People v. Ruiz CA4/1

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Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Ruiz CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084504

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. FWV23001287)
ALVARO RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael A. Camber, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded
with directions.

Tracy R. LeSage, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Alvaro Ruiz pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen.

Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1).) Ruiz appeals the judgment, arguing the court
erred by denying his pre-plea motion to suppress evidence. As we will
explain, resolution of this claim turns on a factual issue not expressly
addressed by the trial court below, and thus, we conditionally reverse and
remand for a new hearing on Ruiz’s suppression motion.
Ruiz also contends the trial court made certain errors in imposing fines
and fees. The People agree the trial court erred by staying, rather than
striking, the conviction assessment and court operations fees, but contend the
court properly executed the restitution fine. We find merit to Ruiz’s
arguments regarding both the fines and fees. We provide direction to the
trial court for addressing the fines and fees on remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Arrest and Charges
On a sunny afternoon, Ontario Police Officer Kyle Hanlin and two
partners came upon Ruiz sitting in a U-Haul truck in a motel parking lot.
The truck was backed into a parking spot, which prevented Officer Hanlin
from seeing the license plate. Officer Hanlin knew U-Haul trucks were often
stolen and knew the motel to be in an area where people often possessed
firearms, narcotics, and other contraband. As the officers passed Ruiz, he
and his passenger immediately exited the truck. The officers parked and
approached Ruiz. Ruiz was wearing a tank top and loose shorts. His
demeanor was calm and cooperative.
Officer Hanlin asked Ruiz about the truck. Ruiz stated another
individual rented the truck, and Ruiz might be late returning it. Officer
Hanlin then conducted a patdown search of Ruiz, during which he found two

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
live rounds of ammunition and one spent shell casing in his pocket. Officer
Hanlin placed Ruiz in handcuffs and directed him to sit on the curb near the
truck.
Officer Hanlin asked Ruiz for consent to search the truck. Ruiz agreed.
Officers searched the front passenger compartment of the truck and did not
find anything illegal. The officers discovered that the back of the truck was
secured with a bike lock, but Ruiz did not provide the key. Officer Hanlin
found the key in Ruiz’s pocket. Officers found an AR-15 rifle and ammunition
in the back of the truck.
Ruiz was arrested and subsequently charged with one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of possession of ammunition
by a felon.
B. Motion to Suppress
Ruiz filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, seeking
suppression of all evidence resulting from his encounter with police and the
related searches of his person and the U-Haul truck.
At the hearing on the motion, Ruiz argued the entire contact with
police constituted an unlawful detention, rather than a consensual encounter.
He also asserted that the searches of his person and the back of the truck
were unlawful, both because they were conducted without warrants or Ruiz’s
consent and because the scope of the patdown search was excessive. The
prosecution argued the contact between police and Ruiz was both consensual
and based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; Ruiz consented to the
searches of his person and the truck; and the scope of the patdown search
was proper.
The trial court denied the motion, finding the initial contact between
police and Ruiz was consensual; the patdown search was supported by

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reasonable suspicion he was involved in criminal activity; and the scope of
the patdown was lawful. The court also found Ruiz consented to the search of
the truck.
C. Plea and Sentence
After the trial court denied Ruiz’s motion to suppress, he pled no
contest to the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. The prosecution
dismissed the remaining count. The trial court sentenced Ruiz to state prison
for 16 months. The court also imposed a $300 restitution fine, and imposed,
but stayed, a $30 conviction assessment fee and a $40 court operations fees.
Ruiz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Suppress
1. Standard of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures and is applicable to
states by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends.; People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824,
829.) When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress based on an alleged
Fourth Amendment violation, we indulge all inferences in favor of the trial
court’s ruling and will uphold the court’s express and implied factual findings
if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Redd (2010)
48 Cal.4th 691, 719; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) But “we
exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on
the facts so found.” (Woods, at pp. 673–674.)

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2. Consensual Encounter
Ruiz first contends the initial police contact was not consensual. The
California Supreme Court has recognized “three broad categories” of police
encounters in the context of the Fourth Amendment: “consensual encounters
that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are
seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and
purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s
liberty.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821 (Manuel G.).)
“Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny,” and
thus, “require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime.” (Ibid.; see also Fla. v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429,
434; People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309 [“It is well established that
law enforcement officers may approach someone on the street or in another
public place and converse if the person is willing to do so.”].) A detention, on
the other hand, while less intrusive than a formal arrest, does require some
objective manifestation of reasonable suspicion. (See People v. Souza (1994)
9 Cal.4th 224, 230 [“the temporary detention of a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than
an arrest, be based on ‘some objective manifestation’ that criminal activity is
afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity”].)
There is no bright-line rule to determine if an encounter is consensual.
(Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39.) Rather, “a court must consider all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.” (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 439.) Whether or not a person
would have believed that he or she was free to leave is to be evaluated in

