Jacobs v. Sharp Healthcare CA4/1

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Filed 9/23/25 Jacobs v. Sharp Healthcare CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VALORI JACOBS, D084337

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
00070139-CU-MM-CTL)
SHARP HEALTHCARE, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.
Valori Jacobs, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Amy E. Rankin, David Sohn;
Dummit, Buchholz & Trapp, Scott D. Buchholz, Courtney S. Becker, and
Amanda K. Behrendt, for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
This is the second appeal in this medical malpractice action. Valori
Jacobs sued her former physician for medical malpractice and lack of
informed consent, alleging he was negligent in performing her sinus surgery
and failed to disclose all risks and procedures associated with the surgery.
Jacobs also sued Sharp Healthcare and Sharp-Rees Stealy Medical Group,
Inc. (collectively, Sharp), which operated the hospital facility where she was
treated and had the surgery, alleging her physician was an “employee and/or
contracted agent” of Sharp.
In the prior appeal, we reversed the trial court’s ruling sustaining
Sharp’s demurrer to Jacobs’s causes of action. (Jacobs v. Sharp Healthcare
(Jan. 25, 2023, D079404) [nonpub. opn.] (Jacobs).) The trial court had ruled
in part that her operative complaint was fatally uncertain as to Sharp’s
liability for her physician’s actions. We disagreed and held Jacobs
sufficiently alleged Sharp’s liability on the basis her physician was Sharp’s
ostensible agent. Critical to our holding, nothing in the operative complaint
revealed Jacobs received notice her physician was not a Sharp agent or
employee. (Ibid.)
Following remand, Sharp successfully moved for summary judgment on
numerous grounds, including that Jacobs was, in fact, notified that her
physician was not a Sharp agent or employee. Jacobs now appeals the entry
of summary judgment. Because she fails to demonstrate triable issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on ostensible agency, we affirm
the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sharp.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jacobs is a former patient of Dr. James Amsberry, an ear, nose and
throat (ENT) specialist. Amsberry performed sinus surgery on Jacobs on
February 28, 2017, at a facility operated by Sharp. She underwent a revision
sinus surgery on December 20, 2019.

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I.
Proceedings Before Summary Judgment
A. Lawsuit and Second Amended Complaint
On December 31, 2019, Jacobs filed this action. In her operative
pleading, a verified second amended complaint (SAC), she alleged that
lesions were removed from her left sinus during her revision surgery. She
stated she was “not sure what these lesions are” but believed they were
stents Dr. Amsberry had placed in her nasal cavity and then failed to remove.
Jacobs alleged she suffered infections, pain and suffering, corrective
surgery, and other issues because of the sinus surgery performed by
Dr. Amsberry. She further alleged she was not informed of all procedures
and risks associated with the sinus surgery, and she “believe[d] she was part
of some clinical trials without her consent.” She alleged Amsberry was an
“employee and/or contracted agent of [Sharp] . . . acting in the course and
scope of his capacity as an employee and/or contracted agent of [Sharp]” and
Sharp was liable “under the doctrine of ‘respondeat superior.’ ” She asserted
causes of action for (1) professional negligence, (2) lack of informed consent,
(3) “[i]ntentional and deliberate [f]raud,” and (4) “medical incompetence.”
B. Sharp’s Demurrer
Sharp demurred to the SAC. It argued the statute of limitations under

Code of Civil Procedure1 section 340.5 had run on Jacobs’s first cause of
action for professional negligence. Sharp further argued the entire SAC
failed for uncertainty because Dr. Amsberry, as a physician, was legally
precluded from being a Sharp employee, and there were no allegations
otherwise establishing how it was liable for Amsberry’s actions. The trial

