CourtListener 10665397•People v. Sanks CA6
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Filed 9/3/25 P. v. Sanks CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051990
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 18CR008467)
v.
JERRY LEE SANKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2021, defendant Jerry Lee Sanks pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter,
among other charges. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years four months in state
prison. Sanks then filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage and did not issue an order to
show cause. The court ruled Sanks was ineligible for relief because, when Sanks entered
his plea in 2021, liability for murder based on a theory of imputed malice had already
been invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437).
Sanks contends the trial court erred by denying his petition for resentencing at the
prima facie stage. For the reasons below, we conclude this claim is without merit, and
we affirm the denial of the resentencing petition.
1
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution and Conviction
In 2018, the prosecution filed a complaint charging Sanks with one count of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) In 2019, the prosecution
moved to consolidate the case against Sanks with a case against his brother, both of
whom were charged with the same murder. The trial court granted the motion to
consolidate, and a preliminary hearing was held in June 2019. The trial court held both
defendants to answer, and the prosecution filed an information charging both with willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. In 2020, the prosecution amended the information
to add the allegation that Sanks personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
proximately causing great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
In September 2021, the prosecution filed a second amended information charging
Sanks with three counts: count 1—willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)); count 2—assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)); and
count 3—voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). All three counts charged the
offenses were committed on the same date against the same victim. Sanks’s brother was
also charged in counts 1 and 3. As to count 1, the prosecution further alleged Sanks
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury
or death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to count 2, the prosecution alleged Sanks
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). As to count 3, the prosecution alleged Sanks personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
That same day, the parties entered a plea agreement whereby Sanks pleaded guilty
to count 2 (assault with a semiautomatic firearm) and count 3 (voluntary manslaughter).2
2
Although the minute order for the plea hearing states Sanks entered pleas of no
contest, the trial court clarified that Sanks had pleaded guilty. Sanks’s written plea
2
He admitted the allegations attached to each count. In October 2021, in accord with the
plea agreement, the trial court imposed a total of 25 years four months in state prison.
The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss count 1 (willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder).
B. Petition for Resentencing
In January 2024, Sanks filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 using
a preprinted form on which he checked various boxes to allege his eligibility for relief.
The prosecution filed a written opposition to the petition, arguing Sanks had failed to
make a prima facie showing that he was eligible for relief. Based on the filing of the
initial complaint in 2018—prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437—the prosecution
conceded that, under the literal language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), “a
complaint was filed” that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a now-invalid theory
of liability. The prosecution opposed the petition on the ground that Sanks was ineligible
for relief because Senate Bill 1437 had already taken effect by the time he entered the
plea agreement. The prosecution pointed out that the operative charging document was
filed in September 2021—after the change in law—such that the prosecution could not
have proceeded under an impermissible theory of imputed malice at the time of the plea.
Sanks argued he was eligible for resentencing because he could have been
convicted of murder under an impermissible theory of malice at the time of his plea.
Sanks asserted that nothing in the record of conviction—including all factual admissions
and stipulations made as part of his guilty plea—conclusively established the underlying
theory of guilt.
At a hearing in March 2024, the trial court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage. Looking to the second amended information filed in September 2021, the court
found that the prosecution could not have proceeded under an improper theory of murder
agreement also stated he was pleading guilty on both counts. The record does not include
a transcript of the plea hearing.
3
liability. Second, the court rejected Sanks’s allegation that he could not presently be
convicted of murder as a result of changes in the law, because when he entered his plea,
the now-invalid theories of liability had been eliminated, such that he could only be
convicted under a valid theory.
The trial court rejected the prosecution’s concession that a complaint had been
filed that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a now-invalid theory of liability. The
court reasoned that the initial complaint had been superseded by subsequent charging
documents, and that the only relevant charging document for the purposes of determining
eligibility under section 1172.6 was the most recently filed charging document. Because
the most recent charging document—the second amended information—was filed after
Senate Bill 1437 had eliminated the now-invalid theories of liability, the court concluded
Sanks could not show he could have been prosecuted under an invalid theory.
II. DISCUSSION
Sanks contends the trial court erred by denying the petition at the prima facie stage
because the record of conviction does not establish he is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. The Attorney General contends Sanks is ineligible for relief because he entered his
plea after Senate Bill 1437 had already taken effect.
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Penal Code Section 1172.6
Senate Bill 1437 made several ameliorative changes to California homicide law
effective January 1, 2019. “Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842.) “As part of these ameliorative changes, malice, a key
element the People must prove in a murder prosecution, may no longer be imputed to a
4
defendant solely because the defendant participated in another crime.” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton).)
“The Legislature, to provide relief to those with existing murder convictions
dependent on theories of the crime it had rejected, devised a path to resentencing.”
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558.) Section 1172.6 sets forth procedures for previously
convicted defendants who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief by filing a petition for resentencing with the court that sentenced
the petitioner. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) With the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature expanded eligibility for resentencing
relief to persons convicted of manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2.) As relevant here, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides, “A person convicted
of . . . manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have
the petitioner’s . . . manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts” when all the conditions set forth in subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(3)
apply.
