People v. Cravens CA4/1

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Filed 9/25/25 P. v. Cravens CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083539

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD206917)

SETH CRAVENS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David M. Gill, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct. assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley, Warren J. Williams and Evan Stele, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Seth Cravens appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing

pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6. After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the petition. Cravens claims (1) the court
failed to make an independent finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
guilty of implied malice murder, and (2) the evidence of implied malice was
insubstantial. He asks us to reverse the court’s order denying his petition.
Finding no error, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2007, the San Diego County District Attorney charged Cravens
with the murder (§ 187) of Emery Kauanui and several other crimes not
relevant here. Kauanui died after Cravens punched him so hard he fell and
cracked his head on a concrete road. Kauanui was the fifth person Cravens
had punched in the face without warning over the course of the preceding two
years. The case was tried to a jury in October 2008.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
I.

Evidence Adduced at Trial2
Because the issues in the underlying petition for resentencing involve
Cravens’ murder conviction only, we limit our factual recitation to
circumstances relevant to that crime.
A. Prior Similar Offenses
“In October 2005, [Cravens] and one or two other people approached
Eric Pardee outside a party. They were on the curb; Pardee was at street
level. Pardee did not remember any arguing or even talking before [Cravens]
jumped off the curb and delivered a sucker punch that knocked Pardee, who
was six feet tall and weighed 155 pounds, unconscious and broke his
cheekbone in multiple places.
“At another party on December 31, 2005, [Cravens] bumped into Ryan
Granger and spilled a drink on Granger. When Granger asked, ‘Dude, what’s
up?,’ [Cravens] threatened to instigate a fight and demanded Granger
apologize. Granger tried to ignore [Cravens] and turned his face away, but
[Cravens] sucker punched him from the side and knocked him down.
Matthew Yanke then told Granger, who was five feet 10 inches tall and
weighed around 170 pounds, ‘You better get the hell out of here.’

2 Our summary of the trial record is quoted directly from People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500 (Cravens). Cravens is a prior decision by the
California Supreme Court in the instant case. We quote from our high court’s
factual summary not only for convenience, but also because Cravens
specifically addresses the Court’s factual findings and conclusions as part of
his insubstantial evidence argument. In compliance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), we have conducted an independent review of the relevant
portions of the record, and we do not rely on the Court’s prior appellate
opinion for the factual findings necessary to resolve the issues presented
here.

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“In August 2006, Shannon O’Neill sought to stop a fistfight between
[Cravens] and her boyfriend, Christopher Jarrett, at Windansea Beach.
[Cravens] hit her in the face with a closed fist and knocked her into the sand.
“And on May 8, 2007, about two weeks before the murder, [Cravens]
sucker punched Michael Johnson, without any warning whatsoever, outside
The Shack Bar and Grill. Christopher Horning, Johnson’s coworker, testified
that [Cravens] stepped right up to Johnson and knocked him right in the face
with ‘as much force as you can possibly give a person.’ Horning wanted to
stop the violence, but one of [Cravens’] companions said, ‘[Y]ou don’t want to
get hurt. Stay out of it.’ Johnson stood there in a daze and said nothing.
[Cravens] taunted the disoriented Johnson and then punched him again,
‘[j]ust full out hit him as hard as you can.’ Johnson fell to the ground. His
nose was broken at an angle.” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 510.)

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B. Kauanui Offense
Cravens, “then 21 years old, and the decedent, . . . Kauanui, 24, were
. . . at the La Jolla Brew House on the night of May 23, 2007. Kauanui, a
professional surfer, was sitting at the bar and drinking with some friends
while he waited for his girlfriend, Jennifer Grosso, to arrive. Grosso left work
late and got to the bar between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m. to find her boyfriend in
a ‘[v]ery cheerful’ mood. About half an hour later, [Cravens] arrived with his
friends, all former football teammates from La Jolla High School: Eric House,
Matthew Yanke, Orlando Osuna, and Henri ‘Hank’ Hendricks. Grosso went
up to say ‘hi’ to [Cravens] and gave him a big hug. [Cravens] and his friends
approached the bar where Kauanui was seated and became ‘like . . . a big
group’ where people were standing close to each other, ‘kind of elbow to
elbow.’
“Sometime later, Kauanui and Grosso started dancing next to the
tables. Kauanui had a full drink in his hand. A little bit of it spilled
accidentally on Eric House, who was close by. House complained, ‘You better
watch out, you know. I can knock you out with one punch.’ Kauanui replied,
‘[W]hat? Like, what did you say?’ [Cravens] stepped in and said, ‘Yeah. You
know [House] could beat your ass. Like don’t say anything.’ The mood
became more aggressive, less joking, but Kauanui kept asking, ‘[D]o you guys
have like a problem?’ In an effort to defuse the worsening situation, the bar
manager, Ron Troyano, intervened and eventually suggested that Kauanui
leave. Troyano explained that Kauanui was not being kicked out but that it
was easier to remove Kauanui than to evict [Cravens], who was there with
many friends. When Kauanui, who appeared calm, expressed a fear of being
‘jumped’ outside, Troyano said he would escort Kauanui to his car. [Cravens]
attempted to follow them as they left the bar, but Troyano told him twice to

5
stop and wait. While Troyano was still at the vehicle, Grosso (who had been
settling the tab) came out and said she would drive Kauanui home. Grosso
had consumed less than one drink; Kauanui had consumed three or four.
[Cravens], House, Yanke, Osuna, and Hendricks eventually came outside to
continue the argument, but Grosso and Kauanui drove off in Kauanui’s car.
“Kauanui was on the phone as Grosso pulled up to Kauanui’s house a
couple minutes later. She heard him say, ‘If you want to fight me one on one,
I’ll fight you.’ She yelled at him to get off the phone. He did so, and they
went inside together. She scolded him for acting in an immature manner.
He apologized, admitted the situation was ‘dumb,’ and ‘completely went back
into a just really calm behavior.’ Satisfied that he was contrite, Grosso felt
able to walk back towards the bar to retrieve her own car, which was parked
illegally in a nearby lot. He made her promise to come back and said he
needed her.
“Grosso started out by walking but then realized the risk in being out
alone at that time of night and jogged the rest of the way. Unable to shake a
bad feeling about what might happen, she picked up the pace and, as she was
running down the alley near the bar, heard [Cravens] say, ‘Let’s go fuck him
up. . . . [D]on’t call him. Don’t call him. I know where he lives. Let’s go fuck
him up.’ She screamed out [Cravens’] name, but he and his friends sped past
in a black Ford Explorer, ignoring her. She immediately tried to call
Kauanui, but he did not answer. She ducked her head into the Brew House
to tell her friends that Kauanui was going to get jumped. Then she ran to her
car and raced back to the house. She figured she was one to two minutes
behind [Cravens] and his friends. Meanwhile, inside the Ford Explorer,
[Cravens] was egging on and encouraging House to fight Kauanui. The fight
began promptly after [Cravens] and the others exited the Explorer.