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a
judgment of dismissal.
C. Jacobs’s First Appeal
Jacobs appealed. In Jacobs, supra, D079404, we reversed the demurrer
ruling as to her causes of action against Sharp for professional negligence

and lack of informed consent.2 We did so for two reasons. First, we found
the allegations of the SAC did not clearly and affirmatively establish a
statute of limitations defense to professional negligence. We noted that
Dr. Amsberry was alleged to have repeatedly reassured Jacobs about her
ongoing postsurgical symptoms, and reasoned she was entitled to rely on her
doctor’s disclaimers. We held that when liberally construed, Jacobs’s
allegations supported the conclusion she did not discover her injuries and
their negligent cause until within one year of the date she originally filed the
claim. (Ibid.)
Second, we found Jacobs’s causes of action for professional negligence
and lack of informed consent were not fatally uncertain as to the basis for
Sharp’s liability. We held the SAC “sufficiently alleged Sharp’s liability for
[Dr. Amsberry’s] actions on the basis of ostensible agency.” (Jacobs, supra,
D079404.) We explained that under California law, Sharp, the operator of
the hospital facility, “may be held liable for a physician’s wrongdoing when
the physician is an ostensible agent of the hospital.” (Ibid., citing Markow v.

2 In addition to Sharp (and Dr. Amsberry), Tom-Oliver Klein, M.D.
(identified in the SAC as “Tom Oliver-Klein”) and Ahmed Turek, M.D. were
also named in the SAC as defendants. Klein and Turek were also
respondents, along with Sharp, in Jacobs’s first appeal. (See Jacobs, supra,
D079404.) However, this court dismissed the appeal as to Klein and Turek
upon the parties’ written stipulation, thus leaving intact the judgment of
dismissal as to these two defendants.

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Rosner (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038 (Markow) and Mejia v. Community
Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1453 (Mejia).) We
explained, “Where a patient seeks to hold a hospital liable for the negligence
of a physician, the doctrine of ostensible agency requires two elements: ‘(1)
conduct by the hospital that would cause a reasonable person to believe that
the physician was an agent of the hospital, and (2) reliance on that apparent
agency relationship by the plaintiff.’ ” (Jacobs, supra, D079404, quoting
Mejia, at p. 1453.) In this scenario, “ultimately, ‘there is really only one
relevant factual issue: whether the patient had reason to know that the
physician was not an agent of the hospital.’ ” (Jacobs, supra, D079404
[cleaned up], quoting Markow, at p. 1038.)
We evaluated Jacobs’s allegations under these rules and found
ostensible agency was “readily inferred” from the SAC. (Jacobs, supra,
D079404 [cleaned up].) We reasoned the facts in the SAC supported this
inference, and nothing in the SAC revealed that Sharp gave Jacobs
“ ‘contrary notice’ ” that Dr. Amsberry was an independent contractor and not
an agent or employee of Sharp. (Jacobs, supra, D079404 [quoting Markow,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038 and parenthetically describing Markow, at
p. 1032 as a case “reversing judgment after jury verdict against hospital on
ostensible agency theory where hospital ‘unambiguously informed’ plaintiff in
25 conditions of admission forms that ‘all physicians furnishing services to
patients were independent contractors, not agents or employees of [the
hospital]’ ”].) For these reasons, we reversed the judgment with directions to

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enter a new order overruling Sharp’s demurrer on the first and second causes

of action and sustaining it on the remaining causes of action.3
II.
Summary Judgment Proceedings
A. Sharp’s Motion for Summary Judgment
After the case was remanded, Sharp moved for summary judgment. It
argued (1) Jacobs’s medical records and deposition testimony showed her
causes of action were time-barred; and (2) Jacobs’s causes of action failed as
to Sharp because she received notice Dr. Amsberry was an independent
contractor and not a Sharp agent or employee. Assuming Jacobs could
overcome the evidence refuting the existence of an ostensible agency
relationship between Amsberry and Sharp, Sharp further argued
(3) Amsberry did not deviate from the applicable standard of care; (4) Jacobs
suffered no “measurable” injuries or damages from the sinus surgery;
(5) Amsberry obtained Jacobs’s informed consent for the surgery; and
(6) Jacobs was not harmed by any assertedly undisclosed risks or results of
the surgery.
As supporting evidence, Sharp submitted medical records, excerpts of
Jacobs’s deposition testimony, and the declaration of James K. Bredenkamp,
M.D., Sharp’s retained expert and (like Dr. Amsberry) an ENT specialist. As
relevant here, the medical records included a consent form signed by Jacobs

3 Jacobs did not challenge the ruling sustaining Sharp’s demurrer to her
third and fourth causes of action, thus leaving intact the dismissal of Sharp
from those causes of action. (See Jacobs, supra, D079404.)

