CourtListener 10660184•Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co.
Texto completo
Filed 7/25/25; Certified for Publication 8/25/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ALLISON BJOIN, Individually B335334
and as Personal Representative,
etc., (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV30709)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
J-M MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Graciela Freixes, Judge. Affirmed.
Weitz & Luxenberg, Benno Ashrafi and Josiah Parker for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Manning Gross & Massenburg (MG+M), Carrie S. Lin;
Miller Barondess, Nadia A. Sarkis, James Nikraftar; Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeff A. Miller and Florence A.
McClain for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________
After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin (Bjoin)
and his wife Allison brought this action against J-M
Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that
Bjoin’s cancer was caused by dust created when he cut JMM’s
asbestos cement pipe (AC pipe) with a power saw in the 1980’s.
A jury found in favor of JMM on effectively all causes of action.
The jury specifically found in favor of JMM on its sophisticated
user and product misuse affirmative defenses, which were
defenses to his causes of action for failure to warn and design
defect. The jury also found in favor of JMM on Bjoin’s cause of
action for general negligence.
Bjoin appeals from the judgment entered after trial. He
contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s findings
on the two affirmative defenses and therefore necessarily
insufficient to support the negligence verdict. The burden of
proving insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict is
extremely high, and Bjoin has not met it.
Bjoin also contends the trial court erred in permitting JMM
to offer evidence of the California Occupational Safety and
Health Administation (Cal-OSHA) regulations in place during
the time Bjoin was working with AC pipe. He has waived this
claim by failing to provide the appropriate legal standard of
review and cogent argument explaining how he was prejudiced by
this evidence. He further contends the trial court erred in
granting nonsuit on his cause of action for fraudulent
concealment. Although we do not agree with the rationale of the
trial court’s order, we find the ruling correct. We affirm the
judgment.
2
BACKGROUND
When Bjoin was about 10 years old, his parents divorced.
He spent summers with his father H. Bjoin in Southern
California. Bjoin worked for his father informally until 1977,
when he was about 16 years old. Beginning in the summer of
1977, Bjoin went to went for his father’s company, then called
Frontier Constructors. The company did sewer, water and drain
work. Bjoin began laying pipe that summer. Bjoin again worked
for his father’s company in the summer of 1978.
Bjoin graduated from high school in 1979 and began
attending the University of Montana. He quit college in 1981 for
financial reasons and went to work full-time for his father’s
company, then called H.A. Bjoin & Sons (Bjoin & Sons). As early
as 1981, Bjoin cut AC pipe and did so with a power saw.
At some point after Bjoin started working for Bjoin & Sons,
Bjoin’s father simply disappeared one day. Testimony about the
year varies. Bjoin’s Social Security statement shows full-time
income from Bjoin & Sons for 1982 but does not reflect any
income at all for 1983. Bjoin testified this was the period when
he continued to work on projects for Bjoin & Sons; he was paid in
cash under the table by the clients. When asked why he took it
upon himself to continue the business after his father left, Bjoin
testified that his father left all his equipment and there were jobs
he could finish, “[s]o it seemed like the best thing to do at that
time was just try to pick it up and see if we can make it work, Bill
[Bevilacqua] and I.”
Around the same time, in 1983, Johns-Manville underwent
a corporate restructuring. JMM and its sister company J-M/AC
were founded to purchase Johns-Manville’s former pipe division,
including its former AC and PVC pipe businesses; Johns-
3
Manville later went out of business due to asbestos injury
lawsuits. Under this arrangement, J-M/AC manufactured AC
pipe, while JMM was the exclusive supplier of the pipe. JMM
was also responsible for health and safety at both companies.
This founding in 1983 marks the beginning of JMM’s liability in
this action.
In October 1984, Bjoin and Bevilacqua incorporated their
own business, Bevilacqua & Bjoin (B & B), which specialized in
laying pipe. Bjoin owned 40 percent of the company. The
company did most of its business between 1984 and 1990. The
men began winding down the business around 1990, although
Social Security records indicate it lasted until early 1992. When
B & B ended, Bjoin and Bevilacqua threw all the company’s
paper records into a dumpster. Bjoin had no B & B documents in
his possession at the time of trial.
Bjoin worked for a number of other companies until 2021,
when he was diagnosed with lung cancer.
Bjoin subsequently brought this action against
10 defendants. By trial, only three defendants remained: JMM;
Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. (Ferguson), which supplied
CertainTeed AC pipe to Bjoin’s worksites; and Industrial
Holdings Corporation (formerly Carborundum) which made a
cutting wheel that Bjoin believed he used to cut AC pipe.
