigid routine for the kids” that involved cleaning the house for
four hours in the morning and running laps. The social worker was
concerned that “the environment that the father [was] creating for the
children [was] constantly instilling anxiety and fear to them, and . . . [was]
affecting their emotional health [and] well-being.”
The social worker assigned to the minors’ case after intake testified
that living with “violence and aggression in the home,” such as frequent
yelling, can have an “effect . . . on development and creat[e] anxiety,
depression.” Her “biggest worry of this case [was] that [Father] doesn’t worry
about his ability to have empathy for his children, to see their perspective
and for them to feel nurtured.” She further testified that “I think some of
father’s desires are genuine to do better, but I am not sure that he’s shown
that he’s capable at this time.” She believed that the older minors had
experienced trauma in Father’s care. She acknowledged that Father did well
in parenting classes, but he nonetheless did not reveal any insights into
himself as a parent or the way his parenting impacts his children.
The paternal grandmother testified about her observations of Father’s
parenting and her concerns about his mental health. When Father’s counsel
asked the grandmother on cross-examination whether she had devised a plan
with Younger Sibling’s mother to have the children removed so that Father
12
would be free to care for his parents, the grandmother testified, possibly
while tearing up, “You know, just take a good look at the two of us [an
apparent reference to herself and the paternal grandfather]. Do we look like
the ones that need his help, his care? It’s him, in fact, who needs our care,
our support. My heart is broken for him. You see how skinny my son is, how
thin he is? That’s why I want to care for him every day. I want to be able to
be there for him.” She acknowledged that she did not believe Father was
intentionally trying to hurt his children, but actions such as making the
minors undress when they entered his house was “a really bad habit of his
that it is his pet peeve. It is just going to the extreme.”
Mother also testified. When asked why she believed she needed a
protective order, she stated, “It has been so difficult to communicate. I think
his behavior was very controlling. If there is any disagreement, there will be
endless call, endless text. So it will never end until I agree with him. I think
it bothers me a lot.” Mother explained that Father would only stop calling
and texting her if she agreed with his demands or gave him more child-
support money. This made her feel “mentally harmed, harmed according to
previous experience during our marriage. So much controlling, coldness,
selfish.” Mother was further concerned that if there was no restraining
order, Father would continue trying to control the older two minors’ behavior.
She reported that Younger Brother gradually stopped wetting himself after
contact with Father ended. His performance and behavior in school also
improved. As for Older Sister, she became more relaxed and improved
academically.
Father testified and provided short video clips and pictures that he said
represented his time with his two older children. The court ultimately
admitted around 70 such exhibits from 2022 and 2023. Father described
13
activities he enjoyed with the children, such as baking; playing sports;
drawing; reading; and visiting the dining halls at University at California,
Berkeley, which Father described as the children’s “favorite place.” When
asked whether he ordered his children to take a shower when they entered
his home, Father testified, “No. No. I think it is pretty much a routine. Kids
will end of day they will take a shower.” On cross-examination, Father was
asked whether he believed his older two children knew the difference
between lying and telling the truth. As for Younger Brother, Father testified,
“Not fully,” and as for Older Sister, Father testified that “I would think she
would know if she is lying, although there is also a possibility her memory
could have been changed.”
As of a hearing held on June 4, 2024, the therapeutic visitation the
juvenile court had ordered the previous month had not begun, apparently
because of issues with insurance coverage. Because Mother was covered by
private insurance, it was unclear whether the Agency could make referrals or
whether they had to rely on Mother, and “there was a lot of run around”
between the public and private “systems.” The court directed Mother to
contact her insurance provider (which also covered the minors) to get a list of
referrals who could provide therapeutically supervised visitation and to
provide the list to the social worker. Apparently they tried one therapist but
then ended sessions due to a combination of the “overwhelming” amount of
time therapy took (one hour for each child, plus an hour with Mother) and the
fact the therapist was “pretty direct in asking about what [the minors have]
experienced with dad as opposed to building rapport so it just wasn’t a good
match.”
The social worker tried to arrange visitation, but there were challenges
since the minors lived in a different county from Father. When asked in late
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June 2024 if she wanted to visit Father, Older Sister “violently shook her
head, no, no, no.” Younger Brother also was not interested in visits with
Father because he was “afraid dad will yell.”
