Asbury v. Bowers CA4/3

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Filed 9/19/25 Asbury v. Bowers CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DENNIS ASBURY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G064728

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01254658)
TED BOWERS et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Thomas S. McConville, Judge. Affirmed.
Bohm Wildish & Matsen, Daniel R. Wildish and Charles H.
Smith for Defendants and Appellants.
Ford & Diulio, Kristopher P. Diulio, Brendan M. Ford and
Eduardo Dominguez for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendants Ted and Celeste Bowers challenge the trial court’s
denial of their motion for attorney fees under Civil Code section 5975.1 The
Bowerses contend the court erred by concluding they were not prevailing
parties, claiming that plaintiffs achieved none of their litigation goals.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It
reasonably found that plaintiffs—the Bowerses’ neighbors—accomplished a
central goal before their voluntary dismissal: getting the homeowners’
association to enforce the CC&Rs.2 We therefore affirm the court’s order.
FACTS
Plaintiffs and the Bowerses were all homeowners in a residential
community managed by an HOA. The Bowerses sought the HOA’s approval
for an expansion of their residence, including the construction of an almost
1,100 square-foot “garage and workshop.” The HOA’s architectural committee
initially denied the application. But when the Bowerses appealed the
decision, the HOA’s board approved the project, on the condition that the
garage would not be used for commercial purposes.
Plaintiffs filed this action in 2022 against the HOA and three of
its board members (the HOA defendants) and the Bowerses, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Bowerses planned to
use the garage and workshop for commercial purposes: (1) to restore antique
automobiles and (2) as a museum for antique automobiles. They claimed this
violated the community’s CC&Rs, which barred the use of a lot for
commercial, storage, or other non-residential purposes.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

2 Plaintiffs are Dennis Asbury, Samuel Davis, John Issa, Wendy

Rivera, Barbara Swanson, and Anthony Swanson.

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According to plaintiffs, the HOA board’s non-commerce condition
was “illusory”—the HOA defendants “[could] not be trusted to enforce the
CC&Rs” because they had failed to act on multiple reports of prior violations
by the Bowerses. The complaint listed multiple examples of the Bowerses’
alleged violations, including “very loud noises resulting from repairing [a]
vehicle in the[ir] garage.” Plaintiffs claimed the HOA defendants’ failure to
respond to these violations and their approval of the project constituted a
breach of their fiduciary duty.
Plaintiffs sought “a permanent injunction compelling [the HOA]
to enforce the CC&Rs” and enjoining the Bowerses from constructing “the
commercial garage and workshop.”3 The trial court later denied plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction.
All defendant board members left office while this action was
pending. One of them lost reelection, and plaintiffs dismissed her from the
case. The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with the remaining HOA
defendants. The remaining defendant board members resigned and plaintiffs
dismissed them and the HOA from the case, leaving only the Bowerses as
defendants.
The HOA’s new board then sent the Bowerses a cease-and-desist
letter. The letter stated that their construction was “in violation” because it
did not match the approved plans. It requested additional documentation and
instructed the Bowerses to stop any work requiring architectural approval
until they received approval. A few months later, plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed this action.

3 Barbara Swanson voluntarily dismissed her claims a few

months after filing the complaint. Because her dismissal is immaterial to our
analysis, we do not address it further.

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The Bowerses moved for attorney fees under section 5975,
subdivision (c), claiming they were the prevailing parties. Plaintiffs opposed
the motion, asserting they had achieved their litigation goals by removing the
offending HOA board members and compelling the HOA to enforce the
CC&Rs against the Bowerses’ project. In reply, the Bowerses contended that
plaintiffs achieved nothing against them, claiming that the construction had
now been completed with all necessary approvals.
The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding
the Bowerses were not prevailing parties. The court found that plaintiffs had
dismissed their complaint only after they achieved their goal: “gaining
compliance with the governing CC&Rs to ensure that the . . . proposed
remodel had been properly vetted and approved by the HOA.” It noted that
after plaintiffs succeeded in replacing the HOA’s board members, the new
board found the project violated the CC&Rs and demanded compliance. The
court observed that the Bowerses “failed to present any evidence . . . that
[p]laintiffs dismissed the complaint based upon the probability that the
Bowers[es] . . . would succeed on the merits” or that the Bowerses were
“ready to defend on the merits.”
DISCUSSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
Bowerses’ motion for attorney fees. In an action to enforce an HOA’s
governing documents, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney
fees and costs. (§ 5975, subd. (c).) A prevailing party is one who “prevailed on
a practical level by achieving its main litigation objectives.” (Almanor
Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 773.) In
determining those objectives, the court may consider the pleadings, trial
briefs, and similar sources. (Id. at p. 774.) The moving party has the burden