At trial, Bjoin testified that he had cut JMM AC pipe with
a power saw between 1978 and 1988, but most frequently from
1983 to 1985; the act of cutting produced a large quantity of dust;
he did not wear a respirator while using a power saw; and he
never saw a warning label on JMM’s pipe. He did not learn that
AC pipe was hazardous until the mid-1990s. Bjoin contended
that warning labels should have stated that the pipe should not
4
be cut with a power saw, the dust from such cutting could cause
cancer, and the risk of cancer could be mitigated by wearing a
respirator. Bjoin testified he would have worn a respirator if he
had been properly warned.
JMM responded to Bjoin’s evidence and argument in
several ways. As relevant to this appeal, JMM argued and
offered evidence in support of two affirmative defenses: 1) Bjoin
was a sophisticated user of AC pipe; and 2) the use of a power
saw to cut AC pipe was, by 1983, so highly extraordinary as not
to be a reasonably foreseeable misuse of the pipe. For the
reasons set forth in the discussion section below, we need not and
do not consider this evidence in detail.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted JMM’s
motion for nonsuit on Bjoin’s fraudulent concealment claim.
During jury deliberations, Bjoin settled with Industrial Holdings
Corporation.
The jury made its findings as to JMM and Ferguson on a
lengthy and detailed special verdict form. The jury first found
that Bjoin was exposed to asbestos from AC pipe supplied by
JMM and Ferguson. It also found that his exposure from JMM’s
AC pipe was a substantial factor in risk of developing lung
cancer, but his exposure from Ferguson’s AC pipe was not. 1
The jury then turned to the affirmative defenses, finding
Bjoin was a sophisticated user of JMM’s AC pipe and then
finding the use of a power saw to cut or bevel AC pipe was so
highly extraordinary that it was not reasonably foreseeable to
defendants, and therefore should be considered as the sole cause
1 Bjoin has not challenged the jury verdict in favor of
Ferguson, and Ferguson is not a party to this appeal.
5
of Bjoin’s injuries. As a result of the product misuse finding, the
jury was directed by the verdict form to skip to question 22,
which concerned the negligence cause of action. Thus, the jury
did not answer any intervening questions related to Bjoin’s strict
product liability cause of action for failure to warn or his strict
product liability cause of action for design defect. The jury found
JMM was not negligent.
Bjoin filed a motion for a new trial on his claims against
JMM. He argued JMM’s evidence was insufficient to show he
was a sophisticated user between 1983 and 1984; he contended
he was just a pipe layer during that time. Bjoin also contended
the evidence was insufficient to justify the product misuse verdict
because the evidence showed it was common in the 1980’s to use
a power saw to cut AC pipe. The trial court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“An appellate court ‘ “must presume that the record
contains evidence to support every finding of fact . . . .” ’
[Citations] It is the appellant’s burden, not the court’s, to
identify and establish deficiencies in the evidence. [Citation.]
This burden is a ‘daunting’ one.” (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409 (Huong Que).) The appellant bears this
burden on appeal, even if he did not bear the burden of proof in
the trial court proceedings. (See Claudio v. Regents of University
of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230 [summary
judgment motion].)
At a minimum, a party challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a particular finding “ ‘must summarize the
evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how
and why it is insufficient.’ ” (Huong Que, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th
6
at p. 409.) 2 The appellant “ ‘cannot shift this burden onto
respondent, nor is a reviewing court required to undertake an
independent examination of the record when appellant has
shirked his responsibility in this respect.’ ” (Ibid.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, our review
“begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the
entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, [that] will support the [jury’s] determination.”
(Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874, italics
omitted.) Evidence that supports the judgment must be accepted,
conflicting evidence must be rejected, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict. (Toste v.
CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 366
(Toste); Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621,
630–631.) “We do not review the evidence to see if there is
substantial evidence to support the losing party’s version of
events, but only to see if substantial evidence exists to support
the verdict in favor of the prevailing party.” (Pope, supra,
229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245.) “Even if the jury’s findings are
against the weight of the evidence, they will be upheld if
supported by evidence that is of ponderable legal significance and
reasonable in nature.” (Toste, at p. 366.)
2 The Fourth District Court of Appeal has described an
appellant’s burden in even stronger terms. (Pope v. Babick (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 (Pope) [“Appellants’ ‘fundamental
obligation to this court, and a prerequisite to our consideration of
their challenge’ [Citation], is to ‘set forth the version of events
most favorable to [respondent ]’ ”].)
7
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury’s Finding in
Favor of JMM on the Sophisticated User Affirmative
Defense
JMM asserted a sophisticated user affirmative defense to
Bjoin’s claims. Under the sophisticated user defense, a
manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product
for failure to warn about the product’s dangers if the
sophisticated user knew or should have known of the dangers.
(Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 65
(Johnson).)