Father continued to engage in services on his own, including a
parenting group, individual therapy, and a fatherhood-support group. The
social worker reported that Father “attempts to present himself very well to
providers and there is rarely a misstep in his attendance or how he presents
himself or speaks to providers,” but “[t]here was little acknowledgement
regarding the children stating something made them uncomfortable, such as
undressing in a common area of the home or reporting to him when they had
to pee or the color of the urine.” The social worker acknowledged that “there
are a range of parenting response[s] to various issues,” but the Agency was
“concerned that [Father] chooses the extreme options that make the children
anxious or fearful.” The social worker acknowledged that, in general, there is
nothing objectionable about having structure and routine, but that “if you
look at each individual task that the father is asking them to do, that it
doesn’t seem as much of a problem, kids have chores in the home, the
exercise is good objectively. But when you put it all together and look at it
overall and how it’s clearly impacting the kids, like these kids are not just
complaining because they have to do chores or they’re being rebellious.
[¶] They are saying this is abnormal and it’s making us feel fearful and
scared and anxious. And they’re confused by it. They don’t understand the
rigidity, I think. [¶] So I think looking at it as the overall picture of father’s
needing to control each day and control their productivity and kind of control
his appearance to everyone else about the kids love cleaning and love telling
me about the color of their urine, the myriad of things that are laid out in the
allegation that he’s kind of presenting this picture perfect home.” The older
15
children also felt uncomfortable that Father was “constantly filming” them,
even when they were eating, and telling them they had to smile.
The juvenile court again addressed visitation at the end of a hearing in
early July 2024. At that point, Father had not seen the older minors for
seven months. The court said that if the previous order to have therapeutic
visitation could not be implemented, it would look for alternatives. The court
continued the case for around two weeks. Before the continued hearing, the
older two minors filed an opposition to Father’s proposed visitation. They
argued that the evidence provided so far indicated emotional abuse that
would make any visitation detrimental. Counsel reported that Mother had
scheduled therapy sessions for both children.
At a continued hearing on July 16, 2024, the juvenile court granted
Mother’s request for a reissuance of the TRO. As for visitation, Mother’s
attorney reported that Younger Brother had had one therapy session, and
Older Sister was scheduled to have one the following day. Mother also had
identified a family therapist who could eventually speak with the individual
therapists about starting therapeutic visitation. The juvenile court ordered
that Father be provided with weekly one-hour, professionally supervised
visitation with the older two minors, with family therapy to start when a
therapist was identified. And the social worker was granted discretion to
increase the length of visitation following the first visit, up to three hours.
Father appealed from the reissuance of the TRO following the hearing.
(No. A171093.)
The day after the court ordered visitation, the social worker visited the
minors to discuss seeing Father. Both children said they did not want to visit
and asked if Father would be picking them up and whether they would be
required to go to Father’s home. The social worker explained that Agency
16
staff would pick them up and the visits would occur in a park. Younger
Brother said it “feels like hell that we have to go visit him” and that staff
could “take him when he was in heaven because he can control everything
there.” Younger Brother tightly wrung his hands together during the visit, a
behavior the social worker had not previously observed, and Older Sister
cried after the social worker left.
When the social worker arrived at the home in late July to pick up the
minors for the scheduled visit, Mother had them ready to leave for the visit.
But the minors ran upstairs and said they did not want to go. Both children
reported having nightmares about Father, and Younger Brother said he
dreamed that Father stabbed him and killed him over and over but that he
would not die. The social worker left the home, and the visit did not take
place.
Another visit was scheduled for early August. The minors appeared
anxious and said they did not want to leave, and the social worker said they
would try again the following week. The third and fourth attempts at
visitation also were unsuccessful. Representatives of the Agency, the City
Attorney’s Office, the dependency unit, and the visitation unit decided in late
August to pause sending staff to the minors’ home since the attempts
“appeared to be only hardening the children’s decision in not wanting to visit
their father.” During a therapy session, Younger Brother drew a picture of
him and members of his family inside a bank and Father as a bank robber on
the outside. The Agency opined that in-person visitation between Father and
his older two children would be detrimental to them and not in their best
interest.
