CourtListener 10668558•In re H.C. CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 9/9/25 In re H.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re H.C., a Person Coming B341208
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP02171B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Daniel C. (father) appeals from
the juvenile court’s October 2, 2024, jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders in which his daughter, H.C. (minor, born
Sept. 2012), was declared a dependent of the court and removed
from his custody. Father argues that (1) insufficient evidence
supports one of the jurisdictional findings; (2) insufficient
evidence supports the removal order; and (3) the court abused its
discretion by requiring him to submit to weekly drug tests and
undergo a psychological assessment.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Family
Father and Z.O. (mother) are minor’s parents. Mother has
another daughter, A.O. (born Apr. 2008), who has a different
father than minor. Mother is not a party to this appeal, nor is
A.O. a subject of it.
II. Referral
On June 14, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
physical abuse of minor and A.O. by father. According to the
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reporting party, father had stated that he wanted to kill his
family. Father had also expressed suicidal ideation.
III. Initial Investigation
When interviewed by a DCFS social worker on June 19,
2024, father denied the allegations.
Father’s work manager was interviewed on July 1, 2024.
The manager reported that mother had called in an attempt to
locate father. When father returned to work a few days later, he
told the manager that he was “‘not in a good mental state [and]
d[idn’t] know what to do.’” (Bolding omitted.) Father disclosed
that he and mother had gone on a hike, they were having marital
problems, and he had “dark thoughts” about killing mother.
(Bolding omitted.) One of father’s coworkers disclosed to the
manager that father had reported being scared to go home and
hurt his children. Father had no plan to harm himself or others.
On July 5, 2024, mother called the social worker and
reported that father had threatened to kill her. Father broke
mother’s cell phone and “trashed the home in the presence of”
minor and A.O. The police responded to the home and father
fled.
Interviewed later that day, mother reported that father had
become jealous early that morning, “got more aggressive with”
mother, “pushed her on the bed[,]” and “verbally abus[ed] her.”
(Bolding omitted.) Father threatened, “‘I will kill you if you cheat
on me.’” Father got on top of mother and began to choke her
“forcefully” with two hands, causing her to almost lose
consciousness. (Bolding omitted.) A.O. intervened and pushed
father off of mother. Father then pushed A.O. away from him.
Father pushed mother against the wall and slapped the right side
of her face, injuring her lower lip. Mother tried to call the police
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with her cell phone but father took it and destroyed it, along with
mother’s glasses. Father also destroyed the television, a lamp,
and slashed two of mother’s car tires. Mother claimed that this
was the first time father had ever been physical with her and
that she had never seen him act in such a way.
An emergency protective order was issued against father.
When told by a social worker that it would expire on July 12,
2024, mother asked if father could move back in then. Mother
stated, “‘I need him to pay the rent for July.’” (Bolding omitted.)
Mother did not intend to seek an extension of the restraining
order. She said, “‘I am not going to press charges on him[.] I
want him back with the family[.] [W]e are never separated.’”
(Bolding omitted.)
According to A.O., on the morning of July 5, 2024, mother
and father argued about mother communicating with another
man. Father’s anger escalated to the point where he pushed
mother down on the bed and got on top of her. A.O. intervened
when she saw father “choking” mother. (Bolding omitted.) A.O.
pushed father off of mother, and father responded by pushing
A.O. Father did not push A.O. “hard, but pushed [her] away.”
(Bolding omitted.)
Father was interviewed on July 8, 2024. He said he was
“‘devastated, sad, c[ould]n’t sleep [and was] having nightmares.’”
Father reported drinking alcohol rarely, although he had last
drunk the week before. He last used cocaine two to three years
earlier. He said that he and mother rarely fought and “‘this is a
first time thing.’”
Father was arrested on July 10, 2024.
According to a Los Angeles Police Department investigative
report, at approximately 4:55 a.m. on July 5, 2024, officers
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responded to a call of a suspected assault with a deadly weapon.
The officers met with mother outside a convenience store. She
was “crying uncontrollably, fearful, [and had] fresh bruising and
dried blood on her arms.” She reported that she and father had
argued and that it had escalated to a physical fight. Father had
threatened to kill her. Father had shoved mother onto the bed;
A.O. attempted to calm father down by intervening, resulting in
father shoving A.O. away. Mother stood up from the bed to
defend A.O., and father shoved mother back on the bed a second
time. Father then climbed onto the bed, sat over mother, and
strangled her with both of his hands around her neck. Mother
felt “immense pressure on her neck to the point where she could
no longer breathe and started to lose consciousness.” A.O.
pushed father off of mother. The report documented that mother
sustained two six-inch bruises, one on each upper arm. She also
had red marks on both sides of her neck. Both of her eyelids were
swollen.
IV. Detention
On July 10, 2024, DCFS obtained an order authorizing the
detention of minor and A.O. from parental custody. Minor and
A.O. were placed in the family home under the care of the
paternal grandmother, A.C. (paternal grandmother). Mother and
father moved out of the home.