“The ‘should have known’ portion of the formulation is an
objective standard. [Citation.] It examines what is generally
known or should have been known to the class of sophisticated
users at the time of the plaintiff's injury.” (Collin v. CalPortland
Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601.) The defense applies to both
strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims. (Johnson,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 71.)
Here, the jury was instructed: “Defendants claim that they
are not responsible for any harm to plaintiffs based on a failure to
warn because Kirt Bjoin was a sophisticated user of asbestos
cement pipe. To succeed on this defense, defendants must prove
that, at the time of the product use, Kirt Bjoin, because of his
particular position, training, experience, knowledge, or skill,
knew or should have known of the asbestos cement pipe’s risk,
harm or danger.” On the special verdict form, the jury answered
yes to the question “Was Kirt Bjoin a sophisticated user of
asbestos cement pipe throughout the entire time that he was
exposed to asbestos cement pipe supplied by [JMM]?”
8
Bjoin contends that “the entire time” must be subdivided
into two periods: 1) 1983–1984, during which he was a simple
pipe-laying laborer, and 2) 1984–1990, when he was a co-owner
of, employer and supervisor at B & B. Bjoin’s claim of error on
appeal concerns only this first time period. He claims JMM failed
to show that a simple pipe-laying laborer should have known of
the dangers of cutting asbestos cement pipe with a power saw.
Bjoin has waived this claim by failing to set forth all the
material evidence in the record on the issue of whether he was an
ordinary laborer. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971)
3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman) [appellant is “ ‘required to set forth
in their brief all the material evidence on the point, and not
merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is
deemed to be waived’ ”].)
Bjoin’s selection of the 1983 start date reflects the
formation of JMM. It also loosely coincides with the abrupt
departure of Bjoin’s father, who ran Bjoin & Sons. The 1984 end
date reflects the formal incorporation of B & B. Bjoin contends
that the knowledge of these two categories of users is different.
He treats it as essentially undisputed that he was a simple pipe-
laying laborer. He fails to address the evidence that he was more
than a simple pipe laying laborer prior to the incorporation of
B & B.
Bevilacqua testified that although Bjoin was a laborer at
Bjoin & Sons in 1982, “he actually became a supervisor, I believe,
towards the end.” According to Bevilacqua, the duty of a
supervisor was primarily to direct crews. And, “at the very end
when his dad left, he was mostly in the office.”
9
Samuel Wathen worked with Bjoin for about a year, ending
in 1983. Wathen described Bjoin as performing a variety of
tasks: “He kind of roamed around—he checked grade for the
excavator. He helped lay pipe. He generally helped and he was
generally just learning the business. He was fresh out of
school[.]”
Dave Baumann characterized Bjoin as a “laborer,” but
described Bjoin’s specific job duties as “[a]nywhere from following
the backhoe to make sure the ditch was in order to laying the
pipe.” Bjoin has not pointed to evidence of a formal definition of
laborer, but making sure a ditch is in order could reasonably be
viewed as supervisory work. This would be consistent with
Bevilacqua’s definition of a supervisor as one who directs crews,
and of a laborer as someone who used a shovel or jackhammer,
carried pipe and laid pipe, basically working with their hands in
the field.
Bjoin’s own testimony indicates he was more than simply a
pipe layer in 1983–1984, during the transition period between
Bjoin & Sons and B & B. Bjoin’s background was more than
simply a pipe layer at Bjoin & Sons. When asked if he was a
foreman with his father’s company by 1981 and 1982, Bjoin
replied: “I helped supervise—run some work as a foreman, but it
would be like lining out trucks or doing stuff. I wasn’t really
running crews. I guess you could consider me a foreman.” When
asked why he took it upon himself to continue the business after
his father left, Bjoin testified that his father left all his
equipment and there were jobs he could finish, “[s]o it seemed
like the best thing to do at that time was just try to pick it up and
see if we can make it work, Bill [Bevilacqua] and I.” “We still had
all the contacts.” Bjoin agreed he interfaced with the companies
10
that were paying him and his crew, along with Bill. As they got
closer to formulating their own company, Bjoin would be the one
responsible for renting equipment or ordering materials. 3
Bjoin does not mention, let alone discuss, the implications
of the evidence described above. At a minimum, this evidence on
its face is favorable to JMM and inconsistent with Bjoin’s claim
that he was simply a pipe-laying laborer. The omission of this
evidence, and any analysis of it, is sufficient to support a finding
of waiver. Moreover, this evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to JMM, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference
that Bjoin (and Bevilacqua) were the owners and/or supervisors
of the entity that performed pipe installation in the period
between the disappearance of Bjoin’s father and the formal
incorporation of B & B. A business can take many legal forms in
California, and we do not view the formal incorporation of B & B
as determinative.
