CourtListener 10673733•People v. Chenot CA5
Texto completo
Filed 9/18/25 P. v. Chenot CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088501
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRF14-0012187)
v.
KIMBERLY ROSANNE CHENOT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mariposa County. Michael A.
Fagalde, Judge.
Paboojian Inc., Warren R. Paboojian and Tara A. Sarabian for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and Joseph Penney,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Duran Law Office and Jack Duran, Jr., for L.C. as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Kimberly Rosanne Chenot appeals from an order for victim restitution
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1202.4, subdivision (f). She contends the trial court:
(1) “abused its discretion in awarding the amount of restitution it did” (capitalization
omitted); and (2) “committed legal error in its award of pre-judgment interest”
(capitalization omitted). We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I. Defendant’s convictions and sentence
On June 22, 2014, defendant intentionally caused a propane gas leak at the
Midpines residence of L.C., which resulted in an explosion and fire. Defendant was
charged with arson of an inhabited structure during and within an area of a state of
emergency (§ 454, subd. (a)(2) [count I]), criminal threats (§ 422 [count II]), and driving
a motor vehicle when her privilege to do so was suspended for driving under the
influence (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a) [count III]). In connection with counts I
and II, the information alleged she was previously convicted of assault upon a peace
officer with a deadly weapon, a qualifying “strike” under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant was convicted on counts I and II and the special allegations were found
true. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 24 years four months: a doubled
upper term of 18 years on count I, 16 months on count II, and five years for the prior
serious felony enhancement.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal
Code.
2.
II. Determination of victim restitution award
At the April 30, 2015 sentencing hearing, the trial court reserved the issue of
victim restitution. In early 2023, the People requested a restitution hearing. Said hearing
was eventually scheduled for July 10, 2024.2
a. Prehearing briefs
i. The People
In a brief filed February 1, 2024, the People argued L.C. “suffered the loss of her
family home and possessions,” “has been living in a trailer on the property for the last
few years, just trying to get by,” and was entitled to restitution “for the replacement of her
house and all its contents” (boldface & capitalization omitted). The People further
asserted the court “must award interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per year” and asked
for accrual “from the date of the loss in this case.”
Two estimates for the cost of constructing a new house were provided. David
Lawson, a general building contractor, indicated a 962-square-foot home would cost
$312,650, or $325 per square foot. Randy Brower, an owner-operator of a construction
company, declared “the construction of [a] standard single-family home in Mariposa
County for 2024 is between $250 to $300 per square foot,” i.e., between $240,500 and
$288,600 for a 962-square-foot home.
Estimates were also given for the following items: (1) $25,000 for “two (2) 10
[inch] x 10 [inch] Southern Sierra Miwuk Twined Basket[s]”; (2) an aggregate $10,484
for a wood stove, two couches, two rocking chairs, a flatscreen television, an amplifier, a
stereo receiver, two DVD recorders, clothing, three oriental rugs, silverware, bath towels,
dishes, pots and pans, a daybed, a hutch, six lamps, a kitchen table, a washer and dryer, a
coffee pot, blankets, and a toaster oven; and (3) an aggregate $22,420 for a greenhouse, a
2 At oral argument, counsel for defendant stated the People’s request was made at
or around the time defendant prevailed in a separate, unrelated wrongful death action.
3.
shed, a Chevy Blazer sports utility vehicle, jewelry, two handguns, two electric guitars, a
sleigh bed and bedroom set, an antique steam trunk, two antique baby dolls, and two
laptop computers. The baskets were appraised by W.C., a tribal anthropologist and L.C.’s
nephew. The Kelley Blue Book guide valued the Chevy Blazer at $7,200. Estimates for
most of the remaining items were based on the current prices of new but comparable
items sold online.
