CourtListener 10677076•People v. Marks CA2/3
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Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Marks CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B337704
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA054462
v.
MICHAEL MARKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Dee A. Hayashi, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2003, a jury convicted Michael Marks of two counts of
attempted murder and one count of kidnapping a person under
14 for repeatedly strangling his girlfriend and trying to break her
neck, slamming her six-month-old baby into a wall, and taking
her five-year-old son without permission. He now appeals from
the superior court’s order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate counsel asks us
to follow the procedures outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Marks filed a supplemental brief. We
affirm the order denying Marks’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Facts2
On February 26, 2003, Marks went with his girlfriend
Shalana Craig to pick up her children, Michael U. and Ryan S.
Michael was five years old. Ryan was six months old. After
placing the children in the car, Craig heard Marks say, “ ‘Oh
shit.’ ” Craig saw and smelled liquid PCP on Marks’s shirt.
Marks took off his shirt and said he “wasted” the PCP and had
lost money. Craig had seen Marks with a bottle of PCP before.
He would dip cigarettes in the bottle. That night, he gave a
cigarette dipped in PCP to Craig’s cousin Eric Howard. Marks
drove Craig and the children to the motel where they were living.
The next morning, Marks stabbed Craig in the chest with a
pen, telling her that she was the devil and she was “doing voodoo”
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We refer to the factual background from the opinion in
People v. Marks (Jan. 26, 2006, B174648) [nonpub. opn.], which
affirmed the judgment of conviction. These facts are “for
2
to him. Craig began to run but stopped because the children
were still inside. Marks grabbed Craig’s neck and strangled her.
He again told Craig that she was the devil. He also said God was
telling him to kill her and she had to die. Craig pretended to be
dead. But she coughed, alerting Marks that she was still alive.
Marks strangled Craig again until she passed out. When Craig
woke, Marks put his foot on her back and repeatedly tried to snap
her neck. After Craig unsuccessfully pretended to be dead again,
Marks strangled her until she lost consciousness.
Marks picked up Ryan by his feet and swung his head into
the wall. Marks asked Michael if he wanted to be like Ryan.
Michael said, “ ‘No’ ” Marks left the motel room with Michael.
He told Michael, “ ‘Don’t worry. She’s still breathing.’ ” Craig did
not give Marks permission to take Michael from the room.
Ryan was lifeless on the floor. Craig asked an occupant
from a nearby room to call 911. Ryan was taken to the hospital
where he remained until March 30, 2003. He sustained a
fractured skull. Tests indicated he would have permanent brain
damage.
Marks drove Michael to an underpass near downtown Los
Angeles and told him to get out and wait for the police. After
dropping off Michael, Marks got into a car accident. He was later
found by police officers in a restricted area of LAPD’s 77th
Division station.
background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2, disapproved on another ground in People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 569.) We do not rely on these facts in assessing
whether the superior court properly concluded that Marks failed
to make a prima facie showing of eligibility. (Flores, at p. 988.)
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II. Procedure
A. Original trial court proceedings and direct
appeal
On February 23, 2004, the jury convicted Marks of the
attempted murder of Craig (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a); count
1), the attempted murder of Ryan (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd.
(a); count 2) and the kidnapping of Michael, a person under 14
years old (§ 208, subd. (b); count 3).3 The jury found that each
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. It
also found true the allegation that Marks personally inflicted
great bodily injury on Ryan, who was under the age of five years
(§ 12022.7, subd. (d)) as to count 2.
The trial court imposed consecutive life sentences for each
attempted premeditated murder in counts 1 and 2, six years for
the great bodily injury enhancement as to count 2, and a
consecutive 11 years for the kidnapping in count 3.
On direct appeal, this division affirmed Marks’s conviction.4
B. Resentencing petition
On May 2, 2022, Marks filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95.5 On January 18, 2023, the District
Attorney responded that Marks was ineligible for relief because
he was prosecuted as the actual perpetrator and the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
3 On February 25, 2004, the jury found Marks was sane at
the time of the commission of the offenses.
4 People v. Marks, supra, B174648.
5 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
4
The District Attorney included the jury instructions, the opinion
from the direct appeal, and the verdict forms. On March 7, 2023,
the superior court appointed counsel to represent Marks on the
petition.
On April 10, 2024, the superior court conducted a hearing
on the prima facie showing. The court found that Marks had not
established a prima facie showing for relief and denied the
petition.
On April 24, 2024, Marks filed a notice of appeal.
Marks appealed and we appointed counsel to represent
him. Counsel filed an opening brief stating she had “reviewed
the entire record and found no arguable issues to raise on
appeal.” Counsel requested that we follow the procedures in
Delgadillo and exercise our discretion to conduct an independent
review of the record. Counsel stated she had written to Marks
and advised him he could submit a supplemental brief. Counsel
also stated she would send a copy of her brief and the transcripts
of the record on appeal to Marks.
