CourtListener 10676355•People v. Kestner CA2/6
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Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Kestner CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337793
(Super. Ct. No. MA083775)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
JOSHUA KESTNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Joshua Kestner appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,1
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), and prohibited person in
possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The
trial court sentenced Kestner to two years in state prison for
count 1, and a concurrent sentence of two years for count 2.
Kestner contends the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury sua sponte: (1) that it must unanimously agree
which ammunition he possessed, and (2) regarding the defense of
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
momentary possession. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sheriff’s deputies obtained a search warrant for a house
where they believed D.F. lived to obtain evidence of an armed
robbery in which he was a suspect. Before serving the warrant,
deputies saw D.F. leave the house, arrested him, and recovered
from his person the firearm used in the robbery.
Deputies then searched the house. Inside were Kestner,
Kestner’s girlfriend, her father, and her two children.
At 5:03 p.m., a deputy searched an unlocked hallway closet
“in a common area of the house.” The closet contained men’s
clothing, a backpack, and a locked safe. The clothing was for a
larger person than D.F. or the girlfriend’s father. In the
backpack was a piece of mail addressed to Kestner. Also in the
closet was a holster containing a Glock pistol, loaded with 10 live
.40 caliber bullets.
A deputy asked Kestner for the code to open the safe.
Kestner said, “That’s not mine.” But when the deputy said they
would have to break it open pursuant to the search warrant,
Kestner told him the six-digit code.
At 5:21 p.m., a deputy opened the safe using the code
Kestner provided. Inside the safe was a Glock magazine
containing 30 live rounds of .40 caliber ammunition that would fit
the firearm found in the closet, three boxes of live ammunition of
various calibers, firearm parts, and a scale with what appeared to
be drug residue.
After being advised of his Miranda2 rights, Kestner
admitted the firearm, the safe, and its contents, including the
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
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ammunition, were his. He also admitted a bag containing drugs
found in a bedroom he shared with his girlfriend was his.
The parties stipulated Kestner had been previously
convicted of felonies.
Kestner’s testimony
Kestner testified his girlfriend lived at the house. He did
not live there but had stayed there the night before the search.
The clothes in the closet were not his. He testified the safe was
not his but belonged to D.F., who had given Kestner the code for
it. Kestner had never opened or looked inside the safe.
Regarding the piece of mail addressed to him, he “might have
used her address as a mailing address . . . for something like
maybe like a cash app card or something like that.”
Kestner testified the firearm was not his. He said he made
the admissions under Miranda because a deputy told him if he
did not admit possessing the drugs found in the black bag, they
could take away his girlfriend’s children.
On cross-examination, Kestner testified he did not
remember telling a deputy that D.F. had given him the firearm.
The prosecution then played a video of a conversation between
Kestner and a deputy that included the following: Kestner said,
“it’s not my gun.” He said D.F. did not live at the house but had
spent the night there. Kestner said that in the morning, D.F.
“had his guns, and he was like, uh, can you put this in, in the
closet by my safe real quick? I’m gonna run and grab some
cigarettes.” Kestner said D.F. “ ‘was in a hurry, and he handed it
to me.’ ”
After hearing the video at trial, Kestner admitted he made
the statements. On redirect examination, he testified he did not
remember how D.F. handed him the firearm, or if it was in a bag,
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or what time D.F. gave it to him. On further cross-examination,
he said he did not recall if he put the firearm in the closet. He
testified, “obviously someone had to put it there. It could have
been me. I’m just saying I don’t really remember a hundred
percent; so I can’t tell you yes or no.”
DISCUSSION
Unanimity instruction
Kestner contends count 2 must be reversed because the
trial court did not advise the jury sua sponte that it must
unanimously agree which ammunition he possessed. We are not
persuaded.
A defendant possesses a prohibited item “ ‘when it is under
his dominion and control.’ ” (People v. Blakely (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1042, 1052.) “[M]ore than one person may possess
the same contraband.” (People v. Miranda (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 398, 410.) The jury here was correctly advised that
to be guilty of possession of ammunition, the defendant must
know he had custody and control of ammunition. (CALCRIM No.
2591; People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332.)
“In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous.”
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “[W]hen the
evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the
prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must
require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.; see
CALCRIM No. 3500.) “This requirement of unanimity as to the
criminal act ‘is intended to eliminate the danger that the
defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense
which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ” (Russo, at
p. 1132.)
We apply the independent standard of review to claims of
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instructional error. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
919.)
A unanimity instruction is required where “[t]he different
defenses gave the jury a rational basis to distinguish between the
various acts.” (People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 843,
853.) It applies in possession cases where conviction may be
based on more than one item and there are “distinctive facts
surrounding defendant’s ‘possession’ of each.” (People v.
Crawford (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 591, 599–600 (Crawford).)
The prosecution did not elect whether count 2 was based on
the ammunition in the loaded firearm, or the ammunition inside
the safe. On the contrary, the prosecutor argued they both served
as a basis for count 2. Regarding possession of the loaded
firearm, Kestner claimed that D.F. handed him the firearm to put
in the closet. His possession of the ammunition in the safe was
based in part on his knowledge of the code and his (later
recanted) admission. Because there are arguably “unique facts”
regarding possession of the ammunition located inside the
firearm and the ammunition located inside the safe (Crawford,
supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 599), a unanimity instruction was
required. It was a “ ‘general principle[] of law relevant to the
issues raised by the facts of the case before it.’ ” (People v.
Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 417; Crawford, at p. 596.)
But even if the court erred, we conclude any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “Although there is a split of
authority on whether the Chapman [v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18] standard applies to the failure to give a unanimity
instruction, we agree with the majority view that it does.”
(People v. Jones (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1096.)
Here, the ammunition in the loaded firearm and the
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ammunition in the safe were found in the same closet, and within
20 minutes of each other. Kestner exercised dominion and
control over the closet, including the safe, as evidenced by
Kestner’s backpack and clothing in the closet and his knowledge
of the code for the safe.
People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177 is instructive.
There, the Court of Appeal held that failure to give a unanimity
instruction regarding possession of several firearms found in a
trailer was harmless under Chapman. The defendant made a
“damning admission: ‘[M]y guns are in the light fixtures above
the kitchen.’ ” (Wolfe, at p. 188.) He “presented a unitary defense
with respect to all of the firearms—that they belonged to his
mother, and he had no dominion or control over them.” (Ibid.)
Similarly here, Kestner admitted to police that he
possessed both the firearm and the ammunition in the safe. His
defense at trial was that he was coerced into making these
statements, had never opened the safe, and did not remember if
he put the firearm in the closet. But the jury found his testimony
lacked credibility when it found him guilty of possessing both the
firearm and ammunition. “ ‘Where the record indicates the jury
resolved the basic credibility dispute against the defendant and
therefore would have convicted him of any of the various offenses
shown by the evidence, the failure to give the unanimity
instruction is harmless.’ ” (People v. Curry (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 766, 783.) Reversal is not warranted.
Momentary possession
Kestner contends the trial court erred by not instructing
the jury sua sponte regarding the defense of momentary
possession of the firearm. We disagree.
The defense of momentary possession is defined in
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bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 2510. It states the
possession of a firearm is not unlawful if the defendant proves
they “possessed the firearm only for a momentary or transitory
period,” “possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or]
dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it,” and “did not intend to prevent law
enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.”
Kestner did not request a momentary possession
instruction and did not mention it during closing argument. But
“[a] trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on
all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and openly
connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47
Cal.4th 203, 246.) “The duty to instruct sua sponte” includes
“defenses that are raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marquez
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 581.) “The court may, however, ‘properly
refuse an instruction . . . if it is not supported by substantial
evidence.’ ” (Burney, at p. 246.) “[T]he court need not give the
requested instruction where the supporting evidence is minimal
and insubstantial.” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044,
1145.)
The defense of momentary possession was first described
regarding possession of narcotics in People v. Mijares (1971) 6
Cal.3d 415. There, the defendant removed a package of heroin
from the pocket of a friend who was overdosing and threw it into
a field “for the sole purpose of putting an end to the unlawful
possession of [his friend].” (Id. at p. 420.) The court held that
possession of narcotics “does not include merely handling for only
brief moments prior to abandoning the narcotic.” (Id. at p. 423.)
The defense of “temporary possession for disposal” was also
discussed regarding a felon’s possession of a firearm in People v.
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Hurtado (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 810. There, an 11-year-old
boy found a loaded firearm and extra bullets and gave them to
the defendant. (Id. at p. 808.) The Court of Appeal concluded the
trial court erred in instructing on the defense of momentary
possession because the defendant’s retention of the firearm for at
least two days “cannot be characterized as momentary.” (Id. at
p. 814.)
Our Supreme Court recognized the defense in People v.
Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180. The court stated, “We agree with
the Hurtado court that recognition of a ‘momentary possession’
defense serves the salutary purpose and sound public policy of
encouraging disposal and discouraging retention of dangerous
items such as controlled substances and firearms.” (Id. at
p. 1191.) In Martin, the defendant’s girlfriend discovered a
packet of drugs in her son’s room and gave it to defendant with
instructions to “ ‘[g]et rid of it.’ ” (Id. at p. 1183.) But the
defendant kept the drugs in his pocket for four hours before the
police arrived in response to an altercation at the residence, and
for another 40 minutes before police arrested and searched him.
(Id. at pp. 1192–1193.) The court concluded the defendant was
not entitled to a momentary possession instruction because
“[t]here is no indication in the record that during these periods
defendant made any attempt, or took any physical action, to
dispose of the methamphetamine bindle, much less enlist the
assistance of the officers in doing so.” (Id. at p. 1193.)
We conclude substantial evidence did not support giving a
momentary possession instruction. While Kestner’s statements
suggested he only briefly handled the firearm, there was no
evidence he possessed it “ ‘for the purpose of abandonment,
disposal, or destruction.’ ” (People v. Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
8
p. 1190.) Instead, he simply moved the firearm from one area of
the house to another so D.F. could “grab some cigarettes.”
Kestner placed the firearm in a common area over which he
continued to have access. We reject Kestner’s claim of
instructional error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Emily J. Cole, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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