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“There was conflicting testimony as to whether the fight was truly a
one-on-one battle between Kauanui and House or whether Kauanui was
instead the victim of a group beating.
“Neighbor Erica Wortham was awakened by loud voices out in the
street. She saw four people approaching Kauanui with the apparent
intention of fighting. As she left her balcony to call 911, she heard ‘a lot of
blows, a lot of hitting. Like a maul. . . . [L]ike several people on top of each
other hitting. . . . [R]eally awful. Like a soundtrack out of a movie.’ The 911
call awakened her husband, Philip Baltazar, who saw what looked like a
rugby scrum: ‘What I saw were four guys on top of one guy, and four guys
were either kicking or punching or elbowing or kneeing. And as I said, you
know, it was moving. . . . [I]t was like a scrum line. And they were just
whaling—four guys were just whaling, you know, on someone who turned out
to be [Kauanui].’
“Dylan Eckardt, who was friends with Kauanui and was driving
towards Kauanui’s house after receiving a frantic phone call from his friend
that there was going to be a fight, saw a few men circled around Kauanui,
kicking or hitting him while he was on the ground. Eckardt’s girlfriend,
Karen Loftus, saw four or five people punching or kicking Kauanui while he
was on the ground.
“On the other hand, [Cravens’] friends and former teammates Matthew
Yanke and Hank Hendricks claimed that the fight was between House and
Kauanui alone. Yanke testified that Kauanui came out swinging, but that
House ducked, tackled Kauanui around his legs, and brought him down to
the ground. Hendricks confirmed that House tackled Kauanui and brought
him to the ground. Yanke described a wrestling match, in which House and

7
Kauanui took turns being on top. Hendricks said that House initially had the
upper hand but that Kauanui later had the advantage.
“In any case, House had the advantage when Grosso drove up. House
was straddling Kauanui and punching him with both fists. Kauanui had one
arm wrapped around House’s shoulder, as though attempting a headlock, but
it was not working. Grosso honked her horn to wake up the neighbors, but
the beating continued. Kauanui was not yelling, he was not throwing any
punches, and ‘[t]here was no strength being exerted from his body.’ Grosso
ran up and kicked House in an effort to break up the fight, but House did not
react to her other than to tell his friends to ‘get her the fuck off of me.’
Hendricks pulled Grosso away, but she continued to scream out their names
and vow that they would go to jail. When this still failed to stop the fight, she
started to kick at the headlights and pound on the body of the Ford Explorer.
The group then started talking amongst themselves, calling her ‘crazy’ and
suggesting it was time to leave.
“Meanwhile, Kauanui had managed to get loose, but he was unsteady
and could not walk straight. Loftus was surprised he was able to get up at
all. Kauanui asked [Cravens], ‘How the fuck are you going to jump me at my
house?’ and raised his palms upward, as though as ‘what happened?’ He was
not behaving in an aggressive manner. But [Cravens] nonetheless ‘came
flying out’ and “coldcocked’ Kauanui. At the time of the blow, [Cravens] was
on the curb and Kauanui was at street level. Grosso, Eckardt, and Hendricks
opined that Kauanui was unconscious from the blow before he hit the ground.
The punch was described by witnesses as ‘extremely hard’ and ‘one of the
hardest punches I’ve ever seen thrown.’ Eckardt added that ‘[i]t was a
knockout. . . . [A]ll you heard was like boom, like, from his head hitting the
concrete. Nothing else hit first. It was like a side punch [Kauanui] didn’t

8
see.’ Even the neighbors could hear the sound of his skull hitting the ground.
A pool of blood started to stream from the back of Kauanui’s head. Grosso
thought ‘he was dead right then and there.’ Hendricks checked Kauanui’s
pulse to determine whether he was still alive.
“When Grosso asked [Cravens] why he did this, [Cravens] had no
reaction. Instead he said to his friends, ‘Come on. Let’s go.’ Yanke drove
[Cravens] away in the Ford Explorer. Grosso testified that the Explorer
drove away quickly. Hendricks and Osuna left on foot. House refused to
leave; he was on all fours on the ground looking for his tooth. (At the time
police took him into custody, House had suffered a laceration above his right
eye and a missing tooth, as well as abrasions to his knees and swollen
knuckles.) An ambulance took Kauanui to the hospital. Kauanui had a
blood-alcohol level of 0.17 percent when he was admitted, and his blood
contained traces of marijuana.
“At the hospital, doctors performed a craniotomy (an operation to open
the skull) and a craniectomy (removal of part of the skull to release pressure).
However, the pressure on Kauanui’s brain remained high, despite maximal
therapy, surgeries, and medications. The brain injury continued to worsen,
and Kauanui was pronounced brain dead on May 28, 2007.
“Christina Stanley, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy,
described a skull fracture that radiated down into the base of the skull,
spanned 15 centimeters across multiple bones, and ended up quite far
forward on Kauanui’s head, just behind the eye sockets. The entire left side
of his brain was swollen and had shifted over prior to surgery, cutting off one
of the blood vessels supplying the right half of the brain. According to her
testimony, the more swelling there is, the less blood flow there is, which leads
to more swelling—and, over a period of days, to brain death. Kauanui’s

