CourtListener 10670137•Duket v. Gordon CA2/2
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Filed 9/11/25 Duket v. Gordon CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DUSTIN TAYLOR DUKET, B335785
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCP00664)
STEVE GORDON, as Director, etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed and
dismissed in part.
Markelz Law Group and Christopher Markelz for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Jones and Anthony William
Gomez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
______________________________
Dustin Taylor Duket (Duket) filed a petition for writ of
mandate challenging the constitutionality of Vehicle Code
section 13352, subdivision (e)(2),1 which requires the Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend a restricted driver’s license
without a hearing when it receives notice from a driving-under-
the-influence (DUI) program that the driver has failed to comply
with the program’s requirements. Although the trial court
concluded that Duket had not shown that section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2), is facially unconstitutional, the court granted
the petition on the ground that, as applied to Duket, the statute
violates procedural due process. Both Duket and the DMV2
appealed from the ensuing judgment.
We dismiss Duket’s appeal. As the prevailing party, he
lacks appellate standing. We address the merits of the DMV’s
appeal and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Duket enrolls in a DUI program
Duket was convicted of driving under the influence in 2011
and again in 2021. Following his second conviction, the DMV
suspended Duket’s license for two years. The DMV stayed the
suspension and issued Duket a restricted driver’s license after he
enrolled, as a condition of his probation, in an 18-month DUI
program at ABC Traffic Programs (ABC Traffic).
1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The petition was filed against defendant Steve Gordon
(Gordon), as director of the DMV. For simplicity, we refer to
Gordon as the DMV.
2
Duket’s enrollment contract with ABC Traffic required him
“to attend interviews, individual counseling sessions, group
sessions and educational sessions all by appointment.” It
provided that Duket would “be referred back to the referring
agency for consideration of termination” for reasons including
(1) failure “to comply with drinking driver program rules and
policies”; (2) failure “to obtain a leave of absence, in accordance
with [California Code of Regulations, title 9, s]ection 9876.5,
when the participant is unable to attend scheduled program
services for 21 days or more”; and (3) exceeding “the number of
absences allowed in [California Code of Regulations, title 9,
s]ection 9876[, subdivision] (d)” without an approved leave of
absence.
Duket also signed a “Program Contract Review” that
stated: “Ten . . . absences or no activity within 21 days will result
in your case being referred back to the proper agency for
notification of non-compliance[.] (DMV will also be notified, and
your license will be suspended, and the court may issue a bench
warrant for violation of court order.)” (Underlining and bolding
omitted.)
B. Duket is terminated from the DUI program for
exceeding the number of allowed absences
On January 9, 2022, Duket’s live-in girlfriend and her
children were confirmed to be infected with COVID-19 (COVID).
Because Duket had close contact with them, his employer placed
him on paid administrative leave. Duket became ill with COVID
on January 17, 2022. Los Angeles County Department of Public
Health orders directed him to isolate/quarantine until
January 20, 2022.
3
Before a scheduled in-person meeting at ABC Traffic on
January 19, 2022, Duket called to reschedule and to request a
leave of absence. The program clerk told Duket that it was not
possible to reschedule the meeting within 24 hours of the
appointment, that his leave-of-absence request was untimely, and
that his absence would be treated as a missed meeting.
On February 1, 2022, Duket went to ABC Traffic in person
to reschedule the missed meeting. He explained that he had
missed the meeting because of his exposure to COVID and his
own COVID illness. Duket was informed that he had been
terminated from the DUI program on January 19, 2022, for
exceeding the number of allowed absences.
C. The DMV suspends Duket’s restricted driver’s license
On February 16, 2022, the Orange County Superior Court
granted Duket’s request to be reinstated in the DUI program.
One day later, on February 17, 2022, the DMV sent Duket
an order of suspension, notifying him that his “privilege to
operate a motor vehicle [wa]s suspended effective February 21,
2022.” The order stated that the action was taken under
section 13352 because the DMV had “been notified that [Duket]
failed to comply with the terms of” his DUI program.