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on February 28, 2017 at 0725 (i.e., 7:25 a.m.).4 The first sentence of the form
stated, “Your physician has recommended a surgery or special diagnostic or
therapeutic procedure to be performed at a Sharp HealthCare facility.”
Among the form’s disclosures was the following statement: “The physicians,
surgeons and specialists who perform services for you are not the agents,
servants or employees of the hospital or, in most cases, of each other. They
are independent contractors who are responsible directly to you.” Sharp
argued Jacobs’s causes of action for professional negligence and lack of
informed consent failed because her signature on the form demonstrated she
was aware Amsberry was not a Sharp agent, servant, or employee.
Dr. Bredenkamp, Sharp’s expert, reviewed and summarized Jacobs’s
medical records and offered opinions about her care and treatment. He
opined that Sharp, through Dr. Amsberry, met the applicable standard of
care with regard to the care and treatment of Jacobs on February 28, 2017;
adequately advised Jacobs of the risks of sinus surgery and obtained her
informed consent to perform the surgery; and did not “cause any injury” to
Jacobs on February 28 nor did Jacobs suffer “measurable injuries or
damages” from her surgery. He elaborated on these opinions and averred
they were made to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Sharp’s
arguments that there were no triable issues of fact as to whether
Dr. Amsberry violated the applicable standard of care, failed to obtain
informed consent, or caused resulting damages, relied on this declaration.
Sharp’s statute of limitations defense was premised on an August 17,
2017 e-mail exchange in which Jacobs asked Dr. Amsberry whether he had

4 Jacobs alleged in the SAC that she arrived for her sinus surgery before
6 a.m. on February 28, 2017, and the surgery was completed at
approximately 4 p.m.

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heard of empty nose syndrome and said its symptoms seemed to match what
she was feeling. Amsberry responded that he “[did]n’t think this is ENS” and
recommended products Jacobs could use for her symptoms. Sharp argued
Jacobs suspected she had empty nose syndrome due to her surgery as of the
date of this email exchange, triggering the statutes of limitations for both
causes of action and rendering both untimely.
Sharp submitted a separate statement with a total of 117 undisputed
material facts and references to supporting evidence. Its motion was noticed
for hearing on March 29, 2024.
B. Jacobs’s Opposition
Jacobs, appearing as a self-represented litigant, responded to the
motion by filing documents with the following titles: (1) “Jacob’s Response to
Bredencamp Declaration”; (2) “Plaintiff Jacobs Objection to Defendants
Sharp Healthcare, et al Motion for Summary Judgement/ Adjudication
Judgement”; and (3) “NOL in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgement Adjudication.” (Boldface and capitalization
omitted.)
The first document had multiple components. First, Jacobs made a
series of assertions disagreeing with Dr. Bredenkamp’s opinions. Next, she
responded to the first 79 undisputed material facts from Sharp’s separate
statement. Many, but not all, of her responses included references to
materials she characterized as evidence.
In the second document, Jacobs argued she did not consent to balloon
dilation and ethmoidectomies; she suffered health issues that were
complications from the sinus surgery; and a “foreign object” was discovered
during her revision surgery. She also set forth a second declaration averring,
among other things, that “[a]ll mentioned individuals in this matter are

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associated with Sharp . . . either as employees or agents”; Dr. Amsberry did
not inform her he would perform an ethmoidectomy or balloon dilation
sphenoidectomy; and medical reports “from other ENTs . . . corroborate . . .
the medical conditions and diagnoses I have reported.”
The third document, the “NOL,” listed her lodged exhibits. It also
contained a third declaration in which Jacobs averred that Sharp and
Dr. Amsberry had breached the applicable duty of care, had performed
experimental procedures on her, and had failed to provide her an