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light of the totality of the circumstances, rather than emphasizing particular
details of that conduct in isolation. (Mich. v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567,
573.) Factors that might indicate an unlawful detention has taken place
include (1) the presence of several police officers; (2) an officer’s display of a
weapon; (3) some physical touching of the person; or (4) the use of language
or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might
be compelled. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554;
Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) “The officer’s uncommunicated state
of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in
assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has
occurred.” (Ibid.)
Thirty-nine seconds elapsed between the time the officers parked near
the U-Haul truck and when Officer Hanlin began the patdown search of Ruiz.
During this brief period, the officers engaged Ruiz in a consensual encounter.
When the officers first approached Ruiz, they did not make any significant
show of authority or otherwise give Ruiz the impression he was not free to
leave. To the contrary, Officer Hanlin testified, and the bodyworn camera
footage shows, they parked approximately 20 to 25 feet away from the truck,
in a manner that did not block it from moving. Although there were multiple
officers, only Officer Hanlin spoke with Ruiz, and he did not say anything
compelling Ruiz’s compliance. None of the officers physically touched Ruiz at
this time. In addition, although the officers were in uniform and wore their
duty belts with guns, none of them drew their weapons, showed any sign of
force, or used language demanding Ruiz’s compliance.
We therefore conclude the brief initial encounter between the police
and Ruiz was consensual. (See, e.g., Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)

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3. Patdown Search
Next, Ruiz challenges the lawfulness of the patdown search.
a. The Patdown Search was Not Supported by Reasonable
Suspicion
Ruiz contends the patdown search was not supported by reasonable
suspicion. We agree.
In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry), the Supreme Court held that
when a police officer harbors reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous,” an investigatory detention and patdown search for
weapons is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment. (Id.,
at p. 30.) The purpose of such a patdown search “is not to discover evidence
of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his [or her] investigation without
fear of violence.” (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 373.)
Accordingly, a patdown “must be strictly ‘limited to that which is necessary
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby.’ ” (Ibid.)
Reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause (United States v.
Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274), but is more than a mere “hunch,” and must
be based on “specific reasonable inferences which [officers are] entitled to
draw from the facts in light of [their] experience[s].” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S.
at p. 27.) Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the totality of the
circumstances, and a court must ask “whether a reasonably prudent [person]
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety
or that of others was in danger.” (Ibid.) “Considerations relevant to this
inquiry typically include visible bulges or baggy clothing that suggest a
hidden weapon; sudden movements or attempts to reach for an object that is
not immediately visible; evasive and deceptive responses to an officer’s

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questions about what the individual was doing; and unnatural hand postures
that suggest an effort to conceal a weapon.” [Citation.] Other relevant
circumstances can include the type of crime at issue; the detained
individual’s suspected involvement in such a crime; and the searching
officer’s experience with such crimes and their associated weapon use in the
particular location of the detention.” (In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 299, 305 (Jeremiah S.).)
By the time Officer Hanlin conducted the patdown search of Ruiz, he
knew it was common for people to possess firearms in the area and U-Haul
trucks were often stolen. Also, he was unable to view the truck’s license plate
and saw Ruiz and his passenger exit the truck “immediately” after the
officers passed them. Finally, Ruiz told Officer Hanlin he did not rent the
truck, and he was not going to return it by the deadline. These facts might
have supported Officer Hanlin’s suspicion that the truck was stolen, that
Ruiz was engaged in other unlawful activity, and/or that Ruiz was
attempting to evade the officers’ attention or distance himself from
possession of the truck, which are important circumstances to consider in the
totality. However, they do not alone support an inference that Ruiz was
carrying a weapon as to provide reasonable suspicion for the patdown search.
Crucially, there are no facts in the record supporting a finding that Ruiz
might have possessed tools related to an auto theft that he could have used as
a weapon against Officer Hanlin; Officer Hanlin did not testify to having seen
any suspicious bulges in Ruiz’s clothing; and there was nothing about Ruiz’s
demeanor or movements suggesting he was in possession of any weapons.
“Where, as here, the record is lacking in specific and articulable facts
indicating that a particular suspect may be armed and dangerous, a
patsearch for weapons is an impermissible intrusion.” (Jeremiah S., supra,