As applicable here, eligibility for relief depends on the following conditions:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person's participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
. . . manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-
(a)(3).)
5
“Petitioners seeking relief under section 1172.6 must, first, file a facially valid
petition that states the statutory requirements for relief [citation], and second, make a
‘prima facie showing’ [citation], before a court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of resentencing at which the People
will bear the burden of defending a conviction under the amended law [citation].”
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 556.) “A petition that includes ‘[a] declaration by
petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for relief . . ., based on all the requirements of
subdivision (a),’ the case number and year of the petitioner’s conviction, and whether the
petitioner seeks counsel is facially sufficient.” (Id. at pp. 558-559.)
“ ‘After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall
hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citation.] If the ‘petitioner makes a prima facie showing,’ then the trial court issues an
order to show cause and holds ‘a hearing to determine whether to vacate the . . .
conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner.’ [Citation.]” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559.) The prima facie inquiry is analogous to that of a habeas
proceeding. (Id. at p. 563.) The court takes the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment of whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if the
allegations were proved. (Ibid.) The court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds, and the court should not engage in factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. (Ibid.)
However, “[w]here facts from the record of conviction are undisputed, accepting
them over contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is not ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565-566.) “[A] petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations
of entitlement to relief under section 1172.6, in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby,
made a prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 557.) “[T]he record of conviction the parties
6
may consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a
guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 568.) In determining whether a petitioner was convicted under a
now-invalid theory, the court may rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a
preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory “checkbox” allegations. (Id. at
p. 564.)
We independently review the trial court’s determination of whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (People v. Nguyen (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 668, 677.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Petition at the Prima Facie Stage
As set forth above, the prosecution initially charged Sanks by complaint with one
count of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in 2018—before Senate Bill 1437
took effect. At the time, the law did not prohibit the prosecution from charging Sanks
under a now-invalid theory of murder based on imputed malice. The preliminary hearing
took place in 2019—after Senate Bill 1437 took effect—and the prosecution filed an
information charging both Sanks and his brother with one count of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder. In 2021, the parties entered a plea agreement, whereupon the
prosecution filed a second amended information and Sanks pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter.
Sanks contends he is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 because his petition
satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(3), and nothing in the record
of conviction establishes as a matter of law that he is ineligible for relief. The Attorney
General contends Sanks is ineligible for relief because he was convicted under the current
law. (See People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434 (Gallegos) [petitioner
ineligible for relief because he could not be prosecuted through an imputed malice theory
at the time he entered his plea]; People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583 (Lezama)
[persons who pleaded guilty to manslaughter after the statutory amendments eliminated
imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of
7
law]; People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292 [petitioner ineligible for relief because
now-invalid theories of murder liability had been eliminated at the time he entered his
plea].)
The procedural history of Lezama is similar to the procedural history of this case.
The prosecution initially charged Lezama in 2017—before the enactment of Senate Bill
1437—with a complaint alleging murder and conspiracy to commit murder. (Lezama,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 585-586.) In June 2019—after Senate Bill 1437 took
effect—Lezama entered an agreement to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at
p. 586.) After he petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6 in 2022, the trial court
denied the petition based partly on the ground that Lezama had pleaded guilty after
Senate Bill 1437 took effect. (Id. at pp. 586-587.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the petition. (Lezama, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 585-586.) The court looked to section 1172.6, subdivision
(a)(3)—requiring, as a condition of eligibility, that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019”—and the court construed it to mean that, at the time of the
conviction, the only way the petitioner could be convicted of murder was through a now-
invalid theory of imputed malice. (Id. at p. 590.) The court supported its interpretation
with extensive citations to the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 775. “These
consistent statements of legislative intent reveal the Legislature’s aim in the manslaughter
context was to make relief available to defendants who were convicted by plea or trial at
a time when the prosecution could have pursued a murder charge, but the only way of
doing so would have been a now invalid theory of imputed malice. Thus, in the
manslaughter plea context, the most reasonable reading of the third criterion for
establishing resentencing eligibility is that at the time of conviction—i.e., the time the
plea was entered—the only way to a murder conviction was through an imputed malice
theory. As a matter of law, this cannot be true for a person, like defendant, who pled
8
guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time when imputed malice theories had already
been statutorily eliminated.” (Id. at p. 590.) (See also Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 443 [accord].)
Lezama is on point, and as applied here, it forecloses relief. Sanks asserts Lezama
and Gallegos were wrongly decided. He argues the Lezama Court had no occasion to
resort to legislative history because the plain language of section 1172.6 is unambiguous,
and the plain language of subdivision (a)(3) necessarily requires a factual determination
regarding the truth of the petitioner’s allegation that they could not presently be convicted
of murder because of the ameliorative changes to the law. As to the ambiguity of the
statutory language, we are persuaded by the analysis set forth in Lezama: “The notion
that someone could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made by Senate Bill 1437 implies that at one point in time the circumstances
were different. But the statute does not specify the temporal point of contrast. On one
hand, and consistent with defendant’s position, it could be the time of filing of an
information charging murder which left open the possibility the prosecution could
employ an imputed malice theory. On the other hand, and consistent with the Attorney
General’s position, it could be the time of the trial or plea which resulted in the
conviction.” (Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 588-589.)