“ ‘experimental subject’s bill of rights.’ ”5
C. Sharp’s Reply
Sharp filed a total of 54 evidentiary objections to Jacobs’s declarations,
most of her exhibits, and the assertions in her response to Dr. Bredenkamp’s
declaration.
Sharp argued that Jacobs had failed to respond to its moving evidence
with competent expert testimony or admissible evidence, and she therefore
failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to any material fact underlying its
motion. It also argued her response to its separate statement did not comply
with the rules governing separate statements, and this alone was grounds for
deeming its material facts undisputed and granting its motion.
D. Summary Judgment Hearing and Jacobs’s Additional Filings
On March 28, 2024, the day before the hearing, the trial court issued a
minute order indicating its tentative ruling was to grant Sharp’s motion in its
entirety.
At 6:21 a.m. on the morning of the hearing, Jacobs filed four new
documents: (1) “Jacobs Request for Judicial Notice in Opposition to

5 Jacobs’s first three declarations were not signed. However, Sharp did
not object to the lack of signature.

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Defendant Sharp et al Motion for Summary Judgement-Adjudication
Amended”; (2) “Jacobs Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendants
Sharp Healthcare, et al Motion for Summary Judgement/ Adjudication
Judgement Amended”; (3) “Jacob’s Response to Defendants Evidentiary
Objection and Reiteration of Response to Expert Declaration Ame[n]ded”; and
(4) “Jacobs Evidence in Opposition to Defendant Sharp et al Motion for
Summary Judgment-Adjudication – Amended.” (Boldface and some
capitalization omitted.) She did not ask for permission to file these
documents after the statutory deadline. (See § 437c, former subd. (b)(2)
[opposition to summary judgment motion must be served and filed 14 days in
advance of the date of the hearing “unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise”].)
In the first document, Jacobs sought judicial notice of records (e.g.,
“Plaintiff’s Medical Records”; “Correspondences and Formal Complaints”) but
did not attach the referenced records. The second document contained
arguments followed by a declaration identical to the one in Jacobs’s
“objection,” except that it described Jacobs as an expert. (Boldface and
capitalization omitted.) The third document was the same as Jacobs’s
original “[r]esponse,” except that it included responses to 10 of Sharp’s
evidentiary objections. (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) The fourth
document was largely new; in it, Jacobs provided free-form responses to
many of Sharp’s undisputed material facts.
At the hearing, Jacobs objected to Dr. Bredenkamp’s declaration and
said there were facts that refuted his opinions. She did not notify the trial
court of her recent filings. The court took the matter under submission.
E. Trial Court Ruling and Entry of Judgment

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On April 3, 2024, the trial court issued a minute order granting the
motion. The court sustained 25 of Sharp’s evidentiary objections, thereby
excluding most of Jacobs’s documentary exhibits and many of her declaration
averments, including her assertion that all individuals “in this matter” were
employees or agents of Sharp.
On the merits of the motion, the trial court first observed that
Dr. Bredenkamp opined Sharp, through Dr. Amsberry, met the applicable
standard of care and obtained Jacobs’s informed consent, and that Jacobs did
not suffer measurable injuries or damages from Amsberry’s surgery. The
court stated Sharp’s production of an expert opinion shifted the burden to
Jacobs to come forward with conflicting expert evidence.
The trial court then evaluated Jacobs’s response and found it
procedurally and substantively inadequate. Procedurally, the court found her
response separate statement failed to comply with California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1350(e), and ruled this was a sufficient ground for granting the motion.
Substantively, it found Jacobs failed to provide a qualified expert opinion
raising any triable issue of fact and failed to address “the statute of
limitations issue.” The court then granted the motion as to her professional
negligence cause of action.
Turning to the cause of action for informed consent, the trial court
found Jacobs had failed to address the evidence Dr. Amsberry was an
independent contractor responsible for providing informed consent, and failed
to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the cause of action was barred by
the statute of limitations. It then granted the motion as to the informed
consent cause of action and in its entirety.

