People v. Sandoval CA2/5

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Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Sandoval CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B335726

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA501906)
v.

GERARDO SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott. A. Taryle, and Sophia A.
Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5,1 defendant Gerardo
Sandoval moved to suppress evidence the police discovered in his
vehicle following a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant then entered a negotiated no contest plea to
possession of firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and
appeals from the judgment of conviction. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

At the hearing on defendant’s suppression motion, Los
Angeles Police Department Officer Manuel Rios testified that at
approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 16, 2021, he and his
partner, Officer Rangel, were on patrol when he observed
defendant drive through the limit line at the intersection of 33rd
Street and Grand Avenue, in violation of Vehicle Code section
22450. Officer Rios conducted a traffic stop of defendant’s
vehicle. During the traffic stop, Officer Rios approached the
driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle, informed defendant of the
violation, and requested his driver’s license. Defendant provided
a California identification card instead of a driver’s license.
When Officer Rios ran defendant’s identification card, the inquiry
result showed that it had expired.
Officer Rios observed that defendant had a pocketknife on
his person. For officer safety reasons, Officer Rios asked

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise noted.

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defendant to place the pocketknife on the dashboard and exit the
vehicle. As defendant exited the vehicle, Officer Rios observed a
black plastic baggie “on the passenger side door area” that
appeared to contain residue from a white crystalline substance.
When the trial court asked the officer to describe again what he
saw as defendant was stepping out of the vehicle, Officer Rios
stated he saw a white plastic baggie with a residue of a white
crystalline substance on it. The residue was the type typically
left after a baggie contained methamphetamine. Asked where he
saw the baggie, he responded, “The . . . driver’s side door.” He
also saw a white powdery substance that resembled
methamphetamine spread throughout the driver’s side
floorboard.
Officer Rios conducted a pat-down search of defendant’s
outer clothing for possible weapons and felt what he immediately
recognized to be a glass bowl or bulb pipe commonly used for
ingesting methamphetamine. Officer Rios handcuffed defendant
and escorted him to the sidewalk.
Based on his observations, Officer Rios believed there were
narcotics in defendant’s vehicle. Officer Rangel searched the
vehicle, without a warrant, and recovered a 9-millimeter
semiautomatic handgun from the rear passenger floorboard
behind the driver’s seat; the handgun had a magazine in it.
Officer Rangel recovered a second magazine from the center
console.
Defendant testified at the hearing on his suppression
motion that before the police officers pulled him over, he had
stopped at the intersection’s limit line. From that limit line,
defendant could not see southbound traffic. In order to make a

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safe right turn, he had to “[m]ake another stop to check if cars
[were] coming.”
Defendant admitted “the officer” found a “meth pipe” in his
pants pocket. He denied smoking methamphetamine in his
vehicle that night and said the pipe was empty. He also denied
having a baggie with crystal residue in his car or that there was a
crystallized substance on his vehicle’s floorboard.
Asked if he had a gun magazine containing ammunition in
the center console of his vehicle, defendant responded that he did
not remember having anything in the center console and that it
was his brother’s truck. He did not know if there was a gun on
the vehicle’s back seat floorboard. He had never handled a gun.

B. Motion to Suppress

On July 1, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the firearm and observations the officers made during
the traffic stop and searches of his person and vehicle. Defendant
argued the prosecution bore the burden of establishing the
warrantless search fell within an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.
In its opposition, the prosecution provided two different
grounds for denying the motion. First, the prosecution argued
that the “automobile exception” applied to the search and seizure.
Second, the prosecution argued that police performed a “‘stop and
frisk’” under a lawful stop and with the reasonable suspicion that
defendant was armed and dangerous.
On September 23, 2023, during oral argument of
defendant’s suppression motion, the prosecution argued Officer
Rios testified he stopped defendant’s vehicle because defendant

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failed to stop at a limit line in violation of Vehicle Code section
22450, subdivision (a). During his contact with defendant,
Officer Rios learned defendant was armed with a pocketknife,
giving him a reasonable belief defendant was armed. The officers
then conducted a pat down search and discovered the
methamphetamine pipe. They looked inside defendant’s vehicle
and observed baggies with residue and white powder on the
floorboard causing them to believe there were narcotics in the
vehicle. That reasonable belief gave them a basis to search the
vehicle which resulted in discovery of the gun and magazine.
In response, defendant contended the traffic stop and
resulting search were unlawful because the evidence showed
Officer Rios was unable to see defendant drive through the limit
line given the intersection’s configuration and Officer Rios’s
position.
The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion,
finding the prosecution had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant violated Vehicle Code section 22450,
subdivision (a)—i.e., that he failed to stop at the limit line. The
court believed Officer Rios’s testimony and disbelieved
defendant’s testimony. Accordingly, the search was justified.

C. Conviction

Following the denial of defendant’s suppression motion,
defendant pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a
felon. The trial court accepted the plea, suspended the imposition
of sentence, and placed defendant on formal probation for two
years subject to various terms and conditions.

