CourtListener 10668555•People v. Chavez Ramirez CA2/7
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Filed 9/9/25 P. v. Chavez Ramirez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B332137
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA491566)
v.
BENITO CHAVEZ RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
INTRODUCTION
Benito Chavez Ramirez appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)).1 The trial court sentenced Chavez to a prison term of
15 years to life. Chavez argues substantial evidence did not
support the jury’s finding of malice. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Law Enforcement Officers Discover a Body
On November 17, 2018, at approximately 6:00 a.m., police
received a report of a body in the middle of a residential street. A
nearby police officer responded and found the body of a woman
later identified as Catrina Johnson.
Johnson’s shirt and bra were pushed above her breasts; she
was otherwise unclothed. There was one sandal near Johnson’s
feet. She had contusions and abrasions on her forehead, face,
right hand, back, and both knees. The whites of her eyes showed
petechiae from oxygen deprivation,2 and there was foam around
her mouth. Two of Johnson’s fingernails were torn off and
bleeding; several of her acrylic nails were broken or missing.
Rigor mortis, the stiffening of muscles after one dies, was present
throughout her body. Lividity, the settlement of blood after one
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Petechiae are small hemorrhages. (Chatterjee v. Kizer
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1348, 1354.) “[T]he presence of petechiae
[is] indicative of strangulation.” (People v. Cody (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 87, 95.)
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dies, was observed on her back, appearing “dark [and] blanched
with pressure.” A medical examiner determined Johnson died
from asphyxia due to neck compression.
B. The Sheriff’s Department Investigates
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department handled the
investigation. Detectives from the Sheriff’s Department
interviewed Charde Richardson, a close friend of Johnson, who
was with Johnson the morning she died. Richardson said she
and Johnson were street sex workers and had worked early in the
morning of November 17, 2018. Richardson remembered seeing a
white truck pull up to Johnson at a street corner. Johnson
approached the truck, spoke briefly with the driver, and got into
the front passenger seat after the driver grabbed her breast.
Detectives obtained surveillance footage from a nearby tire shop
that confirmed Richardson’s description of the encounter.
When Johnson did not return, Richardson sent her a text
message, “You straight bro?” Johnson received a reply, “Yes.
Coming back now. I had to get condoms.” Richardson found the
message odd because they had purchased condoms earlier that
night and Johnson had them when she got into the white truck.
Richardson’s subsequent texts to Johnson were not delivered.
The Sheriff’s Department obtained surveillance footage
from a residence near where the officer found Johnson’s body.
The video showed that at 5:48 a.m. a white truck was traveling
near where police found Johnson’s body and moving slowly down
the street with the truck’s headlights off and passenger door
open.
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C. Detectives Identify Chavez as a Suspect
Using cellular data from towers near the intersection
where Johnson got into the truck and the area where Johnson’s
body was found, detectives identified Chavez as a suspect.
Chavez’s cellphone records and timeline location history, which
investigators obtained pursuant to search warrants, revealed the
location and movement of his phone on the morning of Johnson’s
death. After Johnson got into the white truck, Chavez’s phone
traveled a few blocks, and then remained stationary from
3:10 a.m. to 3:51 a.m. Chavez’s phone then moved toward the
intersection of the 110 and 105 freeways in Los Angeles.
Additional data showed Chavez’s phone moving between
5:45 a.m. and 5:50 a.m., very close to the area where Johnson’s
body was discovered.
On November 21, 2018 a state highway transportation
worker found Johnson’s cellphone and two $100 bills near the
intersection of the 110 and 105 freeways. Johnson’s phone last
registered data at 3:59 a.m. from near the intersection of the
110 and 105 freeways.
Investigators also obtained information about Chavez’s
internet search history on his phone. Between November 17,
2018 and November 19, 2018 Chavez searched several times for
“body found” and “body located.”
D. Chavez Eventually Admits He Strangled Johnson
Sheriff’s deputies arrested Chavez in November 2020 for
Johnson’s murder. In his first interview Chavez said he had
“never seen” Johnson and knew nothing about the incident.