The juvenile court addressed visitation at the end of a hearing in
September 2024. Counsel for the Agency reiterated that visitation would be
17
detrimental to the children, and counsel for the minors and Mother agreed.
Father’s counsel argued that the Agency had violated the previous visitation
order and that Mother’s resistance had contributed to visitation not
occurring. The court ordered that visitation would be detrimental and
temporarily suspended it. The decision was based, not solely on the
children’s wishes, but also on the social worker’s assessment, input from
Younger Brother’s therapist, and writeups from various visitation
supervisors. The court ordered that both children continue in individual
therapy and that the social worker inform the therapists that restoring
Father’s visitation was a treatment goal. After the close of evidence on
October 2, the court continued the matter for closing argument and also
continued the TRO. Father appealed from both the September 12 and
October 2 orders reissuing the TRO. (No. A171461.)
Counsel for the Agency and for the minors urged the juvenile court to
take jurisdiction. Mother’s counsel also agreed that jurisdiction was
appropriate and asked the court to issue a permanent restraining order.
Father’s counsel, by contrast, asked the juvenile court to dismiss the petition,
deny the permanent restraining order, and “issue a nunc pro tunc on all the
temporary restraining orders issued in this case.”
The juvenile court ultimately sustained allegations in the operative
amended petition that the minors were children described by section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (c). The court concluded that “the totality of the
evidence show[ed] that [Father’s] behaviors add[ed] up to a pattern of over
controlling and rigid and unrealistic demands with an unwillingness to
compromise or a relentlessness as was described during testimony that do
bring [the minors] within the jurisdiction of this court.”
18
The court also issued a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO,
form No. JV-255) protecting Mother and the minors for three years. The
court provided an exception for “brief and peaceful contact” with Mother
regarding court-ordered visits, and for having contact or visits with the
children during court-ordered contact or visitation. The protective order
indicates that visitation had been ordered in the case, and describes it as
follows: “Therapeutic visitation as arranged by the Agency; however, visits
are currently suspended. The Agency shall develop a plan towards
visitation.” Father appealed from the restraining order. (No. A171571.)
Father continued in individual therapy every other week. The
therapist reported that he (the therapist) “provides a lot of education
regarding parenting,” and the two discussed activity planning and
approaches to discipline. The therapist tried to guide Father to “focus[] on
what has moved forward in the [dependency] case and next steps,” and that
Father said “he [was] open to hearing from the children about their
experience.” The Agency was concerned, however, about Father’s lack of
accountability and the fact that “[w]hile he states that he would like to hear
about the children’s experience directly from them, he does not appear to
believe their statements that they have made to their mother, the assigned
social worker, their attorney, their therapists, or teachers.”
The children continued to state that they did not want to visit with
Father. The Agency again recommended in a disposition report that the
minors live with Mother, that the petition be dismissed with legal and
physical custody to her, and that no visitation be ordered for Father. The
report stated that it did not appear productive to pressure the children to
have contact with someone they did not feel safe with, and it raised the
possibility of conjoint therapy or exchanges of letters in the future.
19
At the dispositional hearing in early November 2024, counsel for both
Mother and the minors stated they agreed with the Agency’s
recommendation. The juvenile court adjudged the children dependent minors
and found by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial
danger to the minors’ physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being if they were returned to Father’s care, and there were
no reasonable means by which they could be protected absent removal. The
court further concluded that because the children were safe in Mother’s
home, there was no need for ongoing dependency jurisdiction, and it
dismissed dependency proceedings. The court granted sole legal and physical
custody of the minors to Mother. The court further ordered that the minors
continue to participate in individual therapy, and that an ultimate goal was
for Father to have supervised therapeutic visitation with the children by
February 2025. Father appealed. (No. A171708.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A. We Shall Not Dismiss the Appeals of the Expired TROs, But We Will
Not Consider Interim Visitation Orders (Nos. A170028, A170728,
A171093, A171461).
Before we address the merits of the final restraining order against
Father, we consider whether some of Father’s appeals are now moot.
Although it is a close question, we conclude that it is appropriate to reach the
merits of the issuance of the TROs, but not the interim visitation orders.
