People v. Jackson CA2/1

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Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Jackson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340790

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24SFCF01148)
v.

SHAWN BALTAZAR
JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Pamela Tamu Usher, Judge. Dismissed.
Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Without a certificate of probable cause, appellant Shawn
Baltazar Jackson appeals from his plea of no contest to one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm, contending the
magistrate judge erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5.1 Because Jackson
never renewed his motion before the superior court prior to
pleading no contest, we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal
and therefore dismiss it.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Jackson is Charged and Moves to Suppress
Evidence
In August 2024, a felony complaint charged Jackson with:
(1) being a felon in possession of a firearm; (2) unlawful
possession of ammunition prohibited by a prior conviction;
(3) carrying a loaded handgun on his person and in a vehicle; and
(4) providing false information to a police officer.
Eight days later, Jackson moved to suppress evidence
under section 1538.5. Jackson admitted that, on August 12,
2024, he was sitting in a car with two acquaintances when police
detained all three. While handcuffed, a police officer patted
Jackson down and found a firearm and a “clear plastic baggie
containing a crystalline substance.” Jackson alleged the police
searched him without a warrant and without his consent.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

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B. The Court Hears the Motion at Jackson’s
Preliminary Hearing
In September 2024, the court heard Jackson’s motion to
suppress at his preliminary hearing. An officer from the San
Fernando Police Department testified that, on the night in
question, he and his partner were patrolling a high crime area
and conducted a traffic stop for a car that had a license plate
cover (which was a Vehicle Code violation). Jackson was sitting
in the right rear passenger seat of the car. When the officer
approached the car’s driver, he noticed a pipe with residue inside
the car and smelled vinegar. Based on his training, this
indicated the presence of heroin. The officer detained all three
individuals in the car. When he approached Jackson to conduct a
pat-down, he noticed Jackson “was wearing very baggy clothing
and sweating profusely” and had “Elmwood” on his forehead,
which was the name of a Burbank gang. As a result of the pat-
down, the officer recovered an “unserialized,” loaded firearm and
arrested Jackson.3 After the arrest, he searched Jackson and
recovered his California Driver’s License which gave “his actual
name and not the name that he gave to my partner.”4 On cross-
examination, the officer agreed he had no other basis for patting
Jackson down except for his baggy clothing, the fact that he was
sweating, and the “Elmwood mark” on his forehead. The officer
also admitted Jackson was handcuffed before the pat-down

3 The officer testified an “unserialized” gun “wasn’t properly

purchased, . . . manufactured, [or] registered.”
4 The partner subsequently testified Jackson had given him

the name “Jonathan Lopez” and a birthdate different than the
birthdate ultimately found on Jackson’s driver’s license.

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occurred. The prosecution rested after introducing a certified rap
sheet.
In support of his motion to suppress, Jackson’s attorney
argued the police officer who patted Jackson down lacked specific
and articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that Jackson
was armed and dangerous. The prosecution countered that there
had been multiple individuals detained and “indicia of
contraband,” and that the pat-down was justified because it
occurred in a high crime area, because Jackson “had a gang
tattoo on his face,” and because Jackson “was wearing baggy
clothing.”
The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that
while each of the factors noted by the prosecution were
insufficient by themselves, combined they were “reasonable
articulable facts to support a pat-down for weapons.” The court
then concluded there was sufficient evidence to hold Jackson to
answer for the charges contained in the felony complaint. Two
weeks later, the prosecution filed an information charging
Jackson with the same counts in the felony complaint.

C. Jackson Pleads No Contest
On the same day the prosecution filed the information,
Jackson pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and admitted to a prior felony conviction that was “also a
strike conviction.” The court dismissed the remaining counts and
sentenced Jackson to the low term of 16 months, doubled to 32
months due to the strike. Jackson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is