9
injuries were consistent with being punched by someone coming off a greater
height and propelling him onto a concrete surface. In Stanley’s experience,
the severe injuries Kauanui suffered—a fracture through the bony structures
containing the ear canal, which are one of the thickest areas of the skull—can
be seen in victims of motor vehicle crashes or in those struck in the head with
a hammer, baseball bat, or tire iron. Kauanui’s other injuries (abrasions and
bruises on his arms, knees, shoulder and back) were not life threatening and
were consistent with an assault. The cause of death was blunt-force head
injuries.
“Yanke, testifying for the defense, claimed that Kauanui ‘uppercut’
House several times while House was repeatedly saying ‘I’m done.’ On the
other hand, Hendricks, another defense witness, recalled that House said,
‘You got me. You got me. It’s over. It’s over,’ while he and Kauanui were
holding each other like boxers in the 15th round. According to Yanke,
[Cravens] had to push Kauanui away and said, ‘Get off him. He’s done. He’s
done. Get off him.’ Both Yanke and Hendricks claimed that after Kauanui
stood up, he charged towards [Cravens] and started speaking in an
aggressive manner. Yanke recalled that [Cravens], who is right[-]handed,
punched Kauanui with his left hand, and said that [Cravens] looked very
shocked and worried after Kauanui fell. However, once they got to Yanke’s
house, [Cravens] bragged about knocking out Kauanui with his left hand. A
few hours later, after Nur Kitmitto called [Cravens] to describe Kauanui’s
condition (‘he didn’t look good’) and to warn him that the police were there
and ‘it’s a big deal,’ [Cravens] insisted he ‘was willing to go back at [Kauanui]
again.’ The next morning, when Kristen Link called to ask whether
[Cravens] had been in a fight with Kauanui, [Cravens] bragged, ‘I would
hardly call it a fight. I punched him out.’ During a telephone conversation

10
that same morning between Hendricks and Nicole Sparks about the fight,
[Cravens] laughed and said, ‘We put him to sleep.’
“Yanke claimed he and [Cravens] drove away slowly after Kauanui fell,
but he admitted crashing the Explorer into a retaining wall on the drive
home.
“Hendricks admitted that [Cravens] was bigger, taller, and weighed
quite a bit more than Kauanui. At the time of the murder, Kauanui was five
feet 10 inches tall and weighed 181 pounds. [Cravens] stood six feet and
weighed 240 pounds. The top of [Cravens’] left hand appeared swollen at the
time of his arrest.” (Cravens, supra¸ 53 Cal.4th at pp. 502–506.)
II.
Jury Verdict, Appeal, Petition for Review
In November 2008, the jury convicted Cravens of implied malice
murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to a total term of 20 years to
life, including a term of 15 years to life on the murder conviction.
Cravens appealed. Among other issues, he argued there was
insufficient evidence of implied malice to support the second degree murder
conviction. In August 2010, another panel of this court agreed and directed
the trial court to reduce the second degree murder conviction to voluntary
manslaughter. The court reasoned that a person acts with implied malice,
when the person “acts with conscious disregard for human life . . . [and]
knows the act he or she is about to commit endangers the life of another but
does not care. Implied malice requires both a high probability that
defendant’s act will result in death and such conscious disregard for human
life. [Citation.] A single fist blow to the head does not involve a high
probability of death simply because it occurs on pavement, and awareness
that the recipient of . . . such a blow might fall and hit his or her head on the

11
pavement is merely awareness of a risk of serious bodily injury, not conscious
disregard for life. . . . [A]wareness of a risk of causing serious bodily injury is
insufficient for a finding of implied malice.” (People v. Cravens (Aug. 18,
2010, D054613) [nonpub. opn.].)
The California Supreme Court granted review. In January 2012, the
Court reversed, holding the evidence was sufficient to satisfy both the
physical and mental components of implied malice. (Cravens, supra, 53
Cal.4th at pp. 510–512.) Justice Liu wrote a separate concurring opinion.
(See id. at pp. 512–514 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) Justice Kennard dissented.
(See id. at pp. 514–518 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
The majority reasoned as follows:
“[W]e must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to satisfy
both the physical and the mental components of implied malice, the physical
component being ‘ “the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life,’ ” ’ and the mental component being ‘ “the
requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We
conclude that both components are satisfied here.
“This state has long recognized ‘that an assault with the fist . . . may be
made in such a manner and under such circumstances as to make the killing
murder.’ [Citation.] However, ‘if the blows causing death are inflicted with
the fist, and there are no aggravating circumstances, the law will not raise
the implication of malice aforethought, which must exist to make the crime
murder.’ [Citation.] Based on our review of the record, we find sufficient
evidence that the manner of the assault and the circumstances under which
it was made rendered the natural consequences of defendant’s conduct
dangerous to life.

12
“First, the record shows that [Cravens] targeted a smaller and shorter
victim who was intoxicated, exhausted, and vulnerable. [Cravens] points out
that Kauanui was a healthy young male and a professional athlete, but a
reasonable jury could conclude that those attributes were of little assistance
to him at the time of the murder. Kauanui’s blood-alcohol level was 0.17
percent. Moreover, Kauanui was visibly worn out from the prior altercation,
regardless of whether he had been repeatedly punched and kicked by Eric
House alone or by House along with several of House’s friends. There was
testimony that just before [Cravens] attacked him, Kauanui was unsteady
and unable to walk straight. Before Kauanui managed to stand up, Jennifer
Grosso observed that ‘[t]here was no strength being exerted’ from her
boyfriend’s body, and Karen Loftus was surprised he was even able to get up.
Although unmentioned in the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the judgment, those were the relevant facts available
to the jury—not Kauanui’s general physical condition when rested and
sober—at the time [Cravens] swung hard against a fatigued and intoxicated
victim who was two inches shorter and 60 pounds lighter. [Citation.]
“And it was a very hard punch. Witnesses described it as ‘extremely
hard’ and ‘one of the hardest punches I’ve ever seen thrown.’ The punch was
hard enough to knock Kauanui unconscious, despite his youth and fitness,
even before he hit the ground. The absence of facial markings from the blow
itself did not preclude the jury from considering the other evidence
concerning the severity of the blow. Indeed, [Cravens’] punch was hard
enough to force Kauanui’s head to hit the pavement with an audible cracking
sound that even the neighbors could hear, and caused skull fractures the
forensic pathologist likened to the force experienced in a motor vehicle crash
or from being struck in the head with a hammer, baseball bat, or tire iron.

