CourtListener 10668616•People v. Ball
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Filed 8/13/25; Certified for Publication 9/9/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064274
v. (Super. Ct. No. 20HF0795)
JACOB FREDERICK BALL, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Reversed and remanded with direction.
Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Brendan Sullivan, Deputy
District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Respondent.
The Orange County District Attorney appeals from an order
setting aside a count alleging that Jacob Frederick Ball brandished a firearm
at a motor vehicle occupant. (Pen. Code, § 417.3.) 1 We hold the statute sets
forth an objective test about causing fear and does not require a victim to
subjectively experience it. Because the count was set aside based on a lack of
evidence of subjective fear, we reverse.
FACTS
On a parkway one night in 2020, Ball pointed a handgun in
another driver’s direction before speeding away to a freeway onramp. Ball’s
vehicle had been stopped on the passenger side of the driver’s vehicle, at a
traffic signal. The driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate number
after witnessing him drive recklessly. After the driver called 9-1-1, police
found Ball at his home, and found a handgun and black gloves in his vehicle.
Ball was charged with a felony violation of brandishing a firearm at a person
in a motor vehicle (§ 417.3; count 1) and two misdemeanors.
At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate (Judge Joy Weisenfeld
Markman) heard testimony as to these facts and found there was probable
cause to hold Ball to answer all counts charged.
The trial judge (Judge Gary S. Paer) later granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss count 1. (§ 995.) It reasoned there was no evidence that the
brandishing caused the driver any subjective fear.
DISCUSSION
An information “shall be set aside” if a defendant has been
“committed without reasonable or probable cause.” (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
“‘Evidence that will justify a prosecution need not be sufficient to support a
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
conviction.’” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 582.) Sufficient cause
exists “‘“if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an
offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.”’” (Ibid.)
“‘[W]here the facts are undisputed, the determination of probable
cause “constitute[s] a legal conclusion which is subject to independent review
on appeal.”’” (People v. Black (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 889, 898.) We review the
magistrate’s probable cause determination and disregard the trial court’s
section 995 ruling. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
We conclude count 1 should be reinstated because the Legislature
did not intend to require that the brandishing victim experience subjective
fear. The statute states: “Every person who, except in self-defense, in the
presence of any other person who is an occupant of a motor vehicle
proceeding on a public street or highway, draws or exhibits any firearm,
whether loaded or unloaded, in a threatening manner against another person
in such a way as to cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear of bodily
harm is guilty of a felony.” (§ 417.3, italics added.)
We find the phrase “a reasonable person” indicates the statute
requires only that the “threatening manner” of brandishing be done “in such
a way” that it would objectively cause fear. We have not found any legislative
history to the contrary. When drafting the standard jury instruction for a
section 417.3 charge, the Judicial Council included only an objective element:
“The defendant drew or exhibited the firearm against the other person in a
threatening manner that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily
harm.” (CALCRIM No. 980.) It omitted any subjective element. And in
addressing the related misdemeanor of deadly weapon brandishing, the court
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long ago held that a victim does not even need to be aware of the brandishing.
(People v. McKinzie (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794.)
The Legislature knows how to specify a subjective element when
it wants to require one. For example, section 422 prohibiting criminal threats
imposes a subjective element by requiring the threat to “cause[] that person”
to experience fear. 2 (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 810 [criminal threat requires reasonable fear and actual fear
sustained by recipient].)
We are unpersuaded by Ball’s reliance on People v. Lara (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 1560. That court resolved whether the victim had to “actually
be the occupant of a vehicle.” (Id. at pp. 1565–1566.) In addressing the
occupancy requirement, Lara assumed “the brandishing reasonably
generated apprehension or fear of bodily harm on the part of the person
threatened.” (Id. at p. 1565.) But “‘“[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course
to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court,
and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”’”
(People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1418.)
The same principle applies to People v. Howard (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 94, which the trial judge cited in dismissing count 1. Howard
overturned a section 417.3 conviction because the victim’s vehicle had “c[o]me
2
Section 422, subdivision (a) states: “Any person who willfully
threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
to another person . . . which, on its face and under the circumstances in which
it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to
convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably
to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate
family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to
exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” (Italics added.)
4
to a stop in the center median of a street” (Howard, at pp. 96, 99) and the
statute requires a “‘motor vehicle [to be] proceeding on a public street or
highway’” (id. at p. 97, italics added). Any discussion about subjective fear
was unnecessary to its holding.
In sum, the statute’s plain meaning supports the magistrate’s
ruling that there was probable cause to hold Ball to answer on count 1.
Section 417.3 did not require the district attorney to show that the victim
actually experienced fear.3
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting Ball’s section 995 motion is
reversed and the court is directed to reinstate count 1 of the February 8,
2023, information filed in this matter.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
3
Ball does not persuade us there was insufficient evidence he
“actually did anything with the firearm that could be considered
threatening.” (People v. Black, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 898 [review of
disputed facts requires drawing reasonable inferences in favor of
information].)
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Filed 9/9/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
G064274
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 20HF0795)
v.
ORDER GRANTING
JACOB FREDERICK BALL, REQUEST FOR
PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.
The Orange County District Attorney has requested that our
opinion filed August 13, 2025, be certified for publication. It appears that our
opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule
8.1105(c). The request is GRANTED.
The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
2
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