The interim TROs, as well as orders declining to dissolve them, were
appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6) [orders granting, denying,
or refusing to dissolve an injunction are appealable]; Nakamura v. Parker
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 332; In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th
199, 208 [restraining order in dependency proceeding directly appealable to
20
the same extent as restraining order in civil action under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6)].) We asked Father to brief whether his challenge to the
TROs issued in these proceedings are moot, as the temporary orders expired
long ago.
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A
case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him [or her] any
effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements
must be met. First, the [appellant] must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the [appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
“This rule applies in the dependency context. (In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [‘the critical factor in considering whether a
dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error’].) A reviewing court must ‘ “decide
on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency
matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome
in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P. supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In
general, where the time period of an injunction elapses, any challenge to it is
rendered moot. (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1068, 1078–1079; Covina UnionHigh School v. Interscholastic Federation
(1934) 136 Cal.App. 588, 589.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent
discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. [Citation.] As a rule, courts
21
will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there
may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a
material question remains for the court’s determination.’ ” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
In A170028, A170728, A171093, and A171461, Father appealed from
the interim TROs entered before the issuance of the permanent restraining
order. In both his supplemental brief on mootness and in his opening brief,
he advances several reasons why we should reach the merits of these appeals
despite the fact they expired by their terms many months ago. The most
persuasive of these is that the existence of a restraining order could
potentially be used in family-law proceedings even after the order has
expired. (See Fam. Code, § 3044, subd. (a) [finding of domestic violence by
party creates rebuttable presumption that custody award to that party would
be detrimental to child’s best interest]; Cardona v. Soto (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 141, 147–148 [reviewing restraining order despite its
expiration since it may trigger adverse presumption in future proceedings].)
Since any family-law proceedings involving Father are separate from these
dependency proceedings, the record sheds little light on how, or whether, the
existence of the TROs was or will be used in those separate proceedings. But
the possibility is not so speculative that we will decline to consider any
arguments regarding the order.
The analysis is different for the portions of the orders appealed from
that addressed visitation. For example, Father in A170028 challenges both
the TRO and the order denying an exception to the TRO for visitation. But
there is no effective relief that this court could grant to Father even if we
agreed that visitation should have been granted at that stage in the
22
proceedings. The juvenile court later considered visitation to be appropriate
and, even though visitation was not ultimately successful, the court’s final
order contemplates future visitation. Any reversal of an interim order would
not rectify any ongoing harm. (Cf. D.P. supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
Likewise in A170728, Father appealed from a May 2024 order that
continued the TRO. Although we shall not dismiss the appeal as moot, we
decline to review the portion of the order that granted Father’s request that
he be allowed therapeutic visitation with the minors and ordering the Agency
to arrange therapeutic, supervised visitation with the minors, since that
ruling was favorable to Father. And as Father acknowledges, interim orders
on visitation are not separately appealable before the dispositional order and
are only cognizable in the appeal following disposition. (E.g., In re M.C.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 801.)
In sum, although we will consider the TROs in A170028, A170728,
A171093, and A171461, we will not consider ancillary orders issued at the
same time, even if they were arguably referred to in the notices of appeal.
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Issuance of the TROs and the Final
Juvenile Restraining Order.
Father argues that the TROs and restraining order issued against him
are not supported by sufficient evidence. The minors have filed a
respondents’ brief in support of the order, and the Agency takes no position.
1. The Applicable Law and the Standard of Review.
The restraining orders were issued under section 213.5. Subdivision (a)
of the statute permits a juvenile court in a dependency action to enjoin a
person from, among other things, “harassing” or “disturbing the peace of [a]
23
child.”5 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630 [juvenile court’s authority to
issue restraining order].) While evidence that a restrained person previously
has inflicted harm on a minor is sufficient to justify a restraining order under
section 213.5, “issuance of a restraining order does not require such evidence.
[Citations.] Nor does it require evidence of a reasonable apprehension of
future physical abuse. [Citations.] There need only be evidence that the
restrained person ‘disturbed the peace’ of the protected child.” (In re
Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997.) “In this context, disturbing the
peace means ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Different courts have applied different standards of review when
reviewing a restraining order in a dependency action. (Compare In re B.S.
