CourtListener 10660221•Fishback v. Campbell CA2/2
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Filed 8/25/25 Fishback v. Campbell CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
BARTON WAYNE FISHBACK, B339326
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV31683)
v.
DAVID CAMPBELL,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Mainak D’Attaray and Mainak D’Attaray for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Behar | Gibbs | Savage | Paulson, William O. Woodland and
Renee E. Jensen for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________________
Barton Wayne Fishback (Fishback) appeals from a judgment
after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer of
David Campbell (Campbell) to Fishback’s operative third amended
complaint (TAC). Fishback sued Campbell, a then deputy district
attorney, for defamation based on an email sent by Campbell to
another public employee in which Campbell stated that Fishback
“entered a no contest (guilty) plea to charges” years earlier, when the
particular misdemeanor action referenced was actually dismissed
under Penal Code section 1385. Reviewing de novo, we conclude that
Campbell is immune from liability based on the allegations in the TAC.
We accordingly affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Allegations
We draw the factual allegations from the operative TAC, as well
as exhibits attached thereto and matters properly judicially noticed.
(See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [demurrer treated as
admitting all properly pleaded material facts and judicially noticed
matters]; Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284, 288 [exhibits to
pleading are properly considered].)
On April 22, 2014, Campbell, a deputy district attorney and code
enforcement prosecutor in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office, replied to an email from David Pang, a code enforcement officer
in the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works who
investigated illegal dumping. Campbell’s email stated: “The criminal
case number for Barton Wayne Fishback is 8GF00031. The Fishback
case stemmed from a Board complaint received on 10-17-07 in which it
was asserted (and later determined to be true) that Fishback was using
his property as a commercial rock crushing operation and was
performing surface mining at his property in Browns Canyon. [¶]
Fishback was arraigned on 2/19/08 on misdemeanor charges of
maintaining concrete crushing equipment. He entered a no contest
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(guilty) plea to the charge on 5/20/09 after removing all equipment from
his property.”
The email concerned activities commenced by Fishback in 2007 at
his 160-acre property in the northern part of Los Angeles County, in or
near an area called Browns Canyon. Fishback claimed that he was
attempting to “rehabilitate and improve” the property. In October
2007, a governmental conservancy organization made a complaint
about Fishback’s activities with the local county supervisor. Shortly
after, law enforcement and code enforcement officers, along with
district attorney investigators searched the property. Campbell was
involved with the investigation of Fishback’s conduct.
In January 2008, Fishback was served with a warrant for his
arrest and a misdemeanor criminal complaint was filed against him,
alleging three violations for unlawful use of land, a violation for
unlawful grading, a violation of stop work order, and violation of oak
tree permit, each pursuant to a section of the Los Angeles County
Code.1 Campbell was the prosecutor on the matter. A March 2008
letter written by Fishback’s lawyer noted an agreement that criminal
charges would be dismissed if Fishback brought his property into
1 Fishback was facing similar legal problems in Ventura County
at around the same time. As detailed in a nonpublished opinion by
Division Six of this court, Fishback v. County of Ventura (Feb. 18, 2020,
B292947) (nonpub. opn.), of which we take judicial notice (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(b); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City and County of
San Francisco (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 897, 907, fn. 10), beginning in
around 2006, Fishback operated an unpermitted “ ‘solid waste facility’ ”
on 120 acres of hillside land in Ventura County, bringing in over
100,000 cubic yards of “ ‘unpermitted fill’ ” with “ ‘a wide variety of solid
waste.’ ” The operation “placed downstream property owners at a
serious risk of injury or death.” In 2015, judgment was entered against
Fishback and his wife for a mandatory injunction requiring them to
remove the waste, among other things, and for statutory damages in
the amount of $21,710,000.
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compliance. Minutes for the criminal matter show that by February
2009, equipment had been removed from the property and Fishback’s
targeted work on the property had stopped, and in May 2009, each of
the six counts was dismissed in furtherance of justice under Penal Code
section 1385.
By the beginning of 2014, however, Fishback’s activities on the
property had recommenced. Fishback sent emails to various
governmental officials, including Pang and Campbell, complaining
about surveillance of his property. The TAC alleges: “The County’s
response to Plaintiff’s emails to . . . staff including Campbell was to
double down and search for violations even when none existed, and
make them up just like in 2007.” The TAC further claims that Los
Angeles County officials were “making up fake violations.”
