People v. Turner CA2/5

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Filed 9/4/25 P. v. Turner CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B335121

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. SA102755
v. and BA498371)

EDDIE TURNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Eddie Turner (defendant) appeals his convictions for
making threats and engaging in harassing communications with
the criminal defense attorney who previously represented him.
He asserts that the trial court erred in not declaring a doubt
about his competency to stand trial. Because the trial court did
not have before it substantial evidence of defendant’s
incompetency (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1032-1033
(Mai)), the court did not err. We accordingly affirm defendant’s
convictions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Defendant’s Initial Round of Threats and
Harassment To His Former Defense Attorney
In 2016, a jury convicted defendant of grand theft, fraud
and perjury arising out of a real estate scheme. During those
criminal proceedings, defendant was represented by attorney
Winston McKesson.
Upon defendant’s release in April 2019 from the sentence
imposed for those convictions, defendant contacted McKesson to
request copies of an immunity agreement between the People and
a prosecution witness in the 2016 trial, which defendant felt had
been wrongfully withheld from him. Once defendant’s parole
ended in April 2020, defendant’s contacts with McKesson grew
more aggressive and threatening. Through a series of text
messages and voice mails, defendant repeatedly told McKesson

2
that his disagreement with McKesson had become “personal”;
told McKesson that he did not “like [him]” or “[his] bitch” (that is,
McKesson’s wife); told McKesson that he and his “lady friend”
“have to pay”; and promised McKesson that it was “jus[t] a
matter of time” before defendant lit “the [cigar] that blows up in
[McKesson’s] face,” and that McKesson “can run, but can’t hide
forever.” At other times, defendant said he would “touch”
McKesson “[f]inancially,” that he would “ruin” the “career[s]” of
McKesson and his wife, and that McKesson would “be the scape
goat on charges of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Defendant’s
messages were infused with racist language and iconography.
Both McKesson and defendant are African-American.
II. Initial Charges Against Defendant
On June 22, 2020, the People1 filed a criminal complaint
charging defendant with (1) two counts of making criminal
threats, as felonies (Pen. Code, § 422),2 (2) two counts of making
criminal threats, as misdemeanors (ibid.), (3) three counts of
making annoying telephone calls or contact by electronic
communication, as misdemeanors (§ 653m, subd. (a)), and (4) one
count of making repeated contacts with intent to annoy or harass,
as a misdemeanor (id., subd. (b)).3

1 Because McKesson’s wife worked for the District Attorney’s
Office (and was implicated in the alleged threats), the matter was
prosecuted by the Office of the Attorney General.

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

3 On August 11, 2020, the People amended the complaint to
add a second misdemeanor count of making repeated contacts
with intent to annoy or harass (§ 653m, subd. (b)).

3
On July 21, 2020, the trial court ordered defendant not to
contact McKesson, McKesson’s wife, or McKesson’s children or
relatives, and on August 19, 2020, a civil trial court issued a
restraining order prohibiting such contact.
III. Pretrial Proceedings
The pretrial proceedings in this case spanned from August
2020 through January 2024, when trial commenced. During this
period, defendant appeared before six judges. During this same
period, defendant had seven appointed lawyers—as well as seven
Marsden4 hearings.
Between October 8, 2021 and June 15, 2022, defendant
represented himself. Before granting defendant’s request for self-
representation, the trial court questioned defendant at length,
during which time defendant stated he had a college degree, had
represented himself in “several” civil cases (because he had
worked as a landlord), had conducted legal research, and had
written legal motions. Defendant also reported that he had never
been “examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist to determine
[his] mental competence.” In granting the request, the trial court
expressly found that defendant “ha[d] the mental capacity to
understand the proceedings.” The grant occurred in the middle of
defendant’s preliminary hearing. Defendant immediately
objected to the admission of the text messages and voicemails he
sent to McKesson on the ground of attorney-client privilege,
demanded a ruling on a prior request for judicial notice, and cross
examined the investigating officer about prior Pitchess5 material,

4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

5 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, superseded
by statute as stated in People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311.

