People v. Tuli CA4/3

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Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Tuli CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G061647

v. (Super. Ct. No. 16NF2053)

JEFFREY TULI, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gregg L. Prickett, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Martin and Gordon S. Brownell, under appointment by
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Randall Einhorn and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Jeffrey Tuli and his two codefendants, Aaron Jackson and Dejon
Griffin, were charged with murder and related crimes. The case was tried
before a dual jury, one for Tuli and one for Jackson and Griffin. Tuli’s jury
found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the allegation he
personally discharged a firearm causing death, Tuli appealed. He contends
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his repeated motions for a full
severance of his trial from Jackson and Griffin’s trial on the basis of
conflicting defenses. As discussed below, we conclude there was no abuse of
discretion, and that Tuli was not deprived of a fair trial or due process of law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 20, 2020, the Orange County District Attorney filed
an information charging Tuli with the murder of Maher Yousef. It was
alleged as a special circumstance that the murder was committed during an
attempted robbery, and that Tuli personally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury and death. It was further alleged he suffered a prior strike
conviction under the Three Strikes law.
The case against Tuli was consolidated with the case against
Jackson and Griffin, who were charged with the murder and attempted
robbery of Yousef in a separately filed information. The consolidated case
was set for trial before two juries: one jury for Tuli, and the other for Jackson
and Griffin. On February 23, 2022, Tuli moved to sever his jury trial from

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that of Jackson and Griffin based on conflicting defenses among the
defendants. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice.
Defense counsel gave opening statements to their clients’
respective jury only. Subsequently, Tuli’s counsel renewed his motion for
severance in light of his codefendants’ opening statements. The trial court
denied the renewed motion.
The following day, Tuli’s counsel again moved for severance,
citing a news article about the opening statements. He argued that “we’re
likely rolling with an I.D. defense and [Jackson and Griffin’s counsel] in their
openings identified Mr. Tuli as the shooter.” The prosecutor noted she also
had “identified Mr. Tuli as the shooter in my opening to Mr. Tuli’s jury.” The
trial court denied the motion.
Toward the end of trial, Tuli’s counsel moved to conduct separate
closing arguments for the two juries if two jury instructions, which did not
apply to Tuli, were given. After the judge amended the instructions to
address counsel’s concerns, the court denied the motion.
On March 24, 2022, a jury found Tuli guilty of first degree
murder. It also found true the allegations Tuli personally discharged a
firearm causing death, and the felony murder special circumstance. In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that Tuli had suffered a prior
strike conviction.
The trial court sentenced Tuli to life without the possibility of
parole, plus 25 years to life on the firearm use enhancement.
II.
TRIAL TESTIMONY
Because Tuli does not raise a factual challenge, we briefly
summarize the trial testimony in light of the jury’s verdict. Further

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elaboration of the facts can be found in our prior non-published opinions
affirming Jackson and Griffin’s convictions. (See People v. Jackson (May 13,
2024, G061646); People v. Griffin (March 14, 2024, G061875).)
The evidence showed that Tuli, Jackson, and Griffin conspired to
rob Yousef, the owner of a check cashing services business. Before the
robbery, one of them slashed the tire of Yousef’s vehicle. On the day of the
robbery, the defendants followed Yousef’s vehicle as it left his business and
then parked at a gas station. The defendants parked in a nearby alley, exited
their vehicle, and walked over to Yousef’s vehicle to commit the robbery.
A.H., a close friend and employee of Yousef, was present at the
crime scene. He testified that Yousef was driving him home when Yousef
noticed the car was veering to the right. They pulled over into a gas station
and noticed a flat tire. Because there were no tools to change the tire, A.H.
suggested that Yousef call his brother, who lived nearby, to bring them some
tools. While waiting for Yousef’s brother, A.H. went inside the gas station
market to purchase some drinks while Yousef remained in the vehicle.
When A.H. exited the store, he saw three armed men around
Yousef’s vehicle. Two men were on the driver’s side, one of whom was talking
to Yousef. A.H. identified the two men as Jackson and Griffin. The other
man, who A.H. later identified as Tuli, was on the passenger side. Tuli
pointed his gun at A.H. before “put[ting] it down.” Griffin also pointed his
gun at A.H. before asking him, “Where’s the money?” After A.H. stated they
did not have money, Griffin repeated his question before going to the trunk
and checking under the spare tire. Tuli then fired a single shot at Yousef
before all three men ran into the alley. Yousef died from the single gunshot
wound to the right side of his head.

