CourtListener 10663190•People v. Williams CA5
Texto completo
Filed 8/28/25 P. v. Williams CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F085868
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 1422550)
v.
KYLE ANDREW WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Dawna
Reeves, Judge.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General, Darren K.
Indermill and Paul E. O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Kyle Andrew Williams petitioned the trial court, pursuant to former
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) of the Penal Code,1 for resentencing on his conviction for
attempted murder (§§ 187, 664). The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage after determining that petitioner was “prosecuted and convicted as the direct
perpetrator of the attempted murder” and therefore was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. Notably, the court based this determination in part on its review of
transcripts from petitioner’s preliminary hearing and plea colloquy.
On appeal, petitioner initially argued the court erred in denying his facially
sufficient petition at the prima facie stage by engaging in impermissible factfinding based
on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea. He further argued that neither
his plea nor his counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis for the plea rendered him ineligible
for resentencing.
In our original opinion, the majority held the record of conviction did not establish
petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reversed in
a divided opinion. (People v. Williams (June 28, 2024, F085868) opn. ordered nonpub.
July 16, 2025, S286314; see ibid. (dis. opn. of Meehan, J.).)
The People petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. The state high
court granted review (S286314), and eventually transferred the matter to us with
directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton). Pursuant to the high court’s order, we vacated our prior
opinion. The parties submitted briefing on the effect of Patton on the issues raised in this
appeal.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former section
1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) We refer to the current section 1172.6 in this opinion.
2.
Having reconsidered the cause in light of Patton, we now remand with directions
for the superior court to consider an amended petition, should petitioner seek to file one
within 30 days. We otherwise affirm the order denying the petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Several percipient witnesses testified at the preliminary hearing. We briefly
summarize their testimony from the preliminary hearing transcript, while acknowledging
that the propriety of the court relying on this testimony is a subject of dispute in this
appeal.
On May 19, 2010, Donald W.2 drove his minivan to an apartment complex in
Modesto. With him were his nephew, Nathaniel W., and Nathaniel’s friends, brothers
Brandon R. and Michael R., who went to the apartment complex to sell someone
marijuana. Michael was armed with a firearm because Brandon asked him to bring a
gun. Donald was in the driver’s seat, Nathaniel was in the front passenger seat, Michael
was in the rear passenger side seat, and Brandon initially was in the rear driver’s side
seat.
At some point while they were at the apartment complex, a gold Saturn arrived
and blocked in the minivan. Michael removed his firearm from his pocket and loaded it,
before putting it back in his pocket in its holster. Brandon got out and stood on the
driver’s side of the minivan. Petitioner got out of the Saturn; someone else remained in
the Saturn’s driver’s seat.
Petitioner got into the rear driver’s side seat of the minivan. The van’s door closed
behind him. Petitioner asked about the marijuana and said it looked fine or smelled good,
but then pulled a revolver from his backpack and pointed it at Michael’s head. Petitioner
said, “You’re dead. I’ve got nothing to live for. Times are tough. I’m robbing everybody
2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by
their first names. No disrespect is intended.
3.
for everything.” According to Donald, petitioner also pointed the gun at Donald’s head.
Petitioner demanded the keys to the minivan. Donald gave petitioner the keys. Michael
turned to look at the car door to see if he could escape, then turned back toward
petitioner. Around the same time, petitioner shot Michael in the face. Michael estimated
that the entire encounter lasted 45 seconds to two minutes.
Michael survived the shooting but spent 14 days in the hospital.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 18, 2011, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed an information
charging petitioner with premeditated and deliberate attempted murder of Michael
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count I), robbery of Donald (§ 211; count II), and making
criminal threats against Michael (§ 422; count III). As to count I, it was alleged that
petitioner personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great
bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to counts II and III, it was alleged that
petitioner personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b), (c)).
On August 7, 2012, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to the attempted murder
of Michael on count I, and the second degree robbery of Donald on count II. On count I,
petitioner admitted enhancements for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b))
and for causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). Petitioner did not admit the allegation
that the attempted murder was premeditated, and the prosecutor indicated the parties’
understanding was that this allegation would be dismissed. All remaining counts and
enhancements were dismissed. Counsel for all parties stipulated that the preliminary
hearing transcript provided a sufficient factual basis for the plea. In addition, the
prosecutor offered the following factual basis for the plea, to which defense counsel also
stipulated:
“On May 19th, 2010, [petitioner] took at least one direct but . . . ineffective
step toward killing the victim Michael [R.]. [Petitioner] intended to kill
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victim Michael [R.]. [Petitioner] personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense. And [petitioner] personally inflicted great
bodily injury on Michael [R.] during the course of the felony. [¶] In
addition, [petitioner] took property not his own from the presence,
possession and immediate presence of Donald [W.]. The property was
taken against the will of Donald [W.]. [Petitioner] used force . . . and/or
fear when taking the property to prevent the resistance, and [petitioner]
intended, while using the force or fear, . . . with the intent to deprive
[Donald] of it permanently. This took place in Stanislaus County on or
about 19th day of May, 2010.”
Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years.
On August 29, 2022, petitioner filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on
his conviction for attempted murder. The People opposed the petition on the ground the
charge and plea established petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law,
and substantial evidence from the preliminary hearing supported a finding that petitioner
acted with intent to kill. The People argued that no facts were presented at the
preliminary hearing to support a theory of implied malice and the charge of malice
aforethought did not permit a plea based on imputed malice. The People argued the
undisputed facts showed that petitioner shot Michael in the head and there was therefore
no basis to conclude he was convicted under a natural and probable consequences theory.
In reply, petitioner argued that he had pled a prima facie case and was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.
The court held a hearing on the petition. The People argued petitioner was not
entitled to resentencing because he pled guilty to premeditated attempted murder3 with
personal use of a firearm. In its written decision, the court explained that it had reviewed
the complaint, transcripts of the change of plea hearing and preliminary hearing, and the
abstract of judgment. Based on review of these documents, the court determined that
petitioner was prosecuted as a direct perpetrator and “not on a theory of felony murder or
3 In actuality, petitioner pled no contest to attempted murder and did not admit the
premeditation allegation.
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a theory of natural and probable consequences.” The court noted petitioner was
originally charged with premeditated and intentional attempted murder involving
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm. He then entered a no contest plea to
attempted murder with malice aforethought and admitted personally using a firearm and
personally inflicting great bodily injury. The court also noted that the preliminary
hearing testimony “demonstrates that [petitioner] was accused of personally firing a
firearm directly at Michael [R.] during a transaction for drugs.” Accordingly, the court
determined, petitioner was prosecuted as the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder
and “would still be convicted of attempted murder” under current law. On that basis, the
petition was denied.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 Procedure
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 1437) “altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).) First, the bill narrowed the scope of the felony-
murder rule “so that a ‘participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
[specified felony] in which a death occurs’ can be liable for murder only if ‘[t]he person
was the actual killer’; ‘[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree’; or ‘[t]he person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467–468, quoting § 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).)
Second, the bill “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” by requiring that, “except in cases of felony
murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of
murder.” (Curiel, at p. 449, quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).) Now, “ ‘[m]alice shall not be
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imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Curiel, at
p. 449.)
Additionally, Senate Bill No. 1437 added former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6, to provide a procedure for those convicted of a qualifying offense “ ‘to seek
relief’ where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s
conviction.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Under section 1172.6, an offender
seeking resentencing must first file a petition in the sentencing court, and the sentencing
court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or
she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708.) If the sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
The court’s prima facie inquiry is limited but involves more than an inquiry into
the petition’s mere facial validity. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 562–563.) In the
prima facie inquiry, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes
a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if
[those] factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
971.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) However, the
court may rely on “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing
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transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations” contained in the petition without
resorting to judicial factfinding. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) “[P]etitioners
confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden
of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court
to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail. . . . [S]hould a trial court encounter a
material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and
should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming relief is not otherwise
foreclosed.” (Id. at p. 567.)
We review the court’s prima facie determination de novo. (People v. Hickman
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268.)
II. A Limited Remand Is Appropriate in Light of Patton
Petitioner initially argued that the court engaged in impermissible factfinding at
the prima facie stage by relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to find him
ineligible for relief. Petitioner does not dispute, however, that this issue since has been
resolved adversely to him in Patton. Patton makes clear that the court may rely on
unchallenged facts within the preliminary hearing transcript to refute the allegations
contained in a form petition without resorting to judicial factfinding. (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 564.) Petitioner does not suggest that the preliminary hearing transcript
lacks “relief-foreclosing facts” regarding his role in the murder that support denial of the
petition. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court did not err in relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript to conclude petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.
Nonetheless, relying on Patton, petitioner asks us to conditionally reverse the
order denying the petition to afford him an opportunity to allege additional facts
establishing a prima facie case. In Patton, the petitioner requested an opportunity to
plead additional facts on remand and, “out of an abundance of caution,” the high court
agreed to afford him that opportunity. However, the high court otherwise affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had affirmed the order denying the petition.
8.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569–570.) Here, the People contend it is “questionable”
whether a limited remand would be appropriate in light of the record, which the People
describe as “conclusively establish[ing] that [petitioner] is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law.” Nonetheless, the People acknowledge the remedy provided in Patton, as
well as more recently in People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, includes an
opportunity to develop nonconclusory allegations on remand, and the People therefore do
not oppose petitioner’s request for a limited remand.
Out of an abundance of caution, we will follow our Supreme Court’s procedure in
Patton and allow petitioner an opportunity to file an amended petition pleading additional
facts on remand, should he choose to do so.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions for the superior court to consider an
amended petition should petitioner, within 30 days of remand, seek to file one. (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 570.) The order denying the petition for resentencing is otherwise
affirmed.
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
SNAUFFER, J.
9.
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