CourtListener 10663302•People v. Machuca CA2/5
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Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Machuca CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333221
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA048904)
ROBBIN MACHUCA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew Missakian, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Robbin Machuca (defendant)
sought Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)
resentencing for three first degree murders committed in 1991.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Penal
Code section 1172.6 relief. Defendant waived her right to be
present at the hearing in writing, but she now asks us to reverse
because she believes that waiver was invalid—chiefly because
she was not advised she could participate in the hearing
remotely.
I
A
Defendant and three others participated in what
defendant’s appellate briefing fairly describes as a “horrible crime
spree.” Defendant, Vincent Hubbard (codefendant Hubbard),
John Lewis (codefendant Lewis), and Eileen Huber (codefendant
Huber) conspired to (and did) abduct three victims, rob them, and
then fatally shoot them; codefendant Lewis confessed to being the
actual killer of the three victims: Willie Sams, Elizabeth Nisbet,
and Shirley Denogean. We summarize the offense conduct by
drawing substantially on our Supreme Court’s published opinion
resolving co-defendant Lewis’s appeal.1 (People v. Lewis (2008) 43
Cal.4th 415.)
1
Defendant and her accomplices were tried together. The
trial court stated it reviewed the trial transcripts in connection
with the Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings and
we have judicially noticed a 19-volume excerpt of those
transcripts provided by the Attorney General.
2
“In July and August 1991, [codefendant Lewis] was living
in apartment E of the Woodside Village Apartments in West
Covina with codefendants Huber ([codefendant Lewis’s]
girlfriend), [defendant] ([codefendant Lewis’s] half sister), and
Hubbard ([defendant’s] boyfriend).” (People v. Lewis, supra, 43
Cal.4th at 432.) At “[a]bout 9:30 p.m. on August 18, 1991, Willie
Sams drove his car to . . . Security Pacific Bank . . . . From a gas
station across the street, [codefendant Lewis] saw Sams drive up
to the drive-through ATM . . . . [Codefendant Lewis] and
codefendant Hubbard approached Sams’s car and got in.
Pointing [a] Ruger handgun at Sams, [codefendant Lewis] forced
him to withdraw $200 from that ATM . . . and then to drive to
another Security Pacific Bank and withdraw another $600.
“[Codefendant Lewis] drove Sams to Edgewood Middle
School . . . . [Codefendant Lewis] and [codefendant] Hubbard
forced Sams to get into the dumpster near the baseball field.
[Codefendant Lewis] and [codefendant] Hubbard each fired
several shots at Sams, killing him. [Codefendant Lewis] later
removed the radio from Sams’s car, attempted to wipe his
fingerprints off the car, and abandoned the car in a shopping
center parking lot.
“Shortly after 11:00 p.m., West Covina police officers found
Sams’s body. Several copper-jacketed bullets or bullet fragments
were recovered from the dumpster.
“A couple of hours later, at 1:07 a.m., $60 was withdrawn
from Sams’s bank account using an ATM . . . .
“On August 19, 1991, . . . [codefendant] Hubbard and
[defendant] attempted to use Sams’s credit card to purchase
about $700 worth of clothing from a store in El Monte. When the
3
attempted purchase was denied, [codefendant] Hubbard and
[defendant] hurriedly left the store.
“Sams’s car, minus its radio, was recovered two days later
in the shopping center parking lot. Fingerprints on the car and
on papers found in the car matched [codefendant Lewis’s] prints.
[Defendant’s] prints were [also] found on papers in the car.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Around 11:30 a.m. on August 24, 1991, Neil Nisbet and his
wife Elizabeth drove their car to the Puente Hills Mall. Elizabeth
was wearing or carrying several items of jewelry, including a gold
ring with 17 diamonds, a gold bangle bracelet, and a gold rope
chain bracelet. Elizabeth waited in the car while Neil entered
the mall to run an errand. When Neil returned about 10 minutes
later, the car and Elizabeth were gone. Neil searched for
Elizabeth for several hours and then called the police.