In the midst of Fishback’s renewed suspect activity and the
attendant governmental attention to the property, Campbell sent the
April 22, 2014 email to Pang, in response to an email sent by Pang. In
May 2014, a field deputy from the local supervisor’s office sent an email
to Campbell, Pang, and others stating that the situation on Fishback’s
property was “spinning out of control with more dump trucks showing
up.” In June 2014, a stop work order was posted, but Fishback
continued to allow dumping and bulldozing of debris. Shortly
thereafter, in July 2014, an email from the Office of the Los Angeles
County Counsel noted that the district attorney was “considering
bringing a code enforcement action,” and requested that “all the
departments involved assist the DA in putting the case(s) together.”
An email in response noted that Fishback had engaged in improper
activities on multiple properties, and stated that “[h]is history is to
continue work even though he doesn’t have authorization to do so and
he has brought in thousands of tons of material and could do more very
quickly.” A follow-up email noted that Campbell was involved in
discussions regarding Fishback’s actions, and explained how Fishback
had brought in thousands of tons of construction and demolition waste,
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landfilled it, and covered it with natural soil from the surrounding
native hills.
In September 2014, through a public records request, Fishback
discovered the subject April 22, 2014 email from Campbell to Pang.
Fishback notes that, after receiving the email, Pang forwarded it to his
supervisor. The TAC alleges that Campbell’s April 22, 2014 email
“sparked a firestorm of aggressive and unlawful statutory, regulatory
and local code enforcement to interfere with Fishback’s use and
enjoyment of his property.”
In October 2015, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office filed another misdemeanor criminal complaint against Fishback.
Five counts were alleged: two counts of unlawful dumping under Penal
Code section 374.3, subdivision (a) and subdivision (b), both pleaded as
infractions; misdemeanor trespassing (Pen. Code, § 602); misdemeanor
public nuisance (Pen. Code, § 602); and misdemeanor dumping in
violation of Public Resources Code section 33211.6, subdivision (a). On
February 16, Fishback pleaded no contest to misdemeanor trespassing
and was convicted of the offense, while the remaining counts were
dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.
Judicially noticed documents submitted in connection with the
demurrer showed that in October 2020, judgment in a civil action, filed
in July 2015, was entered in favor of the People and the County of Los
Angeles against Fishback and a corporation associated with him. The
judgment concluded that Fishback operated an unpermitted dump on
his property, and graded and altered the land in an unpermitted
manner, including by erecting an unpermitted structure. Fishback
imported massive amounts of soil, concrete, brick, demolition debris,
and construction waste material to the property, charging $100 to $120
per truckload. The court found that Fishback created a public nuisance
and a serious danger of hillside instability. A permanent injunction
was entered prohibiting Fishback from, among other things, allowing
medium-duty or larger trucks to enter the property, depositing or
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allowing to be deposited any fill material, including construction
material, and performing grading or excavation without proper
permits. Additionally, Fishback was assessed civil penalties in an
amount greater than $5 million for creating a public nuisance and for
violations of code.
Procedural History
After two prior demurrers were sustained with leave to amend,
Fishback filed the TAC in August 2023 for defamation and libel per se
against Campbell based on the April 22, 2014 email. Campbell’s
demurrer to the TAC relied on several grounds, including that, as a
government employee, he was immune from suit under Government
Code sections 820.2, 822.2, and 821.6.
In October 2023, the trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. The trial court based its ruling on a finding that
Campbell was immune from suit under Government Code sections
820.2 and 822.2.
Judgment was entered in April 2024. Fishback filed a timely
notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (Lazar v.
Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501.) “ ‘We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” (Blank v.
Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The TAC alleges a single cause of action for defamation/libel
per se. Defamation is a reputational injury, occurring via libel or
slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) “ ‘Defamation requires the intentional
publication of a false statement of fact that has a natural tendency to
injure the plaintiff’s reputation or that causes special damage.’ ” (J-M
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a
publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and
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(5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong
v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) Libel is publication of
defamatory matter by written or printed words. (Civ. Code, § 45.)
