People v. Spelker CA2/1

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Filed 9/18/25 P. v. Spelker CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B342689

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA131741)
v.

BRYAN ADDISON SPELKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Asya Ovsepyan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristin J. Inberg and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
A jury convicted defendant Bryan Addison Spelker of four
felonies, two of which involved possession of a firearm. The trial
court sentenced Spelker to a total of six years in prison, including
four years for one of the gun-related charges and a consecutive
eight months for the other. Spelker argues, the Attorney General
concedes, and we agree that the trial court should have stayed
the sentence for the second gun possession-related charge under
Penal Code section 654.1
At Spelker’s request, we have also reviewed the sealed
portion of a search warrant to determine whether the trial court
erred in denying his motion to unseal it and to quash or traverse
the warrant. We find no error in the court’s denial of Spelker’s
motion with regard to the search warrant.
BACKGROUND
A. The Information
The information charged Spelker with the following crimes,
which occurred on or about November 2, 2022: possession of a
controlled substance while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), unlawful possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 3), driving or taking a
vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4),
child abuse under circumstances or conditions likely to cause
great bodily injury or death (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 5-7), and
possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11378; count 8). The information alleged four aggravating
factors, including that his prior convictions “are numerous and of

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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increasing seriousness” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)),
and further alleged that Spelker was convicted of two prior
felonies pursuant to section 1203, subdivision (e)(4).
B. Proceedings Regarding Search Warrant
Prior to trial, Spelker filed a motion to unseal, quash, and
traverse a sealed search warrant that led to his arrest, and to
suppress all evidence seized thereunder. After conducting an in
camera review under the procedures of People v. Hobbs (1994) 7
Cal.4th 948, the court denied Spelker’s motion to unseal because
to do so would readily identify a confidential informant. The
court also denied Spelker’s motion to quash or traverse the
search warrant.
C. The Trial
Prosecution Evidence
The People presented testimony from Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Jason Ford, Detective Raul
Guerrero, deputy Thomas Wilson, and criminalist Chien Hsing
Lee, as well as from the auto-theft victim.2
Ford testified that on November 2, 2022, he went to a home
that belonged to Spelker’s wife and where Spelker sometimes
resided to execute a search warrant.3 Wilson was there to assist,

2 Because the appeal does not concern counts 4 through 8,
we do not summarize the evidence related to those counts.
3 Some testimony indicated that Spelker did not live at the
home and he would go there only to pick up and drop off his
children. However, Guerrero, who surveilled the home for
several weeks, believed Spelker lived there, and Spelker told
Ford and Guerrero that he lived at two locations, including his
wife’s home.

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and Guerrero was at the location conducting surveillance. All
three saw Spelker leave the home and enter a white Hyundai
that was missing a front license plate. Guerrero and Wilson
stopped the car and spoke with Spelker. Wilson observed that
the car’s ignition had been modified to allow a person to start it
without the car’s key and, in fact, Spelker was using a key from a
different car. Wilson looked up the license plate and vehicle
identification numbers, and discovered that both the plate and
the car had been reported as stolen. At trial, the Hyundai owner
testified her car had been stolen and she had not given Spelker
permission to drive it.
Spelker told Ford and Guerrero that he wanted to
cooperate and that he had a fully functional ghost gun,4
ammunition, and about half a pound of methamphetamine
located in the garage in a toolbox. Spelker later executed a
Miranda5 waiver on which he wrote, “The meth and gun are mine
and only mine.”
Ford and Guerrero conducted a walk-through of the home
pursuant to the search warrant. Guerrero found the self-made
gun, ammunition, and approximately 367 grams of
methamphetamine in the toolbox and garage.6

4 A ghost gun is a self-made gun assembled from gun parts.

5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694].
6 The People also presented evidence that Ford and
Guerrero found gun parts, including an upper receiver to a
revolver, a lower receiver to an AR-15 rifle, and two lower
receivers for handguns. Guerrero testified that the lower receiver
of an AR-15 rifle is regulated and itself considered a firearm,

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Defense Evidence
The sole defense witness, Robert Ramirez, testified that he
had known Spelker for many years. He also knew Spelker’s wife
and periodically lived at her home. When Ramirez lived there,
Spelker did not live there. Ramirez had been at the home on the
nights of November 1 and 2, 2022, but was not there when law
enforcement executed the search warrant. He did not know there
were firearms or drugs at the home.
D. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Spelker guilty of counts 1 through 4. The
court declared a mistrial as to counts 5 through 8, and the People
chose not to retry those counts.
At his sentencing, Spelker argued that any sentence
imposed for count 2 should be stayed pursuant to section 654.
The People agreed with Spelker’s position and requested a
sentence of five years and four months “because counts 1 and 2
would merge.” The trial court disagreed that the counts merged
because they had distinct elements: count 1 required possession
of narcotics but not a prior felony conviction, whereas count 2
required a felony conviction but not narcotics possession. The
People agreed with the court and requested that the court
therefore impose a six-year prison term.
The court found true the aggravating factor that Spelker’s
convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness. It did
not expressly rule as to the other alleged aggravating

although not a fully functional firearm (i.e., not operable).
Neither party argues the gun parts are relevant to their position
on appeal; nor did the trial court discuss the gun parts in
rendering its sentencing decision.