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Judgment in favor of Sharp was entered on September 16, 2024.6
DISCUSSION
Jacobs, who is representing herself in this appeal, raises several claims
of error. She contends, among other things, that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because there were triable issues of material
fact with respect to whether Dr. Amsberry was an ostensible agent of Sharp.
Like Jacobs, we interpret the court’s ruling as embracing a finding it was

undisputed Amsberry was not Sharp’s ostensible agent.7 Although Sharp did
not address ostensible agency in its response brief, it is Jacobs who bears the
burden of demonstrating error. As we explain, she fails to carry this burden.
And because Sharp’s alleged liability to Jacobs is premised on an ostensible
agency theory, we can and do affirm summary judgment on this ground
without the need to consider her remaining claims of error.
I.
Standard of Review
“A defendant moving for summary judgment ‘bears the burden of
persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question

6 In her notice of appeal, Jacobs identified the minute order granting
summary judgment as the appealed order. In an October 14, 2024 order, this
court construed the notice of appeal as taken from the judgment.

7 Although the trial court’s wording was imprecise, when it stated there
was evidence Dr. Amsberry was an independent contractor, it was clearly
referring to the notice provided in the Sharp consent form signed by Jacobs.
This notice, in turn, was offered by Sharp for the sole purpose of showing
Jacobs “was aware that Defendant Dr. Amsberry was not an agent, servant,
or employee of Defendants” (italics added), thus negating its alleged liability
for Amsberry’s torts. By taking Sharp’s evidence as true and finding Jacobs
failed to address it (and thereby refute it), the court necessarily found Sharp’s
evidence of the absence of ostensible agency was undisputed, and its order
granting summary judgment in turn embraced this finding.

12
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense thereto.’ The
defendant also ‘bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie
showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.’ Where, as
here, the burden of proof at trial is by a preponderance of the evidence, the
defendant must ‘present evidence that would require such a trier of fact not
to find any underlying material fact more likely than not.’ If the defendant
carries this burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff ‘to make a
prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.’ The
plaintiff must present evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the underlying material fact more likely than not.” (Franklin v. Santa
Barbara Cottage Hospital (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 395, 402–403 (Franklin)
[cleaned up].)
We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. (Yanowitz
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) “Our obligation is to
determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues
themselves.” (Franklin, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [cleaned up].) We
must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of
that party.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1037.)
“ ‘[A]lthough we use a de novo standard of review here, we do not
transform into a trial court.’ ” (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 379.) We approach a summary judgment appeal,
as with any appeal, with the presumption the appealed judgment is correct.
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Meridian Financial
Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) Therefore, “on review
of a summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing error, even
if [she] did not bear the burden in the trial court.” (Dinslage, at p. 379

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[cleaned up].) The appellant “still bears the affirmative burden to show
error” even when the appeal is unopposed. (In re Marriage of F.M. and M.M.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn. 1 [cleaned up].)
II.
Analysis
The threshold question when evaluating a grant of summary judgment
is whether the moving party met its burden of production and persuasion.
(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) We therefore start by addressing an apparent
contention by Jacobs that Sharp failed to meet its burden of establishing
Dr. Amsberry was not its ostensible agent. Jacobs asserts she “was not given
notice that Dr. Amsberry was an independent contractor” and “[n]o disclosure
or waiver advised her that he was not a Sharp employee or that he operated
independently.” The record does not support her assertions.
As we explained in our prior opinion, under California law, “[w]here a
patient seeks to hold a hospital liable for the negligence of a physician, the
doctrine of ostensible agency requires two elements: ‘(1) conduct by the
hospital that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician
was an agent of the hospital, and (2) reliance on that apparent agency
relationship by the plaintiff.’ ” (Jacobs, supra, D079404, quoting Mejia,
supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453.) “ ‘Ultimately, “there is really only one
relevant factual issue: whether the patient had reason to know that the
physician was not an agent of the hospital.” ’ ” (Jacobs, supra, D079404,
quoting Markow, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038.)
Contrary to Jacobs’s assertions, Sharp’s moving evidence included the
consent form signed by Jacobs. As we explain, the form was evidence Jacobs
had reason to know Dr. Amsberry was not an agent of Sharp, making it