“Meanwhile, [codefendant Lewis], . . . [defendant], and
possibly one or more other codefendants arrived at the Puente
Hills Mall in codefendant Huber’s car, parked, and saw Elizabeth
Nisbet in her car. [Codefendant Lewis] forced his way into the
car and pointed his gun at Nisbet. One or more of the
codefendants bound Nisbet’s hands and feet with duct tape.
[Codefendant Lewis] drove the Nisbets’ car to the Covina branch
of First Interstate Bank, where he and . . . [defendant] used
Nisbet’s ATM card to withdraw $400. [Codefendant Lewis] then
drove to a convenience store in Covina, where an additional $100
was withdrawn from Nisbet’s account through an ATM . . . .
[Codefendant Lewis] then drove north on the 605 freeway,
followed by codefendant Huber’s car. After stopping along the
side of the freeway, [codefendant Lewis] shot and killed Nisbet.
4
[Codefendant Lewis] or one of his codefendants removed Nisbet’s
jewelry, and they departed in [codefendant] Huber’s car.
“About 3:10 p.m. that same day, California Highway Patrol
officers found the Nisbets’ car on the northbound 605 freeway.
Elizabeth Nisbet’s body was under a blanket on the rear
floorboards. The body was not yet cold.
“Elizabeth Nisbet had a gunshot wound to her left temple,
which caused her death, and there were several gunshot wounds
to her left arm and hand. She had a large blunt force trauma
injury between her eyes, lacerations on her cheeks and lips,
blackened eyes, and bruises on her wrists and hands. Holes in
the blanket covering her indicated shots were fired through the
blanket. Fragments of duct tape were attached to her socks and
to her right forearm, and a twisted ring of duct tape was found
underneath her body at approximately waist level. Three bullets
were recovered from various locations inside the car.
“Several fingerprints lifted from the Nisbets’ car and from
an ATM receipt found in the car matched [codefendant Lewis’s]
fingerprints. A forensic scientist from the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department determined that the duct tape used to bind
Elizabeth Nisbet’s feet came from a roll of tape that was [later]
recovered [by police] from a nightstand in the bedroom of
apartment E in West Covina . . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Between 12:15 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. on August 27, 1991,
Shirley Denogean drove her Mercedes Benz car to the Puente
Hills Mall. Meanwhile, [codefendant Lewis], codefendant Huber,
and at least one other codefendant drove to the mall. . . .
[Codefendant Lewis] saw Denogean arrive, enter the mall, and
return about 20 minutes later. As she was getting into her car,
5
[codefendant Lewis] forced his way at gunpoint into the car. One
or more of the codefendants tied Denogean’s hands in front of her
with . . . plastic ties. [Codefendant Lewis] drove Denogean to the
First Interstate Bank’s City of Industry branch, where $400 was
withdrawn from Denogean’s account. [Codefendant Lewis] then
drove Denogean to another branch of the same bank, where
[codefendant] Huber withdrew another $100 from Denogean’s
account. Several unsuccessful attempts to withdraw more money
from Denogean’s account were made at various ATM[s] . . . .”
“[Codefendant Lewis] drove Denogean’s car west on the
Pomona Freeway, stopping between the Rosemead and San
Gabriel Boulevard exits. Codefendant Huber followed in her car.
[Codefendant Lewis] forced Denogean at gunpoint to walk down
an embankment, to an area surrounded by bushes. Once there,
[codefendant Lewis] fired three shots at Denogean, killing her.
[Codefendant Lewis] and his codefendants then drove away.
“About 12:04 a.m. the next day, $220 was withdrawn from
Denogean’s bank account through an ATM at a convenience
store. Denogean’s car was found in El Monte that same day.
Fingerprints on the car and on papers found in the car matched
[codefendant Lewis’s] and . . . [defendant’s] prints.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Codefendant Huber was arrested [at] about 2:30 a.m. on
August 30, 1991. At 3:15 a.m., [codefendant Lewis]
and . . . [defendant] and [codefendant] Hubbard were arrested at
apartment E in West Covina. [¶] . . . [¶] Several plastic ties of
the kind used to bind murder victim Shirley Denogean’s wrists
were found in the dishwasher and in the hall closet. The roll of
duct tape that had been used to bind murder victim Elizabeth
Nisbet was found inside the nightstand in the bedroom.