The order of suspension further provided that Duket’s
“driving privilege shall not be reinstated before September 15,
2023[,]” and not until the DMV received proof of financial
responsibility and proof of completion of a DUI program.
II. Procedural History
A. Petition for writ of mandate; supplemental petition
Duket filed a verified petition for peremptory writ of
mandate to set aside the February 17, 2022, order of suspension.
In the petition, Duket asserted that section 13352,
4
subdivision (e)(2), which required the DMV to suspend his
restricted driver’s license without a hearing, was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.
On April 25, 2022, Duket filed a supplemental petition with
additional allegations, including that he had “‘public interest
standing’ to challenge” the constitutionality of section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2). He also sought an award of attorney fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
The DMV filed answers to Duket’s petitions.
B. Preliminary injunction
On May 9, 2023, the trial court granted Duket’s motion for
a preliminary injunction and enjoined the DMV from suspending
his driver’s license.
C. Trial court’s ruling
On October 3, 2023, the trial court issued its ruling
granting Duket’s petition for writ of mandate. Although the
court concluded that Duket had not satisfied the “‘heavy burden’”
required to show that section 13352, subdivision (e)(2),
“‘inevitably pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict with
applicable constitutional prohibitions’ such that it should be
found unconstitutional on its face[,]” the court found merit in
Duket’s as-applied constitutional challenge.
The trial court found that, as applied to Duket,
section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), “violates procedural due
process[.]” Duket “may have been improperly dismissed from the
DUI program[,] . . . but the applicable statutes and regulations do
not provide for [the] DMV to reverse any improper dismissal[.]”
As for “[t]he ultimate issue of whether [Duket] timely requested a
leave of absence (or [wa]s otherwise entitled to have his absence
5
excused)[,]” the court “reserved” the issue for the “DMV at a post-
suspension hearing.”
D. Judgment; appeals
The trial court subsequently entered judgment “in favor of
[Duket] and against [the DMV].” Duket and the DMV each
appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Duket’s Appeal
Duket raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that
section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), is unconstitutional on its face.
Second, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence the declaration of Jeannie Ho (a Department of Health
Care Services section chief) and an e-mail exchange between the
parties’ respective counsel. We do not reach the merits of either
argument because Duket, as the prevailing party, lacks standing
to appeal from the judgment.
“In a mandamus proceeding, just as in a civil action, ‘[a]ny
party aggrieved may appeal’ from the final judgment. [Citations.]
‘One is considered, “aggrieved” whose rights or interests are
injuriously affected by the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (El Dorado
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 937, 977 (El Dorado).) The injurious effect must
be “immediate and substantial . . . , and not as a nominal or
remote consequence of the decision. [Citations.]” (In re K.C.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.)
“Conversely, ‘[a] party who is not aggrieved by an order or
judgment has no standing to attack it on appeal.’ [Citation.]”
(El Dorado, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 977.) Generally, a party
is not aggrieved by a judgment rendered in that party’s favor.
(See ibid.; Nevada County Office of Education v. Riles (1983)
6
149 Cal.App.3d 767, 779.) Because lack of standing is a
jurisdictional defect, an appeal is subject to dismissal if the
appellant does not have standing. (In re B.S. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 888, 893; see also In re J.B. (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 133, 139 [“‘Without standing there is no
justiciable controversy for a court to entertain[]’”].)
Here, Duket appeals from a judgment expressly entered in
his favor granting his petition for writ of mandate. “Because
[Duket] cannot claim to be aggrieved by the trial court’s
judgment in [his] favor, [Duket] lacks standing to appeal from
that judgment . . . .” (El Dorado, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at
p. 977.)
Duket resists this conclusion, contending that he “had, and
continues to have, standing to challenge the constitutionality
of . . . section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), both individually and on
behalf of the public.” Duket argues that the portion of the trial
court’s ruling concluding that section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), is
not facially unconstitutional was “unfavorable [to him] as it
relates to his bringing of the action in the public interest.”3
We disagree. Duket’s facial and as-applied challenges were
not separate claims but rather different arguments in support of
the claim that section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), violates due
process. (See Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n (2010)
558 U.S. 310, 331 [explaining that a facial challenge was “‘not a
3 Whether Duket had public interest standing to bring this
action in the trial court is not the issue before us. For this
reason, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. California Department
of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, which considered
whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring an action
under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a and upon which
Duket relies heavily, is inapposite.