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sufficient to meet Sharp’s moving burden to establish the absence of
ostensible agency. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
The facts of Markow are instructive. The plaintiff in Markow sought
chronic pain treatment from a physician after learning he was the medical
director of the pain center of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars).
(Markow, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.) Although the physician was a
partner in a medical group, not a Cedars employee, he used business cards
imprinted with Cedars’s name, and his letterhead included the Cedars logo.
During the period the physician treated the plaintiff, the plaintiff signed and
initialed 25 forms that bore the Cedars logo and stated either “ ‘physicians
are independent contractors and are neither employed by nor agents of this
facility’ ” or “ ‘[a]ll physicians and surgeons furnishing services to the Patient
. . . are independent contractors and are not employees or agents of the
Hospital.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1033, 1039, boldface omitted.)
On the basis of this evidence, the Markow court reversed a jury verdict
holding Cedars liable for the physician’s negligence on an ostensible agency
theory. The court reasoned that by initialing the forms the plaintiff indicated
he received actual notice of his doctor’s independent contractor status.
Further, “[t]he wording of the disclaimer in each form . . . was simple and
unambiguous, not obtuse ‘legalese.’ ” (Markow, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1039.) And even assuming plaintiff relied on other factors, such as
Cedars’s name and logo on the physician’s business cards, they were “negated
by the actual notice Cedars provided [the plaintiff.]” (Id. at p. 1042.)
Accordingly, as a matter of law the plaintiff either knew or should have
known his physician was an independent contractor and not Cedars’s agent
or employee. (Id. at p. 1041.)

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Wicks v. Antelope Valley Healthcare Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 866
(Wicks) is also instructive. In Wicks, the plaintiffs’ decedent went to the
emergency department of a hospital seeking treatment for chest pain. He
died of “ ‘acute dissection of aorta’ ” eight hours after the emergency room
doctor discharged him. (Id. at p. 871.) Plaintiffs sought to hold the hospital
liable for the physician’s actions on an ostensible agency theory. The hospital
moved for summary judgment based on evidence the decedent, shortly after
arriving at the hospital, signed and initialed a “ ‘Conditions of Services’ ”
form that stated, “all physicians providing services, including the emergency
physician, ‘are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital.’ ”
(Id. at p. 872; see id. at p. 870.) The trial court granted summary judgment,
reasoning the decedent received “ ‘actual notice that the [hospital’s]
emergency department physicians were independent contractors.’ ” (Id. at
p. 874.)
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued an admission form cannot negate
ostensible agency as a matter of law when the purported agency relationship
arises in the emergency room setting, in which the patient does not choose
the physician who provides treatment. (Wicks, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 882–883.) The court disagreed. It reasoned that in other cases dealing
with the emergency room setting, there was either no evidence the hospital
gave the patient notice its physicians were independent contractors (id. at
p. 883 [discussing Mejia, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450]), or there was
evidence the patient was in no condition to understand the admission form
(Wicks, at p. 883 [discussing Whitlow v. Rideout Memorial Hospital (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 631, 663–634 (Whitlow)]). Here, by contrast, the decedent
did receive such notice, and there was “nothing to suggest” the decedent was
incapable of understanding the admission form. (Wicks, at p. 883.)