In a separate conversation with two undercover deputies
Chavez said he picked a woman up after a party, began kissing
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her, and tried to have sex with her in his truck. When the
woman refused and began hitting him, Chavez grabbed her by
the neck and later used his legs to kick her out of the truck.
Chavez alleged the woman “got up” after he pushed her out of his
truck.
In his second interview Chavez admitted he recognized
Johnson. He claimed that he picked her up in his white truck
and paid her $200 to have sex with him, but that she demanded
more money. Chavez claimed that, after he rejected her demand,
Johnson saw cash in his wallet and threatened him with a
pocketknife. Chavez said he “squeez[ed] her neck, and when [he]
saw her hand going down, weak, that’s when [he] just tossed her
out [of his truck] like that.” Chavez first claimed that Johnson
“wasn’t that awake” when he pushed her out of his truck, but
later claimed that she “was conscious . . . [and] talked” to Chavez
when he pushed her out of his truck.
A senior criminalist with the Sheriff’s Department
determined Chavez’s DNA was a likely contributor to DNA found
on the sandal near Johnson’s feet, in bloodstains on her body, on
her breasts, and on her right hand fingernail. The criminalist
found no DNA from Chavez in Johnson’s genital area or on her
neck.
E. A Jury Convicts Chavez of Second Degree Murder
In 2023 a jury convicted Chavez of the second degree
murder of Johnson. The court sentenced Chavez to prison for
15 years to life. Chavez timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
Chavez contends substantial evidence did not support the
jury’s finding he acted with malice. But it did.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being “with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Second degree murder is
“‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought
but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction
of first degree murder.’” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
943, 953; see People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151.)
Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) It is
express “when there is manifested a deliberate intention” to kill.
(§ 188, subd. (a); see People v. Nguyen (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
668, 679 [“‘Malice is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow
creature’”].) Malice is implied when “‘the killing is proximately
caused by “‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a
person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and who acts with conscious disregard for life.”’”’ (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) To determine whether substantial
evidence supported a second degree murder conviction based on
implied malice, the reviewing court must assess whether there
was sufficient evidence of both the physical and mental
components of implied malice. (See People v. Cravens (2012)
53 Cal.4th 500, 508 (Cravens); People v. Palomar (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 969, 976.)
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“[O]n appeal, the reviewing court applies the substantial
evidence standard to the superior court’s findings. [Citation.]
Under this familiar standard, ‘“we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’” (People v. Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; see
Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507.) A “‘reviewing court
“presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’
[Citations.] Substantial evidence also ‘“includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.”’” (Vargas, at p. 951.) We will affirm the judgment
“‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is there
substantial evidence to support [it].”’” (Cravens, at p. 508.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding of
Implied Malice
Strangulation, particularly when prolonged, is inherently
dangerous to life. (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
1019-1020; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 510; People v.
Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) Johnson died of
asphyxia caused by neck compression that restricted blood flow to
her brain. The medical examiner testified that unconsciousness
typically occurs within 30 to 60 seconds of manual strangulation,
while death requires consistent pressure for five to 10 minutes.
(See People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 680 [“death by
strangulation takes time—about four to five minutes”].) Thus,
the jury reasonably could have found Chavez maintained
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pressure on Johnson’s neck for at least five minutes—long
enough to endanger her life and, in this case, to cause her death.
There was substantial evidence of the physical component of
implied malice.
There was also substantial evidence Chavez acted with the
requisite mental state. A “finding of implied malice depends
upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the
risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (People v. Watson
(1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297; see In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th
593, 604.) Medical evidence and testimony indicated Chavez
continued strangling Johnson for at least five minutes after she
lost consciousness. By that point, she no longer posed a threat—
yet, Chavez persisted. This prolonged use of force, well beyond
any plausible justification, supported the jury’s finding Chavez
consciously disregarded the danger his actions posed. (See
People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1020 [“prolonged
manner of taking a person’s life, which requires an offender to
apply constant force to the neck of the victim, affords ample time
for the offender to consider the nature of his deadly act”];
People v. Gobert, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 [medical
testimony “a person being strangled will lose consciousness after
about a minute but not experience irreversible brain damage and
imminent death until ‘the four-to-five minute mark’” supported a
finding of malice]; People v. Shamblin, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
p. 11 [“[b]ecause the evidence supports a finding that the
defendant applied significant force to the victim’s neck for a
significant period of time, a reasonable juror could infer that his
actions were not the result of accident, mistake, or uncertainty of
purpose”]; Shackleford v. Hubbard (9th Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 1072,
1079 [‘“One ordinarily cannot strangle and garrote someone and
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listen to their labored breathing for ten minutes as they expire
without appreciating that the conduct is life threatening.’”].)