13
Under these circumstances, [Cravens’] apparent belief that he could have
inflicted even more damage had he hit Kauanui with his right hand is hardly
exculpatory.
“Moreover, the jury could reasonably have found that [Cravens] secured
himself every advantage to ensure that he could inflict the greatest possible
injury on his victim. Not only was [Cravens] bigger and taller, but he gained
extra inches of height for his punch by standing on the curb while Kauanui
was at street level. [Cravens’] conduct thus guaranteed that Kauanui would
fall on a very hard surface, such as the pavement or the concrete curb. ‘The
consequences which would follow a fall upon a concrete walk must have been
known to [Cravens].’ [Citations.]
“Perhaps worst of all, [Cravens] decked Kauanui with a sucker punch.
The jury could reasonably have found that at the time [Cravens] attacked,
Kauanui posed no threat and was not behaving in an aggressive manner.
Nonetheless, [Cravens] ‘came flying out’ without warning and ‘coldcocked’
Kauanui. That [Cravens] used a sucker punch here—and, thus, that
[Cravens] intended to catch Kauanui at his most vulnerable—was
corroborated by his use of sucker punches in prior incidents, each of which
the jury was allowed to consider as evidence of a common plan or scheme.
[Citation.] The Court of Appeal not only failed to acknowledge that the fatal
blow here was a sucker punch (or that it was inflicted with enough force to
knock Kauanui unconscious before he even hit the pavement), but failed as
well to grapple with the evidence tending to show [Cravens’] pattern of using
sucker punches to his advantage.” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 508–
509.)
The majority found the record also supports the jury’s finding of the
mental component of implied malice. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511.)

14
It reasoned, “Of course, the jury was entitled to infer [Cravens’] subjective
awareness that his conduct endangered Kauanui’s life from the
circumstances of the attack alone, the natural consequences of which were
dangerous to human life. [Citation.] But [Cravens’] behavior before and
after the fight further demonstrated that this was not, as [Cravens] suggests,
a simple fistfight between friends. Before he arrived at Kauanui’s house,
[Cravens] was egging on Eric House and encouraging him to fight Kauanui,
while dissuading others from sharing these plans with Kauanui. Then,
having knocked Kauanui unconscious and with his head split open on the
ground, [Cravens] took no steps to ascertain Kauanui’s condition or to secure
emergency assistance. Instead, he bragged about his own prowess, laughed
and joked about Kauanui’s condition (which ‘didn’t look good’), and expressed
a willingness ‘to come back at him if he had to.’ These facts, too, bolstered
the finding of implied malice.” (Ibid.)
In his concurring opinion, Justice Liu discussed the two definitions of
implied malice that had evolved from the case law. He explained that the
Court had “previously acknowledged two lines of decisions that attempt to
delineate the objective and subjective components of implied malice.”
(Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 512 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) The line of
decision relied upon by the majority in its analysis articulates an implied
malice murder as a “ ‘ “killing [which] proximately resulted from an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The second line of authority provides that implied malice is shown when
“ ‘the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for

15
human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.’ ” (Ibid.)
Justice Liu noted that these two “formulations” had been described as
“equivalent” in the Court’s prior decisions, and remarked that, in his view,
the majority’s failure to mention the “ ‘high degree of probability’ test”
suggested that it had become disfavored. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 514 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) He further stated, in his view, “the
circumstances here fall just within the outer bounds of conduct sufficiently
dangerous to satisfy the . . . test” that had been cited by the majority, i.e.,
“ ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying the substantial evidence standard, the California Supreme
Court upheld Cravens’ murder conviction based on a review of “ ‘the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Cravens, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 507.)
III.
Petition for Resentencing
In August 2021, Cravens filed a petition for resentencing under section

1172.6.3 Section 1172.6 allows certain convicted defendants who could not
have been convicted of murder under current law to petition retroactively to
have their sentences vacated and to be resentenced to a shorter term of
imprisonment.
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 1437) “significantly limited the scope of California’s felony-

3 Cravens filed his petition under former section 1170.95, which was
renumbered to section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (See Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)

16
murder rule and eliminated liability for murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine through two key provisions.” (People v.
Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 930 (Berry-Vierwinden); Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) “First, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section
189 so that ‘[d]efendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for [felony] murder only if they were “major
participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life[.]” ’ [Citations.] Second, it amended section 188 to provide that,
when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder can only be convicted where he or she acted ‘with malice
aforethought,’ and ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on
his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Berry-Vierwinden, at p. 930.)
“Senate Bill No. 1437 also established a new procedure to allow
defendants who could not have been convicted under current law to
petition the sentencing court to vacate their murder conviction and
resentence them on any remaining counts.” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 930–931.) Under section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1), “[t]he
process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met. [Citations.] If the defendant’s petition is
facially valid, the trial court is permitted to examine the record of conviction
after appointing counsel to assess whether it refutes the petitioner’s claim of
eligibility. [Citation.] Under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), the court may
deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of conviction discloses
that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. [Citation.]
Otherwise, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d) to determine

17
whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence
the petitioner on any remaining counts.” (Berry-Vierwinden, at p. 931.)
“One of the requirements for the prima facie showing is that the
petitioner ‘could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189’ made by Senate Bill No. 1437.”
(Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 931; § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
“Accordingly, a court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the
record of conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner was convicted
on a theory not affected by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Berry-Vierwinden, at
p. 931.)
“Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 775) amended section 1172.6. As relevant here, the
amendment expanded eligibility for resentencing to include not only those
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, but also those convicted of murder under any ‘other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.’ ” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 931, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
“Senate Bill No. 775 further clarified the governing procedures for the
prima facie hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) and the evidentiary
hearing under subdivision (d). For a petition satisfying the basic pleading
requirements, the court must appoint counsel, permit briefing, and conduct
an initial hearing under subdivision (c) to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief, and if so, issue an order to show cause.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c).) After issuance of an order to show cause, the
court must conduct an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d) to determine
whether the petitioner is entitled to relief. At the evidentiary hearing, the

18
burden is ‘on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the petitioner is guilty of murder’ under California law as amended by Senate
Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 931–932.)
After reviewing Cravens’ petition, which was filed in propria persona,
the trial court ordered the appointment of counsel and set a briefing schedule
to address whether he had made a prima facie case for relief. In March 2023,
the court ruled that Cravens made the required showing and was entitled to

an evidentiary hearing.4
The evidentiary hearing took place in December 2023. The parties
jointly presented as an exhibit a complete copy of the record from Cravens’
trial. The People did not present further evidence. Cravens elected to testify
and did so remotely by Zoom.
According to Cravens, he was “good friends” with Kauanui and “best
friends” with House. At the bar, House and Kauanui “got[ ] into it over a girl.
They threw . . . beers at each other, [they] had to get separated multiple
times, and they both got kicked out of the bar.” Cravens got between them at
one point and told them to “[c]alm down.”
Cravens left the bar about 10 minutes after House was told to leave.
Cravens, House, Yanke, Hendricks, and Osuna got into a car to take House
home. But House spoke with Kauanui on the phone and decided he wanted
to fight him. So the group drove House to Kauanui’s house instead.