By failing to show there was no evidence that he was more
than a simple pipe-layer in 1983–1984, Bjoin has waived his
claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict
that he was a sophisticated user in 1983–1984. Therefore, we
need not and do not consider his claim that simple pipe-laying
3 Bjoin did testify that all the people from Bjoin & Sons who
continued working during this time worked on their own, there
was no structure and everyone “pretty much” just went around
doing what they wanted. This testimony comes close to being
incredible on its face, given that, pipes were laid pursuant to a
precise plan developed by engineers and the pipe laying itself was
not a single person job – it required coordination among a team of
workers performing different tasks.
11
laborers were not aware that they could mitigate the risk of using
a power saw by wearing a respirator.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury Finding in
Favor of JMM on the Affirmative Defense of Product Misuse
The trial court instructed the jury using a fact specific
version of CACI No. 1245, as follows: “Defendants claim that
they are not responsible for plaintiffs’ claimed harm because the
asbestos cement pipe was misused after it left defendants’
possession. To succeed on this defense, defendants must prove
that: [¶] 1. The asbestos cement pipe was misused after it left
defendants’ possession; and [¶] 2. The misuse was so highly
extraordinary that it was not reasonably foreseeable to
defendants and therefore should be considered as the sole cause
of plaintiffs’ harm.” The use note for CACI No. 1245 states that
this defense applies to strict liability claims. (Judicial Council of
California Civil Jury Instruction No. 1245.) As a practical
matter, in this case the instruction was relevant only to Bjoin’s
cause of action for design defect strict liability. 4
Bjoin contends the evidence was insufficient to support an
instruction on product misuse and insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict on this defense. We hold that Bjoin has waived
both claims.
4 Bjoin also alleged a cause of action for strict liability failure
to warn, but as set forth above, the sophisticated user defense
applied to and defeated that cause of action.
The trial court instructed the jury on strict liability design
defect using fact specific versions of CACI 1203 (consumer
expectations test) and 1204 (risk-benefit test).
12
1. Instruction
Bjoin has waived any separate claim of instructional error.
There is no dispute that giving an instruction which is not
supported by the evidence is error, but Bjoin has failed to provide
a standard of review for such error and has failed to demonstrate
prejudice from any error. In a footnote in his reply brief, citing
Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
292, 303 (Joyce), Bjorn states: “Contrary to JMM’s insistence
otherwise, if the product misuse instruction was ‘not supported
by the evidence [and was] likely to mislead the jury,’ then it
necessarily ‘divert[ed]’ jurors ‘from the real issues before them’
and prejudiced the proceedings.” This is a misleading quote from
Joyce and does not correctly state the law on this topic. 5
As a general rule, giving the jury a legally correct
instruction unsupported by the evidence is harmless when the
jury is also instructed to disregard any instructions it finds are
not supported by the evidence. (Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.
(1971) 6 Cal.3d 361, 371.) The jury received such an instruction
5 The Court of Appeal in Joyce stated: “An instruction correct
in the abstract, may not be given where it is not supported by the
evidence or is likely to mislead the jury.” (Joyce, supra,
110 Cal.App.4th at p. 303, italics added.) The Joyce court
described the special instructions requested by the defendant as
“argumentative and confusing.” (Ibid.) Bjoin has not made any
argument that CACI No. 1245 is argumentative or confusing.
More importantly, the trial court in Joyce rejected the requested
instructions. (Ibid.) We see no discussion in Joyce of prejudice
from giving an unsupported instruction, no doubt because the
instructions at issue were never given.
13
here. 6 While there may be exceptions to this general rule, Bjoin
has not offered any legal or factual argument that this case
should be an exception.
2. Verdict
Bjoin’s attack on the jury finding on the defense of product
misuse is twofold. First, he contends that “the overwhelming
evidence at trial was that using power saws to cut AC pipe during
the 1980s was a known risk.” Next, he acknowledges that
foreseeable product misuse can be a viable defense when the
manufacturer has warned against such misuse, but he contends
JMM’s warnings were legally inadequate.
We would not characterize the evidence described by Bjoin
as “overwhelming.” But the weight of the evidence is not the
determinative factor in our review for sufficiency of the evidence
to support a verdict. “Even if the jury’s findings are against the
weight of the evidence, they will be upheld if supported by
evidence that is of ponderable legal significance and reasonable
in nature.” (Toste, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.)
Bjoin has failed to set forth the evidence favorable to JMM
and the jury’s finding, as required, and so has waived this claim.
(Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) To give just one example,
Bjoin claims in his opening brief “[e]very witness who worked in
the pipe-laying industry during the 1980s—including Mr. Bjoin;
his coworkers, Mr. Baumann, Mr. Bevilacqua, and Mr. Wathen;
6 The jury was instructed: “After you have decided what the
facts are, you may find that some instructions do not apply. In
that case, follow the instructions that do apply and use them
together with the facts to reach your verdict.”
14
and JMM’s construction expert, Mr. Stone—testified that power
saws were still used to cut AC pipe during that time. (Section II.,
A., 4., supra.)” There is only one section of Bjoin’s brief labelled
with the number 4, and we see no reference to Michael Stone in
that section. If anything, Stone’s testimony was that he stopped
using a power saw in 1979 and the use of power saws to cut AC
pipe essentially stopped after 1980 or 1981. Stone was testifying
as an expert and so could speak to the industry as a whole. The
witnesses identified by Bjoin were his co-workers during the
1980’s. They did not qualify as experts and so could testify only
to their personal observations, which were limited.
The remainder of Bjoin’s evidence is inferences from the
prior approval of power saw usage, the continued existence of
Cal-OSHA regulations barring the use of power saw to cut AC
pipe and JMM’s warnings against power saw usage. Bjoin,
however, fails to draw these inferences in favor of the jury’s
finding, as is required. (Toste, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.)
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the evidence
was undisputed that some use of power saws continued into the
1980’s and so was a foreseeable risk, Bjoin acknowledges product
misuse can be a viable defense even to a reasonably foreseeable
risk if the manufacturer provides an adequate warning of the
risk. We agree with Bjoin that the sophisticated user finding is
not a finding that JMM’s warnings were adequate. It is a finding
that warnings were unnecessary. 7 Bjoin does not, however,
discuss the effect of the sophisticated user finding on the product
misuse defense. Specifically, Bjoin does not discuss whether a
7 The product misuse instruction did not require any finding
by the jury about the adequacy of warnings against misuse.
15
sophisticated user’s knowledge of the dangers of misuse could act
as a substitute for a defendant’s warning when the defendant
asserts a product misuse defense.
In Johnson, the Court implicitly recognized that a
sophisticated user defense could have relevance to product
misuse issues. The Court pointed out that “numerous generally
safe products exist that can become hazardous when the proper
precautions are not followed. Although manufacturers are
responsible for products that contain dangers of which the public
is unaware, they are not insurers, even under strict liability, for
the mistakes or carelessness of consumers who should know of
the dangers involved. [Citation.] Accordingly, we adopt the
[sophisticated user] defense in California.” (Johnson, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 70.) This suggests that a sophisticated user’s
knowledge of the dangers of misuse could be a substitute for an
adequate warning of the dangers of misuse. 8 If so, JMM would
not be liable for any foreseeable misuse by Bjoin. This failure to
cite and analyze relevant law is an additional ground for waiver. 9
8 The Johnson Court did expressly decline to decide whether
a plaintiff could negate the sophisticated user defense “by
showing that the sophisticated user’s misuse of the product was
foreseeable.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 69, fn. 5.)
9 Bjoin has also failed to explain how he would be prejudiced
by an unsupported product misuse finding with respect to his
consumer expectations theory of strict liability design defect,
given the sophisticated user finding. Division 5 of this District
Court of Appeal has indicated in dicta that a sophisticated user
defense applies in design defect cases, specifically under the
consumer expectation theory of a design defect. (Johnson v.
Honeywell Internat. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 558, fn. 4,
16
(See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 (United Grand) [We may and do
“ ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt.’ ”)
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury’s Verdict
that JMM Was Not Negligent
The jury found in favor of JMM on Bjoin’s cause of action
for general negligence. Bjoin claims that because there was no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s sophisticated user and
product misuse verdicts, the jury’s verdict that JMM was not
negligent must be reversed as well. We have found that Bjoin
has failed to show insufficient evidence to support those findings.
As a result, his claim of insufficient evidence to support the
negligence verdict fails as well.
D. Motion in Limine to Exclude Cal-OSHA Regulations
Bjoin contends the trial court’s denial of his motion in
limine to exclude reference to Cal-OSHA regulations violated
559 [plaintiff alleged only a risk-benefit design defect theory, not
consumer expectations].) The First District Court of Appeal has
agreed with Johnson. (Watts v. Pneumo Abex, LLC (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 248, 260.) Both courts agree that a sophisticated
user is not an ordinary consumer, and so a sophisticated user
may not prevail on a design defect cause of action under the
consumer expectation theory. Bjoin does not acknowledge these
cases or attempt to distinguish them.
17
Labor Code 10 section 6304.5 and the holding of Elsner v. Uveges
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 915 (Elsner). We find Bjoin has waived this
claim.
