CourtListener 10661087•People v. Williams CA2/1
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Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Williams CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335647
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA318827)
v.
SMITTY LEE WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A “jury convicted Smitty Lee Williams of forcible rape
(Pen. Code,[1] § 261, subd. (a)(2)) . . . , forcible oral copulation
(§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), and sexual penetration by a foreign object
(§ 289, subd. (a)(1)). The jury sustained the special circumstance
allegation that [Williams] personally used a knife (§ 12022.3,
subd.(a)). [Williams] was sentenced to 15 years to life and a
concurrent term of 54 years in state prison.” (People v. Williams
(Apr. 9, 2010, B212342) [nonpub. opn.] [Williams I].) Williams
appealed from the judgment, and this court affirmed the
judgment. (Ibid.)
This is Williams’s second appeal following an order denying
him resentencing relief under section 1170.91. The first appeal
followed the trial court’s application of the wrong statute, and in
2021, this court remanded the case to the trial court for “a new
hearing at which the trial court shall satisfy its statutory
obligations under section 1170.91, subdivision (b).” (People v.
Williams (May 20, 2021, B305218) [nonpub. opn.] [Williams II].)
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended
section 1170.91 by, inter alia, adding subdivision (c), which, as
Williams admits, would render him ineligible for resentencing
relief.
Williams makes two arguments to avoid this conclusion.
First, he contends our disposition in Williams II allowed the trial
court to consider his petition only under former section 1170.91,
subdivision (b) and not the current statute. Second, he argues
because of the many continuances of the hearing on his petition
for resentencing relief, his counsel, of which there were several,
were ineffective in not ensuring that his petition was heard
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
before the Legislature amended the statute rendering him
ineligible for resentencing relief.
We disagree with both contentions and affirm the trial
court’s denial of his resentencing petition.
BACKGROUND
Our background has two components. First, we briefly
summarize the facts underlying Williams’s crimes to give context
to the trial court’s ruling on Williams’s petition. Second, given
Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we detail the
lengthy procedural history of Williams’s petition.
1. Summary of Williams’s crimes
On appeal, Williams provides no facts underlying his
convictions. The record, however, includes his resentencing
petition in which he summarized those facts, albeit with no
citation to the trial record: “Twenty-two-year-old Shawna N. was
legally blind, being extremely nearsighted and having no depth
perception or peripheral vision. She generally perceived objects
10 to 20 feet away to be shadows. On the evening of April 29,
2000, she traveled by bus from Temecula to San Clemente. At
the bus station in downtown Los Angeles, she was unable to
transfer to a bus to San Clemente and became lost. At the
station she met Daniel Johnson, a fellow passenger, and accepted
his offer to stay with him in a motel room for the night. They
drove to a motel in a cab driven by [Williams], and they spent the
night there.
“The next morning, April 30, 2000, [Williams] appeared at
the door and offered to drive Shawna N. and Johnson again.
They went to Johnson’s uncle’s house to solicit a ride to
3
San Clemente. When Johnson went inside the house, [Williams]
persuaded Shawna N. to leave with him.
“[Williams] drove Shawna N. to the Los Angeles River,
where for a few hours he raped her at knifepoint, forced her to
orally copulate him, and inserted his fingers into her vagina. He
also stole some jewelry from her. Shawna N. eventually escaped,
running naked along the river with [Williams] in pursuit until
she was rescued by people on the embankment.” (Williams I,
supra, B212342.)
When imposing sentence, the trial court found the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Its
minute order failed to identify those factors. The court indicated
it had read the probation report, which showed that Williams’s
criminal history dated back to 1985 and included assault to
commit rape, multiple counts of infliction of corporal injury on a
spouse or cohabitant, assault with a deadly weapon, driving
while under the influence, and possession of a controlled
substance.2
2. Relying on an incorrect Penal Code section, the trial
court denies Williams’s 2019 section 1170.91 petition
and this court reverses and remands
On January 23, 2019, Williams filed a pro per resentencing
petition pursuant to section 1170.91. Williams alleged he suffers
from posttraumatic stress disorder because of his military service
between 1974 and 1977. Williams also alleged when the trial
court sentenced him, the trial court did not consider his military
2 Williams asserts on appeal without citation to the record
that he is “unable to acquire a transcript of the original
sentencing proceeding.”
4
service as a mitigating factor. Williams verified that the matters
stated in his petition were true.
The court appointed counsel for Williams. Later, the court
denied the petition and described it as a section 1170.953
petition, not a section 1170.91 petition.
On May 20, 2021, this court reversed because the trial
court did not consider Williams’s eligibility for resentencing
under section 1170.91. (Williams II, supra, B305218.) We
explained that section 1170.91 applied only to the determinate
term and resentencing would not affect the indeterminate term.