8
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 307 [finding patdown search was not supported by
reasonable suspicion where subject was suspected of committing a robbery
and the officer knew robbers tended to carry weapons, but no evidence
robbery involved a weapon and suspect’s appearance and demeanor were not
indicative of being armed].)
b. Consent
Our finding that Officer Hanlin did not possess reasonable suspicion to
justify the patdown search does not end our inquiry, as the patdown must be
deemed lawful if it was conducted pursuant to Ruiz’s voluntary consent.
“[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally
permissible.” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 222; (People v.
Cantor (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 (Cantor) [“Consent to a search is a
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”].)
“Where . . . the prosecution relies on consent to justify a warrantless search
or seizure, it bears the ‘burden of proving that the defendant’s manifestation
of consent was the product of his free will and not a mere submission to an
express or implied assertion of authority.’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 342. Whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined in the light of all the circumstances. (People v. Llamas (1991)
235 Cal.App.3d 441, 447.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of
review to the court’s finding of voluntariness. (Ibid.)
The record here shows Officer Hanlin asked Ruiz if he had any
weapons on him, and Ruiz responded by raising his arms, turning his back to
Officer Hanlin, and taking one step in the direction of the officer. At the
hearing on Ruiz’s suppression motion, Officer Hanlin testified he perceived
Ruiz’s actions as consent to a patdown search for weapons.

9
In denying Ruiz’s suppression motion, the trial court found the contact
between officers and Ruiz remained consensual “until we are past the
ammunition being located.” The court, however, did not make an express
finding that Ruiz voluntarily consented to the patdown search. Specifically,
with respect to the lawfulness of the patdown search, the court denied the
motion to suppress based on a finding that the search was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Had the trial court directly addressed the issue of
voluntary consent, it might have found Ruiz consented of his own free will
when he raised his arms and turned his back toward the officer. (People v.
Lopez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 317, 327 [consent to search may be nonverbal
and implied by conduct].) On the other hand, the court might have found the
facts supported the conclusion that Ruiz involuntarily submitted to the
officers’ authority when he was confronted by multiple officers and pointedly
questioned about his activities and potential possession of contraband.
(People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 110–112 [discussing factors that may
support a finding that consent was result of involuntary submission to
authority].)
Because there remains an outstanding factual question about whether
Ruiz voluntarily consented to the patdown search, we cannot decide whether
the search was lawful despite the lack of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly,
remand is warranted to allow the trial court to make this determination in
the first instance. (In re Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 752, 769 [remand
required where additional factual determinations must be made by trial court
in first instance before ruling on motion to suppress].) Nevertheless, as we
will discuss, if Officer Hanlin conducted the patdown search pursuant to
Ruiz’s voluntary consent, the scope of the patdown search and the search of

10
the U-Haul also were lawful. Thus, we conditionally reverse the judgment
and remand with instructions, as discussed in greater detail post.
c. The Patdown Search Did Not Exceed the Permissible Scope
Ruiz also contends the patdown search exceeded any permissible scope.
A patdown is limited to a search “reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 29.) Generally, an officer cannot search
a suspect’s pockets or otherwise intrude on the suspect’s privacy beyond a
patdown of his outer clothing unless the officer feels an object that could be a
weapon. (See People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 957.) “If the
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is
armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”
(Minn. v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 373, citing Sibron v. New York
(1968) 392 U.S. 40, 65–66 [officer’s reach into defendant’s pocket to retrieve
narcotics exceeded scope of search for weapons and violated Fourth
Amendment].) The “plain touch” exception, however, allows for an officer to
seize an object “whose contour or mass makes its identity” as contraband
“immediately apparent.” (Dickerson, at pp. 375–376; see People v. Dibb
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 832, 835–836; Dickey, at p. 957.)
Here, Officer Hanlin testified he slid an open palm on the outside of
Ruiz’s pocket and, in doing so, felt what he recognized to be ammunition. The
bodyworn camera footage generally corroborates Officer Hanlin’s testimony,
as it shows a partial view of Officer Hanlin running a flat palm across the
front of Ruiz’s pocket before manipulating the contents of the pocket. Officer
Hanlin then removed a plastic baggie containing ammunition and other
items from Ruiz’s pocket. As did the trial court, we have some question about
how Officer Hanlin was able to distinguish the ammunition from other items

