CourtListener 10675584•Garretson v. Murrillo CA1/5
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Filed 9/22/25 Garretson v. Murrillo CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VANESSA GARRETSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171205
v.
DAISY MURRILLO, (Sonoma County
Defendant and Respondent. Super. Ct. No. SCV-268818)
Daisy Murrillo’s dog bit Vanessa Garretson, a dog groomer,
while Garretson was trimming the dog’s nails. Garretson sued
Murrillo, alleging causes of action for negligence and strict
liability under California’s dog bite statute (Civ. Code, § 3342,
subd. (a)). Murrillo moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Garretson assumed the risk of being bit when she agreed to
groom the dog. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
On appeal from the resulting judgment in Murrillo’s favor,
Garretson contends the trial court erred because she established
a triable issue of material fact as to whether an exception to the
so-called veterinarian’s rule was triggered. We disagree and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
On September 11, 2019, Garretson was working as a pet
groomer for PetSmart, Inc. when Murrillo’s Husky, named Tahoe,
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bit her left wrist. Because Garretson had never met or groomed
Tahoe before, she asked the man who brought Tahoe for
grooming whether she should be aware of any behavioral issues.
The man said, without further elaboration, that Tahoe “did not
like his feet being messed with.”
Garretson took Tahoe to the grooming table, attached a
“groomer’s loop,” as well as a “groomer’s helper”—an additional
safety harness used to reduce the risk of bites—and started
clipping Tahoe’s nails. Garretson did not use a muzzle or refuse
to groom Tahoe, either of which are safety precautions she would
take if a dog were known to be aggressive. Garretson clipped the
nails on three of Tahoe’s paws without incident. But as
Garretson was clipping the nails on Tahoe’s fourth and final paw,
the dog turned and bit her left wrist without warning. Tahoe did
not release his bite until Garretson yanked her hand away.
Garretson sustained several puncture wounds as well as
weakness and swelling in her left wrist and two left fingers.
B.
In 2021, Garretson filed a form personal injury complaint
against Murrillo. She alleged causes of action for negligence and
for strict liability under Civil Code, section 3342, subdivision
(a)).1 Murrillo filed an answer in which she asserted primary
assumption of the risk as a defense.
1 That statute provides, in pertinent part: “The owner of
any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is
bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private
place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless
of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of
such viciousness.” (Civ. Code, § 3342, subd. (a).) “Subdivision (a)
of [Civil Code] section 3342 has been recognized as imposing a
duty of care on every dog owner to prevent his or her dog from
biting persons in a public place or lawfully in a private place.”
(Priebe v. Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112, 1120 (Priebe).)
2
Murrillo moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Garretson’s claims were barred, as a matter of law, by the
veterinarian’s rule. (See Priebe, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1115.)
Garretson opposed Murrillo’s motion for summary judgment. She
did not dispute that the veterinarian’s rule extends to pet
groomers injured during a grooming session or that she was
acting in that capacity when bitten. However, she argued that
the veterinarian’s rule does not apply when a dog owner knows or
should know of their dog’s vicious propensities and fails to
adequately warn of such facts. Garretson argued that a trier of
fact could reasonably conclude that Tahoe had previously bitten
or otherwise shown aggression toward people who touched the
dog’s paws and that Murrillo knew about but failed to adequately
warn Garretson of this behavior.
The trial court granted Murrillo’s motion for summary
judgment. In its written order, the court concluded (implicitly)
that the veterinarian’s rule applies to dog groomers—and
Murrillo thereby owed no duty of care to protect Garretson from a
dog bite—noting that “[d]og bites are a known risk to dog
groomers.” The court also agreed with Garretson that the
veterinarian’s rule would not bar Murrillo’s liability if she knew
or should have known her dog had vicious propensities and failed
to inform Garretson of such facts. However, the court concluded
that Murrillo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
Garretson had not met her burden to present evidence
establishing a triable issue of material fact—i.e., that Murrillo
knew Tahoe presented an increased risk to bite while having his
nails clipped. The trial court entered judgment in Murrillo’s
favor.
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DISCUSSION
A.
Garretson insists the trial court erred in concluding the
veterinarian’s rule bars her claims as a matter of law. After
reviewing the trial court’s order granting summary judgment de
novo (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860
(Aguilar)), we disagree.
1.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the
moving party meets their burden of persuasion and shows that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)2 When the
moving party is a defendant, they have the burden of showing
that one of the required elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action
cannot be established or that there is a complete defense.
(§ 437c, subds. (b)(1), (p)(2); Aguilar, at pp. 850, 854.) If the
defendant meets their “initial burden of production” by making a
prima facie showing of “the nonexistence of any triable issue,” the
burden of production shifts to the opposing party to show the
existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, at p. 850;
accord, § 437c, subds. (b)(3), (p)(2).)
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling independently, “we
apply the same three-step analysis used by the trial court. First,
we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Second, we
determine whether the moving party has established facts
justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, in most cases, if the
moving party has carried its initial burden, we decide whether
the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable
2Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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issue of material fact.” (Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 865, 874.) We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the losing party, liberally construing their
evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing the moving
party’s showing. We resolve any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in the losing party’s favor. (Id. at p. 876.)
