People v. Orozco CA4/2

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Filed 9/15/25 P. v. Orozco CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083908

v. (Super.Ct.No. 16CR030622)

ALONZO OROZCO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson

Uhler, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Beesley and

Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Alonzo Orozco appeals the trial court’s order declining to resentence him under

Penal Code section 1172.75, which declares legally invalid most prison prior

enhancements imposed before 2020 and requires courts to strike such enhancements and

resentence defendants whose sentences include them.1 The People argue he is ineligible

for resentencing under section 1172.75 because at his initial sentencing the court stayed

the punishment for the enhancement. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2018 Orozco was convicted of several crimes. At Orozco’s sentencing, the

court said “there were two priors alleged pursuant to 667.5(b), one-year priors, that

actually the Court is considering not imposing,” and reiterated this sentiment moments

later by stating “[t]he Court was considering striking the two one-year priors as not really

being meaningful in this case.” It ultimately found true the two prison prior

enhancements but said it was “going to strike the two one-year prior prison terms. The

sentence that Mr. Orozco’s serving is basically a life sentence, and those are not

meaningful, so I will strike those.”

In 2023 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

identified Orozco, among others, as an inmate serving a sentence that contained a prior

prison term enhancement, and referred him to the trial court for possible resentencing

under section 1172.75. The trial court cited People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38

(Rhodius), reversed by People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, and concluded it

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

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“lack[ed] jurisdiction for resentencing under 1172.75 based on the fact that the 667.5(b)

priors were stricken or stayed at the time of pronouncement of judgment.” It therefore

denied Orozco’s request for resentencing.

DISCUSSION

In 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) added

section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, later re-numbered to section 1172.75. This section says

“[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to

subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior

conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

Section 1172.75 charges the “Secretary of the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation [CDCR] and the county correctional administrator of each county” to

“identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that

includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),” and provide certain information

about those people “to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75,

subd. (b).) Once a trial court is made aware of a sentence which includes such an

enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Such resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one

originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would

endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The resentencing is also not limited

to merely striking the now-invalid enhancements, as “section 1172.75 requires a full

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resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.”

(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)

To date, two published cases define whether section 1172.75 provides relief where

the enhancement or the punishment for the enhancement was stricken: People v. Espino

(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino) and

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003 (Tang). In Espino the sentencing court

“imposed a prison prior, but stated that it was ‘striking that additional punishment.’ ”

(Espino, at p. 194.) The reviewing court relied heavily on those cases disagreeing with

the now reversed Court of Appeal opinion in Rhodius in holding that so long as an

enhancement is imposed—even if the court strikes the punishment for that

enhancement—defendants are entitled to relief under section 1172.75. (Id. at p. 196

[after discussing the split, concluding there is “no good reason to reject the weight of

authority interpreting section 1172.75 and imply an execution requirement into the word

“ ‘impose.’ ”].) Espino is currently pending review before the California Supreme Court.

The circumstances in Tang were different. There, an appellate court struck the

prison prior enhancement before the defendant sought resentencing. (Tang, supra, 109

Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) The Tang court noted that this scenario was unlike any

previously considered, because the enhancement was not imposed and executed, imposed

and stayed, or imposed with punishment stricken, but stricken entirely. (Tang, at

pp. 1007-1008.) According to Tang in that circumstance “[i]t would be anomalous to

conclude that an enhancement was both imposed by and stricken from the judgment.”

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(Id. at p. 1008.) Accordingly, the court concluded that resentencing under

section 1172.75 was not available to defendants whose enhancements had been stricken

entirely. (Id. at p. 1009.)

Therefore, the primary question before us is whether the sentencing court struck

the enhancement or just the punishment for the enhancement, as under section 1385,

subdivision (b)(1) it may do either. Considering the court’s order in the context of the

entire record, we conclude it intended to strike the enhancement itself, not merely the

punishment for the enhancement.

In the sentencing hearing, shortly before asking Orozco to give up his right to a

trial on the prison priors, the court stated “there were two priors alleged pursuant to

667.5(b), one-year priors, that actually the Court is considering not imposing.” Orozco

then waived his trial right. Moments later, in explaining its tentative sentence, the court

repeated this same sentiment by saying “[t]he Court was considering striking the two

one-year priors as not really being meaningful in this case.” These are unambiguous

statements that the court was considering striking the enhancements, not just the

punishment. If the court was considering striking just the punishments, it would need to

impose the enhancements. Saying it was considering not imposing them at all is

therefore the same as saying it was considering striking the enhancements. In his

argument, accordingly, the prosecutor stated that he was “assuming the Court strikes the

two one-year priors.” Moreover, as the court explained the sentence it would impose, it

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gave no indication that it would impose the prison prior enhancements but strike their

punishment.

Given this context, we read the court’s ultimate statement that it was “going to

strike the two one-year prior prison terms” to mean that it intended to strike the

enhancements themselves and not just the punishment for the enhancements. Unlike

most other enhancements, these enhancements are sometimes referred to using the word

“term” when speaking of the enhancement itself, and not just the punishment on the

enhancement. (See, e.g., People v. Acosta (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 19, 25 [trial court

“must strike the three prior prison terms”] [bolding, italics, and capitalization omitted];

People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1563 [trial court has decision “to impose

or strike the three prior prison terms”].) Indeed, immediately after saying it was going to

strike the prior prison terms, the court reiterated that “[t]he sentence that Mr. Orozco’s

serving is basically a life sentence, and those [enhancements] are not meaningful, so I

will strike those.” Like the earlier statements, this final statement provides no indication

that the court intended to impose the enhancements and strike the punishment only.

Therefore, on the oral record alone we believe the sentencing court struck Orozco’s

enhancements, and not merely the punishment for the enhancements.

The abstract of judgment is not helpful in the determination of what the oral

pronouncement meant. The abstract of judgment incorrectly records the enhancements as

stayed by using an “S” in the appropriate box. That did not happen. If the trial court had

intended to only strike the punishment, the form abstract of judgment provides that the

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clerk should enter the abbreviation “PS”—for punishment stricken. The oral transcript

shows that the abstract of judgment is in error and should be corrected. Our reading of

the record is that it should be corrected by removing any reference to the enhancements.

Because the sentencing court struck the enhancements themselves, we apply Tang

and conclude that Orozco is not entitled to relief under section 1172.75. We therefore

affirm the trial court’s order denying his petition.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Orozco’s petition under section 1172.75,

but remand with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment by removing any

reference to the stricken enhancements, and to correct the sentencing minute order to

reflect that the enhancements were stricken rather than stayed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:

CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
J.

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