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Moreover, the form’s language was “straightforward,” devoid of “obtuse
legalese,” and therefore gave the decedent “meaningful written notice,
acknowledged by [the decedent] at the time of admission, . . . when he was
alert, oriented and cooperative, that the staff physicians were not employees
or agents.” (Id. at pp. 883, 884.)
The holdings of Markow and Wicks support the conclusion the signed
consent form filed with Sharp’s motion was sufficient to negate ostensible
agency. The consent form, which bore the Sharp logo, informed the patient—
identified in the form as Valori Jacobs—her physician had recommended “a
surgery . . . or therapeutic procedure to be performed at a Sharp HealthCare
facility.” It stated, “The physicians, surgeons and specialists who perform
services for you are not the agents, servants or employees of the hospital” but
rather “are independent contractors who are responsible directly to you.” The
form was signed by the “Patient[ ]”—Jacobs—on February 28, 2017 at
7:25 a.m., a little over an hour after she allegedly arrived for sinus surgery.
And it stated the patient’s “signature on this form indicates that . . . [the
patient] ha[s] read and understood the information provided in this form.”
The content of the form, together with the indicia Jacobs signed and
therefore read and understood the information provided, were evidence she
received actual notice Dr. Amsberry was an independent contractor and not
an agent or employee of Sharp. The language of the form was “simple and
unambiguous” (Markow, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039) and
“straightforward” (Wicks, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 883) with no “obtuse
‘legalese’ ” (Markow, at p. 1039; Wicks, at p. 883). By producing the signed
form, Sharp therefore demonstrated “[Jacobs] had some reason to know of the
true relationship between [Sharp] and [her] physician.” (Markow, at

17
p. 1038.) Accordingly, it was sufficient to meet Sharp’s moving burden to
establish the absence of ostensible agency.
The burden shifted to Jacobs to produce admissible evidence creating a
triable issue on this essential component of her claims against Sharp.
(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Jacobs fails to establish that she met this burden. She
identifies no admissible evidence in the record creating a triable issue on
ostensible agency. Although she filed a declaration stating “[a]ll mentioned
individuals in this matter are associated with Sharp . . . either as employees
or agents,” the trial court sustained Sharp’s objections to this averment, and
Jacobs has not challenged this evidentiary ruling on appeal.
Instead, Jacobs makes a series of factual assertions aimed at
persuading us there is a triable issue. She states she “believed that the
physicians at Sharp, including Dr. Amsberry acted as an agent or employee of
the medical facility.” We disregard this statement because it is
unaccompanied by a citation to supporting evidence. (Falcon v. Long Beach
Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 (Falcon).) Moreover,
ostensible agency exists when “the patient reasonably believed the doctor was
an agent of the hospital.” (Whitlow, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 641, italics
added.) Jacobs’s asserted subjective belief about Amsberry’s status does not
create a material dispute as to ostensible agency because it does not address
whether her belief was reasonable.
Elsewhere in her opening brief, Jacobs states, “Marketing materials,
employment agreements, and patient expectations establish agency. . . . At
all times known to Plaintiff, Dr. Amsberry is a Physician/Doctor/Surgeon,
practicing at Sharp Medical facilities, the surgery on February 28, 2017 was
held at Sharp Memorial Hospital, at all times that she went in for care with
Dr. Amsberry and other affiliated doctors through Sharp, her health care

18
provider, she was seen and treated at a Sharp facility.” She further asserts
she “spoke to Dr. Amsberry and other doctors at Sharp facilities,” refers to
“Sharp’s website and marketing material,” and states “[h]er email and
correspondence through the MyHealth app . . . is owned/operated or
controlled by Sharp or 3d party communicator.” She notes that the same law
firm is representing Sharp and Dr. Amsberry. In her reply brief, she adds
that she was “referred to Dr. Amsberry through Sharp Rees-Stealy,” “received
care, surgical scheduling, billing, and pre-operative instructions exclusively
through Sharp’s facilities,” and “all forms, emails, and instructions came from
Sharp’s staff and through Sharp’s facilities.” The effect of these facts, she
claims, is that “although there was evidence suggesting that no actual agency
existed . . . the only logical conclusion is that ostensible agency exists as a
matter of law.”
These efforts to establish a triable issue fail. Once again, the facts
Jacobs recites are unaccompanied by proper citations to supporting evidence.
(Falcon, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) Although her reply brief does
include record citations, the citations lead to Sharp’s moving evidence, not
her opposition evidence, and the pages cited do not match the purportedly
referenced materials (a purported “Complaint and Intake” and “Deposition
excerpts”). Moreover, so far as we can determine, Jacobs is relying on these
facts for the first time on appeal, making it inappropriate for us to consider

them.8 (See American Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195

8 In her reply brief, Jacobs notes that during the summary judgment
hearing, she argued Dr. Amsberry “treats patients at Sharp facilities,”
“doesn’t have a private practice,” and is “in their system.” Contrary to her
apparent belief, unsworn assertions during a hearing are not testimonial and
do not constitute evidence. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11;
In re Heather H. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 91, 95.)