From 1972 to 1999, section 6304.5 limited the introduction
of Cal-OSHA regulations to employer-employee lawsuits; the
regulations could not be introduced at all in a lawsuit by an
employee against a third party tortfeasor. (Elsner, supra,
34 Cal.4th at p. 926.) In 1999, the legislature amended section
6304.5 to provide that, “[i]n general, plaintiffs may use Cal–
OSHA provisions to show a duty or standard of care to the same
extent as any other regulation or statute, whether the defendant
is their employer or a third party. The lone exception arises
when the state is the defendant.” (Id. at pp. 926, 935–936.)
When the defendant’s wrongful conduct occurs after the
1999 amendment, application of section 6304.5 is
straightforward. When, as here, the conduct occurred before
1999, section 6304.5 may not be used to retroactively “ ‘change[]
the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or
different liabilities based upon such conduct[]’ ” or to
“ ‘substantially affect[] existing rights and obligations[.]’ ”
(Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 937.) Elsner involved such pre-
1999 conduct, and the Court in Elsner considered the three
specific reasons section 6304.5 was used in that case: “to allow
Cal-OSHA provisions to be introduced to establish a duty of care,
to allow Cal-OSHA provisions to be introduced to establish the
standard of care, and to allow the burden of proof to shift to
[defendant] once a violation of Cal-OSHA was found.” (Elsner, at
p. 937.) Under the facts of the Elsner case, the regulations used
10 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
18
did not expand the duty of care and so their use was not
impermissibly retroactive. But the latter two uses did change the
standard of care and shift the burden of proof and so were
improper retroactive uses of the regulations.
Bjoin focuses on the three specific uses in Elsner and
contends that an improper retroactive application of section
6304.5 occurs whenever a Cal-OSHA regulation (a) expands a
party’s duty of care, (b) sets a new standard of care for the party
that didn’t exist at the time of the alleged conduct, or (c) changes
the evidentiary burdens with respect to that party’s past conduct.
(Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 937–938.) This is true as far as
it goes. Bjoin then contends that “[i]nstead of barring evidence of
any Cal-OSHA provision that expanded a party’s duty of care, or
which set a standard of care that did not exist under the common
law, the order allowed unfettered evidence of specific pre-1999
Cal-OSHA provisions provided the jury did not consider them in
determining whether any person or entity was at fault for the
Plaintiffs’ harm.”
Although “[a] trial court’s determination of the
admissibility of evidence . . . is generally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion,” “[t]o the extent the trial court’s ruling depends on the
proper interpretation of [a statute], it presents a question of law;
and [its] review is de novo.” (People v. Walker (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 782, 794–795, fn. omitted.)
We do not agree with Bjoin’s characterization of the trial
court’s ruling. As Bjoin acknowledges in an earlier section of his
opening brief, the trial court stated: “[T]his Court would like to
make clear that . . . Defendants may not refer to OSHA or
Cal/OSHA guidelines to expand the common law duty of care
plaintiff owed to his employees and to himself[.]” The trial court
19
also stated: “The use of Cal/OSHA provisions to establish the
standard of care and shift the burden of proof to plaintiff would
be improper and violate the holding of Elsner vs. Uveges.” Bjoin’s
characterization of the court’s ruling is based on the trial court’s
comments during the discussion of potential special jury
instructions on the use of Cal-OSHA regulations and cannot be
reasonably understood as negating these quoted statements,
particularly since the trial court ultimately did not give any such
special instruction.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial
court’s ruling did erroneously permit such use, Bjoin would still
bear the burden of showing that such impermissible use in fact
occurred; not all references to Cal-OSHA regulations are
improper. As the analysis in Elsner shows, Bjoin would have to
cite law or evidence showing what the pre-existing (common law)
duty of care and standard of care were, and how Cal-OSHA
regulations differed. Bjoin would similarly have to explain how
the use of Cal-OSHA regulations shifted a previously-existing
burden of proof. (See Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 937–938.)
We see no such citations or explanations. Simply citing instances
where specific regulations were admitted into evidence is not
enough, particularly, when the regulations are admissible for the
relevant purposes of showing knowledge and foreseeability
(which is relevant to the scope of the duty of care). (See Kesner v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1146–1147.) These
omissions alone are sufficient to support our waiver finding.
(United Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 [We may and do
“ ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
20
adopt’ ” as well as arguments that are not supported by specific
citations to the record.].)
Bjoin has also waived his claim by failing to cite and apply
the standard of review for prejudice from the erroneous
admission of evidence. Prejudice is not presumed from the
erroneous admission of evidence. (Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 786, 799.) It is the appellant’s burden to
establish that the error was prejudicial. (Ibid.) The standard of
review is not obscure and can be found in Elsner: “We will not
reverse a judgment unless ‘after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a
‘miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) In the case of
civil state law error, this standard is met when ‘there is a
reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached.’ ” (Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 939.)