6
[¶] . . . [¶] The search also revealed several items of the victims’
property, including Denogean’s white purse, credit card, camera,
and diamond engagement and wedding ring set, and the radio
from murder victim Willie Sams’s car. At the time of her arrest,
[defendant] was wearing several pieces of murder victim
Elizabeth Nisbet’s jewelry. [¶] After his arrest, [codefendant
Lewis] made four statements to law enforcement officers in which
he admitted killing . . . Sams, Nisbet, and Denogean.” (Lewis,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at 436-439.)
The trial jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit
murder (and other crimes); the murders of Sams, Nisbet, and
Denogean; and numerous other kidnapping and robbery charges.
The jury found true robbery-murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(A)), kidnapping-murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(B)), and lying in wait (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15))
special circumstance allegations attached to each of the murder
counts. The jury also found true a multiple murder (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) special circumstance allegation. The trial
court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for the murders.
B
Decades later, defendant filed a Penal Code section 1172.6
petition seeking resentencing on the murder convictions. After
initial proceedings in the trial court and this court on the
resentencing petition,2 the trial court set the matter for an
2
We reversed the trial court’s initial summary denial of
defendant’s petition because the record did not establish she was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We cautioned, however,
that there “appear[ed] to be considerable evidence that would
7
evidentiary hearing (what it called a “hearing on remittitur” in
its minute order).
Before the hearing date, the trial court asked counsel for
defendant whether he would be getting a waiver of his client’s
right to be present at the hearing.3 Counsel said he would submit
a written waiver. A short time later, the defense filed a written
waiver of appearance with the court, prepared on defense
counsel’s letterhead, that was personally signed by defendant.
The waiver of appearance defendant submitted, which is
dated June 19, 2023, includes a typed paragraph waiving the
right to be present and an additional, longer handwritten note
from defendant—which is important for purposes of this appeal.
The typed paragraph states: “I, Robbin Machuca, having been
advised of my right to be present at my hearing on the
Remitt[it]ur, do hereby waive my right to be present and request
that my attorney, John Tyre, appear on my behalf. I wish to
support a conclusion that defendant is a major participant who
acted with the requisite reckless disregard—including
defendant’s knowledge of the violent tendencies of her co-
defendants (at a minimum, as to two of the murders); defendant’s
presence at the scene of the crimes; and defendant’s sharing in
the spoils obtained from the murdered victims.” We accordingly
explained that the court on remand was not precluded “from
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was a major
participant in the murders who acted with reckless indifference
to human life—particularly if the record looks much the same at
a [Penal Code] section [1172.6], subdivision (d)(3) hearing” as it
did at the time of that prior appeal.
3
Defense counsel was the same attorney who represented
defendant at her criminal trial.
8
remain at the State Prison facility in order to continue my classes
and my rehabilitation. Thank you for this opportunity and I
appreciate any consideration the Judge may be able to give me in
this case[.]” Beneath that paragraph and defendant’s signature,
defendant handwrote the following (emphasis ours): “Please
know that because of high risk medical, compromised immune
system I am very hesitant to risk infections that could potential be
life threatening but, I will if Judge Dominguez request my
appearance there are other options such as court tv C.C.W.F can
be contacted call to litigations co-ordinator schedule court
appearance. (see bottom of page for contact info.) [¶] I very
humbly request this and am very sorry for my past choices to live
the immoral, selfish, criminal lifestyle. I have to say thank you
for consideration on [SB] 1437, [SB] 775, [and Penal Code section]
1172.6. My past 30+ years were justifiable, today I live to give
back to society and the victims, the community, the neighbors,
paramedics, all police agencies and the Judges.” Beneath this
statement, defendant also handwrote the contact information she
referenced: “ext: 5113 ask for Z. Myers (Court TV).”
C
At the evidentiary hearing in August 2023, counsel for
defendant stated on the record that he had a signed waiver of
appearance for his client. The parties then confirmed there was
no additional evidence to be presented beyond the trial
transcripts and, without objection, the court said it was ready to
rule based on the briefing the parties provided to the court in
advance of the hearing.
