CourtListener 10676906•People v. Cooc CA3
Texto completo
Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Cooc CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100523
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE015641)
v.
JIMMY CHI COOC,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2023, defendant Jimmy Chi Cooc was pulled over and arrested on suspicion of
driving under the influence. During a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence,
defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to a support reasonable suspicion of his
crime. The magistrate denied the motion to suppress, as did the trial court. Defendant
later pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm and driving under the
influence. Defendant appeals, requesting this court reverse the trial court’s ruling on his
motion to suppress. We affirm.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Early September 30, 2023, California Highway Patrol Officer Juan Garcia and his
partner pulled defendant over for suspicion of driving under the influence and
subsequently arrested him. Defendant later pled no contest to being a felon in possession
of a firearm and driving under the influence.
On October 30, 2023, defendant filed a motion under Penal Code1 section 1538.5
to suppress all evidence related to his arrest.
During the preliminary examination, Officer Garcia testified he saw a vehicle “that
was weaving in a serpentine manner within [a] lane of the roadway,” agreeing with the
description defendant was “drifting within the lane.” When asked to clarify the term
serpentine, Officer Garcia explained, “[G]enerally they use the entire width of the lane to
drive, so they’ll drive all the way to the right, and then they’ll drive all the way to the left,
in a continuous fashion.” Officer Garcia further said he did not consider the weaving to
be “drastic,” clarifying: “It’s kind of more slower in motion, if you will. It’s not really
jerking or anything like that.” Based on his observations, Officer Garcia testified he
“believed that the driver was possibly impaired.” He estimated the duration of his
observation to last 30 seconds and span a distance of “maybe a mile.”
After reviewing the dashcam video, Officer Garcia confirmed defendant’s vehicle
was “weaving” before he initiated a traffic stop to investigate the driver’s possible
impairment. In the dashcam video played for the trial court, the officers can be heard
asking after pulling defendant over if he was “falling asleep or what[ was] going on.”
Officer Garcia testified he had received approximately 56 hours of training related to
driving under the influence and had conducted “several hundred [driving under the
influence] investigations” in his capacity as a peace officer.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant argued that Officer Garcia acted without a warrant and lacked
reasonable suspicion to support a detention according to U.S. v. Colin (9th Cir. 2002)
314 F.3d 439 (Colin).
The magistrate, Judge Donald J. Currier, denied defendant’s motion to suppress
after finding that “a reasonable officer with the same or similar training and experience
and the same or similar circumstances, would entertain a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot, and that . . . [d]efendant was involved in that activity.” In
making this finding, the magistrate relied on the credibility of Officer Garcia’s testimony,
citing Officer Garcia’s 30 seconds of observing defendant “moving from side to side
within his lane . . . driving in a serpentine manner” and “drifting within the lane.” The
magistrate also considered Officer Garcia’s training and experience conducting
investigations related to driving under the influence. Additionally, the magistrate noted
that after stopping defendant for suspicion of driving under the influence, the officers
“inquired as to whether or not . . . [d]efendant was falling asleep.”
Defendant renewed his objections to the traffic stop before the trial court in a
motion under section 995. The trial court, Judge Deborah D. Lobre, relied on the
magistrate’s factual findings to deny the motion. Defendant later pled no contest to being
a felon in possession of a firearm and driving under the influence.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
“When a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 is denied at the
preliminary hearing and reviewed by the trial court in a section 995 proceeding, even
though the appeal is from the trial court, we, in effect, review the magistrate’s decision
directly, deferring to the magistrate’s factual findings.” (People v. Hawkins (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 194, 200.)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is well established that when a police officer
3
detains a citizen, the Fourth Amendment is triggered. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16.) Traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions.
(People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.)
“[T]o justify a detention, ‘the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must
include specific and articulable facts causing [the officer] to suspect that (1) some activity
relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person [the
officer] intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must [the officer]
subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for [the
officer] to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a
like position, drawing when appropriate on [the officer’s] training and experience
[citation], to suspect the same criminal activity.’ ” (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d
473, 478.) The facts related to a stop are “ ‘considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances.’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299.)
Defendant argues we should reverse the magistrate’s denial of his motion to
suppress because Officer Garcia’s observations did not provide reasonable suspicion of
driving under the influence. Defendant focuses specifically on Colin, supra, 314 F.3d
439 in support of his argument. Although “[f]ederal appellate court decisions are not
binding on this court, . . . we may consider them for any persuasive value.” (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 404.) In Colin, the court relied on an Appellate
Department of the Superior Court of San Diego County opinion in People v. Perez (1985)
175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 (Perez) to hold “ ‘pronounced weaving within a lane provides an
officer with reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence
where such weaving continues for a substantial distance.’ ” (Colin, at pp. 445-446, citing
Perez, at p. Supp. 11.) Defendant contends the facts of the instant case fall short of the
“ ‘pronounced weaving’ ” for a “ ‘substantial distance’ ” standard developed in Perez and
used in Colin. We disagree.