7
new claim[]’” but was—“at most”—a new argument supporting a
First Amendment claim].) Indeed, courts may decline to address
a facial constitutional challenge when an as-applied challenge is
meritorious. (See In re Eduardo C. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 937,
940 [declining to address facial constitutional challenges where
as-applied challenge to statute was “dispositive”].)
As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
“although the occasional case requires us to entertain a facial
challenge in order to vindicate a party’s right not to be bound by
an unconstitutional statute [citations], we neither want nor need
to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully
protect the litigants.” (U.S. v. National Treasury Employees
Union (1995) 513 U.S. 454, 477–478; see also In re Taylor (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1019, 1039 [“consideration of as-applied challenges, as
opposed to broad facial challenges, ‘is the preferred course of
adjudication since it enables courts to avoid making
unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments[]’”].)4
4 It does not appear that section 13352, subdivision (e)(2)’s
facial constitutionality is an issue evading review. Upon Duket’s
request, we judicially noticed court records in Randolph v.
Gordon (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2024, No. 22STCP02919)
(Randolph). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) According to
those records, on February 21, 2024, the superior court in
Randolph granted a petition for writ of mandate, concluding that
sections 13352, subdivision (e)(2), 13352.4, subdivision (f),
13353.75, subdivision (a)(1)(C), and 13353.6,
subdivision (a)(1)(C), “are facially unconstitutional as a matter of
due process because they do not provide the driver an
opportunity for an administrative hearing to determine whether
his or her driver’s license should be suspended or revoked after
the DMV receives notification from a DUI program that the
driver has been dismissed from the program.” The superior court
8
Because Duket has failed to show that the judgment
injures him in any “immediate and substantial way[,]” he is not
an “aggrieved person” with standing to appeal. (In re K.C., supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal.
II. The DMV’s Appeal
In its appeal, the DMV argues that section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2), is not unconstitutional as applied to Duket,
and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting Duket’s petition
for writ of mandate.
A. Standard of review
We review the constitutionality of section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2), de novo. (Vergara v. State of California (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 619, 642.)
B. Relevant law
1. Section 13352
Upon receipt of an abstract of record showing that a person
has been convicted of a DUI, the DMV “shall immediately
suspend or revoke” that person’s privilege to operate a motor
vehicle. (§ 13352, subd. (a).) For those convicted of a second DUI
offense within a 10-year period, the suspension is for two years.
(§§ 13352, subd. (a)(3)(A), 23152, 23540.)
A person subject to a two-year driver’s license suspension
may apply to the DMV for a restricted driver’s license if, among
other requirements, he or she provides proof of enrollment in an
18-month DUI program. (§ 13352, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I).) But if
the DUI program notifies the DMV that the driver has failed to
comply with the program’s requirements, the DMV “shall”
noted that the petitioner in that case had abandoned his as-
applied challenge to the statutes. Randolph is currently pending
on appeal in Division Seven of this Court (case No. B338305).
9
suspend or revoke the restricted driver’s license. (§ 13352,
subd. (e)(2).)5 A person whose restricted driver’s license is
suspended under section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), is not entitled
to a hearing. (See § 14101, subd. (a) [“A person is not entitled to
a hearing . . . [¶] . . . [i]f the action by the department is made
mandatory by this code”].)
2. DUI program regulations
Health and Safety Code section 11836 vests the
Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) with “the sole
authority to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke the license of a [DUI]
program.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11836, subd. (a).) Regulations
regarding DUI programs are codified in title 9 of the California
Code of Regulations. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11836.15; Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 9, § 9795 et seq.)