There were other indicia of malice. “Among the
circumstances courts have found relevant in determining
whether malice may be inferred are the victim’s vulnerability, the
number of assailants, the ferocity and duration of the attack, and
the unusualness or unexpectedness of the victim’s death.”
(People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485,
502.) Johnson was undeniably vulnerable: She was alone with
Chavez in his truck, under his control, and (according to Chavez)
subdued with one hand. Chavez acknowledged he had “more
strength against her.” Police found Johnson wearing only a bra
and shirt that had been pushed up to her neck, with no pants or
undergarments, further confirming her vulnerability and
suggesting the attack was sudden and unexpected. And the
attack was violent: Johnson had burst eye capillaries from
oxygen deprivation consistent with prolonged strangulation. Her
index and ring fingernails were ripped off and bleeding, and some
of her acrylic nails were broken or missing. She had extensive
abrasions consistent with being pushed from a vehicle.
Chavez’s conduct after killing Johnson—dumping her body,
discarding her phone, searching “body found,” and denying any
involvement—further supported the jury’s finding of implied
malice. (See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511 [“defendant’s
behavior before and after the fight further . . . bolstered the
finding of implied malice”]; People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
136, 139 [“implied malice may be inferred from a defendant’s
conduct before, during, and after” the killing].) The evidence of
Johnson’s vulnerability, the sustained and brutal nature of the
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attack, Chavez’s post-killing conduct, and his admissions amply
supported the jury’s finding he acted with implied malice.
Chavez argues that he strangled Johnson only for “a
minute,” that he intended only to render her unconscious, and
that she was still alive when he pushed her out of his truck. But
the jury did not have to believe Chavez’s chronology or version of
events, which conflicted with the medical examiner’s testimony
that death by manual strangulation takes five to 10 minutes.
(See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 510 [jury is “not compelled
to credit the defense version” of events].) The jury was entitled to
rely on the medical examiner’s testimony and conclude that
Chavez did not briefly choke Johnson, as he said he did, but that
he strangled her to death.
Citing the medical examiner’s inability to quantify the
precise force or duration needed to kill by manual strangulation,
Chavez argues a “medically untrained youthful immigrant
construction worker might be ignorant of the probability that his
act would result in [Johnson’s] death.” But one need not be a
medical expert (or hear testimony from one) to recognize choking
someone unconscious and maintaining that pressure for several
minutes endangers the life of another. (See People v. La Vergne
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 265, 272 [“homicide by strangulation indicates
malice”]; People v. Pool (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 904, 908
[defendant who strangled his victim “acted with knowledge of the
danger to and conscious disregard for life”]; see also People v.
Rowland (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [evidence of strangulation “is
a means of establishing malice aforethought”].)
Chavez points to the absence of internal trauma to
Johnson’s neck as evidence he did not recognize the danger of his
actions. But as the medical examiner explained, manual
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strangulation does not always cause internal trauma; its absence
can result from a range of variables—such as the manner in
which force is applied, the positioning of the victim, and the
circumstances of the struggle. Thus, the lack of visible neck
trauma did not undermine the jury’s finding that Chavez’s
prolonged strangulation was lethal or that Chavez was aware of
the risk his actions posed to Johnson’s life. His admissions
confirm his awareness: He said he strangled Johnson until she
was unconscious and then discarded her body. Chavez’s conduct
demonstrated not only that he recognized the risk, but that he
understood and accepted the likely fatal outcome.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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