Marks filed a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
I. Ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the
substantive law on accomplice liability for murder by
significantly narrowing the felony murder rule and by requiring
that a principal in a crime act with malice aforethought. (§§ 189,
subd. (e), 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448–449 (Curiel).) The latter change requires that malice “not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The change eliminated liability for
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murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 449; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021
Reg. Sess.) expanded eligibility for resentencing to include
convictions for attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 223, fn. 3.)
These new laws created a procedure, codified at section
1172.6, for defendants convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine (or murder under the
felony murder or natural and probable consequences doctrines or
any theory in which malice is imputed based on participation in a
crime) to petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on
any remaining counts, if they could not now be convicted because
of the changes made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing where the prosecutor
and petitioner may offer new or additional evidence.6 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 960.)
6 At the evidentiary hearing, the superior court may consider
evidence previously admitted “including . . . , stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder under the amended
law. (Ibid.; People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065–
1066.) The trial court acts as an independent fact finder to
determine whether the prosecution has met its burden (Hill, at p.
1066) but its factual determinations are limited to “issues made
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The prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The superior court takes the petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and refrains from factfinding. (Ibid.)
The record of conviction will necessarily inform the prima facie
inquiry, enabling the court to distinguish between potentially
meritorious petitions and clearly meritless ones. (Ibid.)
The jury instructions and verdicts are part of the record of
conviction. They “may provide ‘readily ascertainable facts from
the record’ that refute the petitioner’s showing . . . . [Citation.]”
(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, overruled to the
extent it is inconsistent with Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952; People
v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56 [affirming summary
denial because jury instructions and verdict established
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law].) If the record
conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief,
the superior court may dismiss the petition. (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 450.)
Whether the record of conviction shows the petition is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal
question that we review de novo. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
Section 1172.6 relief for a conviction of attempted murder is
only available if it was based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley); People v. Lovejoy (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865.) To properly deny a petition for
relevant by the changes to the law effected by [the
amendments].” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
778, 787.)
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resentencing a conviction for attempted murder at the prima
facie showing stage, the record must conclusively demonstrate
that the jury did not rely on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Lovejoy, at p. 865.)
Here, the court did not instruct on any theory of aiding and
abetting, including the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Cases consistently affirm the denial at the prima facie
showing stage when the jury was not instructed on any theory
that required malice be imputed to the defendant. (People v.
Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206; People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, 946; People v. Rushing (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 1025, 1034–1035; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p.
548.)
The only theory of liability provided by the jury
instructions was that Marks was the direct perpetrator who acted
with intent to kill and the only participant in the attempted
murders. Consistent with that theory was the trial court’s
instruction on attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder in CALJIC No. 8.67. Also consistent with the theory that
Marks was the direct perpetrator who acted with intent to kill
was the jury’s special findings that the attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated and that Marks personally
inflicted great bodily injury on Ryan. Relief under section 1172.6
“is unavailable if the [petitioner] was . . . the actual killer.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710; Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 233.)
II. Other claims raised by Marks
In Marks’s supplemental brief, he first argues that counsel
“sufficiently lacked the professional conduct to represent and
defend [his] rights to fair and equal rights in court proceedings”
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and “made no meaningful attempts to devise [a] defense.” As an
initial matter, “ ‘there is no constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings[,]” such
as the hearing on the prima facie showing under section 1172.6.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) But Mark’s claim fails
even under the federal standard required to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel because he does not specifically explain how
his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
688.) Where, as here, the record conclusively established
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law, counsel is not ineffective
for declining to make meritless claims (People v. Solomon (2010)
49 Cal.4th 792, 843, fn. 24; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,
616), nor can prejudice be established.
Next, Marks complains about the prima facie showing
being determined by Judge Arnold, who was the original
sentencing judge. But section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1) states,
“The petition shall be filed with the court that sentenced the
petitioner. . . .”
Finally, Marks appears to argue that he was improperly
excluded from the hearing to determine the prima facie showing.
We disagree.
The right to be present attaches when eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6 requires an evidentiary hearing. (People v.
Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 58; People v. Quan (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 524, 532.) A defendant has the right to be present,
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
constitution and article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution, at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings,
such as the imposition of sentence, a modification of the sentence,
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or resentencing. (Basler, at p. 57; People v. Simms (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 987, 996 (Simms).) The section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3) evidentiary hearing permits the parties to offer “new or
additional evidence” and requires the prosecution to prove that
the petitioner is guilty under a valid theory. The petitioner may
provide input to his counsel and may choose to testify. Because
such a proceeding is critical, the petitioner is afforded the right to
be present.
However, section 1172.6 does not provide a right to be
present at the prima facie showing stage. Nor would the state
and federal right to be present apply. (Simms, supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Petitioners do not have the right to be
present to address purely legal questions or where their presence
“ ‘would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.’ ”
(People v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 98, 109.) Unlike the
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3),
eligibility at the prima facie showing stage is determined as a
matter of law, not any interpretation of disputed facts. Parties
may not present evidence. The court bases its determination on
the record of conviction without making any factual findings.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) Marks’s presence would not
have affected the outcome of the hearing, especially when the
jury instructions and verdict entirely established that he was the
sole direct perpetrator who intended to kill the victims.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Marks’s petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON. P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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