In a second brief filed July 10, 2024, the People supplied estimates for the
following services: (1) $19,363 for well drilling; (2) $13,744.16 for a well pump and
accessories; (3) $2,500 for septic system repairs; (4) $585 for architectural construction
plans for the rebuilding project; (5) $8,000 for property cleanup; and (6) between $11,800
and $13,800 for installation of a new electrical pole.
ii. Defendant
In a brief filed July 10, 2024, defendant maintained L.C.’s residence was a “used
mobile home” and “the appropriate measure of loss” “would be the cost of a used mobile
home in 2014 that was similar to the used mobile home that served as [L.C.’s] residence
and the cost of like-kind contents in 2014.” She also claimed interest “should be based
on replacement costs of ‘like property’ ” as of June 2014.
b. Hearing
i. Witnesses for the People
Lawson testified he had 41 years of experience as a general contractor and built
260 single-family residences, most of which are located in Mariposa County and “[a]
handful of them” in Midpines. He opined the cost to replace a 962-square-foot “slab on
grade, stick-framed house” with “[e]ither a metal roof or a textured one” in 2014 “would
have been roughly $300,000,” i.e., “plus or minus” $300 per square foot. By contrast, the
current cost would range between “around $400 to $425” and “$500, $550” per square
foot. Lawson acknowledged he specialized in the construction of “[m]iddle to high-end”
homes and did not typically build tract housing, which would cost “substantially less.”
4.
S.C.—L.C.’s niece—testified L.C. originally lived in a trailer in 1979 and had “a
living room added onto her trailer” at some point. Subsequently L.C. received a grant for
new housing construction. S.C. recalled “the contractor just built off of and left [L.C.’s]
living room that was there and built the rest of the house, the other bedrooms and
everything else.” The residence, which S.C. affirmed was “[a] regular conventional
home” as opposed to “a mobile home,” was approximately 900 square feet.
C.S. testified she helped S.C. obtain an estimate from Lawson on L.C.’s behalf.
C.S. once visited L.C.’s house in 1999. She knew the difference between a “conventional
stick-built home” and a “mobile home” and attested L.C.’s house was the former.
W.C. testified the two Native-American “gathering baskets” destroyed in the fire
were woven by “a famous basket weaver” whose works are “non-replaceable” and
auctioned at “very expensive” prices. In the past, he attempted to procure a “two-and-a-
half to three-inch basket bowl” valued at $10,000. Other baskets have fetched “all the
way up to $140,000 and even more.” W.C. acknowledged he relied on L.C.’s
descriptions of the baskets and neither personally observed the baskets nor reviewed
photographs thereof. After consulting with a university professor and archeologist, W.C.
opined the two baskets were collectively worth $25,000.
L.C. testified her residence in 1979 was a “one-bedroom, one bath” “Sandpoint
trailer” that originally belonged to her grandfather. When her son grew older, she “added
on a den and a bedroom.” After receiving a “Block Grant,” the trailer was relocated “to
the side” and “the rest of the house” was built in or around 1984. The house was
approximately 930 square feet with two bedrooms, a front room, a kitchen, and a
wraparound deck. L.C. confirmed the house was “a conventional-type home” built “from
scratch” with a foundation and framing. The explosion and fire destroyed not only the
house and other outbuildings (i.e., greenhouse, shed) but also L.C.’s personal property in
and around those structures. L.C., with the assistance of her niece S.C., based the
estimates of most of her personal property losses on the current retail value of new but
5.
comparable items sold online. The gathering baskets were appraised by L.C.’s nephew
W.C. L.C. also received estimates from professionals for the following services:
(1) $8,000 for the removal of fire debris; (2) $2,000 for septic repair; (3) $19,000 for
drilling a new well; (4) $13,744.16 for a well pump and other accessories; and
(5) $13,000 for installation of a new electrical pole. When L.C. was asked whether she
needed “a complete new well,” she responded, “I’m not sure.”