4 The People contend the trial court erred when it made this ruling and
this error constitutes an alternate ground for affirming the order dismissing
the petition. We do not address this question because we conclude that
Cravens’ contentions on appeal lack merit and provide no basis for reversal in
the first place.

19
When they arrived, Kauanui jumped over the front gate to his house.
He and House then “rushed each other” and started fighting in the middle of
the street. They were wrestling at first, but then “[Kauanui] got [House] in a
. . . chokehold and was hitting him all the way from the middle of the street
towards the curb” where they both wound up lying in the gutter with “their
arms around each other’s heads.” House was “bleeding a lot.”
A car suddenly came around the corner. It “screeched to a stop” and
Grosso “jumped out.” She “started trying to kick [House] in the head,” but
she missed him about “half of the time” and kicked Kauanui instead.
Hendricks and Yanke both intervened and tried to persuade her to stop.
They told her that Kauanui was “winning” the fight and House was “losing,”
and that everything was “all right.” But she “went bonkers” and started
screaming and honking the horn in her car. She ran to Yanke’s car and “tried
to kick the lights in.” Cravens ran over to “subdue her.”
At this point House and Kauanui had separated from one another.
House was looking on the ground for his lost tooth. While he was trying to
find it, Kauanui kept running back and forth and punching him in the face,
“just drilling, boom, boom, like three or four times.” Cravens “jumped” in
between Kauanui and House and said to Kauanui, “ ‘Hey, he’s done. He’s
done.’ Like, ‘Leave him alone. He’s done.’ ” Cravens pushed Kauanui as he
was saying this.
Cravens also tried to get House to leave, but House was “belligerent”
because he wanted to stay and find his tooth. Cravens was “shocked” that
Kauanui had beaten up House that quickly.
Grosso started screaming that Cravens and his friends were “not going
to get away with this.” They laughed at her because it was House who had
lost the fight, not Kauanui. Cravens turned to ask Hendricks to stop Grosso

20
from “harassing” House while he was trying to find his tooth. When he
turned back around, Kauanui was standing right in front of him.
Kauanui said, “What?” to Cravens, and Cravens perceived this to be a
challenge to fight. Thinking Kauanui was about to punch him, Cravens
punched him first with his left hand. According to Cravens, Kauanui “stood
there,” and was “knocked out [on] his feet.” “His head was wobbling back and
forth, and he was snoring while he was standing on his feet. [Cravens]
stepped out, to, like grab him, because [he] didn’t know what was going on
with him and he fell back and hit his head on the ground, and he was snoring
really loud.” Cravens did not see blood coming from Kauanui’s head, and
“just thought he was knocked out.”
Cravens believed Kauanui was a “tough guy.” He had seen him get hit
twice in the head with a frying pan, win a fight with three “guys that were
jumping him,” and “knock people out after he got hit a bunch of times, and
then go drink afterwards and laugh about it.” Cravens denied telling his
friends, “Let’s go fuck [Kauanui] up.”
Cravens admitted Kauanui did not hit or punch him, saying, “[H]e had
his hands in fists. He didn’t swing them. He didn’t punch me, no.” Cravens
acknowledged he was standing on the curb when he punched Kauanui. He
admitted he told someone who called him that night, “if [Kauanui] comes at
me again, I’ll do it again,” and that he told someone else, “I would hardly call
it a fight. I punched him out.” Cravens explained he made the statements
before he knew Kauanui was in the hospital, saying, “I didn’t know he got
taken away in an ambulance.” When asked why he didn’t just walk away
when Kauanui stepped toward him and said, “What?,” Cravens testified: “I
mean, if you’re asking—you’re asking me back then when that’s how I solved
all my problems. I was 21, and I was ruled by, you know—the things that

21
I’ve learned in prison and things I know about myself now, I can tell you
exactly why I did [that] then. I was fearful. I was scared of being
embarrassed. I was scared of being thought less of. I was scared of backing
down from people. All of those things.”
After Cravens’ testimony, the trial court heard several rounds of
argument. Significant here, the People argued the petition should be denied
for two reasons. First, the People asserted Cravens was ineligible to be
resentenced. As discussed, pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), to
be eligible for resentencing, petitioners must establish they were prosecuted
“under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” Cravens had
persuaded the court at the initial prima facie hearing that the jury
instructions at trial impermissibly allowed the jury to convict him on an
aiding and abetting theory that imputed malice to him. At the evidentiary
hearing, the People continued to assert the jury instructions did not permit
conviction under any such theory and asked the court to reconsider its
eligibility ruling in light of the complete trial record. They argued the court
was required to deny Cravens’ petition for this reason alone.
Second, pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the People
asserted they met their burden at the evidentiary hearing “to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder
under California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” They asserted they met this burden with respect
to all the elements they needed to prove, including the highly disputed
element of implied malice.

22
In response, Cravens argued the trial court was prohibited from
reconsidering its prior ruling that Cravens was prosecuted under a theory
that allowed the jury to impute malice from participation in another crime,
and, regardless, the ruling was correct and he was eligible for relief. In
addition, he asserted the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of murder under current law because the evidence
was insufficient to (1) convict him under current law on a permissible theory
of imputed malice, such as felony murder under the new definition, and
(2) convict him on the theory he was an actual perpetrator and personally
harbored implied malice when he punched Kauanui.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied the petition for
resentencing. The court did not issue a written ruling. Its minute order
states: “The [c]ourt denies [Cravens’ petition]. The [c]ourt finds that
[Cravens] is the actual killer, and the evidence presented to the [c]ourt, which
is the full and complete copy of all trial record transcripts supports that he is
the actual perpetrator.” (Boldface omitted.)
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trial Court Properly Conducted an Independent Assessment of the
Evidence
Cravens contends the trial court erred by failing to act as an
independent fact finder during the evidentiary hearing. The record does not
support this contention. Absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court
“presume[s] that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v.
Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 (Ramirez).) Cravens has not rebutted
this presumption.