4
In Perez, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of San Diego County
addressed the issue of first impression in California of whether an officer may lawfully
detain a driver who has been observed weaving within a lane. (Perez, supra,
175 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 10, 11.) The officer in Perez observed and then pulled over
a “vehicle because of a ‘pronounced weaving’ within the lane. The officer described the
drift as being two feet in each direction. The officer followed the vehicle while it was
weaving for about three quarters of a mile. Due to the weaving observed by the officer
the vehicle was stopped. The detention was predicated on the officer’s belief that the
driver was under the influence of alcohol.” (Id. at p. Supp. 10.) The Perez court found
the stop justified and held, “[P]ronounced weaving within a lane provides an officer with
reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence where such
weaving continues for a substantial distance.” (Id. at p. Supp. 11.)
In Colin, an officer suspected a car was potentially being driven “under the
influence because the car’s wheels touched the fog line on the right side of the right lane
for 10 seconds and then, about 5 [to] 10 seconds later, touched the yellow line on the far
left of the left lane for another 10 seconds.” (Colin, supra, 314 F.3d at p. 445.) The
officer observed the vehicle for 35 to 45 seconds, at a speed of 70 miles per hour. (Id. at
pp. 441, 445.) Although the court recognized that “in some cases evidence of weaving
might be indicative of driving under the influence,” it did not find “the evidence . . .
sufficient for [the officer] to harbor a reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was driving
under the influence.” (Id. at p. 445.) Relying on Perez, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the driver “did not demonstrate ‘pronounced
weaving’ of up to two feet in either direction, or weave for a ‘substantial distance.’ In
fact, the only ‘suspicious’ behavior [the officer] observed was [the driver’s] car touching
the right fog line and the center yellow line each for 10 seconds, after legitimate lane
changes.” (Colin, at p. 446.)
5
Defendant contends his serpentine driving pattern does not qualify as pronounced
weaving because Officer Garcia described it as not “ ‘drastic,’ ” but “ ‘slower in
motion’ ” and “ ‘not really jerking or anything like that.’ ” However, none of the cases
relied on in Perez or Colin describe jerking or drastic weaving as a requirement. Instead,
the qualifying driving patterns are described like the instant case, such as “the drift . . .
being two feet in each direction,” “ ‘continually weaving’ but at all times remain[ing] in
its lane,” and “smooth continuous weaving within a traffic lane.” (Perez, supra,
175 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 10, 11.) This language aligns with Officer Garcia’s
description of the serpentine driving pattern as drifting within the lane and using “the
entire width of the lane to drive, so they’ll drive all the way to the right, and then they’ll
drive all the way to the left, in a continuous fashion.” Therefore, Officer Garcia’s
description of defendant’s driving pattern meets the Perez standard of pronounced
weaving, as relied on by Colin.
Defendant further argues Officer Garcia’s observations fall short of the substantial
distance standard set by Perez because his observations lasted only 30 seconds over a
shorter distance and at a slower rate of speed than in Colin. However, reasonable
suspicion exists when “pronounced weaving . . . continues for a substantial distance.”
(Colin, supra, 314 F.3d at p. 446.) Because the court in Colin did not find pronounced
weaving, there was nothing to continue for a substantial distance. (Ibid. [“Here, [the
driver] did not demonstrate ‘pronounced weaving’ . . . or weave for a ‘substantial
distance’ ”].) Further, neither Colin, Perez, nor any of the out-of-state cases relied on in
Perez set a minimum for what constitutes a substantial distance. (See, e.g., State v.
Bailey (Ore.Ct.App. 1981) 624 P.2d 663, 664 [“The officer followed [the] defendant for
about 4 [to] 5 blocks within the city limits”]; State v. Dorendorf (N.D. 1984) 359 N.W.2d
115, 116-117 [traffic stop justified after observing “smooth, continuous weaving within a
lane” for “approximately one-eighth to a quarter of a mile”].) Further, “ ‘[w]eaving’ for
even the length of a block may signify that something is amiss, and the distance of
6
observation is not a controlling factor in evaluating a traffic stop.” (Arburn v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485-1486.) Therefore, the
distance of “maybe a mile” over which Officer Garcia observed defendant’s driving
pattern qualifies as substantial.
Finally, we note that in Colin the court “[found] it curious that [the officer] did not
conduct a sobriety field test or ask [the defendant] if he had been drinking when he
stopped the car. This further convince[d] [the court] that [the officer] did not harbor
reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was driving under the influence.” (Colin,
supra, 314 F.3d at p. 446.) In contrast here, the trial court noted that after stopping
defendant for suspicion of driving under the influence, the officers “inquired as to
whether . . . [d]efendant was falling asleep.”
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including Officer Garcia’s training and
experience and his observations of defendant’s driving in a serpentine manner for a
substantial distance, we conclude a reasonable police officer in a like position would have
reasonable suspicion to suspect defendant was driving under the influence. Thus, the trial
court did not err in denying defendant’s motion.
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
8
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