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in not suppressing
the evidence of the firearm and observations the officers made
during the traffic stop and searches of his person and vehicle. He
argues that neither the search-incident-to-arrest exception nor
the automobile exception applied to the search. In his reply brief,
defendant acknowledges he did not make these arguments in the
trial court, but argues he did not forfeit them because it was the
prosecution’s burden to establish the search was lawful and the
parties presented arguments to the court about the search’s
validity.

A. Standard of Review

“[I]n ruling on a motion under section 1538.5 the superior
court sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility,
resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences, and hence
. . . on review of its ruling by appeal . . . all presumptions are
drawn in favor of the factual determinations of the superior court
and the appellate court must uphold the superior court’s express
or implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.]” (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718; accord,
People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 166.) On the facts so
found, an appellate court exercises independent judgment in
determining whether the search was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206,
1212.)

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B. Legal Principles

“Section 1538.5 governs motions to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of a search or seizure.” (People v. Williams
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127 (Williams).) Under section 1538.5,
subdivision (a)(1), “[a] defendant may move . . . to suppress as
evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a
search or seizure on the following ground[]: [¶] (A) The search
or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.”
It is a basic rule of Fourth Amendment law that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389
U.S. 347, 357, fns. omitted.) Among the exceptions to the
warrant requirement are a search incident to a lawful arrest and
the automobile exception.
The search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception applies in
two different contexts. “Police may search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 351.)
Under the automobile exception, police officers may search
a vehicle they stop if they have probable cause to believe it
contains contraband. (See United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S.
798, 820–821; People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1026,
1034.) Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.)

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“Once an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle under
the automobile exception, they ‘may conduct a probing search of
compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents
are not in plain view.’” (People v. McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
796, 801, quoting United States v. Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at
p. 800.) Given the widespread regulation of vehicles, a motorist
or occupant of a vehicle has significantly reduced expectations of
privacy. (See New York v. Class (1986) 475 U.S. 106, 112–113.)
When the basis of a motion to suppress is the lack of a
search warrant, a defendant’s section 1538.5 motion is sufficient,
“in the first instance,” if the motion simply asserts the absence of
a warrant and makes a prima facie showing supporting that
assertion. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) If a defendant
has a specific argument why a warrantless search or seizure was
unreasonable other than the lack of a warrant, the defendant
must specify the argument to give the prosecution an opportunity
to offer evidence on the point. (Ibid.) For example, if a defendant
believes the police failed to comply with the knock-notice
requirement in section 844, the defendant cannot “simply bring a
motion to suppress alleging a warrantless search or seizure and
then wait until the appeal to raise the knock-notice issue.”
(Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) The defendant must raise
the knock-notice issue in the trial court proceeding. (Ibid.)
“Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification
for a warrantless search or seizure, defendants must present any
arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.” (Williams,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) Accordingly, although the
“prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless
search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances,” “if
defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a

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flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to
admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.”
(Ibid.) “Defendants cannot . . . lay a trap for the prosecution by
remaining completely silent until the appeal about issues the
prosecution may have overlooked.” (Id. at p. 131.) The failure “to
bring an issue to the attention of the trial court and the opposing
party . . . waives the right to raise the issue on appeal.” (Id. at
p. 128; see also People v. Oldham (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1, 14–
15.)

C. Analysis

1. Forfeiture

In his motion to suppress evidence, defendant argued the
firearm and the officers’ observations should be suppressed
because the searches of his person and vehicle were without a
warrant and were thus presumptively illegal. During oral
argument on his suppression motion, in response to the
prosecution’s proffered justification of the searches, defendant,
through counsel, argued the traffic stop was unlawful because
Officer Rios could not have observed defendant cross the limit
line. Counsel stated, “The issue is: what was the basis for the
initial stop?” He explained, “[T]he only issue then is whether the
officer could have seen, from where he was when he negotiated
that left turn onto Grand from Jefferson, could he have possibly
seen anybody who had legally stopped at the limit line from that
perspective.”
On appeal, for the first time, defendant claims the trial
court erred in denying his suppression motion because neither

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the search-incident-to-arrest exception nor the automobile
exception applied to the search. Although the prosecution raised
the automobile exception in its opposition to defendant’s
suppression motion, defendant did not contest that the exception
applied. The sole issue below was whether the stop itself was
lawful. Because defendant failed to bring these two issues to the
attention of the opponent and the trial court, he “waive[d] the
right to raise the issue[s] on appeal.” (Williams, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 128.)

2. Automobile Exception

Even if defendant did not forfeit his challenge to the
automobile exception, we would affirm because the officers had
probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile
exception.2 The automobile exception applied to the search
because the officers had probable cause to search for narcotics.
Officer Rios observed a white powdery substance spread
throughout the vehicle’s driver’s side floorboard. Officer Rios also
saw a plastic bag in the vehicle with a white residue that looked
like methamphetamine. Defendant was carrying a glass pipe
used to smoke methamphetamine. These observations provided
probable cause for a lawful search because they established a fair
probability officers would find narcotics within defendant’s
vehicle. (See Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.)
Accordingly, the warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle fell
within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.

2 Having decided the automobile exception applied to the
search, we need not discuss the search-incident-to-arrest
exception.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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