11
in the baggie as he testified he had done. Nonetheless, the trial court
reasonably found there was no evidence to contradict Officer Hanlin’s
testimony about feeling ammunition in Ruiz’s pocket. We defer to the trial
court’s credibility finding. (People v. Arebalos-Cabrera (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
179, 189.)
Having conducted the patdown of Ruiz with the suspicion he was
engaged in criminal activity in an area where people often possess firearms,
Officer Hanlin could have reasonably believed the ammunition he discovered
was evidence of that suspected criminal activity. The officer then lawfully
manipulated Ruiz’s pocket to confirm his discovery. (In re Lennies H. (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1237 [under “plain-feel’’ exception to the warrant
requirement, officers could lawfully seize keys in suspect’s pocket during
patdown where the keys’ “incriminating character was immediately
apparent” because they could link suspect to carjacking]; People v. Bradford
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1294 [applying corollary “plain-view” exception and
explaining “the determination that the incriminating nature of an item was
‘immediately apparent’ [is] based upon whether the officers had probable
cause to believe that the item was either evidence of a crime or
contraband.”].)
4. Vehicle Search
Ruiz next argues his consent to search the truck was involuntary, and
the scope of the search exceeded any consent given.
a. If Ruiz Consented to the Patdown Search, His Consent to the
Vehicle Search was Voluntary
Ruiz neither denies that he gave Officer Hanlin consent to search the
truck nor argues he ever rescinded his consent. Rather, he contends his
consent was involuntary because it was given while he was unlawfully
detained.

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Consent is involuntary when it is obtained during an unlawful
detention. (People v. Henderson (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 1651.) If Ruiz
did not consent to the patdown search, and thus, his continued detention
became unlawful, he could not have voluntarily consented to the vehicle
search.
However, if Ruiz was detained based on a lawful patdown search and
seizure of contraband as a result of that search, his consent to search the
U-Haul was not inherently involuntary. The mere fact that a suspect is
lawfully detained does not render his consent to search involuntary. (See
People v. Byers (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 864.) Here, nothing about the
circumstances of Ruiz’s detention rose to the level of coercion. Although
multiple officers approached Ruiz, by the time Ruiz gave his consent to
search the truck, only Officer Hanlin had directly engaged with him. Then,
Officer Hanlin conducted a brief patdown search of Ruiz, handcuffed him,
and directed him to sit on the curb. None of the officers displayed their
weapons or engaged in any aggressive conduct. Thus, substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s finding that Ruiz’s consent was voluntary. (See
Llamas, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 447 [consent was not coerced where
suspect was illegally detained, handcuffed, and placed in back of patrol car,
and the arresting officer had control of the suspect’s car and other units were
on scene].)
Accordingly, we find that, if Ruiz voluntarily consented to the patdown
search, and thus, was lawfully detained at the time he consented to the
vehicle search, the search of the truck was lawful.
b. The Search of the U-Haul Did Not Exceed the Scope of Consent

Ruiz further argues that, to the extent he consented to a search of the
truck, his consent was limited to a search of the front passenger

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compartment, not the locked back compartment to which he did not provide
the key to police.
“A consensual search may not legally exceed the scope of the consent
supporting it.” (People v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408.) The
scope of a suspect’s consent is determined by an objective reasonableness
standard, which asks, “[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” (Florida
v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 251; accord, People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th
952, 983–984.) “ ‘Whether the search remained within the boundaries of the
consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
circumstances. [Citation.] Unless clearly erroneous, we uphold the trial
court’s determination.’ ” (Cantor, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.)
Ruiz relies on Cantor to support his argument. However, Cantor is
inapposite. There, the suspect consented to a “real quick check” of his car.
(Cantor, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 964.) The officer proceeded to conduct
a prolonged search of the car, including the trunk and under the hood. The
officer then returned to the trunk and found a sealed wooden box. He used a
screwdriver to open the box and found cocaine inside. (Ibid.) In finding the
search exceeded the scope of the suspect’s consent, the court did not focus on
the officer’s search of “a compartment of the vehicle itself.” (Id. at p. 967.)
Rather, the court found the suspect’s consent did not extend to searching a
locked or sealed container found inside of a vehicle. (Id. at pp. 966–967.)
Unlike in Cantor, the search here involved a compartment of the
U-Haul truck, not a locked or sealed container carried in, but separate from,
the truck itself. Where, as here, a suspect gives unqualified consent to
search a car, it is deemed consent to search the car in its entirety. (See
People v. Williams (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 67, 74 [“Authorization to search an

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automobile must be deemed to include the automobile in its entirety, unless
the defendant expressly states otherwise.”]; see also People v. Nelson (1985)
166 Cal.App.3d 1209, 1214 [“[T]he evidence is uncontroverted that defendant
gave one of the deputies permission to look into the car, but informed the
deputy that he lost the keys to the trunk. Informing the officer that he does
not have the keys to the trunk is not the same as denying permission to
search.].)
To the extent Ruiz voluntarily consented to the search of the U-Haul,
the search did not exceed the scope of his consent.
c. If Ruiz Voluntarily Consented to the Patdown Search, the
Search of the U-Haul was Lawful Under the Automobile
Exception

