CourtListener 10670004•People v. Galarza CA4/3
Texto completo
Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Galarza CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064265
v. (Super. Ct. No. 08CF0137)
DAMIEN L. GALARZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent..
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Damien L. Galarza of one count of
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first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of street
terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found true two special circumstance
allegations: lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and murder committed to
further the activities of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The
jury also found true that the murder was committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that defendant had
vicariously discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) &
(e)(1)).
The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of life
without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, plus a concurrent
term of 25 years for the firearm enhancement. The court also imposed, but
stayed, the following: 10 years for the gang enhancement and two years for
the street terrorism conviction.
In 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).2 The trial court summarily denied the
petition. It held defendant was ineligible for relief because the jury’s special
circumstance findings necessarily established defendant acted with the intent
to kill. The court also emphasized the jury never received any instructions on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant appealed, and his
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436.
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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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Another panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s order.
(People v. Galarza (Jan. 19, 2023, G061333) [nonpub. opn.].) The court held
the jury’s true finding on the lying in wait special circumstance established
the jurors found defendant acted with the intent to kill. (Ibid.) The court also
found no other viable issues for defendant to argue on appeal. (Ibid.)
In 2023, defendant filed another petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. The trial court again denied the petition. Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appointed counsel indicates he has found no arguable issues.
Consistent with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appointed counsel
has identified two issues to assist in our independent review: (1) whether the
trial court correctly determined the issues had been previously litigated; and
(2) whether a true finding on the lying in wait special circumstance precluded
a finding that defendant was convicted under a theory of imputed malice.
Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on his own
behalf and has done so. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232.)
The issues defendant raises are described below.
We have examined the entire record and have not found an
arguable issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postjudgment order.
FACTS
In December 2023, defendant filed the operative petition for
resentencing and averred: “1. A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against me that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] 2a. At trial, I was convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine; [¶] 3. I could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
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because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.”
In a statement of decision, the court concluded defendant’s
petition was barred by collateral estoppel because defendant’s eligibility for
resentencing had already been litigated and decided. Even if the petition was
not procedurally barred, the court held defendant remained ineligible as a
matter of law. The court emphasized the jury had been instructed with
CALCRIM No. 728, which required a finding that defendant intended to kill
and committed the murder by means of lying in wait. Given these
instructions and the jury’s true finding on the lying in wait special
circumstance, the court found defendant could not have been convicted under
an imputed malice theory.
DISCUSSION
Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of
murder “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) “A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations, that (1) the
petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner was not the actual killer,
but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, or (4)
the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not imputed based
solely on participation in a crime.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1,
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14.) In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–971.)
As relevant here, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues
previously decided if certain requirements are satisfied. (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451 (Curiel).) “‘First, the issue sought to be precluded
from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.
Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding.
Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.
Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the
same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.”’” (Id. at pp.
451–452.)
Here, the trial court correctly held defendant’s second
resentencing petition was barred by collateral estoppel. The issue—eligibility
for resentencing under section 1172.6—was already litigated and decided in
connection with his first petition. As noted ante, the trial court denied the
first petition, and another panel of this court affirmed the court’s denial.
Because defendant was the same party in both proceedings, all elements of
collateral estoppel are met.
In his supplemental brief, defendant contends the trial court
violated his rights to equal protection and due process by denying his petition
without addressing Curiel. According to defendant, his case is materially
indistinguishable from Curiel. We disagree. Unlike the gang-murder special
circumstance at issue in Curiel, the lying in wait special circumstance in this
case required a finding that defendant intended to kill and committed the
murder by means of lying in wait. (CALCRIM No. 728.) The jury’s true
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finding on this allegation established a valid theory of first degree murder
independent of any doctrine of imputed malice.
Defendant also argues his appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel because he “filed a brief that placed the burden of
arguing the . . . issues on [defendant].” Not so. In an appeal from the denial of
a section 1172.6 petition, appointed appellate counsel may notify the court
that no arguable issues exist and should include a recitation of the facts
bearing on the denial of the petition. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
216, 231–232.) Defendant’s appointed counsel complied with this procedure.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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