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about whether the officer’s investigation was “one-sided” because
he only interviewed McKesson (and not defendant), and about
whether McKesson was under oath during the officer’s
interviews. The trial court noted that defendant was making
“legitimate arguments.” At subsequent hearings in November
2021 and January 2022, defendant was careful to put certain
matters “on the record,” described the elements of one of the
charged crimes, remarked that he “underst[oo]d the law” but
requested “advisory counsel” to assist him with discovery,
correctly noted that questions of privilege were for the court and
not the jury, and correctly referred to the use of subpoenas duces
tecum. Defendant’s self-represented status was revoked solely
because defendant had engaged in “threatening conduct” against
McKesson on the day of the revocation, because defendant was
“overtalk[ing]” the court, and because defendant—who at that
hearing called the court a “kangaroo court”—had been “rude” and
“insolent.”
Defendant regularly acted in an inappropriate manner
while in court. On at least four occasions, he raised his voice and
started yelling at the trial judge whenever the judge indicated
disagreement with defendant’s position. At one hearing where
the court asked him not to yell, defendant sought to justify his
behavior by saying he was “a little hard of hearing,” by asserting
that he “suffer[ed] from P.T.S.D.,” and by noting that he was
“wearing [a] mask.” On another occasion, defendant simply
responded that there was nothing “offen[sive]” about his shouting
at the judge. During a July 28, 2021 hearing, defendant angrily
yelled that he could see and talk to the People’s attorney “any
time he wanted to outside of court,” and prior to a December 27,
2023 hearing, defendant sent his then-attorney an email stating

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that “charges better be dropped at our next hearing and THEM
bum-ass squatters BETTER START PACKING AND GET THE
FUCK OUT OF [the property that was the subject of defendant’s
2016 real estate scheme] OR shit is really going to hit the fan and
starting with your ineffective assistance of counsel.” At a
November 2022 hearing, defendant was removed from the
courtroom because he refused to sit down during the hearing.
And at the December 27, 2023 hearing, defendant got up in the
middle of the hearing and started to leave the courtroom. When
the court informed him that he would be taken into custody if he
left, defendant argued that he “never made it outside the
courtroom” because the court’s admonition “stopped [him].” The
court placed him in custody.
IV. Further Harassment Resulting in New Charges
In March 2022, the court quashed all outstanding
subpoenas related to the 2016 immunity agreement and ruled
that the immunity agreement had “no relevance” to the current
charges. Three months later, defendant served subpoenas for the
immunity agreement on McKesson despite the court’s prior
ruling and the protective order prohibiting direct or indirect
contact with McKesson.
On June 15, 2022, defendant approached McKesson in the
hallway outside the courtroom, hurled profanities at him, and
ultimately told him, “I’ll fuck you up.”
In a separate case, the People6 on August 1, 2022, charged
defendant with intentionally violating a court order to prevent
harassment (§ 273.6) and disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd.

6 As with the other case, the People acted through the Office
of the Attorney General.

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(a)(4)), both as misdemeanors.7 Defendant appeared before three
more judges—one of whom granted defendant permission to
proceed as his own counsel.
On April 24, 2023, the court relieved his then-appointed
attorney as counsel of record in the first-filed criminal case, and
on May 17, 2023 appointed new counsel.
On September 13, 2023, the court revoked defendant’s self-
represented status in the second-filed criminal case, and
appointed the same counsel to represent defendant in that case
also.
V. Consolidation of Cases And Defense Counsel’s
Declaration of a Doubt About Defendant’s Competency
On December 8, 2023, the trial court consolidated both of
the criminal cases into a single action.
On January 4, 2024, the first day set for trial, defense
counsel informed the court that he was in “a difficult position”
and that he was “in a quandary [about] how to handle this going
forward” because he “can’t communicate with [defendant] at all.”
When the trial court responded that defendant had been “difficult
for everybody” and that defendant’s “elect[ion] not to cooperate . .
. and not to discuss the issues” was “on him,” defense counsel
proceeded to “declare[] a doubt” as to whether defendant was
competent to stand trial, citing (1) defendant’s “complete inability
to help” counsel because defendant “focus[es]” on “extraneous
matters” rather than “actual issues,” (2) defendant’s “behavior in

7 The People also charged defendant with dissuading a
witness from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) and with
threatening a witness, as a felony (§ 140, subd. (a)), but the trial
court dismissed the dissuasion charge after the preliminary
hearing, and the jury acquitted defendant of the threat charge.