ii. Witness for defendant
Kerry Wolf, a general contractor with 30 years of experience, testified he did not
visit the site of the explosion and fire but reviewed photographs thereof. He concluded
L.C.’s home was a trailer with an addition. Wolf opined a “brand new trailer” would cost
“about $75,000,” i.e., $75 per square foot, whereas a “good used trailer[]” would cost
between $30,000 and $40,000. These estimates were based on 2018 values because his
research “couldn’t go back to 2014.”3 Regarding the well, Wolf highlighted the lack of
an inspection to “[en]sure that there’s something wrong with the casing and the pump”
made the estimate premature. Photographs of the scene showed “the telephone pole was
perfectly fine,” so installation of a new pole was unnecessary.
c. Ruling
On August 5, 2024, the court filed a “Judgment on Restitution,” which read:
“A contested Restitution Hearing was heard in this court on July 10,
2024. After a review of the file and after consideration of the testimony
and evidence presented at that hearing, the Court finds the People proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that [L.C.] is entitled to a judgment for
restitution against the Defendant as follows:
3 Wolf testified he evaluated a Mariposa County Fire Department report, which
assessed damages to a “structure” and “the content” therein at $40,000 and $20,000,
respectively. Wolf suggests “structure” was a reference to L.C.’s residence. The record
indicates Wolf was incorrect: the report assessed damages to (1) L.C.’s residence and the
items therein at $120,000 and $60,000, respectively; and (2) the outbuildings and the
items therein at $40,000 and $20,000, respectively.
6.
“1. Residence . . . that was totally destroyed in the explosion/fire
caused intentionally by the Defendant. [¶] -930 square feet
(per the testimony of [L.C.]) at $250 per square foot =
$232,500
“2. Contents of house, outbuildings, and Chevy Blazer = $25,000
“3. Site clean-up = $8,000
“4. Septic Repair = $2,000
“5. Well repair: pump replacement and new pressure system =
$13,744
“6. 2 . . . Gathering Baskets (described by [L.C.] as 4-8 inches
each in diameter[4]) = $10,000 total
“Total Judgment = $291,244
“The judgment shall be subject to interest at the rate of 10% per
annum pursuant to . . . section 1202.4(f)(3)(G), computed from the date of
the loss – June 22, 2014.
“Further, the Court finds the People failed to make a prima facie
showing as to the need to drill a new well, or to provide a new power pole
and power lines.”
An “Order for Victim Restitution” (capitalization omitted) was filed August 13, 2024.
DISCUSSION5
I. Pertinent law
“Crime victims have a constitutional right to restitution for losses resulting from
criminal acts against them.” (People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 198 (Shelly),
4 L.C. testified to these measurements at the hearing.
5 L.C. filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the People. “[N]ormally an
appellant determines the issues on appeal and normally [an appellate] court will consider
only evidence presented to the trial court.” (People v. Hannon (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 94,
106.) “ ‘California courts refuse to consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when
those arguments are not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on
appeal. “ ‘Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by the
appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus
curi[a]e will not be considered.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 105.) “We will only consider
7.
citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13); accord, People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th
734, 736 (Stanley).) “The Legislature has enacted section 1202.4 to implement this
constitutional right.” (Shelly, supra, at p. 198; accord, Stanley, supra, at p. 736.) Section
1202.4, subdivision (f) provides in part:
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of
the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order,
based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other
showing to the court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“(3) To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar
amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every
determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal
conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
“(A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property.
The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of
like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is
possible. [¶] . . . [¶]
“(G) Interest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the
date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court.”
“The purpose of direct victim restitution . . . is to reimburse the victim for economic
losses caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct, i.e., to make the victim reasonably
whole.” (People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1451.) “A victim’s restitution
right is to be broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
493, 500 (Mearns); accord, Stanley, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 737.)
“A defendant has a right to a hearing ‘to dispute the determination of the amount
of restitution.’ ” (Shelly, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, quoting § 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).)
“ ‘The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not
those arguments by amic[us] curiae which are raised by the parties on appeal and address
them in conjunction with the parties’ arguments.” (Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 790, 794, fn. 1.)
