People v. Castro CA2/3

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Filed 9/29/25 P. v. Castro CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337183

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA125696)
v.

JUSTIN DOMINIC CASTRO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Justin Castro of attempted murder. On
appeal, Castro contends there was insufficient evidence to
support that conviction, and instead, the evidence shows he acted
in self-defense. Because there was sufficient evidence to support
the judgment, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at Castro’s trial
On the morning of September 2, 2020, around 8:00 a.m.,
Pedro Gonzalez was doing construction work at a hospital in
Baldwin Park. While walking to get supplies, he noticed a man
wearing a dark or gray hoodie at the bus stop. Gonzalez got his
supplies and was walking back through the parking lot when he
saw a car pull up and two men who looked like they were going to
fight. All of a sudden there was a shooting. The shooter was the
same man Gonzalez had seen at the bus stop. To Gonzalez, it
sounded like the shooter’s gun jammed after shots were fired, and
the shooter cursed when it happened. The shooter walked to a
black car that a woman was driving, yelled at her to shut up, and
pointed a gun at her. The man who was shot, Danny Pinion, ran
toward the hospital’s entrance. Gonzalez never saw Pinion with
a gun. Two days after the shooting, Gonzalez identified Castro
from a photographic six-pack as the shooter.
Nora Ortega was working at the hospital’s outdoor flu clinic
that day. In a statement she gave to police soon after the
shooting, Ortega said a man in white shorts, Pinion, got out of a
car, and a second man in gray shorts had a gun. Pinion put his
hand in his pocket, but Ortega did not know if he was going to
pull something out. At some point, the man in gray shorts
started shooting. The shooter in gray shorts ran to a hilly grass

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area and fell. When the shooter saw Pinion walking toward him,
the shooter started shooting again.1
Alan Olgren was parked at the hospital that morning,
waiting for his wife. He heard gunshots and saw a man running
on the grass, “kind of like shooting backwards.” The man fell,
and a wallet and cellphones fell out of his pocket. Olgren
recovered the items, which included Castro’s debit and
identification cards.
A 911 caller said that the “suspect firing the gun” walked
down Baldwin Park Boulevard, and the victim got into a black
car. A second 911 caller referred to “a gunman” running toward
Amar Road.
Surveillance footage from the hospital showed Castro on
the sidewalk alongside the hospital. (Peo. Ex. 12.) When Pinion
arrived at the hospital and exited the car, Castro changed course,
walked across a grassy area, and ran toward Pinion, who had just
exited the car. Castro shot in Pinion’s direction as Pinion ran
away, with Castro in pursuit.
Pinion was treated for a gunshot wound to the abdomen.
He refused to speak to law enforcement.
At about 8:15 a.m., soon after the shooting, Estella
Amezcua was at her apartment on Amar Road in Baldwin Park.
Castro entered her apartment, pointed a gun at her, and
demanded that she hide him. Amezcua said she would hide him
in the outside laundromat, but she locked the door when Castro
exited the apartment.

1
At trial, however, Ortega said the two men exchanged
words and shot at each other. She also said that the man who
shot first wore a gray sweater, rather than gray shorts.

3
Eduardo Moreno also lived at the apartment complex on
Amar Road. At about 8:15 a.m., he was walking to his apartment
when Castro ran up to him and asked for a ride. Moreno refused,
saying his kids were alone. Castro pointed a gun at Moreno and
demanded his wallet and keys. Moreno gave his wallet and car
keys to Castro, but Castro did not take Moreno’s car, apparently
because he could not operate it.
Around this same time, Carlos Castillo was in his car at the
apartment complex, getting ready to leave for work. Castro
pointed a gun at Castillo and forced Castro to drive him to a
specific area.
Then, around 6:00 p.m.,2 Benjamin Lieu was working at a
store in Rosemead. Castro refused to pay for cigarettes, pointed a
gun at Lieu, and said he would pay another day.
At about 7:00 p.m., Oscar Perez Conchas was outside his
house in Pico Rivera. While Conchas was washing his car, Castro
pointed a gun at him and asked for Conchas’s car keys. Conchas
gave his keys and cellphone to Castro, who left in Conchas’s car.
Castro returned to the apartment complex on Amar Road,
where he was arrested in the late evening. A gun was found on
the apartment complex’s roof. After his arrest, Castro told law
enforcement that he was a member of the South Side Sangra
gang in San Gabriel.
Cartridge casings recovered from the hospital where Pinion
was shot were fired from the gun found at the apartment
complex.

2
Although the reporter’s transcript states that the robbery
occurred at 6:00 a.m., it appears that the robbery occurred in the
evening.