As relevant here, the regulations require a DUI program
participant “to attend all scheduled activities unless the
participant has: [¶] (1) Contacted the DUI program and
arranged to attend an activity at an alternate time, or [¶]
(2) Been granted an approved leave of absence . . . .” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 9, § 9876, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) A participant in an 18-
5 Section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), the statute challenged in
this action, provides in full: “[T]he [DMV] shall terminate the
restriction imposed pursuant to this section and shall suspend or
revoke the person’s driving privilege upon receipt of notification
from the [DUI] program that the person has failed to comply with
the program requirements. The person’s driving privilege shall
remain suspended or revoked for the remaining period of the
original suspension or revocation imposed under this section and
until all reinstatement requirements described in this section are
met.”
10
month DUI program is not permitted more than 10 absences.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9876, subd. (d)(4).)
A participant must “request prior approval for all leaves of
absence, unless unable to do so due to circumstances beyond the
participant’s control.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9876.5, subd. (c).)
A leave of absence “shall” be approved for “[p]articipants who are
absent due to their own extended illness or medical treatment or
that of a family member” and for “[p]articipants who cannot
participate in program services due to an extreme personal
hardship or family emergency.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9876.5,
subd. (e)(3), (5).)
3. Procedural due process
“Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the
government to afford persons due process before depriving them
of any property interest. [Citations.]” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc.
v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197,
212 (Today’s Fresh Start).) “‘The essence of due process is the
requirement that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given]
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”’
[Citations.] The opportunity to be heard must be afforded ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ [Citations.]”
(Ibid.; see also Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354,
379 [“‘The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner[]”’”].)
“[T]he precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary
according to context. [Citations.]” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 212.) We balance four factors to evaluate the
adequacy of government process: (1) The private interest affected
by the government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation
11
of that interest; (3) “‘“the dignitary interest in informing
individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story
before a responsible government official”’”; and (4) the
government’s interest. (Id. at p. 213.)6
An as-applied constitutional challenge “contemplates
analysis of the facts of a particular case or cases to determine the
circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied
and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the
application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a
protected right. [Citations.]” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995)
9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.)
C. Analysis
We separately address and then balance the private
interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the dignitary
interest, and the government’s interest to evaluate whether, as
applied to Duket, the mandatory suspension of Duket’s restricted
driver’s license pursuant to section 13352, subdivision (e)(2),
without a hearing, comports with procedural due process.
1. Private interest affected
The private interest at issue is Duket’s possession of a
restricted driver’s license. (See Mackey v. Montrym (1979)
443 U.S. 1, 10 [“suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily
defined cause implicates a . . . protectible property interest”];
Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 112 [“It is clear that the Due
Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by
6 The trial court referred to these considerations as the
“Oberholzer/Mathews factors[.]” (See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)
424 U.S. 319, 334–335; Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial
Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 390–391.)
12
the State”]; Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1274–
1275.)
Duket established that he had a particularly high interest
in his continued possession of a driver’s license. The trial court
found that Duket “need[ed] his driver[’s] license for work and
that he could lose his employment if his restricted license [wa]s
suspended.”7 “Once licenses are issued, as in [Duket]’s case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.”
(Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 539.)
The DMV suggests that the private interest is not
significant because Duket only possessed a restricted driver’s
license. We are not persuaded. “There is little practical
difference between the revocation of a license and revocation of a
restricted license. Only the quantum of the driving privilege
differs, not the existence of the privilege; revocation of either can
have the same devastating effect.” (Nicholas v. Secretary of State
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 74 Mich.App. 64, 69.)
2. Risk of erroneous deprivation
Duket’s termination from his DUI program and the
concomitant suspension of his restricted driver’s license under
section 13352, subdivision (e)(2), were consequences of his
absence from a January 19, 2022, meeting at ABC Traffic. Duket
presented evidence that he missed the meeting because of his
exposure to his COVID-stricken girlfriend and her children, his
own COVID illness, and public health directives requiring him to
isolate/quarantine. When Duket called ABC Traffic on the day of
the scheduled meeting, but prior to its start time, to reschedule
7 The DMV does not challenge this factual finding.
13
and to request a leave of absence, he was told by a program clerk
that it was not possible to reschedule the meeting within
24 hours of the appointment, that his leave-of-absence request
was untimely, and that his absence would be treated as a missed
meeting.