When Bjoin does finally address the issue of prejudice in
his reply brief, he first treats the facts of his case as identical to
the facts of Elsner, and, at best, implicitly relies on the trial
court’s analysis and finding of prejudice in that case. Bjoin also
complains of the use of the Cal-OSHA regulations to show
knowledge for sophisticated users and lack of foreseeability for
product misuse. Although we do not consider arguments made
for the first time in a reply brief (United Grand, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 158), we note the facts of this case are not
the same as those in Elsner,11 JMM relied on additional evidence
11 To give just one example, in Elsner, “the trial court granted
Elsner's motion in limine, excluding any testimony of industry
21
to support both affirmative defenses, and Bjoin does not address
Kesner, which at least arguably permits the use of regulations to
show knowledge and foreseeability.
E. Nonsuit on the Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment
We review de novo an order granting nonsuit. (Castaneda
v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1214–1215.) A trial court “may
not grant a defendant’s motion for nonsuit if plaintiff’s evidence
would support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” (Campbell v.
General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117–118.) In
determining whether a plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, we do not
weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. We
accept as true the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff,
disregard conflicting evidence and draw all legitimate inferences
from the evidence in the plaintiff’s favor. (Ibid.) “[W]here a
nonsuit has been granted for the wrong reason but the order
itself is correct based on other grounds,” we will affirm. (Devin v.
United Services Auto. Assn. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.)
“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are
(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a
defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant
intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or
suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and
would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact
was known; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of
custom and practice at odds with the requirements of Cal-OSHA
provisions.” (Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 939.) Here, the trial
court expressly instructed the jury that it could “consider customs
or practices in the community in deciding whether plaintiff or
defendant acted reasonably.”
22
the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan
v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40 (Rattagan).)
Here, the trial court found that there was sufficient
evidence of a duty to disclose on JMM’s part, but insufficient
evidence of the other elements of concealment. Bjoin contends
the trial court erred in finding insufficient evidence of the other
elements. JMM contends there is insufficient evidence of the
direct relationship needed to create a duty to disclose, and the
nonsuit must be upheld on that alternate ground. We agree with
JMM.
The California Supreme Court has recently summarized
the law of fraudulent concealment as follows: A duty to disclose
requires “a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as
‘between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee,
doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of
contractual agreement. [Citation.] All of these relationships are
created by transactions between parties from which a duty to
disclose facts material to the transaction arises under certain
circumstances.’ ([LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
326, 337].) ‘Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct
dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise
between the defendant and the public at large.’ (Bigler-Engler v.
Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 82].)”
(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 40–41.)
Bjoin argues for a broader basis for a duty to disclose and
relies on Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. and Bader v. Johnson &
Johnson (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1094 (Bader) to support his
argument. Specifically, Bjoin relies on one sentence from Bigler:
“The evidence also does not show that [manufacturer] Breg
directly advertised its products to consumers such as Engler or
23
that it derived any monetary benefit directly from Engler’s
individual rental of the Polar Care device.” (Bigler-Engler v.
Breg, Inc, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 314 (Bigler).) Bjoin also
relies on Bader’s adoption of Bigler, 12 and its statement that a
duty to disclose could be found in the case before it because there
was evidence “showing that [manufacturer] J&J was involved in
retail sales of JBP [talcum powder] to consumers and profited
therefrom.” (Bader, at p. 1132.) From these two statements,
Bjoin posits a broad rule that a duty to disclose relationship is
created between a manufacturer and a consumer when a
manufacturer advertises its products to consumers or profits from
the sale of its products to consumers. We do not agree that Bigler
created such a broad duty to disclose.
Before discussing the state of evidence in the case before it,
the Bigler court had accurately summarized exiting law as
follows: “ ‘A duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties
are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as “ ‘seller
and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and
patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual
arrangement.’ ” ’ [Citation.] [¶] Our Supreme Court has
described the necessary relationship giving rise to a duty to
disclose as a ‘transaction’ between the plaintiff and defendant
. . . . Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct
dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise
12 The Bader court stated: “A proper instruction under Bigler-
Engler thus would have instructed the jury here to consider
whether similar evidence of transactions, advertising, or J&J’s
direct monetary benefit supported the transactional
requirement.” (Bader, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.)
24
between the defendant and the public at large.” (Bigler, supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312.) The court then specifically found:
“An essential element underlying Engler’s claim for intentional
concealment, a duty to disclose, is absent here because there was
no evidence of a relationship between Engler (or her parents) and
Breg sufficient to give rise to a duty to disclose. Breg did not
transact with Engler or her parents in any way.” (Id. at p. 314.)