V. Dependency Petition
On July 12, 2024, DCFS filed a dependency petition
seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over minor
and A.O. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b)(1) (failure to
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protect).1 Counts a-1 and b-1 alleged that mother and father had
a history of engaging in violent altercations. Count b-2 alleged
that father had a history of mental and emotional problems,
including suicidal and homicidal ideation. Count b-3 alleged that
father had a history of substance abuse.
VI. Detention Hearing
At the July 15, 2024, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found that a prima facie showing had been made that minor was
a person described by section 300. The court detained minor from
father and released her to mother under DCFS supervision.
Father was granted monitored visitation with minor, provided
neither mother nor paternal grandmother served as the monitor.
Upon mother’s request, the court also issued a temporary
restraining order protecting mother from father.2
VII. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
Minor was interviewed by a dependency investigator on
August 13, 2024. Minor stated that she had seen father choking
mother on July 5, 2024, and it had looked like mother could not
breathe. Minor denied many of the other allegations and
reported that she had never been scared of him and that he had
never threatened anyone.
Mother denied that she had an argument with father on
July 4, 2024, and denied that father had grabbed a knife and
threatened to kill her and himself. Mother denied that father
had put pressure on her neck during the July 5, 2024, incident.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 A criminal protective order protecting mother and A.O.
from father had already been issued on July 12, 2024.
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Mother denied that father had mental health problems or had
attempted to harm himself.
Paternal grandmother was residing with mother and
helping her care for the children. According to paternal
grandmother, father was living in his car. When she spoke to
him over the phone, “he seem[ed] remorseful of the incident.”
VIII. Adjudication Hearing
After entertaining oral argument at the adjudication
hearing on October 2, 2024, the juvenile court sustained counts a-
1, b-1,3 and b-2.4 The court dismissed count b-3 regarding
3 According to counts a-1 and b-1, mother and father “have a
history of engaging in violent altercations.” On July 4, 2024,
father brandished a knife, threatened to use it to kill mother and
himself, and rubbed it against his body causing cuts and
bleeding. On July 5, 2024, father struck and threw items in the
home and broke mother’s glasses. Father pushed mother onto
the bed and threatened to kill her. Father got on top of mother
and used both hands “to forcefully choke” her. Mother was
unable to breathe and almost lost consciousness. When A.O.
intervened by pushing father off mother, father pushed A.O.
Father pushed mother against the wall and struck her face,
injuring mother’s lower lip. Mother attempted to contact law
enforcement, but father took mother’s phone away and broke it.
Father brandished a knife and slashed the tires of mother’s
vehicle. Mother sustained two six-inch bruises, red marks on her
neck, and swollen eyelids. On July 10, 2024, father was arrested
for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, attempted
murder, battery, and vandalism. Father’s “violent conduct . . .
against . . mother . . . endangers the children’s physical health
and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places
the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, [and]
danger.”
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father’s substance abuse. The court explained that it found “the
statements by the children and the statements by the mother
where they walk back some of their initial allegations” lacked
credibility.
The juvenile court declared minor a dependent of the court
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and removed her
from father’s custody. The court placed minor in mother’s home
under DCFS supervision. The court explained, “The father is in
denial and to some degree the mother is in denial as well. [¶] So
it’s not safe to have both of these parents together.”
The court ordered father to enroll in a 52-week domestic
violence program, parenting education, and individual counseling
to address case issues, and to submit to random and on-demand
weekly drug testing and a psychological assessment. The court
maintained father’s monitored visitation in a neutral setting.
IX. Appeal
Father timely appealed from the jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders.
4 According to count b-2, father “has mental and emotional
problems including homicidal ideation, suicidal ideation and
aggressive behavior,” rendering him “unable to provide regular
care and supervision of” minor. On July 4 and 5, 2024, father
threatened to kill mother and himself with a knife. Father had
previously threatened to kill mother, the children, and himself.
Father had “failed to obtain mental health treatment for . . . [his]
mental and emotional problems.” Mother had failed to protect
the children, allowing him to reside in the family home and have
unlimited access to them. Father’s mental and emotional
problems “endanger[] the children’s physical health and safety
. . . and place[] the children at risk of serious physical harm,
damage, and danger.”
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DISCUSSION
I. Father’s Jurisdictional Challenge is Moot
“[T]he principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to
a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘“[a]s long
as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is
immaterial that another might be inappropriate”’ [citation].
Thus, where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both
parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may
be rendered moot. [Citation.] The same is true where there are
multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one finding
may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.
[Citations.]” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283–284.)
“However, where a jurisdictional finding ‘serves as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal’ [citation],
the appeal is not moot.” (Id. at p. 283.)
On appeal, father only challenges count b-2, which alleges
that father’s mental and emotional problems placed minor at risk
of serious physical harm. Because the unchallenged a-1 and b-1
counts pertaining to father’s violent altercations with mother
bring minor within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section
300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), father’s arguments regarding the
b-2 count are moot and we decline to exercise our discretion to
review them. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.)
Father urges us to find his jurisdictional challenge
justiciable, arguing that count b-2 “logically formed the primary
basis” for the portion of father’s case plan requiring him to
undergo a psychological assessment. We are unpersuaded. The
juvenile court did not expressly tie the psychological assessment
order to count b-2 and was “not limited to the content of the
sustained petition when it consider[ed] what dispositional orders
9
would be in the best interests of the child[]. [Citations.]” (In re
Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.).) As
discussed more fully below, the record as a whole, as well as the
sustained counts a-1 and b-1, provides ample support for the
order, even without reliance on the substance of count b-2.