(Williams II, at fn. 5.) Our disposition provided: “The order is
reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new hearing at which
the trial court shall satisfy its statutory obligations under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b).” (Williams II, supra, B305128.)
3. Events after remand
The trial court initially set the petition for a hearing on
June 29, 2021. The petition, however, was not heard until
October 25, 2023. Our record indicates the hearing on the
petition was continued 17 times, and to the extent the record
reveals, for reasons including to accommodate defendant’s
request, to appoint four different defense counsel, and to await
the decision on a writ,4 and on one occasion, because Williams
3 Briefly summarized, section 1170.95, subsequently
renumbered as section 1172.6, provides resentencing relief to
defendants convicted of murder attempted murder or
manslaughter who could no longer be convicted under the current
definition of those crimes, which the Legislature amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437 effective January 1, 2019.
4 On January 12, 2023, Williams filed in pro per a petition
for writ of mandate to compel the trial court to hold a hearing on
5
refused to board the bus to the courthouse.5 As noted in
footnote 4, ante, and for reasons not revealed in our record,
Williams has had four different defense counsel representing him
during the period between issuance of the remittitur in
Williams II on July 21, 2021 and the trial court’s entry of its
order denying Williams’s resentencing petition on October 25,
2023. George Quevedo was his counsel at the October 25, 2023
hearing at which the trial court denied his second petition.
his section 1170.91 petition. On August 16, 2023, this court
denied the petition.
5 The parties agreed to continue the hearing to August 16,
2021. On August 16, 2021, the court continued the case to
September 29, 2021. Defense counsel requested a continuance to
October 22, 2021. On October 22, 2021, defense counsel was
relieved, and the hearing was reset for November 1, 2021. On
November 1, 2021, the court indicated it would appoint new
counsel for Williams. On November 2, 2021, the court appointed
new counsel and continued the hearing to January 20, 2022. At
some point, the court appointed yet another counsel, who
appeared at the January 20, 2022 hearing, at which time the
hearing was continued to March 2, 2022. On March 2, 2022, the
court continued the matter to April 4, 2022, and again to May 3,
2022. On May 3, 2022, the court continued the hearing to June
22, 2022, then to July 22, 2022, and again to August 31, 2022.
On August 31, 2022, the court relieved Williams’s third counsel.
The hearing was reset for September 27, 2022. Still again, the
hearing was continued to October 19, 2022 and thereafter, to
February 16, 2023. After checking on Williams’s writ petition,
the court continued the hearing to May 4, 2023. On May 4, 2023
the court set the hearing for July 21, 2023, which was continued
to September 15, 2023. The court did not proceed on that day
because Williams refused to board the bus to the courthouse. The
court then continued the hearing to October 25, 2023.
6
On June 26, 2023, Williams filed another petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1170.91. He acknowledged that
under an amendment to section 1170.91, effective January 1,
2023, he was not eligible for resentencing because he was
convicted of an offense that requires registration as a sex
offender.6 Williams, however, argued: “Mr. Williams has
suffered a three[-]year delay in having his 1170.91 Petition
‘heard.’ Mr. Williams contends this unusually long delay in
having the court hear his 1170.91 Petition has severely
prejudiced him and denied him due process, and he was
additionally denied effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, and as a remedy to this situation,
Mr. Williams should be provided with an exception to the
subsection (c) exception.” In sum, Williams contended, the trial
court should have applied the earlier version of the statute,
which did not exclude defendants required to register as sex
offenders.
On October 10, 2023, the People opposed the motion for
resentencing. The People argued the version of the statute
effective January 1, 2023 rendered Williams ineligible for
resentencing.
4. The trial court denies Williams’s 2023 resentencing
petition
On October 25, 2023, the trial court held a hearing and
denied Williams’s petition. The court indicated Williams suffered
from posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from his military
service. The court concluded, (1) “Petitioner has not
6 The Sex Offender Registration Act is codified in
section 290.
7
demonstrated in his petition that his military service was not
considered as a factor in mitigation at his original sentence,” and
(2) “petitioner’s convictions are for offenses requiring registration
pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290” and therefore he is
ineligible for resentencing. The court further explained,
“[D]espite numerous opportunities to amend the petition, over
the course of several years, petitioner has not, at any point,
provided evidence that the trial court did not consider those
circumstances as a factor in mitigation at the time of his original
sentencing.”