The same ambiguity arises here with respect to 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1). Sanks
argues that the filing of the initial complaint satisfies section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1)
because it was filed before Senate Bill 1437 took effect, such that “[a] complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed” under a now-invalid theory. The Attorney General adopts the position of the
trial court below: that the initial complaint was superseded, and that the pertinent
charging document is the information filed at the time Sanks entered his plea.
We need not resolve the issue as to 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) because we
conclude the application of subdivision (a)(3) to the record of conviction in this case
9
conclusively shows Sanks is ineligible for relief. We respectfully disagree with the
Lezama Court, however, that the language of subdivision (a)(3) makes Sanks ineligible as
a matter of law based solely on the fact that he entered his plea to manslaughter after
Senate Bill 1437 took effect. It is a truism that the changes effected by Senate Bill 1437
eliminated the possibility of a lawful conviction for murder based on a now-invalid
theory. As a practical matter, however, Senate Bill 1437 did not prevent prosecutors
from pursuing murder cases based on theories of imputed malice because prosecutors and
trial courts could still take the position that Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. Had
the prosecution pressured Sanks to accept a plea agreement for manslaughter while the
prosecution was still pressing a murder charge based on a theory of imputed malice,
arguably he could be eligible for relief.
But Sanks does not claim the prosecution engaged in such tactics in this case, and
we see nothing in the record that might support such a claim. The prosecution initially
charged Sanks with premeditated murder, and at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution
introduced evidence that Sanks was the gunman who shot the victim to death. The
prosecution charged Sanks with premeditated murder in every charging document filed
thereafter, and in the first amended information, the prosecution added an allegation that
Sanks personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing the victim
great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).). Throughout the record, in every
pleading that asserted the facts of the offense—from September 2018 up to the trial brief
filed in June 2021—the prosecution consistently alleged Sanks was the gunman who shot
the victim to death, and that he did so intentionally. Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidate
liability for murder under theories alleging the defendant was the actual killer, acting with
the intent to kill. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 233.)
To be clear, we do not credit any of the prosecution’s factual allegations as true or
accurate, and we do not cite these portions of the record for the purpose of weighing the
10
evidence whether Sanks committed murder under some permissible theory. We note
only that nothing in the record suggests the prosecution ever asserted a now-invalid
theory of imputed malice, such that Sanks might have felt pressured to accept a plea
agreement as a result. 3
With respect to section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), Sanks contends it is sufficient
that his petition alleged he could not presently be convicted of murder without a now-
invalid theory of imputed malice. But the California Supreme Court has clarified that a
prima facie showing requires more than conclusory legal allegations. “[A] petitioner who
offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief under section 1172.6, in
response to a record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under
a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 557.) Likewise, Sanks has not made such a showing. 4
Given that Senate Bill 1437 had changed the law to eliminate liability for murder
based on imputed malice at the time Sanks entered his plea, and given that nothing in the
record suggests the prosecution was asserting an invalid theory of murder liability at the
time, we conclude Sanks failed to make a prima facie showing that he could not presently
be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
3
Additionally, Sanks entered his plea after the California Supreme Court had
denied review in two cases rejecting constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 1437. (See
People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, review denied Feb. 19, 2020, S259835;
People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, review denied Feb. 19,
2020, S259700.)
4
After the prosecution filed its opposition to the petition, Sanks filed a brief in
response in which he asserted, among other things, that the prosecution could have
pursued a theory of natural and probable consequences in its case against Sanks because
his brother was also charged with the murder. But Sanks did not support his assertion
with any specific facts in the record of conviction. Such speculation is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567 [absent specific facts, no
material dispute arises from mere latent, speculative possibilities].) More to the point,
Sanks never asserted that the prosecution actually did pursue a theory of natural and
probable consequences in its case against Sanks, and we see nothing in the record to
suggest it did.
11
made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) (See also Lezama, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 585-586.)
Finally, Sanks contends the trial court’s denial of his petition without issuing an
order to show cause and the opportunity to present evidence at an evidentiary hearing
violated his procedural due process rights. He argues that “when state law gives a
criminal defendant the expectation of receiving a certain right or benefit, the denial of
that right may have the additional effect of violating federal due process.” (See Hicks v.
Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 [defendant’s sentencing under an unconstitutional
law deprived him of due process].) As to the underlying prosecution in this case, state
law gave Sanks the right not to be prosecuted for murder under an invalid theory of
imputed malice. For the reasons above, he has not shown he was denied that right. As to
the petition for resentencing, section 1172.6 gave Sanks the right to file the petition,
which he did; the statute made the right to an evidentiary hearing conditional upon his
making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, which he did not. Sanks has failed
to show he was denied any rights granted to him by state law.
For the reasons above, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Sanks’s
petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
12
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
Grover, J.
________________________________
Lie, J.
H051990
People v. Sanks
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