The sentence upon which Bjoin relies is found in the Bigler
court’s subsequent laundry list of absent evidence in the case.
“Engler obtained her Polar Care device from Oasis, based on a
prescription written by [Dr. David] Chao, all without Breg’s
involvement. The evidence does not show Breg knew—prior to
this lawsuit—that Engler was a potential user of the Polar Care
device, that she was prescribed the Polar Care device, or that she
used the Polar Care device. The evidence also does not show that
Breg directly advertised its products to consumers such as Engler
or that it derived any monetary benefit directly from Engler’s
individual rental of the Polar Care device. Indeed, Oasis appears
to have obtained the Polar Care device Engler used from Breg
several years before Engler’s surgery and maintained the device
itself for rental to its patients.” (Bigler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at
p. 314.)
We do not believe the Bigler court intended to greatly
expand the well settled law on fraudulent concealment, which it
had just summarized, solely by its description of evidence that
had not been offered in the case, without any supporting legal
analysis or citation to legal authority, indeed without any
acknowledgement that it was expanding the law. Further, in
many factual circumstances, such an expansion would create the
exact duty-to-disclose relationship which the Bigler court has
25
expressly disavowed: a relationship between the defendant and
the public at large.
It would also be inconsistent with the California Supreme
Court’s most recent summary of the law: A duty to disclose
requires “a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as
‘between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee,
doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of
contractual agreement. [Citation.] All of these relationships are
created by transactions between parties from which a duty to
disclose facts material to the transaction arises under certain
circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘Such a transaction must necessarily
arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the
defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public
at large.’ (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276,
312 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 82].)” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp.
40–41.)
We recognize that the Bader court did treat Bigler as
expanding the basis for a duty to disclose, but it did so without
any analysis and we do not find the adoption persuasive. It is
also not clear what the Bader court meant by its holding that a
duty to disclose could be found in the case before it because there
was evidence “showing that [manufacturer] J&J was involved in
retail sales of JBP [talcum powder] to consumers and profited
therefrom.” (Bader, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) There is
absolutely nothing in the opinion indicating what that
involvement was or how exactly J&J profited. This statement is
too broad and vague to constitute a standard which is applicable
in other cases.
26
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Bigler does
represent an expansion of the law of fraudulent concealment,
Bjoin has not in fact identified evidence that JMM “directly
advertised to consumers such as” Bjoin or “derived any monetary
benefit directly” from Bjoin’s company’s “individual” purchase of
JMM’s ACC pipe from supply houses, as would be required by the
language in Bigler.
Bjoin points to an internal JMM memo discussing one
advertisement purportedly placed in seven “trade magazines” to
support the advertising element. The gist of the ad is that JMM
and J-M A/C Pipe Corporation have purchased the pipe-
producing plants and assets of Johns-Manville Sales Corporation
and are now a new company. Bjoin does not point to any
evidence in the record showing who read those magazines. He
simply contends that the publications are “trade magazines” and
it is undisputed that he was “an AC pipe tradesman.” Leaving
aside that we do not know what Bjoin means by “AC pipe
tradesmen,” we cannot simply speculate that “AC pipe
tradesmen” read every “trade magazine” published. Three of the
magazines have the words engineer or engineering in their
titles—Bjoin does not explain why it would be reasonable to infer
that an AC pipe tradesman would read an engineering journal.
Other magazines appear to be trade association newsletters, and
Bjoin offers no indication of whether AC pipe tradesmen are
members of those associations. We cannot simply speculate
about the magazines’ readership. To prove that JMM “directly
advertised” to “AC pipe tradesmen” like Bjoin, Bjoin would need
to show that such individuals were known or expected readers of
the specific trade magazines at issue. He has not come close to
doing so.
27
Bjoin testified that he purchased JMM AC pipe from supply
houses and did not believe it was even possible for him to
purchase AC pipe directly from a manufacturer. Bjoin does not
offer any facts that would show that JMM “derived a direct
monetary benefit” from Bjoin’s purchase of JMM AC pipe from a
supply house. Under this system, JMM directly profited from its
sales to supply houses. JMM would appear to have only derived
an indirect economic benefit from consumer purchases from
supply houses: The more JMM AC pipe a supply house sold, the
more JMM AC pipe the supply house might buy from JMM. As
evidence of direct profit, Bjoin points to a JMM memorandum
concerning sales of its AC pipe out of Denison. It is not clear
where Denison is located, but there are no references to sales to
any entity in California, let alone to individual pipe laying
contractors. We do not see the relevance of this memo.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Appellant to pay costs on appeal.
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.
28
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ALLISON BJOIN, Individually and as B335334
Personal Representative, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21STCV30709)
v. ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
INC., [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on July 25, 2025, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now
appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is
so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
________________________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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