19
Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 [“[I]n reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate
court must consider only those facts before the trial court, disregarding any
new allegations on appeal.”].)
In any event, under Markow, the facts Jacobs recites in her appellate
briefs would not create a triable issue even if we were to consider them. In
Markow, the plaintiff relied on analogous factors—“the contents of Cedars’s
Web site,” “the location of the pain clinic in a building owned by Cedars and
displaying Cedars’s name and logo,” and “employment of nurses and other
pain clinic staff”—to establish ostensible agency. (Markow, supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1041–1042.) The Markow court held that even assuming
the plaintiff had knowledge of and relied on each of these factors, “they are
nonetheless negated by the actual notice Cedars provided [to the plaintiff]
that [his physician] was an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1042.) The
same analysis applies here. For this additional reason, Jacobs fails to
persuade us of a triable issue on ostensible agency. (See id. at p. 1044
[concluding ostensible agency was not a factual issue and “the jury’s
ostensible agency finding is contrary to law”].)
Next, Jacobs contends agency is “inherently a factual question.” While
this may be true as a general proposition, as Wicks and Markow demonstrate,
when (as in this case) there is undisputed evidence the patient should have
known her physician was not an agent of the hospital facility, ostensible
agency is properly adjudicated as a matter of law. (See Markow, supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at p. 1039 [ostensible agency is a factual issue “ ‘[u]nless the
evidence conclusively indicates that the patient should have known that the
treating physician was not the hospital’s agent, such as when the patient’ . . .
received actual notice of the absence of any agency relationship”].)

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Finally, Jacobs notes that in Jacobs, supra, D079404, we found she
sufficiently alleged Dr. Amsberry was Sharp’s ostensible agent. She contends
the factual allegations of her SAC, “bolstered by documentary evidence and
deposition testimony[,] support a triable issue under Mejia and Eriksen.” We
remain unpersuaded. A plaintiff opposing summary judgment cannot rely on
allegations in “[her] own pleadings, even if verified, to make or supplement
the evidentiary showing required in the summary judgment context.”
(College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720, fn. 7.) And
Jacobs’s vague references to “documentary evidence” and “deposition
testimony” are insufficient to meet her appellate burden to identify
admissible evidence in the record creating a triable issue as to ostensible
agency. As for her case citations, Mejia is inapposite because it did not
involve evidence the patient was informed of the independent contractor
status of the physician. (See Mejia, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1458–1461.)
As for her other citation—to either Eriksen or Eriken v. Physicians Surgical
Med. Ctr., Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167—we have tried to locate
the case using the names and citation provided. So far as we can determine,
no such case exists.
For all these reasons, we conclude Sharp met its moving burden to
negate Jacobs’s theory of ostensible agency, after which Jacobs failed to carry
her burden to produce admissible evidence establishing a triable material

fact on that issue.9 As a result, summary judgment was properly granted in
favor of Sharp.

9 Although Jacobs at times references actual agency in her appellate
briefs, she admits Sharp’s evidence suggested “no actual agency existed” and
does not attempt to establish she offered evidence creating a triable issue
whether Sharp was liable for Dr. Amsberry’s torts under an actual agency
theory. To the extent she intended to challenge the summary judgment by
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DISPOSITION
The judgment entered on September 16, 2024 is affirmed. The parties
are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

arguing Sharp failed to meet its moving burden or a triable issue existed on
actual agency, any such challenge has been forfeited. (See Tiernan v.
Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4
[issue not raised on appeal deemed waived]; Eck v. City of Los Angeles (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 141, 146 [same].)

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