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of proving its entitlement to fees. (Cf. Bui v. Nguyen (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
1357, 1365 [fees under section 1021.5].)
A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the action does not
automatically make the defendant a prevailing party. Courts still consider
the practical realities surrounding the litigation. (E.g., Champir, LLC v.
Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 594 (Champir); Salehi v.
Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153–
1155.) In Champir, for example, the court found that the defendant HOA was
not the prevailing party—despite the plaintiffs’ voluntarily dismissal—
because the plaintiffs had achieved their goal of compelling the HOA to
comply with the CC&Rs before installing a traffic light. (Id. at pp. 593–594.)
We review the trial court’s prevailing party determination for
abuse of discretion. (Champir, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.) We review
factual findings for substantial evidence and “‘do not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court when more than one inference can be reasonably
deduced from the facts.’” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court reasonably determined the Bowerses were
not prevailing parties because plaintiffs had achieved a primary litigation
objective. The record supports the court’s conclusion that plaintiffs sought to
compel the HOA to enforce the CC&Rs as to the Bowerses’ project. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the HOA “[could not] be trusted to enforce
the CC&Rs” because it had failed to address prior violations by the Bowerses.
They claimed those failures constituted a breach of the HOA defendants’
fiduciary duty and sought “a permanent injunction compelling [the HOA] to
enforce the CC&Rs.” The court reasonably determined this was a primary
goal for plaintiffs.

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The record also supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs
had achieved this goal. Whereas the complaint alleged the HOA’s prior board
turned a blind eye to the Bowerses’ violations, the new board—installed due
to this litigation—issued a cease-and-desist letter, showing that the HOA was
now seriously enforcing the CC&Rs.
We reject the Bowerses’ contention that “[p]laintiffs achieved
none of their litigation goals against the Bowers[es]” because they failed to
“stop the subject construction.” Plaintiffs never set out to stop all
construction; they sought to stop the construction of a “commercial garage
and workshop” and prevent other non-residential purposes. It is reasonable
to infer that they succeeded: the HOA started enforcing the CC&Rs and the
CC&Rs prohibited the challenged uses. The Bowerses do not contend they are
now able to use the garage for commercial or other non-residential purposes.
Even if plaintiffs privately hoped to halt construction altogether,
falling short of that ideal outcome would not mean the Bowerses prevailed.
Litigation is not an all-or-nothing affair. A plaintiff who achieves a central
objective can deprive the defendant of prevailing party status—even if some
aspirations remain unrealized. (See Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit
Plan v. The Churchill Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103, 127
[plaintiffs were prevailing parties, despite not achieving “litigation ‘dream’”].)
A litigant need not destroy their adversary to prevail.
We also disagree with the Bowerses’ reading of the trial court’s
order. The court did not hold that a dismissed defendant can obtain fees only
by showing trial readiness or likely success on the merits. It merely noted
arguable ways in which the Bowerses might have rebutted the evidence that
plaintiffs had achieved meaningful success. The record reveals no compelling
alternate explanation for the dismissal other than plaintiffs’ satisfaction with

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a newly installed board that took enforcement of the CC&Rs against the
Bowerses seriously.4
DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on
appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

4 The trial court was not compelled to accept the Bowerses’

speculation that “it could be” that plaintiffs dismissed their action to avoid
their impending depositions. Nor would that possibility negate the evidence
of plaintiffs’ success.

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