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th[e] courtroom,” and (3) counsel’s belief that defendant did not
“fully understand[] what this case is really about.” Defense
counsel indicated he had “considered whether to declare a doubt .
. . several times” and had “seen quite a bit more” behavior, but
did not elaborate. The trial court asked the prosecutor for his
view of defendant’s competence, and the prosecutor responded
that defendant was “able to comply when it is in his best
interests, but that he very tactically decides not to [comply] when
he believes that that is in his best interests.” The court also
asked defendant whether he knew and “underst[ood]” the charges
against him; defendant responded—as he had many times
before—that he “didn’t understand” how each charge “lined up”
with his actual conduct, and that he had been “focused” on
“attorney/client privilege” issues rather than “what the crimes
were.” Defendant also informed the court that he was
“representing himself across the street in the Court of Appeal”;
when the court indicated self-representation is not permitted in
the appellate courts in criminal cases, defendant responded that
he was pursuing a “civil” “writ of mandate.”
In responding to counsel’s declaration of a doubt about
defendant’s competency, the court addressed each of counsel’s
asserted bases for that doubt. Regarding defendant’s alleged
inability to assist counsel, the court found that, despite
defendant’s “focus[] on issues that may or may not have much to
do with this case,” defendant “certainly has the ability to
cooperate with counsel,” and that his “[un]willingness to do so”
was “not part of the legal test for competence.” Regarding
defendant’s behavior in the courtroom, the court noted that
defendant was at that moment “sitting here and behaving
appropriately” and that his “trouble complying with the rules” in

8
court was thus defendant’s choice, as the court did not “see
anything in [defendant’s] mental or physical makeup that
suggests . . . he is not capable” of acting appropriately. Regarding
defendant’s understanding of the case, the court found that
defendant is “intelligent”; that “he speaks cogently”; that his
responses to the court’s questions indicate that “he understands
exactly what’s going on”; and that his ability to represent himself
in this case for a substantial period of time left “no question” in
the court’s mind that defendant “knows exactly what’s going on.”
The court accordingly declined to declare a doubt about
defendant’s competency to stand trial.
VI. Trial, Sentencing and Appeal
The matter proceeded to trial. A jury convicted defendant
of all charges except it convicted him of the lesser-included
offense of attempted criminal threats (for one of the misdemeanor
counts) and, as noted above, acquitted him of felony threatening
a witness. The trial court imposed a prison term of three years
and eight months and a consecutive term of 1,448 days in county
jail.8 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

8 Specifically, on the two felony criminal threat counts, the
court imposed a high-term, three-year prison sentence for one,
and a consecutive eight-month prison term (one-third of the mid-
term, two-year sentence) for the second. On the misdemeanor
counts, the court imposed consecutive county jail terms of 364
days for disobeying a court order; 364 days for intentionally
violating a court order to prevent harassment; 240 days for
making a criminal threat; 120 days for an attempted criminal
threat; 180 days for sending obscene or threatening messages;
and 180 days for sending repeated harassing messages. The
court also imposed two concurrent jail terms of 180 days each, for
sending obscene or threatening messages and for sending
repeated harassing messages; and imposed but stayed a jail term

9
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not declaring
a doubt about his competency to stand trial, and thus in not
suspending the criminal proceedings and setting a hearing to
determine his competency.
I. Pertinent Law
“The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court
from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally
incompetent to stand trial.” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th
219, 230 (Rodas).) A criminal defendant is mentally incompetent
to stand trial if they (1) lack a “‘“sufficient present ability to
consult with [their] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding,”’” or (2) lack “‘“a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against [them].”’” (People v.
Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 464 (Sattiewhite), quoting
Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402; People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 269.) Critically, however, this
incompetence to stand trial must be the “result of a mental
health disorder or developmental disability.” (§ 1367, subd. (a);
Rodas, at p. 230; People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 82
(Wycoff) [“‘federal constitutional law [means] that an accused has
the right “to a hearing on present sanity if he comes forward with
substantial evidence that he is incapable, because of mental
illness, of understanding the nature of the proceedings against
him or of assisting in his defense,”’” italics added, citing People v.
Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518]; Ghobrial, at p. 270; People
v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 525, disapproved on another
ground by People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919.) A trial

of 180 days for an additional count of sending obscene or
threatening messages.