23
First, the plain language of section 1172.6 requires independent
factfinding by the trial court at an evidentiary hearing on a petition for
resentencing. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) expressly provides “the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” To the extent there may have been ambiguity
about this express language in the past, amendments to section 1172.6 by
Senate Bill No. 775 have “clarified that the trial court’s role in a section
1172.6 proceeding is to act as an independent fact finder and determine, in
the first instance, whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 112, 123.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), now specifically
provides that “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” We presume the trial court did not overlook these express
provisions. (Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.)
Second, the independent factfinding requirement that is set forth in
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), was undisputed during the underlying
proceedings. Both parties repeatedly acknowledged the requirement of
independent factfinding by the trial court as controlling law. To quote the
prosecutor: “Your Honor, at this hearing, the [c]ourt . . . is the fact finder.”
“[N]ow that that imputation of malice is no longer an available theory for
guilt, this [c]ourt as factfinder must reassess . . . with only that remaining
theory available, is Mr. Cravens guilty of murder?” “This [c]ourt stands as
the sole juror, the sole factfinder as to th[e] question, was there sufficient

24
evidence? . . . Was there evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to prove implied
malice in this matter?” “I ask that the [c]ourt deny this petition and find that
this petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder with implied
malice as a direct perpetrator in this case, and as such, deny his petition for
resentencing.”
To quote defense counsel: “At the instant evidentiary hearing, this
court must make ‘an independent analysis of the record and evidence before
finding defendant guilty of murder under current law.’ [Citation.] The
court’s findings must be beyond a reasonable doubt and ‘[i]f the prosecution
fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations
and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the
petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’ [Citations.] The
court is not bound by the jury’s findings (except in case of acquittal or ‘not
true’ findings), and the court is not limited to reviewing the jury’s verdicts.”
“The standard in the trial court is not sufficiency of the original evidence, and
a conclusion that guilt can be rationally inferred from substantial evidence is
not enough to support denial.”
Third, the trial court read the independent factfinding requirement out
loud during the hearing when it asked defense counsel whether Cravens
would be presenting new evidence. The court specifically acknowledged that
it would be conducting an “independent analysis of the trial record and the
new evidence that w[ould] be submitted to the [c]ourt.”
Finally, the ruling itself contains no indication the trial court
misunderstood the law. The court began by quoting from the reply brief
Cravens filed in response to the People’s return to the order to show cause.
As noted, the People had argued the petition should be denied for two
reasons. First, they urged the court to revisit its prima facie ruling that

25
Cravens was eligible to be resentenced and rule that he was in fact ineligible
because the jury instructions did not permit conviction under an imputed
malice theory. Second, they argued the court, as an independent factfinder,
should find they met their burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Cravens was guilty of murder on a theory permitted after changes to sections
188 and 189. The court therefore needed to make clear which of the two
reasons was the basis for its decision. The quoted material makes it clear the
court was denying the petition based on a finding that the People satisfied
their burden of proving Cravens was guilty of murder pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), and not on the People’s alternate contention that
he was ineligible to be resentenced pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(a)(1).
The trial court quoted from the pleading’s introduction where Cravens
argued the People would not be able to prove he was guilty of murder at the
evidentiary hearing, neither on an imputed malice theory under current law,
nor on the theory he was the actual perpetrator and personally harbored
implied malice:
Regardless of whether [Cravens’] act was a proximate cause
of Kauanui’s death,[5] [Cravens’] murder conviction cannot
stand because it lacks a felony murder basis for guilt, and
the prosecution cannot prove he acted with actual or
implied malice.
The court then quoted from the pleading’s conclusion where Cravens asserted
the People would not be able meet their burden at the evidentiary hearing of

5 By this statement, we understand Cravens to be referring to the
“ ‘group attack’ ” theory he asserted improperly imputed malice in violation of
sections 188 and 189.

26
demonstrating, pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), that he could
be convicted under current law:
Because he could not be convicted of murder, this court
must vacate the murder conviction, sentence him on an
appropriate underlying offense, and resentence him
accordingly.
The court then denied the petition, stating:
I do not agree with that conclusion. I think that’s not
correct based on the factual and legal basis for the
conviction.
So [the] petition is denied. Sentence will remain as earlier
pronounced. (Italics added.)
The prosecutor asked for clarification, and the trial court explained its
ruling was based on a finding that Cravens was the actual perpetrator and
acted with implied malice, not felony murder or other theory of imputed
malice:
He was the actual killer. And the evidence amply supports
the finding of required malice.

[¶] … [¶]

I think that clearly he was the actual perpetrator. And the
record, I think, equally supports the finding that he acted
with implied malice. (Italics added.)
We see nothing about this ruling to suggest the trial court improperly
assessed the evidence of guilt using a substantial evidence standard instead
of independently reviewing it. To the contrary, the court used the first
person when explaining its ruling. The court also referred the parties to the
introduction and conclusion of Cravens’ reply brief. Both sections of his brief
identify the correct standard for assessing the evidence. The introduction
provides:

27
[Cravens’] murder conviction must now be vacated if [he]
cannot be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of acting
with personal malice[,] whether implied or actual. During
the court’s independent analysis of the trial record and the
new evidence that will be submitted, the court will find
that the prosecution cannot prove its case. (Italics added.)
The conclusion provides:
Upon conducting its independent analysis, this court should
conclude that the unfortunate and unforeseeable death of
Kauanui does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Cravens] committed a life endangering act with knowledge
that it carried a high risk of death. Rather, his action had
an unexpected and unintended result that no reasonable
person would have foreseen, and more importantly, which
[Cravens] himself did not foresee. Indeed, [Cravens’]
youthful impulsivity, and his own history of assaults made
him unaware that this level of harm would happen. He is
guilty of felony assault causing [great bodily injury], or at
most, voluntary manslaughter. (Italics added.)
Cravens seizes on the two statements the trial court made in response
to the prosecutor’s request for clarification:
He was the actual killer. And the evidence amply supports
the finding of required malice.