“Summary judgment will be upheld when, viewed in such a
light, the evidentiary submissions conclusively negate a
necessary element of plaintiff’s cause of action, or show that
under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact requiring the
process of a trial, thus defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School
Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1360-1361.)
The veterinarian’s rule is a well-established application of
the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Under the rule, “a
dog owner who contracts with a veterinarian to treat his or her
dog is generally exempt from liability should the dog bite or
injure the veterinarian or veterinarian’s assistant during such
medical treatment.” (Priebe, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1115.) In
Priebe, our Supreme Court extended the veterinarian’s rule to
bar a kennel worker’s statutory strict liability claim against a dog
owner for injuries sustained from dog bites while the worker was
caring for the owner’s boarded dog. (Id. at pp. 1115, 1132.) The
court explained that the policy rationale underlying the
application of the rule to veterinarians and their assistants—that
they are paid for their services and “are in the best position, and
usually the only position, to take the necessary safety precautions
and protective measures to avoid being bitten or otherwise
injured by a dog left in their care and control”—applies equally to
kennel technicians and “dog groomers.” (Id. at p. 1130, italics
omitted.)
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2.
Garretson concedes that Murrillo met her first-step burden
and that the veterinarian’s rule applies to dog groomers—which
means that ordinarily Murrillo (as a grooming client) would owe
no duty of care to protect Garretson from the risk of being bitten.
(See Priebe, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1125-1126, 1131 [suggesting
but not holding that rule extends to groomers]; Jordan v. Lusby
(Ky.Ct.App. 2002) 81 S.W.3d 523, 524-525 (Jordan) [concluding
dog groomers accept risk of being bitten when they accept dog for
grooming].) Garretson instead insists the trial court erred
because a trier of fact could reasonably find the facts necessary to
trigger an exception to the veterinarian’s rule. We disagree.
True, the veterinarian’s rule is not absolute (at least if a
common law strict liability cause of action is at issue); the rule
“does not mean dog owners could never be held liable for injuries
to veterinarians or their assistants.” (Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165
Cal.App.3d 709, 715, fn. 4; accord, Priebe, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp.
1115-1116, 1132.) Our Supreme Court has made clear that at
least a common law (non-statutory) strict liability cause of action
may be maintained if the dog owner “knew or had reason to know
of the animal’s vicious propensities” and failed to inform the
plaintiff of such facts. (Priebe, at p. 1115; accord, Nelson, at p.
715, fn. 4 [“if a dog owner purposefully or negligently conceals a
particular known hazard from a veterinarian, he or she would not
be relieved of liability, for this would expose the injured person to
an unknown risk”].) In such circumstances, the primary
assumption of the risk defense does not bar the plaintiff’s claim
because “she could not be found to have assumed a risk of which
she was unaware.” (Priebe, at p. 1116.)
Garretson argues that the above exception applies here
because a reasonable trier of fact could find that Murrillo knew or
should have known Tahoe had vicious propensities and failed to
give an adequate warning. In other words, she acknowledges
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that she assumed the inherent risk of suffering a dog bite while
working as a dog groomer but asserts she did not assume the
increased risk purportedly created by Murrillo—of unknowingly
grooming an aggressive or vicious dog. (See Priebe, supra, 39
Cal.4th at pp. 1115-1116, 1127-1128.) We assume without
deciding that such an exception is available here despite
Garretson’s failure to plead a common law strict liability cause of
action. Nonetheless, Garretson did not present a triable issue
triggering potential application of the exception.
Contrary to her assertion, Garretson failed to present any
direct or circumstantial evidence that Tahoe had bit anyone
before or otherwise acted aggressively. The fact that the
unknown man who delivered Tahoe for his appointment said that
Tahoe “did not like his feet being messed with” does not fill the
void. We cannot reasonably infer from the statement (without
more) that the unknown man had any knowledge of aggressive
behavior, much less that Murrillo possessed such actual
knowledge or should have known such facts. (See Yuzon v.
Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 155, 166 (Yuzon) [landlord’s
request that tenants “ ‘pin the dogs up’ ” before an insurance
inspection was insufficient to establish triable issue of material
fact regarding landlord’s prior actual knowledge of dog’s
aggressive propensities]; Jordan, supra, 81 S.W.3d at pp. 524-525
[owner’s statement that dog “ ‘did not like men’ ” is not evidence
that owner knew dog had violent disposition].)
A triable issue of material fact “can be created only by a
conflict in the evidence.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.) “ ‘An issue of fact . . . is not created by
“speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.” ’ ” (Yuzon,
supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 166.) Garretson failed to establish a
triable issue of material fact. (See Yuzon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th
at p. 166; Jordan, supra, 81 S.W.3d at pp. 524-525.) The trial
court did not err in granting Murrillo’s motion for summary
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judgment. We need not reach the merits of the parties’
remaining arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Murrillo is entitled to her costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.
Garretson v. Murrillo (A171205)
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