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court is obligated to suspend the criminal proceedings and
initiate proceedings to determine whether the defendant is
competent to stand trial if “‘“the court is presented with
substantial evidence of incompetence,”’” which is defined as
“‘“evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning
the defendant’s competence to stand trial.”’”9 (Sattiewhite, at p.
464, quoting People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.)
In assessing whether the evidence raises a reasonable or
bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand
trial, courts must “consider all of the relevant circumstances”
(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164 (Howard)), which
include (1) “‘“prior mental evaluations”’” and (2) “‘“the defendant’s
demeanor[] [and] irrational behavior”’” (Sattiewhite, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 464; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1032-1033; People
v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 742 (Welch)). Although a sworn
“professional opinion” that, due to “mental illness,” a defendant
“is incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the
criminal proceedings against him, or of cooperating with counsel”
constitutes “substantial evidence” (Mai, at pp. 1032-1033),
“bizarre . . . behavior” by itself does not (Sattiewhite, at p. 464).
And although a defense counsel’s declaration of a doubt is
relevant and entitled to “‘some weight,’” it also does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Sattiewhite, at p. 465, quoting
Mai, at p. 1033; Howard, at p. 1132.)
If substantial evidence of incompetence exists, the trial
court must declare a doubt and suspend the criminal
proceedings—even if there is contrary evidence—because

9 Counsel must also share that doubt (§ 1368, subd. (b)), but
that requirement was met in this case because defense counsel
was the one who first articulated a doubt.

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resolution of any conflicts as to competence are to be resolved at
the competency trial once the threshold of “substantial evidence”
is met. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 231, 234; Wycoff, supra, 12
Cal.5th at pp. 82-83.) However, if the evidence of incompetence is
less than substantial, a trial court retains discretion whether to
suspend the criminal proceedings. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p.
1033.) We independently review the substantiality of the
evidence (People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 383), but review
for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision not to suspend
proceedings when the evidence is less than substantial (People v.
Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1030).
II. Analysis
We independently conclude that the trial court did not err
in concluding that there was not “substantial evidence” of mental
incompetence warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings
(and did not otherwise abuse its discretion in declining to
exercise its discretion to suspend the proceedings). Two reasons
support our conclusion.
First, there was no evidence that any lack of ability to
consult with a defense attorney or any lack of understanding the
proceedings was the result of a mental illness or developmental
disability. Although defendant stated he “suffer[ed] from
P.T.S.D.” when explaining why he yelled at the court, defendant
was not qualified to offer an admissible opinion diagnosing his
own mental health, and at no point did defendant indicate that
he was repeating an expert’s diagnosis rather than proffering his
own, speculative self-assessment. Indeed, defendant reported he
had never been examined for incompetence to stand trial.
Further, defendant’s intransigent behavior was, without more,
not evidence of mental illness or developmental disability because

12
there is nothing to indicate his behavior was anything other than
intentional and voluntary, and a defendant’s “disruptive behavior
in the courtroom and disputes with defense counsel” do “not
constitute proof of mental incompetence” because competency to
stand trial turns on “competency to cooperate, not cooperation.”
(People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112, italics
added.) Were the rule any different, every unruly criminal
defendant would be entitled to a competency hearing.
Second, and even if we overlook defendant’s failure to
adduce any admissible evidence of mental illness or
developmental disability, defendant also failed to present
substantial evidence of a present inability to consult with his
lawyer or a lack of understanding of the proceedings against him.
Two different judges independently determined that defendant
was competent to represent himself, a standard that is more
demanding than what is required to show competence to stand
trial when represented by counsel.10 (People v. Johnson (2012) 53
Cal.4th 519, 523, 530.) Nor were these proceedings defendant’s
first time representing himself in court, as he had represented
himself in several civil cases as well as in civil appellate writ
proceedings. Further, defendant’s conduct while representing
himself (including during a preliminary hearing), as well as his
comments on the record while he was represented by counsel,
indicate that he understood the nature of the proceedings, that he
understood his constitutional and statutory rights to counsel and
to discovery, that he was able to make arguments the court
characterized as “legitimate,” that he was able to conduct an
effective cross examination, and that he understood many aspects