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 [reviewing issuance of restraining order for
substantial evidence] with In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866
[factual findings supporting restraining order reviewed for substantial
evidence, while issuance of order reviewed for abuse of discretion].) The
approach in Carlos H. is consistent with our Supreme Court’s approach to
reviewing decisions made under the dependency statute governing selecting a
permanent plan (§ 366.26). In In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, the court
held that the factual elements of the beneficial-relation exception to adoption
5 The court may (1) enjoin a person from “molesting, attacking,
striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls
as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying the personal
property, contacting, either or directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise,
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child or
any other child in the household; and (2) exclude[] a person from the dwelling
of the person who has care, custody, and control of the child.” (§ 213.5,
subd. (a).)
24
are reviewed for substantial evidence, while weighing the various factors of
applying the exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–
640.) A similar approach is appropriate here, where the basis for a
restraining order involves “essentially a factual determination,” and the
decision to impose a restraining order involves “a delicate balancing of these
[factual] determinations as part of assessing the likely course of a future
situation that’s inherently uncertain.” (Id. at p. 640.) And, in any event, “the
practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very
pronounced.” (Id. at p. 641.) We review the evidence in a light most
favorable to respondent, and we indulge all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s order. (In re C.Q. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.)
2. Father Waived Objections to the Imposition of the Initial TRO
(No. A170028).
As we have said, Mother secured a TRO against Father in the Santa
Clara County family court, then sought protection in the San Francisco
juvenile court. At the detention hearing in December 2023, Father’s counsel
stated he would submit on disposition in light of the TRO in effect in Santa
Clara. And then when Mother’s attorney asked if Father would waive the
extension of the TRO until after a scheduled settlement conference, Father’s
attorney agreed, and the juvenile court entered a TRO until February 15,
2024 (around six weeks), apparently with no objection from Father.
On appeal, Father raises several objections to the issuance of the initial
TRO. He complains that the TRO in family court provided an insufficient
basis for the TRO in these proceedings; that Mother’s declaration in support
of the TRO in these proceedings consisted mostly of hearsay; and that the
grandmother’s declaration in support of the TRO was not translated from
25
Chinese by a certified translator but instead by Mother, who was not a
neutral party. And Father also argues that the evidence submitted was
insufficient to show either that the conduct alleged supported a TRO or that
the children should be protected parties. As none of these issues were raised
before the issuance of the original TRO and in fact Father did not object to
having it apply for a brief period of time, Father cannot raise them for the
first time in this appeal.
3. The Subsequent TROs Were Not Impermissibly Based Solely
on the Original Family Law DVRO (Nos. A170728, A171093,
A171461).
Two days before the original TRO was set to expire (February 15,
2024), Father submitted an official response to the request for a permanent
juvenile restraining order. He included a declaration complaining that the
allegations against him were based on hearsay and that there was no need
for a protective order in any event because he had never violated conduct
orders issued by the Santa Clara family court and did not contact his children
outside of court-authorized time. The TRO was continued until the
conclusion of the hearing on jurisdiction and the permanent restraining
order.
On appeal, without relying on any caselaw, Father argues that “[a]ll
these subsequent TROs were made with no additional findings, relying solely
on the original TRO which, in turn, relied on the expired, unsupported, ex
parte family law DVRO.” But this misrepresents the nature of how these
proceedings unfolded. For example, the Agency submitted a status report in
May 2024 stating that Father had completed intake with a child trauma
research program and had met with a psychologist. According to the
psychologist, “she did not see any safety issues” based on what Father had
shared “thus far.” At a hearing the next day, the juvenile court addressed a
26
request from Father to dismiss the TRO and asked whether the psychologist’s
statement about the lack of safety issues affected the need for a TRO.
Mother’s counsel argued that the TRO should not be dismissed without a
hearing since it was “important for the Court to see whether or not there is
merit, and decide that based on evidence rather than a procedural challenge.”
The minors’ counsel likewise argued that there were “very serious concerns
about the children[] . . . while in the care of their father” and that “a hearing
on any restraining order issues would be the only appropriate way for the
Court to evaluate the weight of the need for a restraining order.” As for
whether the psychologist’s statements affected counsel’s position, counsel
stated she had concerns about whether there was evidence about “the weight
of that opinion.” Following further argument from Father’s counsel, the
juvenile court denied the request to dismiss the TRO. But later in the
hearing, the juvenile court granted Father’s request for therapeutic
supervised visitation with the minors. The following day, the social worker
began her testimony. This was illustrative of the juvenile court’s process of
taking into consideration new information and weighing motions and
argument from the parties before extending the TROs, and not simply rubber
stamping the initial DVRO from family court, as Father suggests on appeal.