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circumstances. The court imposed a total prison term of six
years, including the upper term of four years for count 1 and one-
third the middle term of eight months for each of counts 2
through 4, to run consecutively.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred in Not Staying the Sentence
on Count 2
Section 654, subdivision (a) states, “An act or omission that
is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
Spelker and the Attorney General each argue that
pursuant to section 654, the trial court should have stayed the
eight-month sentence under count 2. We agree.
People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776 is on point.
There, law enforcement executed a search warrant at a residence
and found drugs and firearms. (Id. at pp. 782-783.) The jury
convicted the defendant of possession of methamphetamine,
cocaine, and cocaine base while armed with a revolver (counts 9,
10, & 12), possession of each of those substances for sale
(counts 17, 18, & 20), and possession of a revolver by a felon
(count 31). (Id. at p. 785.) The trial court sentenced the
defendant to “the upper term of four years on count 9 (unlawful
possession of methamphetamine while armed), a one-year
consecutive term on count 17 (possession of cocaine base for sale),
and an eight-month consecutive term on count 31 (possession of a
firearm by a felon). The court imposed concurrent terms on
counts 10, 12, 18, and 20 . . . .” (Ibid.)
Washington held the trial court erred. (People v.
Washington, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 799.) Relying on

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Supreme Court authority, the court explained, “The starting
point of a section 654 analysis is to determine whether the
‘different crimes were completed by a “single physical act.” ’ ” (Id.
at p. 795, citing People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 and
People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358.) “ ‘If so, the defendant
may not be punished more than once for that act.’ ” (Washington,
supra, at p. 795.) “ ‘Whether a defendant will be found to have
committed a single physical act for purposes of section 654
depends on whether some action the defendant is charged with
having taken separately completes the actus reus for each of the
relevant criminal offenses.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “[the defendant]’s
possession of each controlled substance constituted a single
physical act that completed two offenses: (1) possession of the
relevant substance for sale, and (2) possession of the relevant
substance while armed.” (Id. at p. 797.) Additionally, “[t]he jury
found that [the defendant] possessed a single firearm (the
revolver) when deputies found him in the garage. This single
physical act completed multiple crimes: possession of each
controlled substance while armed (a total of three counts), and
possession of a firearm by a felon.” (Id. at pp. 797-798.)
Accordingly, under section 654, if the defendant was punished for
possessing a controlled substance for sale, he could not also be
punished for possessing the same substance while armed.
(Washington, supra, at p. 799.) “Similarly, if [the defendant] is
punished for the possession of a firearm by a felon, he may not
also be punished for possessing any controlled substance while
armed (but may be punished for possessing the substances for
sale).” (Ibid.)
Here, like Washington, Spelker’s possession of a firearm
completed two counts: possession of a controlled substance with a

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firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court
thus erred in not staying the sentence on count 2. We therefore
remand the matter with directions to stay the sentence imposed
under that count.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Spelker’s
Motion to Unseal and to Quash or Traverse the
Search Warrant
Spelker also asks us to independently review the sealed
portion of the search warrant affidavit to determine whether the
trial court erred in denying his motion to unseal, and to quash or
traverse the search warrant. The Attorney General does not
object.
A court may seal portions of a search warrant affidavit that
relate facts or information which, if disclosed in the public
portion of the affidavit, will reveal or tend to reveal confidential
informant identity. (People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 364
citing People v. Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 963.) A defendant,
however, may seek to challenge the legality of the search
warrant. (Hobbs, supra, at p. 957.) When a defendant moves to
unseal the search warrant in order to quash or traverse the
warrant, a court should conduct an in camera review of the
sealed materials. (Id. at pp. 971-972.)
At the in camera hearing, the court’s first step is to
determine whether the affidavit or portion of it has been properly
sealed. (People v. Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 972.) During this
step the court should determine “whether there are sufficient
grounds for maintaining the confidentiality of the informant’s
identity” and, “[i]f so, . . . whether the sealing of the affidavit (or
any portion thereof) ‘is necessary to avoid revealing the

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informant’s identity.’ ” (People v. Galland, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 364; Hobbs, supra, at p. 972.)
If the affidavit was properly sealed, the court then
considers the second step, which differs based on whether the
defendant has moved to traverse or quash the warrant. If “the
defendant has moved to traverse the warrant, the court should
then proceed to determine whether . . . the affidavit included a
false statement made ‘knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth,’ and . . . ‘the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’ ” (People
v. Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 974.) If the defendant has moved
to quash the warrant, “the court should proceed to determine
whether, under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ presented in
the search warrant affidavit and the oral testimony, if any,
presented to the magistrate, there was ‘a fair probability’ that
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the place
searched pursuant to the warrant.” (Id. at p. 975.) For either
motion, if the court determines there is a reasonable probability
the defendant will prevail on the motion, “[t]he People may either
(1) consent to full disclosure of the sealed materials, in which
case the motion proceeds ‘to decision with the benefit of this
additional evidence, and a further evidentiary hearing if
necessary,’ or (2) refuse to disclose the confidential information,
in which case the court must grant the defendant’s motion.”
(People v. Heslington (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 947, 957-958.)
“We independently review the court’s decision to seal a
portion of the search warrant affidavit.” (People v. Camel (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 989, 1009.)
Having reviewed the sealed portion of the search warrant
affidavit, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Spelker’s

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motion.7 Sufficient grounds support maintaining the
confidentiality of the informant’s identity and unsealing the
information would tend to reveal that identity. Moreover, there
is no probability that Spelker would have prevailed on his motion
to traverse or quash the warrant. Nothing in the affidavit
suggests any material misrepresentations or omissions were
made. Further, the totality of the information set forth in the
affidavit supported a fair probability that execution of the
warrant would lead to contraband or evidence of a crime at the
location to be searched.

7 The superior court provided a copy of the sealed search
warrant affidavit to this court on September 11, 2025. We
ordered the Court of Appeal record augmented to include this
document.

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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to modify the
judgment to stay the sentence imposed on count 2. The court
shall ensure that an amended abstract of judgment is prepared
and a certified copy is forwarded to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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