Under these circumstances, there is a substantial risk that
Duket was improperly terminated from the DUI program and,
thus, erroneously deprived of his restricted driver’s license under
section 13352, subdivision (e)(2). (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9,
§ 9876.5, subds. (c) [“The DUI program shall require the
participant to request prior approval for all leaves of absence,
unless unable to do so due to circumstances beyond the
participant’s control”], (e)(3) [leave of absence “shall” be approved
for “[p]articipants who are absent due to their own extended
illness or medical treatment or that of a family member”], (e)(5)
[leave of absence “shall” be approved for “[p]articipants who
cannot participate in program services due to an extreme
personal hardship or family emergency”].)8
The DMV argues that the risk of an erroneous deprivation
was low because Duket “had options” to challenge his dismissal
from the DUI program by (1) submitting a grievance with DHCS
or (2) seeking review from the court of conviction. We conclude
that neither option provided a robust safeguard against an
erroneous deprivation.
8 We do not make any finding, actual or implied, that Duket
was inappropriately terminated from the program. Rather, we
detect a sufficient probability of such error solely for the purpose
of assessing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his protected
property interest in his restricted driver’s license.
14
“Any person may request an investigation of a DUI
program by contacting [DHCS] . . . in order to determine
compliance with the provisions” governing DUI programs. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9823.1, subd. (a).) While DHCS must initiate
an investigation within 10 working days of such a request, no
time is prescribed for the completion of the investigation. (See
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9823.1, subds. (b), (f).) And, while a
DHCS investigation may result in the issuance of a notice of
deficiency to the DUI program (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 9823.1,
subds. (g), (i)), the regulations set forth no clear process whereby
either DCHS or the DUI program is required to notify the DMV
that a participant was improperly terminated.
As for seeking review in the criminal court that referred
him to the DUI program, the DMV points us to no authority
allowing that court to order the DMV to reinstate a restricted
driver’s license suspended pursuant to section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2).9
3. Dignitary interest
Given the importance of his possession of a restricted
driver’s license, Duket’s dignitary interest in being
“inform[ed] . . . of the nature, grounds and consequences of the
action” by the DMV and being able “to present [his] side of the
story before a responsible governmental official” (Rodriguez v.
Department of Real Estate (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1297) is
also high. The DMV contends that Duket could have challenged
9 We are also unpersuaded by the DMV’s contention that
Duket could have filed a petition for writ of mandate against the
DMV, DHCS, or ABC Traffic. The availability of relief through
the judicial process does not absolve the DMV from its due
process obligations.
15
his dismissal from the DUI program with DHCS or the court of
conviction, or through a writ of mandate. But these options do
not significantly diminish Duket’s dignitary interest in a hearing
before the DMV, which is the department that granted his
restricted driver’s license and was required under section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2), to suspend it.
4. Government’s interest
There can be no question that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting the public from a driver who has
been twice convicted of DUI offenses and has been terminated
from a DUI program. (See Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016)
579 U.S. 438, 464 [“The States and the Federal Government have
a ‘paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public
highways[]’”]; see also id. at p. 465 [“Our cases have long
recognized the ‘carnage’ and ‘slaughter’ caused by drunk
drivers”]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757,
765 [“the shocking number of injuries and deaths on the
highways caused by drunk drivers has compelled society to adopt
extreme measures in response”].) However, as the trial court
observed, “the governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the
roads would not necessarily be harmed by affording a post-
suspension hearing, which would allow for a challenge to the
suspension only after the suspension had taken effect.”
We also acknowledge that providing a hearing to Duket
imposes an administrative and financial burden on the DMV.
The extent of this burden depends on the scope of the hearing
offered.
5. Balancing of factors
While we recognize the important government interest
involved, the balance of factors weigh in Duket’s favor. We reach
16
the same conclusion as the trial court: As applied, section 13352,
subdivision (e)(2), violates Duket’s right to procedural due
process.
DISPOSITION
Duket’s appeal is dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.
Duket is entitled to his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
17
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