The trial court ruled on the record as follows: “[W]ithout
going into a lot of detail, because I think everyone knows what
9
the facts are of this case, I think clearly the Banks and Clark[ ]
requirements are fully met here; that [defendant] was an active
participant and she acted with tremendous and reckless
indifference to human life. [¶] If I recall correctly, she and one of
the co-defendants were at a store, utilizing the credit cards of one
of the victims. And, again, paperwork was found belonging to her
in one of the victim’s car[s]. So there was a lot of connection—
and she was I.D.’d, I believe, by the surviving witness
as . . . being present. [¶] So, without further ado, the court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] is guilty of first-
degree murder under the felony murder theory rule and also
conspiracy to commit murder. And this is a finding that’s made
by the court as an independent trier of fact. [¶] And the court
does find that the prosecution has met their burden of
establishing each and every element of the offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the [Penal Code section] 1172.6
petition is denied.”
Defense counsel then asked to briefly respond to the court’s
ruling, which the court permitted. Counsel argued defendant
was “there for the kidnappings” but there was no proof “she was
present at the murders” and no evidence she was “actually
involved in the killing of another person.” The court disagreed
and adhered to its ruling, explaining (among other things) that
defendant made statements inconsistent with counsel’s argument
and it was “unimaginable” that defendant, who lived with her
codefendants in the home where weapons and the spoils of the
robberies were found, “did not know . . . that every time they did
a robbery, it ended up in a murder.”
10
II
Defendant’s opening brief acknowledges she “does not
contend that the totality of evidence could not have led a
reasonable trier of fact [to] find her guilty of murder under
current law.” In other words, there is no challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling.
The challenge is, instead, that defendant’s constitutional and
statutory rights to be present at the hearing were violated
because the waiver of her appearance was defective and the
violation is prejudicial because if she had been present she
“might have had something to say” that would have affected the
trial court’s view of her participation in the crimes. For reasons
we now detail, we hold there was no violation of defendant’s right
to be present at the Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing.
The parties agree defendant had a statutory and a
constitutional right to be present at the hearing. A defendant,
however, may waive his or her constitutional right to be present
at a critical stage of the proceedings (which we assume this
hearing was), but the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. (See, e.g., People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008,
1060 [“a defendant may waive his or her federal constitutional
right of presence, provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent”]; People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 534-535.)
State law too permits a defendant to waive his or her right to be
present in court. (Former Pen. Code, § 977, subd. (b) [“The
accused shall be physically or remotely present at all other
proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or
remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by
defendant’s counsel. . . . The waiver of a defendant’s right to be
11
physically or remotely present may be in writing and filed with
the court or, with the court’s consent, may be entered personally
by the defendant or by the defendant’s counsel of record”].) So
the only question we are asked to decide is whether defendant’s
written waiver of appearance form sufficed to effectuate the
waiver that the constitution and the Penal Code permits a
defendant to make.
Defendant principally argues the written waiver was
insufficient because she was not advised of, and did not waive,
her participation in the hearing remotely. She claims that a
waiver of the right to appear at a hearing that does not expressly
specify it applies to an appearance made in a remote capacity
cannot be knowing or intelligent, and cannot be proper under
former Penal Code section 977, subdivision (d)—which specifies
written waivers of the right to be present shall be “substantially”
in the form of the following advisement: “‘The undersigned
defendant, having been advised of their right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings, including, but not limited to,
presentation of and arguments on questions of fact and law, and
to be confronted by and cross-examine all witnesses, hereby
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to be
physically or remotely present at the hearing of any motion or
other proceeding in this cause. The undersigned defendant
hereby requests the court to proceed during every absence of the
defendant that the court may permit pursuant to this waiver, and
hereby agrees that their interest is represented at all times by
the presence of their attorney the same as if the defendant were
physically or remotely present in court, and further agrees that
notice to their attorney that their physical or remote presence in
court on a particular day at a particular time is required is notice
12
to the defendant of the requirement of their physical or remote
appearance at that time and place.’”