We reject his meritless challenges to the remaining TROs.
4. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Final Restraining Order
(No. A171571).
As for the final restraining order, there was abundant evidence that
Father’s controlling, intrusive parenting style caused the minors to fear him
and certainly disturbed their peace. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th
at p. 997.) And the evidence further showed that Father had a history of
abuse toward Mother that did not end after their divorce when they were
27
supposed to be working together on shared custody of the children, to the
point where Father would send “endless text[s]” and calls when they had
disagreements.
On appeal, Father does little to address the evidence presented over
several days at the hearing on the permanent restraining order. He first
complains that Mother was an improper subject of the order. He begins by
attacking the underlying allegations (as opposed to the supporting evidence).
He points to the custody-and-support order entered in the Santa Clara family
court establishing the parents’ shared custody and speculates that
“[p]resumably, if there had been any substance to [the allegations alleged in
this action], mother would have raised them earlier.” Again, this simply
ignores Mother’s testimony that she did not contact the Agency because she
had “lost at family law” but instead because she “heard a lot from [her] kids”
and “[t]heir experiences [with Father] were concerning.”6 The children
suffered anxiety as Father’s custodial time increased, and Younger Brother
struggled with bed wetting and eye blinking that diminished after he was
removed from Father’s care. In other words, the restraining order was
entered after testimony about events that postdated the orders entered in the
parents’ divorce proceedings. Father also discounts evidence that he isolated
Mother during their marriage as not being supported by substantial
evidence, but since there was testimony to support this point we must defer
to all reasonable inferences to support the order.
6 Following this testimony, Mother added that she “also heard from
grandma” and consulted with her family-court attorney, who advised her
what to do. The juvenile court then sustained a hearsay and nonresponsive
objection. The objection was presumably to Mother’s testimony about what
her attorney told her to do.
28
Finally, Father claims that the evidence was insufficient to include the
children in the protective order. He briefly asserts that the allegations in the
sustained petition did not amount to the type of abuse that would call for
protection by a restraining order. Again, though, the issuance of a
restraining order does not require evidence that a party has inflicted physical
harm on a protected child, but merely that the restrained person disturbed
the peace of the child. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.)
Viewing the restraining order in the light most favorable to affirming its
issuance, and in light of the substantial evidence supporting it, we reject
Father’s arguments.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Order
(No. A171708).
Father argues that the sustained allegations against him “are either
insufficient to support dependency as a matter of law, based on stale facts, or
unsupported by substantial evidence.” We are not persuaded by any of these
arguments.
To begin with, as we have said, Father challenged the allegations
against him by way of motions akin to a demurrer. (Ante, fn. 3.) “When the
facial sufficiency of a petition filed under section 300, subdivision (b) is
challenged on review, we construe the well-pleaded facts in favor of the
petition to determine whether the Agency pleaded that the parent or
guardian did not supervise or protect the children within the meaning of
section 300, subdivision (b). [Citations.] A facially sufficient petition ‘does
not require the pleader to regurgitate the contents of the social worker’s
report into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts
establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’ ” (In re
Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 108.) We review the sufficiency of the
29
pleading as we would a ruling on a demurrer, that is, as a matter of law. (In
re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.)
Father also argues that the jurisdictional findings were not supported
by substantial evidence. The court found that the minors were children
described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). We must affirm if there is
substantial evidence to support the court’s order. (In re A.G. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 675, 682.) That is, we must affirm if there is evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the order, resolving all
conflicts in favor of the order and deferring to the juvenile court’s
determination of credibility. (Id. at pp. 682–683.) “We have no power to
judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider
the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence. [Citations.]
Under the substantial evidence rule, we must accept the evidence most
favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not
having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.” (In re Casey D.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52–53, disapproved on another ground in In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636, fn. 5.)
“ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing
court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if
any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Because we conclude that substantial evidence
supported jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), we affirm. (See
30
In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103 [affirming jurisdictional order
after considering one of two grounds upon which juvenile court took
jurisdiction].)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides that the juvenile court may
take jurisdiction of a minor where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” as
a result of “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” “There are three elements to jurisdiction
under section 300: ‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified
forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the minor,
or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’ ” (In re Travis C. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225.) “The third element ‘effectively requires a
showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at
substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing
a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).’ ” (In re James R.
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
Father first argues generally that family court has procedures to
safeguard children, without the need to resort to dependency proceedings.
He cites to documents from the parents’ divorce proceedings that were
presented to the juvenile court. Father’s attorney questioned witnesses about
the divorce proceedings and argued to the juvenile court that the case should
have remained in family court. On appeal, Father ignores all the evidence,
which was substantial, that contradicted the assumption that this was
simply a custody dispute that should have remained in family court.
The two specific allegations the juvenile court sustained under
section 300, subdivision (b) were that (1) the minors are at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm or illness because of Father’s undiagnosed
31
mental-health issues and that (2) “Father’s undiagnosed psychological issues
manifest in an unhealthy, overly-rigid, stressful, and fear-inducing
environment for the children.” And the petition cited several examples
supporting those findings. On appeal, Father mischaracterizes those
examples in the same manner that he did below. For example, he insists that
in April 2023 he stopped asking the children to undress when they entered
his home after the issue was raised in family court. True, the paternal
grandmother testified that “there were a couple of instances where it [having
the children undress] stopped.” She continued, though, that “because of his
psychological profile, it kept going.” (Italics added.) Mother likewise testified
that having the children undress stopped “for a while” (“[a] little time”), and
she was “not sure if it [was] because of the Judge from the Family Court or it
is because [of] me discussing with [Father].” She then testified that the
undressing resumed, which is consistent with the grandmother’s testimony
that it occurred as late as December 2023. This testimony directly
contradicts Father’s argument that issues could adequately be addressed in
family court.
Father also suggests that allegations he yelled at the children and
forced them to run laps “necessarily were not current” since the children had
not seen Father for several months by the time the jurisdictional allegations
had been sustained. This of course was because of the TROs and the
difficulty in encouraging the minors to attend court-ordered visitation.
Father seems to suggest that if a parent’s conduct ends because children are
removed from the parent, it could never be proven that there was a current
risk of harm since the parent has not had custody of the children, a
suggestion we reject. Specifically, we disagree with Father’s appellate
assertion that it “strains credulity” that he would continue his behaviors,
32
given the services he engaged in. Again, this simply ignores all the evidence
that Father lacked any insight into his parenting despite all those services.
Father also spends several pages of his opening brief to listing the
individual supporting examples of risk of harm and arguing that each,
individually, were both insufficient as a matter of law to support dependency
jurisdiction and also were unsupported by substantial evidence. His trial
attorney took the same approach in the juvenile court, asking the social
worker about whether each individual allegation amounted to child abuse.
On redirect, the social worker explained that “I think it’s important to look at
the pattern of behaviors as a whole and the petition as a whole and the
impact on the kids of increasing fear and anxiety in them and not
understanding why dad is treating them that way. [¶] So I think that goes
back to the kids, now that they’re not having contact with dad, feeling
comfortable talking about how they’re feeling and how his behaviors have
impacted them, feeling safe to do so.” (Italics added.) Father on appeal again
fails to view the impact that all the allegations, taken together, had on his
children.
So, for example, Father points to the sustained allegation that he talks
to himself and yells out random names in his home. We accept his argument
that, standing alone, this allegation may be insufficient to establish
dependency jurisdiction. And perhaps the other examples of Father’s
untreated mental-health issues, standing alone, might not be enough. But
taken together, they established a pattern of Father making unrealistic and
inappropriate demands of his children―such as over-monitoring their bodily
functions, making them undress at inappropriate times and locations, forcing
them to exercise and do chores in a manner that was not age-appropriate and
in at least one instance jeopardized Little Brother’s health―that led them to
33
fear him. These findings are all the more serious in light of the evidence
presented that Father had gained no insight into how his behavior affected
his children and did not acknowledge that his behaviors were at all
objectionable.