8.
reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (Shelly, supra, at p. 198.) “Section 1202.4 does not, by
its terms, require any particular kind of proof.” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542–1543 (Gemelli).) “ ‘ “ ‘[S]entencing judges are given virtually
unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider’ ” ’ in determining
victim restitution. [Citation.]” (People v. Phu (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 283–284;
see, e.g., People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 [victim’s testimony]; People v.
Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 [probation report].) “Once the victim
makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s
criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed
by the victim.” (Gemelli, supra, at p. 1543.) “The defendant has the burden of rebutting
the victim’s statement of losses, and to do so, may submit evidence to prove the amount
claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen property.” (Ibid.)
II. Standard of review
“A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed
unless it is arbitrary or capricious.” (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.) “No
abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the
amount of restitution ordered.” (Ibid.; see Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 498
[“ ‘[T]he trial court must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the
victim whole . . . .’ ”].) “In reviewing restitution orders, we do not reweigh the evidence
or make credibility decisions. Our review is to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the inferences made by the trial court.” (People v. Baudoin (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the ‘ “power of
the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s
findings.’ [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ‘If the
circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,’ the judgment may not be
9.
overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding.
[Citation.]” (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468–469; see In re Marriage
of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32 [reviewing court required to uphold a discretionary
ruling “if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually
invoked”].)
“[W]hen the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute,
a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (People v.
Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146.)
III. Analysis
a. L.C.’s residence
At the outset, defendant contends “there is no evidentiary support to award
$232,500.00 in replacement cost damages for a 35-year-old mobile home, less than a
thousand square feet in size.”
The premise L.C.’s residence was a mobile home at the time of the explosion and
fire is undermined by substantial evidence. L.C. testified she originally inhabited a trailer
and “added on a den and a bedroom” sometime before the mid-1980’s. When she
received a grant for new housing construction, the trailer was relocated “to the side” and
the “rest of the house” was built “from scratch” with a foundation and framing in or
around 1984. S.C.’s testimony corroborated L.C.’s account. In addition, C.S. testified
she visited L.C.’s residence in 1999 and confirmed it was a “conventional stick-built
home.” On the other hand, Wolf—defendant’s sole witness—never observed L.C.’s
residence and based his valuation on photographs of the site after the explosion and fire.
Thus, the court could reasonably reject defendant’s assertion the replacement cost of a
mobile home could suitably represent the value of L.C.’s residence.
We also conclude the court’s $232,500 award was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The court calculated this amount by: (1) accepting L.C.’s testimony that her house was
930 square feet; and (2) adopting a rate of $250 per square foot. Regarding the latter, two
10.
contractors provided estimates on L.C.’s behalf. Lawson, who initially proposed a rate of
$325 per square foot, presented a reduced rate of “plus or minus” $300 per square foot at
the hearing. Brower, who did not testify, signed a declaration in which he opined “the
construction of [a] standard single-family home in Mariposa County for 2024 is between
$250 to $300 per square foot.” In selecting Brower’s lower rate of $250 per square foot,
one could deduce the court believed Lawson’s rate of approximately $300 per square foot
was inflated in light of his testimony that he specialized in the construction of “[m]iddle
to high-end” homes.
b. L.C.’s personal property and service charges
Next, defendant contends the court abused its discretion when it awarded L.C.
$25,000 for “Contents of house, outbuildings, and Chevy Blazer.”6
The record shows L.C. provided estimates of $7,200 for the Chevy Blazer (taken
from a Kelley Blue Book guide) and $6,320 total for a greenhouse and shed (taken from
an Internet search). A court could reasonably find this evidence sufficiently established
the values of L.C.’s vehicle and outbuildings. (See Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1542–1543 [§ 1202.4 does not require particular kind of proof]; see also Martinez v.