DISCUSSION
Section 1170.91 currently provides in pertinent part:
“(a) If the court concludes that a defendant convicted of a felony
offense is, or was, a member of the United States military who
may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury,
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health
problems as a result of the defendant’s military service, the court
shall consider the circumstance as a factor in mitigation when
imposing a sentence. This consideration does not preclude the
court from considering similar trauma, injury, substance abuse,
or mental health problems due to other causes, as evidence or
factors in mitigation. (b)(1) A person currently serving a
sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who is,
or was, a member of the United States military and who may be
suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-
traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health
problems as a result of the person’s military service may petition
for a recall of sentence, before the trial court that entered the
judgment of conviction in the case, to request resentencing if the
circumstance of suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain
8
injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or
mental health problems as a result of the person’s military
service was not considered as a factor in mitigation at the time of
sentencing. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) This section does not apply to a person
convicted of, or having one or more prior convictions for, an
offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph
(2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or an offense requiring
registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290.”
(§ 1170.91, italics added.)
The prior version of the statute, effective January 1, 2019
through December 31, 2022, allowed a person to petition for
recall of sentence if “[t]he circumstance of suffering from sexual
trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the
person’s military service was not considered as a factor in
mitigation at the time of sentencing.” (Former § 1170.91,
subd. (b)(1)(A) ); Stats. 2018, ch. 523, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) The
2019 statute in effect at the time Williams filed his resentencing
petition did not exclude from relief defendants convicted of an
offense requiring registration as a sex offender.
On appeal, Williams “requests that this Court vacate the
trial court’s October 25, 2023, ruling, denying his petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1170.91 and order the trial
court to comply with this Court’s original remand order, issued on
May 20, 2021 in Case No B305218.” He claims: (1) the trial
court improperly expanded the scope of this court’s remand order
in Williams II, and (2) defense counsel “collectively” rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to ensure the trial court decided
his resentencing petition before January 1, 2023, the effective
9
date of subsection (c) excluding from eligibility defendants, like
Williams, required to register as sex offenders.
Williams’s arguments fail for the reasons set forth by our
colleagues in the Fourth District in People v. Sherman (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 325 (Sherman). The defendant in Sherman raped
and sexually assaulted numerous women, and the trial court
sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 123 years to life. (Id.
at pp. 327–328.) In 2020, the defendant filed a motion for
resentencing under former section 1170.91 in which he argued he
suffered from substance abuse problems because of his military
service. (Sherman, at p. 328.) The trial court denied the motion
and found no connection between the defendant’s mental health
issue related to the defendant’s military service and his sex
offenses. (Id. at p. 329.) The defendant’s appeal was heard after
the January 1, 2023 effective date of the amendment adding
subdivision (c) to section 1171.91. (Sherman, at pp. 329–330.)
Even though the defendant’s resentencing motion had been heard
by the trial court while former section 1171.91 was in effect, the
appellate court held the amended statute, effective January 1,
2023, governed the appeal. (Sherman, at p. 330.)
To reach its conclusion, Sherman first considered the
history of section 1170.91, which reflects several amendments
since 2014, including a 2022 amendment making persons with
indeterminate sentences eligible for resentencing relief, making
subsection (b) retroactive; and rendering defendants required to
register as sex offenders ineligible for relief: “Section 1170.91
was enacted in 2014. The original statute merely required courts
to consider as a mitigating factor for determinate sentencing
certain specified qualifying conditions the defendant may be
suffering as a result of his or her military service—sexual
10
trauma, traumatic brain injury, posttraumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems. [Citations.] As
amended, this sentencing provision is now contained in
section 1170.91, subdivision (a). [¶] In 2018, the Legislature
added subdivision (b) to section 1170.91. Subdivision (b)
authorizes retrospective relief for previously sentenced criminal
defendants who may suffer from one of the qualifying conditions
as a result of their military service. As originally enacted,
subdivision (b) allowed a defendant who was sentenced before
January 1, 2015, to petition the court for a recall of the sentence
and request resentencing ‘pursuant to subdivision (a)’ if his or
her qualifying condition ‘was not considered as a factor in
mitigation at the time of sentencing.’ [Citation.] Like
subdivision (a), subdivision (b) originally applied only to
defendants who were eligible for determinate sentences.
[Citation.] [¶] In 2022, the Legislature amended the statute
again. (Stats. 2022, ch. 721, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) The 2022
amendment both expanded and restricted eligibility for relief. In
relevant part, it expanded subdivisions (a) and (b) to include
those serving indeterminate sentences; it eliminated the
requirement that the defendant must have been sentenced before
January 1, 2015, to be eligible for resentencing; and it added a
provision explicitly stating that subdivision (b) ‘shall apply
retroactively (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(10)). At the same time,
however, it restricted eligibility by adding subdivision (c), a
carve-out provision stating that ‘[t]his section does not apply to a
person convicted of, or having one or more prior convictions for,
an offense specified in clause (iv) of paragraph (C) of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or an offense
requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290.’
11
(§ 1170.91, subd. (c).) These changes became effective on
January 1, 2023.” (Sherman, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 329–
330.)