Counsel for the Agency argued below that Father had “pedantic”
responses to questions about the effect he had on his children, and his
appellate arguments follow a similar approach. He contends that having a
child run laps “even if [the] child is ill, does not subject a child to serious
physical harm,” and he quibbles about how many laps he had the children
run and whether Younger Brother had the flu or merely suffered allergies
when he was forced to exercise. Again, this shows a remarkable lack of
insight into the effect Father had on his children, and it ignores that the
paternal grandmother was so concerned about the forced exercising that she
feared Younger Brother would be hospitalized if he were not allowed to rest.
We agree with the Agency that Father’s main complaint is that the juvenile
court “refused to accept [his] biased interpretation and narrative of the facts
of this case, and he is essentially asking this Court to reconsider the evidence
and draw different inferences from the facts and testimony than the juvenile
court,” something we are not permitted to do. (In re Casey D., supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52–53.)
In sum, there was substantial evidence that the children were at
current risk of a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of Father’s
inability to care for them.
34
D. Substantial Evidence Supports the Dispositional Order
(No. A171708).
Finally, Father challenges the dispositional order removing the minors
from his care and awarding sole custody to Mother. We once again conclude
that substantial evidence supports the order.
A child adjudged a dependent minor shall not be taken from the
physical custody of his or her parents unless the juvenile court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that there “is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) At the
time of removal, the court shall determine “whether reasonable efforts were
made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their
home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) The juvenile court has the discretion “to terminate
its jurisdiction at the close of a disposition hearing when it finds services and
continued court supervision are not necessary to protect the child.” (In re
Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 208.)
We review a dispositional order removing a child from parental custody
for substantial evidence, keeping in mind the juvenile court was required to
make its finding based on clear-and-convincing evidence. (In re I.R. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) Removal “is a last resort, to be considered only
when the child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent. The
law requires that a child remain in parental custody pending the resolution of
dependency proceedings, despite the problems that led the court to take
jurisdiction over the child, unless the court is clearly convinced that such a
35
disposition would harm the child.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
522, 525.)
On appeal, Father advances the same theory—unsupported by the
evidence—that he unsuccessfully advanced below, that the origins of the case
were “highly suspect” because it arose shortly after the parents’ divorce
became final and because the paternal grandmother reported his behavior
only after she saw a therapist “[a]pparently with no prior need for therapy.”
And he selectively quotes excerpts from testimony to support his claim that a
“logical inference” to be drawn is that Mother “launched this dependency case
to secure additional leverage over [F]ather.” This supposed tie to divorce
proceedings was explored when Father’s counsel cross-examined Mother, and
the juvenile court impliedly rejected this inference when issuing its
dispositional order. Father also states that he “dutifully participated in all
programs and therapy, learning from those efforts”—again ignoring evidence
that he was simply going through the motions and not internalizing any
lessons. As with Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional order, he essentially
asks this court to reweigh the evidence and draw different inferences from
the evidence, something we are not permitted to do.
We likewise reject Father’s argument that there was no substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable efforts were
made to prevent removal since he was not able to visit with the children.
“[R]easonable efforts, like reasonable services, need only be reasonable under
the circumstances, not perfect.” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725.)
Father again claims that he was wrongfully denied visitation at the outset of
the case because of a supposedly inappropriate TRO, an argument we already
have rejected. True, the Agency ultimately was unable to facilitate the
visitation later ordered by the juvenile court since the minors adamantly
36
refused visitation despite Mother preparing them for scheduled visits. Given
the social worker’s repeated efforts to arrange and facilitate visitation, we
cannot say that the Agency’s efforts were unreasonable. The case is
distinguishable from In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504–
1505, upon which Father relies, both because the juvenile court here did not
delegate discretion over visitation to a third party and because the lack of
visitation did not result in the termination of Father’s parental rights. To the
contrary, the exit order contemplates visitation between Father and his
children.
Given all the evidence presented to the juvenile court, its dispositional
order is supported by substantial evidence.
III.
Disposition
In Nos. A170028, A170728, A171093, and A171461, the temporary
restraining orders are affirmed.
In A171571, the restraining order is affirmed.
In A171708, the jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
37
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
In re S.F. A170028, A170728, A171093, A171461, A171571, A171708
(Consolidated)
38
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