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Following a police investigation, the three defendants were
arrested separately in different locations. Tuli was arrested in Riverside,
California, for unrelated burglaries.
After Tuli was arrested, he was interviewed by police and the
video-recording of the interview was played for the jury. In the interview,
Tuli stated he was high on drugs the night of the shooting. That day, Jackson
and Griffin picked up Tuli at his house. Jackson told Tuli about the plan to
rob Yousef. It was Griffin who flattened the tire of Yousef’s vehicle. Griffin
had his own gun. Tuli was given a gun that Jackson had on him. Tuli thought
the gun was a BB gun. He claimed he never planned to shoot anyone but
“panicked” when Yousef tried to get out of the car via the passenger side.
After the shooting, they drove back to Tuli’s house and got rid of their
clothing “off the 91” freeway on the way.
At trial, Tuli testified in his own defense. Tuli and Jackson were
friends and co-workers. Tuli admitted he was in the vehicle, but denied
participating in the shooting. He claimed he remained in the vehicle while
Jackson, Griffin and a man named “Nick” confronted Yousef at the gas
station. Tuli testified he lied when he told police that Griffin slashed Yousef’s
tire and that they got rid of their clothing on the 91 freeway. Tuli stated he
took responsibility for the shooting because he was already facing a life
sentence for the Riverside robberies.
DISCUSSION
“When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any
public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly,
unless the court order[s] separate trials.” (Pen. Code, § 1098, italics added.)
“When defendants are charged with having committed ‘common crimes
involving common events and victims,’ as here, the court is presented with a

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“‘classic case’” for a joint trial. [Citation.]” (People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 40 (Coffman and Marlow).) However, “severance may be
called for when ‘there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We review a
denial of severance for abuse of discretion, considering the facts as they
appeared at the time of the ruling. (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 754.) Moreover, “even if a trial court acted within its
discretion in denying severance, ‘“the reviewing court may nevertheless
reverse a conviction where, because of the consolidation, a gross unfairness
has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of
law.”’” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1079.)
Tuli moved to sever his trial from that of his codefendants’ on the
basis of conflicting defenses. However, as he acknowledges on appeal,
“‘“[a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require severance, even if the
defendants are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other.” [Citation.]
“Rather, to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be
demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are
irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone
demonstrates that both are guilty.”’ [Citation.] When, however, there exists
sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the
conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do
not compel severance.” (Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41.)
Here, Tuli’s confession that he shot Yousef constitutes independent evidence
of his guilt. Thus, conflicting defenses alone do not require severance, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the severance motions.

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Tuli contends “the joint trials compromised [his] specific right to
testify in his own defense [because] the joint trial framework itself damaged
his credibility by forcing him to face three parties accusing him of murder
and therefore lying when he testified he did not shoot Yousef but remained in
the alley.” His argument is a variation on the conflicting defenses claim,
which we rejected above. As the California Supreme Court has explained, “‘no
denial of a fair trial results from the mere fact that two defendants who are
jointly tried have antagonistic defenses’” and one offers evidence “‘that is
damaging to the other and thus helpful to the prosecution.’” (People v. Flinner
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 716 (Flinner) [dual jury criminal case].)
Tuli notes that in his cross-examination, Jackson’s counsel
attacked his credibility, and in their closing arguments, counsel for Jackson
and Griffin stated that Tuli shot Yousef. Essentially, Tuli claims that he
faced a second and third prosecutor at trial. But the high court has rejected a
similar argument, explaining that “just ‘because the prosecution’s case will be
stronger if defendants are tried together, or that one defense undermines
another, does not render a joint trial unfair.’” (Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p.
715 [rejecting claim that “trial court’s failure to sever allowed [codefendant]
to act as a ‘second prosecutor’”].) More importantly, the jury was expressly
instructed that: (1) “Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their
opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys discussed the case
but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence.”; and
(2) “Do not assume that something is true just because one of the attorneys
ask a question that suggested it is true.” We presume the jury followed the
court’s instruction. (Flinner at p. 717 [rejecting claim that joint trial
permitted codefendant to ask inappropriate questions because, among other
reasons, “the jury was properly instructed that questions are not evidence,

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and we presume it followed the court's instructions”].) In sum, Tuli does not
persuade us that he was denied a fair trial or due process of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P.J.

MOORE, J.

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