10 Defendant does not challenge the two judges’ decision
permitting him to represent himself.

13
of criminal procedure. What is more, none of defendant’s seven
prior lawyers and none of the nine judges defendant appeared
before in the two cases ever expressed any concern about
defendant’s ability to assist his counsel or to understand the
proceedings until defendant’s last appointed lawyer, who
declared a doubt on the first day of trial after expressing that he
was “in a quandary” about how to handle defendant’s fixation on
what counsel viewed as irrelevant issues.
Defendant offers what boil down to five arguments in
support of his position that substantial evidence of his
incompetence to stand trial was present. None of the arguments
addresses the absence of evidence of mental illness or
developmental disability, so none cure that defect. They also fail
to cure the defect in the absence of substantial evidence of an
inability to consult with counsel or a lack of understanding of the
proceedings.
First, defendant urges us to apply a lower standard for
evaluating competency; he cites People v. Campbell (1987) 193
Cal.App.3d 1653, for the proposition that, even if he is not
entitled to a competency hearing, he is still entitled to the
appointment of an expert to evaluate his competency “if there is a
reasonable possibility” he “is unable to understand the
proceedings or assist in his defense”—“even if it does not rise to
the level of substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 1663.) However, our
Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly declined to read
Campbell as erecting a lower threshold for competency or for the
appointment of an expert, instead holding that “[a]bsent a
reasonable doubt as to defendant’s mental competence, the trial
court had no obligation to pursue the matter further.” (Howard,

14
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1164, fn. 12; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8
Cal.4th 1060, 1112, fn. 16.)
Second, defendant points to his refusal to get along with his
attorneys, as demonstrated by the long string of lawyers he was
appointed and his seven Marsden hearings, as well as his
threatening emails and other harassing conduct toward them.
But disagreements between a defendant and his attorney over
“which defense[s] to employ” and which issues and strategies to
pursue do not, by themselves, constitute substantial evidence of
incompetence to stand trial. (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 742.)
And defendant’s harassing conduct toward others is what
prompted these cases in the first place; it is not evidence of his
incompetence absent some proof it is involuntary—and no such
evidence of that was presented.
Third, defendant contends that he did not understand the
charges against him, and points to his repeated statements to
that effect. Defendant’s contention ignores the context in which
his statements were made: Although defendant repeatedly said
that the charges were “vague” and that he did not “understand”
them, in each of those instances defendant further explained that
the purported vagueness and his lack of understanding stemmed
from his inability to match which communications corresponded
with which of the dozen criminal charges. When these narrow
complaints (which the prosecutor allayed by explaining the
correlation) are read properly and balanced against defendant’s
myriad other statements indicating a clear understanding of the
charges as well as their elements, defendant’s profession of a lack
of understanding does not constitute substantial evidence.
Fourth, defendant points to his repeated acts of disrespect,
intransigence, and obstreperousness in court as substantial

15
evidence that he did not understand the proceedings or could not
control his own behavior. It is not. As noted above, disruptive
behavior by itself is insufficient and, as the trial court noted,
defendant was able to act appropriately in court when it suited
him. Defendant points to his counsel’s reference to “quite a bit
more [behavior],” but without elaboration or substantiation, this
has no evidentiary weight.
Fifth and finally, defendant argues that he made several
arguments to the trial court that were legally incorrect or
rejected by the court (such as his request to obtain an immunity
agreement). Of course, if that were the test of incompetence, the
losing party and losing attorneys in every case would need to be
examined for incompetence. Defendant also points to a few
statements he made that misapprehend procedural points of legal
practice. This, too, is insufficient to show substantial evidence of
a lack of understanding—particularly in light of defendant’s
otherwise notable savvy about legal process.
When we view the totality of the evidence, including
defense counsel’s declaration of a doubt, there is no substantial
evidence of defendant’s mental illness or developmental disability
and no substantial evidence that defendant was unable to
cooperate with counsel or lacked an understanding of the
proceedings; to the contrary, the evidence suggests defendant
intentionally manipulated the system to forestall trial for nearly
four years.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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