“[F]alse statements charging the commission of crime or tending
directly to injure a plaintiff in respect to his or her profession by
imputing dishonesty or questionable professional conduct are
defamatory per se.” (Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 383,
disapproved on another ground by Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 396, fn. 11.)
Based on the allegations of the TAC, Fishback is correct that
Campbell made a false and ostensibly defamatory statement in his
April 22, 2014 email by writing that, in criminal case number
8GF00031, Fishback “entered a no contest (guilty) plea.” While
Fishback was found to have committed a multitude of violations over
the years relating to his brazen scheme of operating unlawful,
environmentally destructive, and dangerous solid waste disposal sites,
the particular prosecution referenced in Campbell’s email did not result
in a no contest plea or guilty verdict. Nevertheless, we conclude that
Campbell was immune from suit under Government Code sections
821.6 and 822.2.
I. Government Code section 821.6
Government Code section 821.6 provides: “A public employee is
not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any
judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his
employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.”
The statute “applies to claims of injury arising from a public employee’s
initiation or prosecution of an official proceeding, whether the act was
allegedly done with malice and without probable cause . . . or was
allegedly tortious for other reasons.” (Leon v. County of Riverside
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 929 (Leon).) “The immunity is narrow in the
sense that it applies only if the conduct that allegedly caused the
plaintiff’s injuries was the institution or prosecution of an official
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proceeding. But this immunity is broad in the sense that it applies to
every such tort claim, whether formally labeled as a claim for malicious
prosecution or not. And where it applies, it is absolute, meaning that
‘the immunity is not conditioned on a showing that the defendant acted
in a reasonable or procedurally proper manner, or any similar
requirement.’ ” (Id. at p. 922.)
The immunity conferred by Government Code section 821.6 is
typically applied to “prosecuting attorneys and other similar
individuals.” (Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d
1426, 1436, disapproved on another ground in Quigley v. Garden
Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 815, fn. 8; see also
Miller v. Filter (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 652, 666 [the “immunity applies
to a public prosecutor”].) “The immunity is absolute, applying even if
the prosecutor ‘acts maliciously and without probable cause.’ ” (Miller,
supra, at p. 666.) A governmental immunity defense may be raised on
demurrer. (See Silva v. Langford (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 710, 723.)
Government Code section 821.6 does not protect acts that are
“merely investigatory.” (Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 926.) Rather, to
fall under Government Code section 821.6 immunity, the act must be
connected to the prosecution of an official proceeding. (Leon, at p. 926.)
As explained in Leon, if a plaintiff’s claims concern alleged harms from
the institution or prosecution of such proceedings, the defendant will be
immune under Government Code section 821.6 regardless of how the
plaintiff styles his cause of action. (Leon, at p. 922.)
Based on the allegations of the TAC, the content of Campbell’s
April 22, 2014 email is inseparable from the prosecutions and other
official proceedings concerning Fishback’s wrongdoing, and Campbell’s
act of writing and sending the email is therefore protected by the
absolute immunity afforded by section 821.6.
First, the email directly concerns the criminal case initiated and
prosecuted by Campbell in 2008 and 2009, describing the context of the
case and (incorrectly) the result. Campbell’s act of responding to
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Pang’s email regarding the case, and his act of prosecuting the case, fell
squarely within his duties as a deputy district attorney, as shown by
the deputy district attorney job description attached to the TAC.
Campbell’s email could not be construed as “merely investigatory.”
(See Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 926.) Rather, it was directly
connected to his prosecution of Fishback, and therefore is protected by
section 821.6.
Second, aside from the connection to the earlier prosecution, the
TAC’s allegations demonstrate that Campbell’s email was directly
related to legal proceedings—including the second criminal
prosecution—initiated in connection with and shortly after the email
was sent. After Fishback’s activities on the property resumed in early
2014, he sent emails to governmental officials, including Pang and
Campbell, complaining about surveillance of his property, and claiming
that officials were “making up fake violations.” In May 2014, shortly
after Campbell’s email was sent, a government employee noted that the
situation on Fishback’s property was “spinning out of control with more
dump trucks showing up,” and, in June 2014, a stop work order was
posted, which Fishback ignored. The Office of the Los Angeles County
Counsel noted in July 2014 that the district attorney was “considering
bringing a code enforcement action” and requested that “all the
departments involved assist the DA in putting the case(s) together,”
and a responding email noted that Campbell was involved in these
discussions. In July 2015, the County of Los Angeles filed the civil
action against Fishback for an injunction and civil penalties. Then, in
October 2015, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed
the second referenced misdemeanor criminal action against Fishback.