[¶] … [¶]

I think that clearly he was the actual perpetrator. And the
record, I think, equally supports the finding that he acted
with implied malice.
He claims these statements “suggest” the trial court improperly reviewed the
jury’s verdict for substantial evidence instead of independently determining
Cravens could be found guilty of murder under current law. In his view, the
word choice in the statements—that the evidence in the record “ ‘supports the
finding’ ” of implied malice—is “an apparent reference to the jury’s verdict,”
and “is the language of substantial evidence review.” Cravens complains “the

28
trial court never mentioned the “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” standard
much less expressly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cravens was the
actual perpetrator. He argues, “[t]aken together, the trial court’s statements
suggest that the trial court mistakenly viewed its task as determining
whether Cravens was convicted as the ‘actual perpetrator’ and, if so, whether
the evidence ‘supports the finding’ that the jury must have therefore made
regarding implied malice.” We disagree and decline to jump to conclusions in
this manner.
“[A] court’s ‘failure to “discuss” a particular standard does not imply it
applied an incorrect standard. Error on appeal must be affirmatively shown
by the record, and “[w]e presume the trial court knew and properly applied
the law absent evidence to the contrary.” ’ ” (People v. Johnson & Johnson
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 322.) Here, it is true the trial court’s statements
do not say the record “supports my finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Cravens acted with implied malice.” But the statements also do not say the
record “supports a finding of substantial evidence sufficient to persuade a
reasonable factfinder that Cravens acted with implied malice.” We do not
presume error under these circumstances. We are required to do the opposite
and presume the court did not err. (Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.)
Indeed, the rule that we do not make this kind of presumption is especially
apt here, where the trial court’s statements were made on the fly in response
to a request by the prosecutor to clarify an entirely different point.
Finally, at oral argument, Cravens’ appellate counsel asserted the
prosecutor repeatedly misstated the law during the evidentiary hearing,
alleging the prosecutor argued to the trial court “multiple times” that it
should rule against Cravens because the jury had already made a
determination beyond a reasonable doubt on the question of implied malice.

29
We have reviewed appellate counsel’s citations to the record and find no such
misstatement. In each instance, the prosecutor was clearly arguing the
People’s first theory for denying the petition, i.e., that he was ineligible for
resentencing in the first place because the jury was never instructed on a
theory that allowed the imputation of implied malice. As noted, when
arguing the People’s second theory, i.e., that they sustained their burden of
proof at the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor repeatedly recited the correct
standard: proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on an independent review
by the court. We see no basis for inferring the court was confused by the
prosecutor’s discussion of the two bases she asserted for denying the petition.
In any event, there was no need to read tea leaves here in the first
place. The independent, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was
undisputed and repeatedly discussed by both parties. The trial court
pinpointed a pleading that described the correct standard as part of its
ruling. And the court read the correct standard out loud on the record at one
point during the proceedings. Cravens has failed to demonstrate the trial
court erred by failing to act as an independent fact finder during the
evidentiary hearing.
II.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Ruling
Cravens contends his resentencing petition should have been granted
because the evidence presented by the prosecution at the evidentiary hearing
was insufficient to support a finding of implied malice, and therefore
insufficient to demonstrate he could be convicted of murder under current
law. We disagree. The evidence of implied malice was sufficient to support
the trial court’s ruling.

30
A trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for
substantial evidence unless the court misunderstood the elements of the
applicable offense. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
“Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ ” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508.)
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) “To
suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a
high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 989.)
California has “long recognized ‘that an assault with the fist ... may be made
in such a manner and under such circumstances as to make the killing
murder.’ ” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508, quoting People v.
Munn (1884) 65 Cal. 211, 212.)
Based on our independent review of the record, the evidence adduced at
the evidentiary hearing was sufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt of both the objective and subjective components of implied
malice. As a starting point, based on the original trial court record, we agree

31
with our high court’s conclusion that the evidence of implied malice presented
at Cravens’ trial was sufficient to support his original conviction on a theory
where he was the actual perpetrator. We have quoted the Court’s analysis at
length and Cravens does not contend otherwise.
Our review of the additional evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing—Cravens’ testimony—does not change our opinion about the
sufficiency of the evidence under current law, which has not changed for
actual perpetrators. Although Cravens’ self-defense testimony aligned for the
most part with testimony by his friends, it contradicted testimony by Grosso
and Kauanui’s neighbors. The trial court was entitled to reject Cravens’
version of events, and its ruling suggests that it did. On review for
substantial evidence, we presume every fact in support of the judgment the
trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v.
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 (Albillar).) “In reviewing factual
determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result
had it believed other evidence.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)
Cravens asserts “the question of whether there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding of implied malice on direct appeal was exceedingly close.”
He contends that “changes in the law and the evidence that have occurred in
the interim tilt the balance and place this case outside of the outer bounds of
what is necessary to sustain a finding of implied malice.” We are not
persuaded.

32
First, Cravens contends that evidence of two prior assaults was
inadmissible at the resentencing hearing because the prosecutor charged him
with assault but failed to obtain a conviction. He fails to acknowledge this
question was raised in limine before the evidentiary hearing began, and his
counsel conceded the evidence was admissible.
Second, based on “significant changes in the law relating to the
culpability of defendants who were young adults in their teens or early 20s at
the time of their crimes,” Cravens contends the balance has tipped in favor of
finding insufficient evidence he harbored implied malice. (People v. Jimenez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 997.) These changes to the law, however, took
place before the evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Pittman (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 400, 416–418.) There is no evidence the trial court was unaware
of these changes. To the contrary, Cravens affirmatively argued they should
be taken into consideration. We presume the court did so. (Ramirez, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.) But, of course, the court was entitled to reject
Cravens’ testimony that his youth influenced his behavior to the point where
he cannot be said to have harbored implied malice when he killed Kauanui.
The court was entitled to do so on credibility grounds, and also in the face of
conflicting inferences that can be drawn from Cravens actions. We defer to
the trial court in the face of conflicting inferences and questions about
witness credibility. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.)
Finally, Cravens asserts the California Supreme Court “clarified” the
definition of implied malice in Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981. Our review for
substantial evidence is based on current law. We have considered both of our
high court’s articulations of the objective and subjective components of
implied malice. We have taken note that the two “formulations” have been
described as equivalent. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 514 (conc. opn. of