Accordingly, were we to find error regarding the sustaining of
count b-2, we could provide no effective relief that would have
any practical or tangible impact on father’s conduct or legal
status. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277 [“relief is
effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status[]’”]; In re I.A. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490 [“An important requirement for
justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief”].)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order
A. Applicable law
Before removing a minor from a parent’s custody, the
juvenile court is required to make one of five specified findings by
clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) One ground for
removal is that there is or would be a substantial danger to the
child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being if the child were returned home, and there
are no reasonable means to protect the child absent removal.
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “‘“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a
finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to
leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] Actual harm to a child is not necessary
before a child can be removed. ‘Reasonable apprehension stands
as an accepted basis for the exercise of state power.’ [Citation.]”
(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)
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B. Standard of review
We review a dispositional order removing a minor from
parental custody for substantial evidence. (In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p.154.) Because the juvenile court must make
its finding that a ground for removal exists under the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof (§ 361, subd. (c)), “the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011).
C. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order
removing minor from father. Father violently attacked mother
and destroyed property in minor’s presence. Father forcefully
choked mother to the point that she had difficulty breathing and
almost lost consciousness. Father threatened to kill mother and
himself. When minor’s older half-sister, A.O., intervened to
protect mother, father pushed A.O. The court could readily
conclude that father’s homicidal intent, expressed both physically
and verbally, subjected minor to substantial danger absent
removal from his custody.
Father resists this conclusion, arguing that the risk to
minor only existed when mother and father were together and,
therefore, minor could have safely “separately remain[ed]” in
father’s custody subject to DCFS supervision. He further
contends that allowing minor to remain in mother’s care, but not
father’s, is “internally contradictory.” We disagree. Unlike
father, mother did not launch a violent and potentially fatal
attack in minor’s presence nor did she threaten to commit
murder. Father’s violence, homicidal ideation, and lack of
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protective capacity provide strong support for the juvenile court’s
removal order from father only.
Father’s reliance on In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510 is
unavailing. In that case, the Court of Appeal reversed a removal
order where “[t]he sole source of potential danger to [the child]
while in [the f]ather’s care . . . derive[d] from his history of
domestic violence with [the m]other,” which consisted of two
instances of slapping the mother and, on one occasion, throwing a
baby shoe at her. (Id. at p. 521.) The nature of father’s violence
towards mother in the instant case—in which he choked her to
the point of near unconsciousness and expressed an intent to kill
her—is markedly different and more serious. And, unlike in In re
I.R., the record here contains substantial evidence that the
domestic violence between father and mother was likely to
continue, as both parents had minimized the abuse and mother
had expressed a desire to reconcile with father and reunite the
family.
III. Father’s Case Plan Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Father contends that two aspects of his court-ordered case
plan—requiring him to submit to a psychological assessment and
weekly drug and alcohol testing—constituted an abuse of the
juvenile court’s discretion.
Once dependency jurisdiction is exercised, a juvenile “court
may make any and all reasonable orders for the care,
supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the
child[.]” (§ 362, subd. (a).) The juvenile court has broad
discretion to determine what dispositional plan will serve the
best interests of the child. (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
p. 311.) The “court may direct any reasonable orders to the
parents or guardians of the child[,]” including “a direction to
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participate in a counseling or education program,” provided the
program is “designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the
court’s finding that the child is a person described by
[s]ection 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) We review the court’s decision
regarding which orders to impose for an abuse of discretion. (In
re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186–187.)
Assuming that father properly preserved his objections for
appellate review, we find nothing arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd about the juvenile court’s case plan. (See In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641 [“A court abuses its
discretion only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination[]’”’”].)
Father admitted to drinking alcohol around the time of his
violent attack on mother and to prior cocaine use. The court
could reasonably suspect that alcohol abuse or illicit drug use
might have contributed to father’s conduct and that it served
minor’s best interest to closely monitor father’s consumption
through weekly drug and alcohol testing. Random drug and
alcohol tests would also “provide an added incentive for [father]
to avoid illicit drugs and excessive alcohol consumption, either of
which w[ould] interfere with his ability to provide a suitable
home for [minor] and achieve reunification.” (In re
Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008.)
As for the psychological assessment, the record contains
evidence that father harbored homicidal and suicidal ideations.5
When interviewed on July 8, 2024, father reported being
5 We make this determination independent from the fact
that the juvenile court sustained count b-2 related to father’s
mental health problems and failure to obtain treatment.
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“‘devastated’” and “‘sad’” and having sleep difficulties and
nightmares. A psychological assessment could help father
identify and address possible mental health issues and assist him
in protecting minor upon reunification. (See Laurie S. v.
Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202 [a “psychological
evaluation is an ‘information-gathering tool[]’”].)
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court acted well
within its broad discretion in ordering father to submit to
drug/alcohol testing and a psychological assessment.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
______________________, P. J.
LUI
______________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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