Of particular note, Fishback specifically alleges that Campbell’s
email was instrumental to these continued enforcement actions and the
criminal prosecution. The TAC states that Campbell’s April 22, 2014
email “sparked a firestorm of aggressive and unlawful statutory,
regulatory and local code enforcement to interfere with Fishback’s use
9
and enjoyment of his property,” and the TAC seeks as damages the
“enormous legal fees” Fishback “had to pay as a result of the
defamatory statements.”
Thus, treating the material facts as admitted, the TAC alleges
that Campbell’s email was not merely an isolated or investigatory act,
but part of an ongoing course of prosecutorial conduct directly tied to
official legal proceedings. The email was sent in Campbell’s capacity as
a deputy district attorney performing prosecutorial functions.
Accordingly, because Campbell’s email was directly connected to the
prosecution of official proceedings, he is entitled to absolute immunity
under Government Code section 821.6.
II. Government Code section 822.2
We further conclude that, based on the allegation of the TAC,
Campbell is additionally protected by governmental immunity under
Government Code section 822.2, which provides: “A public employee
acting in the scope of his employment is not liable for an injury caused
by his misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be
negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud, corruption
or actual malice.” The exception to this immunity provision only
applies if the public employee is “motivated by corruption or actual
malice, i.e., a conscious intent to deceive, vex, annoy or harm the
injured party.” (Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 401,
410 [overruled on another ground in Morehart v. County of Santa
Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743]; see also Curcini v. County of
Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 649 (Curcini).)
“Conclusory allegations” of corruption or malice are not
“sufficient to bring a fraud action within the exception of Government
Code section 822.2.” (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.)
Rather, “the pleader also must allege facts showing” the exception to
the immunity applies. (Ibid.)
As explained above, Campbell was acting in the scope of his
employment when he sent the April 22, 2014 email stating that
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Fishback “entered a no contest (guilty) plea in criminal case number
8GF00031.” Government Code section 822.2 therefore presumptively
applies, and to state a viable cause of action Fishback must sufficiently
allege that Campbell acted with corruption or actual malice in writing
and sending the email. (See Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.)
Fishback’s attempts to plead actual malice, however, are no more
than merely conclusory. The TAC’s allegations regarding malice rely
on circular reasoning or simply defining relevant terms. For example,
the TAC states: “Campbell’s emails prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Campbell engaged in conduct with malice, oppression,
and fraud. [¶] Malice means that Campbell acted with intent to cause
injury or that Campbell’s conduct was despicable and was done with a
willful and knowing disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiff. A
person acts with knowing disregard when the person is aware of the
probable dangerous consequences of the person’s conduct and
deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.”
Fishback argues that the fact that Campbell was the prosecutor
in the 2008 criminal action must mean he acted with malice when he
drafted and sent the email to Pang in 2014. Campbell’s email,
however, was sent approximately five years after resolution of the
criminal matter. The TAC’s allegations do not support a reasonable
inference that the email—which was sent internally and prompted by
Fishback’s wrongful conduct—was based on anything more than a
faulty memory of the disposition of a prosecution occurring years
before.
Indeed, Fishback implicitly acknowledges the defects in the TAC
when he argues in his briefing that the resolution of the 2008 criminal
action and the falsity contained in the Campbell email “are really the
only facts necessary to prove Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Defamation
Per Se.” This assertion ignores the protection afforded Campbell under
Government Code section 822.2. Without sufficient allegations of
corruption or actual malice, Fishback is unable to plead a viable
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defamation or libel cause of action. The TAC alleges no facts to show
Campbell’s conduct, even if knowingly wrongful, was motivated by
actual malice or corruption within the meaning of Government Code
section 822.2. The demurrer was therefore properly sustained on this
ground.
III. Leave to amend is not warranted
When a demurrer to a complaint is sustained without leave to
amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of
discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such
reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
Fishback does not carry his burden of demonstrating how his
complaint might be amended. He makes no attempt at proffering any
additional facts he could allege in a fourth amended complaint that
would render his sole claim for defamation/libel per se actionable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Campbell is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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