33
Liu, J.).) And we have taken note in particular that, “[t]o suffice for implied
malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in
some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “[i]nvolve[ ] a high degree of
probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, at p. 989.)
On this question, we highlight testimony by two witnesses at Cravens’
trial about the power behind Cravens’ punch and the velocity of Kauanui’s
headfirst fall to the ground. First, Baltazar had a bird’s eye view of the
confrontation from his second story balcony that “look[ed] directly down to
the street.” He saw four men “just whaling” on Kauanui. The men were
“kicking and pounding and slugging.” “[S]omehow . . . , [Kauanui] was able to
right himself up . . . . [¶] And at that point[,] . . . out . . . from where [a] car
was parked[,] someone who was wearing a black baseball cap, a black opened
shirt, short-sleeve shirt, black shorts, black shoes and white socks came
flying out . . . and coldcocked [him]. And that’s when [Kauanui] went down
onto the ground.” (Italics added.) “[Y]ou could hear the doosh of his skull
hitting the ground.”
Second, Stanley, the medical examiner who conducted Kauanui’s
autopsy, testified she had not seen the kind of injuries to Kauanui’s skull
from “a simple accidental fall.” She agreed, “there must have been some
velocity associated with the application of force” to have caused the injuries
she observed, and she agreed Kauanui’s injuries were “consistent with being
punched by somebody coming off at a greater height downward and
propelling him back into the concrete.” (Italics added.) She explained, “I’ve
seen these sort of injuries in motor vehicle crash cases [and where] people . . .
have been impacted with some sort of instrument, hammer, baseball bat, tire
iron.”

34
On these facts, a trier of fact could readily conclude the punch delivered
by Cravens was a truly singular one that unquestionably carried a high
probability of fatal injuries. A trier of fact could also easily conclude the high
risk of death would be self-evident to anyone, including Cravens. (See People
v. Alexander (1923) 62 Cal.App. 306, 308–309 [upholding a second degree
murder verdict where the defendant would have known that “fatal injuries
would result from the striking of his head upon the hard pavement”]; People
v. Efstathiou (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 441, 443 [upholding a second degree
murder verdict where “[t]he consequences which would follow a fall upon a
concrete walk” must have been known to the defendant].) Based on the
entire record at the evidentiary hearing, but in particular based on the
salient testimony by these two witnesses about the power and momentum
behind Cravens’ sucker punch, we conclude there was sufficient evidence
adduced at the evidentiary hearing to support a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Cravens harbored implied malice when he punched Kauanui in
the face with no warning and propelled him headfirst into a concrete
roadway.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Cravens’ petition for resentencing is affirmed.

DO, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

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Buchanan, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment solely on the ground that Cravens failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).
The complete record of conviction from the 2008 trial conclusively
demonstrates Cravens is ineligible for relief because the jury was not
instructed on either felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and the jury could not have convicted him on any theory of imputed
malice. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) To the contrary, the record establishes that the
jury could only have convicted Cravens as the direct perpetrator of implied
malice murder who personally inflicted the fatal blow. It was undisputed at
trial that Cravens threw the sucker punch that caused Kauanui to fall and
hit his head against the pavement, fracturing his skull and resulting in his
death. There was no evidence that Cravens aided and abetted someone else
who perpetrated the fatal blow. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded
there was no “serious dispute about the actual perpetrator . . . in terms of
who struck the fatal blow . . . .”
Where undisputed facts in the record of conviction demonstrate that
the petitioner was the direct perpetrator of the murder, and the petitioner
“points to [no] specific facts that identify someone else as the direct
perpetrator,” a “hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured
from thin air or a legal conclusion.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549,
567 (Patton).) Moreover, at the prima facie stage, a court does not engage in
impermissible factfinding by relying on undisputed facts from the record of
conviction to refute a petitioner’s conclusory allegations of eligibility. (Id. at
pp. 565–566; see also id. at p. 564 [court may “rely on unchallenged[] relief-
foreclosing facts” from record of conviction “to refute conclusory, checkbox
allegations” of eligibility for relief at prima facie stage]; People v. Glass (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 922, 929–930 [following Patton in finding petitioner
ineligible for relief at prima facie stage based on his sworn statements in plea
form and at plea hearing].) Because the record of conviction here
demonstrates as an undisputed fact that Cravens himself inflicted the fatal
blow and was therefore a direct perpetrator of the murder, he is ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. (Patton, at pp. 564–569.)
In arguing he made a sufficient prima facie showing, Cravens relies
primarily on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972. Langi held that a
petitioner convicted of second degree murder was eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because the aiding and abetting instruction given at his trial
(CALCRIM No. 401) permitted the jury to convict him as an aider and
abettor on a theory of imputed malice. (Langi, at pp. 980–984.) As Cravens
notes, the same instruction was given at his trial. In Langi, however, there
was a factual dispute over which of several assailants threw the fatal punch.
(Id. at p. 980.) Such a factual dispute over the defendant’s role cannot be
resolved at the prima facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567.) Here,
by contrast, there was no such factual dispute and no basis for the jury to
find that someone other than Cravens was a direct perpetrator of the murder.
Although others were involved in the fight, it was undisputed that Cravens
himself committed the life-endangering act that caused Kauanui’s death.
Even assuming Langi was correctly decided, therefore, its reasoning would
not apply here. Based on the undisputed facts and the jury instructions

2
given, the jury could not have found Cravens guilty of murder as the actual

perpetrator of the fatal blow by imputing someone else’s malice to him.1
Because I believe the petition should have been denied for failure to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility under section 1172.6, subdivision
(c), I would not reach the other issues relating to the trial court’s ruling on
the merits under subdivision (d).

BUCHANAN, J.

1 The jury instructions defined the “perpetrator” as the person who
“directly committed the crime.” They further stated that someone has
committed the crime of murder if he “committed an act that caused the death
of another person” and did so with “malice aforethought.” Moreover, the
aiding and abetting instructions required that a “perpetrator committed the
crime” and the aider and abettor aided, facilitated, promoted, encouraged, or
instigated “the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” The jury instructions
did not permit a murder conviction against the person who committed the act
causing death if he acted without malice but someone else aided and abetted
him with malice.

3

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