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expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Ordinarily, “[n]o appeal shall be taken by
the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, . . . except where both of the following are
met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a
written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury
showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other
grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial
court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for
such appeal with the clerk of the court.” (§ 1237.5.) It is
undisputed that Jackson obtained no certificate of probable
cause.
“A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a
search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case
notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of conviction is
predicated upon a plea of guilty. Review on appeal may be
obtained by the defendant provided that at some stage of the
proceedings prior to conviction he or she has moved for the return
of property or the suppression of the evidence.” (§ 1538.5, subd.
(m).) This statutory language has long been interpreted to
require that, in order to obtain review on whether a magistrate
judge erroneously denied a suppression motion at a preliminary
hearing, the defendant must renew the motion in the trial court
after the information is filed. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22
Cal.3d 891, 896; People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 194,
199–200, fn. omitted [“In order to obtain direct appellate review
of a magistrate’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under
section 1538.5 at the preliminary hearing, a defendant must
either renew the motion in the trial court or challenge the
legality of the search in a motion to dismiss under section 995”];

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People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, 363–364 [“where
the defendant moves to suppress evidence at the preliminary
hearing, he or she must again raise the issue of the validity of a
search in superior court in order to preserve the issue for
appeal”]; People v. Hinds (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 897, 900
[defendant must renew motion to suppress in superior court “to
preserve the issue of the legality of a search for appeal”]; People
v. Hoffman (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1, 3 [“court unification did not
affect the Lilienthal mandate: the defendant must renew the
suppression motion before the trial court to preserve the issue for
appeal”].)
Jackson acknowledges both this requirement and his
failure to comply with it but, quoting People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161, footnote 6 (Williams), urges us to consider his
appeal regardless because “ ‘[a]n appellate court is generally not
prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved
for review by a party. (Citations.) Indeed, it has the authority to
do so.’ ”
Williams is inapposite. There, the Supreme Court offered
guidance on how a trial court should exercise, and an appellate
court should review, a trial court’s discretion in striking a prior
strike under the “Three Strikes” law. (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at pp. 151–152.) When sentencing a defendant for drunk
driving, the trial court “ordered the finding relating to the prior
conviction for the serious felony of attempted robbery vacated,”
leading to a lower sentence for the defendant. (Id. at p. 157.)
The People appealed, arguing the trial court had imposed an
unlawful sentence. (Ibid.) The appellate court, “having raised
the issue itself, . . . concluded that the superior court’s order
vacating the finding under the Three Strikes law that Williams

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had previously been convicted of the serious felony of attempted
robbery, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), was subject to review for abuse of
discretion, and that such order was erroneous under that
standard in light of Williams’s ‘extraordinary record of prior
criminality.’ ” (Ibid.) Responding to a challenge from the
appellant that the appellate court erred in reviewing this order at
all, our high court disagreed, saying: “Surely, the fact that a
party may forfeit a right to present a claim of error to the
appellate court if he did not do enough to ‘prevent[]’ or ‘correct[]’
the claimed error in the trial court [citation] does not compel the
conclusion that, by operation of his default, the appellate court is
deprived of authority in the premises. An appellate court is
generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not
been preserved for review by a party. [Citations.] Indeed, it has
the authority to do so. [Citation.] True, it is in fact barred when
the issue involves the admission (Evid. Code, § 353) or exclusion
(id., § 354) of evidence. Such, of course, is not the case here.
Therefore, it is free to act in the matter. [Citation.] Whether or
not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion.” (Id. at p. 161,
fn. 6.)
But whether we are “generally” not prohibited from
reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a
party is irrelevant here. This instant appeal does not involve a
“general” circumstance. Instead, our jurisdiction to consider this
issue is defined by statute. Section 1237.5 makes clear “[n]o
appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere” unless the
defendant has obtained a certificate of probable cause. Section
1538.5, subdivision (m) provides an exception to this rule where

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“at some stage of the proceedings prior to conviction [the
appellant] has moved for . . . the suppression of the evidence.”
Case law makes clear that in order to obtain review of a
magistrate’s denial of a motion to suppress at the preliminary
hearing, the motion must either be renewed in the superior court
or challenged by way of a motion to dismiss pursuant to section
995. Because it is undisputed Jackson did not move for
suppression of the evidence in the superior court (or challenge the
ruling via section 995) and has no certificate of probable cause,
there is no statutory basis for us to entertain his appeal.

DISPOSITION
Jackson’s appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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