After reviewing this history, Sherman rejected
“retroactivity concerns” because “[s]ection 1170.91 is a remedial
statute designed to allow the trial court to ameliorate the effects
of a potentially excessive sentence for criminal defendants who
may suffer from qualifying mental health conditions or substance
abuse as a result of their military service. By amending
section 1170.91 to add subdivision (c)—a carve-out provision
making certain groups of defendants who were previously eligible
for relief categorically ineligible—the Legislature effectively
accomplished a partial repeal of the statute. [Citation.] When a
pending matter rests solely on a statutory basis, and no rights
have vested under the statute, a repeal or partial repeal of the
statutory right or remedy operates prospectively and applies to
the pending case.” (Sherman, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 331.)
Sherman then addressed legislative intent: “The
Legislature evidently intended to eliminate the general exclusion
for indeterminate sentences and at the same time replace it with
a more targeted carve-out for the specified disqualifying offenses.
In these circumstances, it would defeat the Legislature’s intent to
apply the expanded eligibility provision to pending cases, but not
the accompanying replacement provision restricting eligibility.”
(Sherman, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.)
Sherman thus held the 2023 version of the statute applies
to petitions pending before January 1, 2023, including those on
appeal. (Supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 333–334.) Because at the
time of his appeal, the defendant was categorically ineligible for
relief under the amended statute, the appellate court affirmed
12
the order denying the defendant relief even “assuming that the
trial court erred” in finding him ineligible for relief under the
prior version of the statute. (Id. at p. 334.)
Similarly, here, assuming arguendo the trial court erred in
how it applied section 1170.91, and even assuming, for
argument’s sake, Williams’s “collective” counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not having his petition heard before the
effective date of section 1170.91, subsection (c), Williams is now
categorically ineligible for relief. Simply put, the remedy he
seeks is not available under the current statute.
In his reply brief, Williams argues Sherman’s holding that
courts must apply the amended statute was merely dicta. We
do not agree. Sherman’s holding that the Court of Appeal had to
apply the current version of the statute was not dicta because the
court applied the 2023 version to conclude that the defendant was
categorically ineligible for relief. (Sherman, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 334.)
In his reply brief, Williams also argues Sherman was
wrongly decided because he had a vested right in the trial court
exercising its discretion under the former statute, and a
legislative act that removes that discretion violates ex post facto
principles. The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies,
inter alia, where a new law postdating the date of a crime
increases punishment for that crime. (People v. Hill (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067.)
As for William’s claim of having a vested right, Sherman
expressly rejected that argument: “Here, Sherman is asserting a
purely statutory right to be resentenced, but he has no vested
right to resentencing under section 1170.91 because ‘[u]ntil it is
fully enforced, a statutory remedy is merely an “ ‘inchoate,
13
incomplete, and unperfected’ ” right, which is subject to
legislative abolition.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, we must apply the
current version of section 1170.91 in resolving this appeal,
including the carve-out in subdivision (c).” (Sherman, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 331–332.)
To support his ex post facto and vested rights challenges,
deeming them “dual concepts,” Williams relies heavily on
People v. Delgado (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1157 (Delgado).
Delgado does not support Williams’s challenges.
In Delgado, between the time the defendant committed his
crime and the time he was sentenced, the law governing
probation of persons committing crimes involving domestic
violence changed to make certain probation terms mandatory.
(Supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.) The appellate court held the
change increased punishment for those crimes in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. (Ibid. [“Here,
section 1203.097 increased the measure of punishment from what
was in effect on the date of defendant’s offenses, by removing the
trial court’s discretion to impose a shorter term and by attaching
the mandatory 36-month term, community service condition, and
$400 payment.”].) The court explained, “[T]he mandatory
conditions of probation are necessarily dependent upon his
earlier offenses. At the time defendant committed the offenses,
the law did not require mandatory conditions of probation for
offenses involving domestic violence.” (Delgado, at p. 1165.) In
contrast to Delgado, section 1170.91 does not impose punishment,
but instead provides ameliorative postconviction sentencing relief
to certain defendants.7
7 In his reply brief, Williams relies on Lynce v. Mathis
(1997) 519 U.S. 433. Lynce does not assist him. There, the
14
DISPOSITION
The order denying Smitty Lee Williams’s resentencing
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
Supreme Court held that a Florida law cancelling provisional
custody credits after they had been awarded and after the
defendant had been released from custody violated the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The
Supreme Court explained: “To fall within the ex post facto
prohibition, a law must be retrospective—that is, ‘it must apply
to events occurring before its enactment’—and it ‘must
disadvantage the offender affected by it,’ [citation], by altering
the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment
for the crime . . . .” (Id. at p. 441.) Here, the modification in
section 1170.91 did not apply to events occurring before its
enactment. The amendment to section 1170.91 did not increase
his punishment from the time he committed his offense. It also
did not alter the definition of his criminal conduct.
15
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