4
II. Verdict and sentence
Castro was tried by a jury. The trial court instructed the
jury on attempted murder and on self-defense.
The jury convicted Castro of attempted murder and found
true premeditation and gun use allegations (Pen. Code,3 §§ 187,
subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c); count 1); first degree
burglary, person present, and found true a personal gun use
allegation (§§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21), 12022.5, subd. (a); count 3
[Amezcua]); two counts of second degree robbery and found true
personal gun use allegations (§§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b); counts 4
[Moreno] & 7 [Lieu]); kidnapping for carjacking and found true a
personal gun use allegation (§§ 209.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd.
(b); count 5 [Castillo]); and carjacking and found true a personal
gun use allegation (§§ 215, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b); count 6
[Conchas]).4
On April 17, 2024, the trial court sentenced Castro. It
struck all five-year prior allegations under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The trial court then sentenced Castro to
consecutive 25 years to life sentences on each count, plus 20 years
on count 1 for the gun enhancement, 3 years for the 12022.5,
subdivision (a) enhancement on count 3, and 10 years on each of
the gun enhancements on counts 4, 5, 6, and 7. His total
sentence therefore was an indeterminate term of 150 years to life
plus a determinate term of 65 years.

3
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

4
The People dismissed count 2 before trial.

5
DISCUSSION
Castro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his attempted murder conviction, contending that the evidence
instead shows he acted in self-defense. As we now explain, this
contention rests on a misunderstanding of the standard of review.
That standard of review requires us to “ ‘review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably
could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
[Citation.] A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor
reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S.
307, 318–319.) Our “task is not to resolve credibility issues or
evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence
might ‘ “ ‘be reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s
innocence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278;
accord, People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 12 [reversing
court of appeal that reweighed evidence].)
The same standard of review applies to cases where the
prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820; People v. Brooks (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1, 57 [substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it].) “ ‘An

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appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of
fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’
[Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside
for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that
on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].’ ” (People v.
Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
To sustain a conviction for attempted murder, there must
be sufficient evidence of the defendant’s “ ‘specific intent to kill
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019)
7 Cal.5th 591, 602; People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739
(Smith).) Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are
essentially the same. (Smith, at p. 739.) Express malice requires
a showing that the defendant either desires the result of death or
knows, to a substantial certainty, death will result. (Ibid.)
Rarely is there “ ‘direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such
intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the
attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’ ” (Id. at p. 741.)
There is sufficient evidence that Castro intended to kill
Pinion. Although Castro frames this incident as mutual combat
or self-defense, the evidence supports a different interpretation.
Per the video surveillance, Castro crossed a grassy knoll to get to
Pinion, who was being dropped off at the hospital. Castro thus
went out of his way to confront Pinion. On doing so, Castro
almost immediately shot at Pinion. Castro also appeared to shoot
at the fleeing Pinion. Castro thus shot at Pinion multiple times.
Such purposeful firing of “a lethal weapon at another human
being at close range, without legal excuse, generally gives rise to
an inference that the shooter acted with express malice. That the

7
shooter had no particular motive for shooting the victim is not
dispositive, although again, where motive is shown, such
evidence will usually be probative of proof of intent to kill. Nor is
the circumstance that the bullet misses its mark or fails to prove
lethal dispositive—the very act of firing a weapon ‘ “in a manner
that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on
target” ’ is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill.”
(Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742; see also People v. Thompkins
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365, 384, 396 [manner of shooting—
“open[ing] fire” on restaurant patrons after shooter’s companion
was told to leave—supported intent to kill].)5
Castro, however, argues that the evidence supports only
the conclusion that he acted in self-defense. As to that defense,
the jury was instructed that Castro acted in lawful self-defense if
he (1) reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of being
killed or suffering great bodily injury, (2) reasonably believed
that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend
against that danger, and (3) used no more force than reasonably
necessary to defend against that danger. (CALCRIM No. 505; see
generally People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–
1083.)
To support this defense, Castro relies primarily on Ortega’s
trial testimony that the two men exchanged words and had a
shootout. However, Ortega’s testimony was at times confusing or
contradictory, because she also could not recall and was not sure
if she actually saw Pinion with a gun and was also not sure if
there was a mutual shootout. Moreover, other evidence showed
that only Castro had a gun. Gonzalez saw only Castro with a

5
Disapproved on other grounds by In re Lopez (2023) 14
Cal.5th 562, 584.

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gun. Ortega’s statement to law enforcement soon after the
incident mentioned only one shooter. The two 911 callers also
suggested there was only one shooter: one caller referred to the
“suspect,” singular, who was “firing the gun” and the second
caller similarly referred to “a gunman.” (Italics added.) And all
casings found at the hospital crime scene were fired from the gun
recovered at the apartment complex where Castro was arrested.
Evidence that only Castro fired a gun thus undercuts his
argument that there was a mutual shootout during which he shot
Pinion before Pinion could shoot him.
This evidence, including Ortega’s differing statements, was
presented to the jury, and the jury clearly rejected that Castro
acted in self-defense. We may not usurp the jury’s role by
reweighing evidence, reevaluating witnesses’ credibility, and
resolving credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts to reach a
different result. (See generally People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 890.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

HANASONO, J.

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