Defendant’s argument fails in light of the substance of her
written waiver—especially the portion of the waiver she
handwrote. The waiver of appearance defendant filed
acknowledged she had been advised of her right to appear at the
“hearing on the Remitt[it]ur” and waived that right and
requested her attorney to appear on her behalf instead. This
appears on its face to be an unqualified waiver of her appearance
in whatever capacity.4 Defendant’s handwritten note clarifies her
waiver extends to remote and in person appearances because it
states she would appear remotely (only) if requested by the trial
court (“I am very hesitant to risk infections that could
potential[ly] be life threatening but, I will if Judge Dominguez
request my appearance there are other options such as court tv”
(emphasis added)). Because defendant acknowledges the
possibility of appearing remotely but opts to exercise it only if
requested by the court, her waiver is “substantially” in the form
required by Penal Code section 977 and cannot be said to have
4
Insofar as defendant argues former Penal Code section 977
gives defendants a right to appear remotely even when a court
hearing is held in person (i.e., to choose whether to attend the
hearing in person or participate remotely), we doubt that is the
correct understanding of the statute. But we need not resolve
that issue to decide this appeal. We will assume for argument’s
sake that a defendant must validly waive the right to appear
remotely even for in-person hearings.
13
been unknowing or unintelligent because she was unaware of the
possibility of participating remotely.5
Defendant additionally argues her waiver was unknowing
and unintelligent because the waiver of appearance form she
signed referred to a “hearing on the Remitt[it]ur” that was a legal
concept that she would not understand and that would prevent
her from understanding the nature of the hearing. The argument
fails for several reasons. First, the waiver form itself reveals a
level of legal sophistication on defendant’s part. Her own
handwritten note, not the portion of the waiver typed by her
lawyer, anticipatorily thanks the trial court for its “consideration
on [SB] 1437, [SB] 775, [and Penal Code section] 1172.6.”6 That
5
To be sure, the model advisement in former Penal Code
section 977, subdivision (b)(4) makes reference to a defendant’s
right to be confronted by and cross-examine all witnesses, but the
absence of a reference to this in the waiver of appearance
executed by defendant is inconsequential. There were no
witnesses for defendant to confront or cross-examine at the Penal
Code section 1172.6 hearing (beyond the confrontation and cross-
examination already reflected in the transcripts of defendant’s
criminal trial).
6
In her appellate briefing, defendant focuses only on the
appearance waiver’s typewritten statement that she would
“appreciate any consideration the Judge may be able to give me
in this case” and believes this shows defendant thought the
hearing was more akin to a sentencing proceeding rather than
one at which evidence would be considered. Defendant ignores,
however, her handwritten statement on the waiver that details
the “consideration” defendant was expecting, namely,
“consideration on [SB] 1437, [SB] 775, [and Penal Code section]
1172.6.”
14
defendant had in mind and cited the correct legislation and
statute governing the hearing belies any suggestion that she was
too unsophisticated to understand the nature of the hearing from
the “hearing on the Remitt[it]ur” description (which was the
same language the trial court itself had used to describe the
nature of the hearing). Second, the waiver form makes clear that
defendant had been “advised” of her right to be present, and
practically and in context, this advisement obviously came from
her lawyer (defendant had not been in court during the
appearances leading up to the evidentiary hearing). That
defendant personally acknowledged having been advised by her
lawyer in connection with making her waiver further undermines
any assertion that the “Remitt[it]ur” description precluded her
from knowingly waiving her right to appear at the hearing.
(Compare People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 [waiver of
presence at pre-trial hearing based merely on counsel’s
Defendant also argues her statement that she would
appear remotely if requested by the court reveals she had a
“fundamental misunderstanding of what this hearing was all
about” because “a judge might wish to hear from a defendant at a
typical sentencing . . . where remorse, rehabilitation, future plans
or the like could be important” but this hearing was instead
“essentially a trial.” The argument is unpersuasive. The most
natural reading of defendant’s handwritten notation is as an
assertion she did not want to make an appearance at all (because
of health concerns—which can arise not only from illness
exposures on the way to court but also illness exposures from
unnecessary movement within a jail facility), but if the court for
some reason insisted on an appearance, she would request that
the court permit a remote appearance.
15
representation that he discussed the hearing with his client and
his client waived his right to appear was invalid].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
16
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