Smith v. Smith CA2/6

CourtListener 10671747Calctapp15 de set. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 9/15/25 Smith v. Smith CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CHRISTIAN SMITH, 2d Civ. No. B337418
(Super. Ct. No. 20FL-0554)
Appellant, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

MEGAN SMITH,

Respondent.

Christian Smith appeals from a judgment dividing the
community estate. Christian1 contends the family court erred
when it failed to equally divide community property by imposing
sanctions under Family Code section 1101, subdivisions (g) and
(h) for his breach of fiduciary duty. We will affirm.

1 We refer to the parties by their first names for ease of

reference.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Christian worked for his family’s company while Megan
raised their three children at home. Christian’s parents
contributed to the marital standard of living. They provided
$125,000 for the down payment on the parties’ home. The parties
also used company funds for a home remodeling project and used
a company credit card for everyday expenses.
Near the time of the down payment, Christian’s parents
reported gifts totaling $123,884 on their tax returns. They were
not on title to the parties’ home. No written agreements exist
about the nature of these funds. Christian’s parents did not
know of or authorize the use of company funds for the home
remodeling. Like the down payment funds, no written
agreements existed regarding the credit card charges, and
Christian’s parents did not speak to Megan about these funds.
Christian told Megan he wanted a divorce in late July
2020. He told her they would need to repay his parents for the
down payment, credit card charges, and remodeling funds. A
notary arrived at their home the next day with loan documents.
Megan said she did not want to sign the loan documents after
being notified of the divorce and that she did not believe they
owed Christian’s parents this money. Christian told Megan they
would need to sell the home if she did not sign. One of the
children overheard this and began crying. Feeling pressured,
Megan signed the loan documents, which included a deed of trust
on the home securing the loan.
Megan did not receive copies of the documents she signed.
She did not understand they were borrowing $155,000 at an
interest rate of 10 percent. Christian told Megan he used
$125,000 of the $155,000 loan proceeds to pay his parents back.

2
He instead transferred $150,000 of the proceeds to his parents.
When the parties sold their home in 2022, $161,791 of the
proceeds were used to pay off the secured loan.
The family court entered judgment of dissolution in July
2022. Trial followed on reserved issues, after which the family
court issued a statement of decision. It found the funds received
from Christian’s parents were not a loan and concluded the
community did not owe them for charges incurred on the
company credit card. It found Christian had breached his
fiduciary duty to Megan by characterizing the funds as a loan; by
pressuring Megan to sign the loan documents; and by
transferring $150,000 from the loan proceeds to his parents
without her consent. The family court concluded that “[a]s a
result of these transactions [Megan] has a claim against
[Christian] for a breach of fiduciary duty that caused a
‘detrimental impact to [Megan’s] undivided one-half interest in
the community estate.’” (Citing section 1101, subd. (a).) As a
remedy for Christian’s breach of fiduciary duty, the court charged
him with the entire amount paid, $161,791, on the secured debt.
The court also sanctioned him $10,000 in attorney’s fees and
costs under section 1101, subdivision (g).
DISCUSSION
Christian contends the family court erred in failing to
divide the community estate equally under Family Code2 sections
760 and 2550 by charging the entire amount paid on the secured
debt to him. He argues his actions do not fall under section 1101,
subdivisions (g) and (h), and that the court failed to make the
necessary findings to impose remedies under subdivision (h). As

2 All further unmarked statutory references are to the

Family Code.

3
a result, he contends the family court improperly “utilized section
1101 as a general sanctions statute and made none of the
required findings necessary to do so.” We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review the family court’s judgment dividing the
community estate for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of
Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 973; In re Marriage of Schleich
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.) “Factual findings are upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Dellaria &
Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196, 201; Quay, at
p. 966.)
Mandatory Remedies Under Section 1101
for Breach of Spousal Fiduciary Duty
“[A]ll property, real or personal, wherever situated,
acquired by a married person during the marriage while
domiciled in this state is community property.” (§ 760.) “[I]n a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of
the parties, the court shall . . . divide the community estate of the
parties equally. (§ 2550.) However, the trial court retains “broad
discretion to determine the manner in which to divide community
property, keeping in mind the requirement of section 2550 that
the community estate be equally divided between the parties.”
(In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 313.)
Section 1101 allows courts to deviate from the general rule
of equal division upon a finding that one spouse breached a
fiduciary duty owed to the other. Subdivision (a) states: “A
spouse has a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the
fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant
spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the community

4
estate.”3 The remedies for a breach of the duty “shall include, but
not be limited to,” 50 percent or 100 percent of “any asset
undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty.”
(§ 1101, subd. (g) & (h).) The 100 percent remedy can only be
awarded if the “breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294.”
(Id., subd. (h).) This requires clear and convincing evidence of
“oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) An
award of attorney’s fees is mandatory under section 1101,
subdivision (g) but discretionary under subdivision (h). (In re
Marriage of Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 993.)
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding
Christian’s Conduct Fell Under Section 1101
and Applying Mandatory Remedies
Christian contends the family court could not impose the
remedies authorized under section 1101, subdivisions (g) because
it did not expressly find that he failed to disclose or that he
transferred any asset “in breach of [his] fiduciary duty [to
Megan].” He argues the court found he breached his duty instead
by “pressuring Megan to sign a loan document.” Christian reads

3 Section 1100, subdivision (e), imposes on spouses the

“general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the
actions of persons having relationships of personal confidence as
specified in Section 721.” Section 721, subdivision (b), imposes a
fiduciary duty on spouses in transactions between themselves. It
provides “spouses are subject to the general rules governing
fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons
occupying confidential relations with each other. This
confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith
and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair
advantage of the other.” This duty continues after the parties
separate and until assets and liabilities are distributed. (§ 2102,
subd. (a).)

5
the statement of decision too narrowly. The court found
Christian pressured Megan to obtain a loan to pay his parents
money they were not owed, and “then transferred [the] loan
proceeds to his parents, without [Megan’s] consent.” It properly
awarded a remedy under section 1101, subdivision (g).
Christian also contends the family court could not impose
the 100 percent remedy authorized by section 1101, subdivision
(h), because it did not find “by clear and convincing evidence that
[he] has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. . . .” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) We again disagree.
“‘Fraud’” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant
with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) The family
court explained Christian breached his fiduciary duty “by
wrongfully claiming they were required to repay his parents.”
(Italics added.) He did not mistakenly or negligently
mischaracterize the nature of the funds. He did so intentionally.
These findings frame his conduct as fraudulent and thus within
the ambit of section 1101, subdivision (h). (See In re Marriage of
Rossi (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 34, 42 [intentionally concealing a
community property asset supports a finding of fraud].)
There is no requirement that the court expressly state the
evidentiary standard applied. (People v. Johnson & Johnson
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 325 [“[T]he court’s mere failure to
discuss a standard does not compel a conclusion that the court
applied the wrong standard”].) Christian objected to the
proposed statement of decision on the same grounds he now
raises. The family law court was clearly aware of the statute’s

6
heightened evidentiary requirement. We presume the court
knew and applied the law unless the record indicates otherwise.
(Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 714, 741; J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 644
[“failure to ‘discuss’ a particular standard does not imply [the
court] applied an incorrect standard . . . ‘absent evidence to the
contrary.’”].) It does not.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

7
Rita Federman, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
_______________________________

The Law Office of Comstock & Wagner, Stephen A. Wagner
and Nicole Radakovich, for Appellant.
The Law Office of Edward L. Somogyi, Edward L. Somogyi,
for Respondent.

8

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.