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 46, 56 [“The retail value [of a
vehicle] can be obtained from a widely accepted source such as the Kelley Blue Book.”].)
The remaining $11,480 of the $25,000 award necessarily covered “Contents of house,” an
amount less than what L.C. had requested. (See ante, at p. 3.) This discrepancy may best
be explained by L.C.’s failure to attach additional evidence of value—i.e., Internet
printouts—for several items. We conclude the $25,000 award was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.
Defendant also contends the court erroneously awarded L.C. $8,000 for “Site
clean-up”; $2,000 for “Septic Repair”; and $13,744 for “Well repair: pump replacement
6 Defendant does not challenge the $10,000 award for the gathering baskets.
11.
and new pressure system.” At the hearing, L.C. testified she received such estimates
from professionals. A victim’s testimony may constitute a prima facie case for
restitution. (People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) We conclude the
aforementioned awards were neither arbitrary nor capricious.
c. Interest
Finally, “section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G), specifically requires the trial court
to order a criminal defendant to make restitution to the victim based on the amount of the
loss claimed by the victim. The order must fully reimburse the victim for every economic
loss caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct, including 10 percent interest as of the
date of [sentencing or] loss.” (People v. Wickham (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 232, 238, fn.
omitted; see § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(G) [restitution amount “shall” include “[i]nterest, at
the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss”].)7
Here, the court complied with the statute and awarded interest “at the rate of 10% per
annum” “computed from the date of the loss – June 22, 2014.”
Defendant suggests interest should not be awarded because it would be “based off
current replacement costs as opposed to replacement values from the date of loss in
2014.” She presents no legal authority in her briefs—nor did she provide any such
authority at oral argument—for the proposition interest may be relinquished on this basis.
Under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(A), the value of the damaged property “shall be
the replacement cost of like property . . . .” The statute does not mention either “current
replacement costs” or “replacement values from the date of loss.” In addition, case law
has recognized a restitution award can account for the appreciation of a replacement cost
over time. (See, e.g., People v. Ung (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 997, 1002 [value of stolen
7 Because this language is unequivocal, the rule of lenity is inapplicable. (See
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 1012 [“ ‘ “[The rule of lenity] requires that
‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.’ ” ’ ”].)
12.
cryptocurrencies incorporated “increase in dollars required to buy them in the markets at
the time of replacement”].) Hence, to the extent defendant believes a property’s value
must be limited to its cost of replacement at a fixed point in the past, she is mistaken.
As to whether a court may have inherent authority to ignore statutory language
and exclude interest from a victim restitution order, no cases have addressed this exact
scenario. However, it is highly unlikely such authority exists. In People v. Tanner (1979)
24 Cal.3d 514, 518, the California Supreme Court held a trial court erroneously
disregarded the mandatory language of section 1203.06 and struck a jury finding that the
defendant used a firearm during the commission of a robbery.8 In a footnote, the high
court pronounced:
“We reject any contention that courts are inherently or constitutionally
vested with ultimate authority in fixing sentences or imposing penalty
enhancing factors for conduct made criminal by legislative enactment.
‘[S]ubject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested
exclusively in the legislative branch.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Tanner,
supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 519, fn. 3.)
In other words, where a statute is clear and unambiguous (and otherwise constitutional), a
court does not have inherent discretion to disregard the language in the defendant’s favor.
(See In re J.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1207 [“ ‘Courts do not sit as super-
legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the
Legislature.’ ”].) In tandem with the notion “[a] victim’s restitution right is to be broadly
and liberally construed” (Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 500), it appears the law
compels interest to be included in the victim restitution order.
8 At the time of this case, section 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1)(iii) read:
“ ‘Probation shall not be granted to’ ” “ ‘[a]ny person who used a firearm during the
commission . . . of’ ” “[r]obbery.” (People v. Tanner, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 518, fn. 1,
italics omitted.)
13.
DISPOSITION
The victim restitution order is affirmed.
DETJEN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
14.
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