Even if Ruiz did not consent to the search of the back of the U-Haul,
but he voluntarily consented to the patdown search that resulted in the
recovery of ammunition from his pocket, the search of the entire U-Haul
truck was lawful.
In ruling on Ruiz’s suppression motion, the trial court expressly found
the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement did
not apply. Nevertheless, on appeal, “we review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not
the court’s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we
affirm.’ ” (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.) As discussed post,
we find the search of the back of the U-Haul here was lawful under the
vehicle exception.
Under the automobile exception, if police have probable cause to believe
that a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or
contraband, they “ ‘ “may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the
vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” ’ ” (People v. Sims (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 943, 950; see United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 800

15
[when police have probable cause, they “may conduct a probing search of
compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in
plain view”].) Probable cause “is a more demanding standard than mere
reasonable suspicion.’ [Citation.] It exists ‘where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found . . . .’ [Citation.]
In determining whether a reasonable officer would have probable cause to
search, we consider the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Lee (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 853, 862.) If probable cause exists, officers “ ‘may conduct a
probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose
contents are not in plain view.’ ” (People v. McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796,
801.)
Here, the officers lawfully stopped the U-Haul for purposes of the
vehicle exception, as they were investigating whether the U-Haul was stolen.
(See Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947–948, 951 [finding vehicle
exception applicable where police approached suspect sitting in his vehicle in
a parking lot to investigate crime of public intoxication].) In addition, if
Officer Hanlin conducted the patdown search pursuant to Ruiz’s voluntary
consent, before the officers began their search of the U-Haul, the officer had
knowledge Ruiz possessed ammunition and had admitted he was recently
discharged from parole. As a former parolee, Ruiz necessarily had previously
served a prison sentence for a felony conviction, and thus, was prohibited
from possessing guns and ammunition. (§ 3000, subd. (a)(1) [“A sentence
resulting in imprisonment in the state prison . . . shall include a period of
parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless
waived . . . .”]; § 29800, subd. (a)(1) [“Any person who has been convicted of a
felony . . . and who . . . has in possession . . . any firearm is guilty of a

16
felony.”]; § 30305, subd. (a)(1) [“No person prohibited from owning or
possessing a firearm . . . shall . . . possess . . . any ammunition . . . .”].) This
evidence provided probable cause to search the entire U-Haul under the
vehicle exception to the warrant requirement. (See Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at
pp. 800–801, 817 [corroborated information from informant about drug sales
combined with officer’s observation of bullet on front seat of suspect’s vehicle
provided probable cause to search under vehicle exception].)
B. Fines and Fees
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine. The
court also imposed a $30 conviction assessment fee and a $40 court
operations fees. Upon a finding that Ruiz is indigent, the court stayed the
$70 in fees. When Ruiz requested that the fines and fees be waived based on
his inability to pay, the court stated it could not “do anything about the
victim restitution fine.”
Ruiz argues the trial court erred by failing to recognize it had
discretion to stay the $300 restitution fine and by staying, rather than
striking, the conviction assessment and court operations fees. The People
argue the court properly imposed the $300 restitution fine but concede the
fees should be stricken. We agree with Ruiz, and provide directions for the
trial court on remand with respect to the fines and fees.
1. Restitution Fine
First, Ruiz challenges the execution of the restitution fine, relying on
People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). In Dueñas, the court
reversed an order imposing and executing a restitution fine after concluding
it violated the defendant’s due process rights under the federal and California
Constitutions to execute such a fine without determining the defendant’s
ability to pay. (Id. at pp. 1169–1172.) The court in Dueñas concluded, “the

17
[trial] court must stay the execution of the fine until and unless the People
demonstrate that the defendant has the ability to pay the fine.” (Id. at
p. 1172.) Although our Supreme Court has granted review to decide this
issue, Dueñas remains good law. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47,
review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
Here, the trial court did not fail to conduct a hearing regarding Ruiz’s
ability to pay the restitution fine, as contemplated by Dueñas. Rather, the
trial court found Ruiz indigent. Nevertheless, the court imposed and
executed the restitution fine upon a finding it could not “do anything” but
execute the fine. Under the reasoning of Dueñas, however, because the court
found Ruiz was unable to pay the restitution fine, the fine should have been
stayed. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.)
2. Conviction Assessment and Court Operations Fees
The parties agree that the trial court should have stricken, rather than
stayed, the $30 conviction assessment and $40 court operations fees after
finding Ruiz was indigent. We accept the People’s concession that the fees
should have been stricken. (See People v. Son (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 565, 592
[“If the trial court determines [the defendant] is unable to pay the court
assessments, they must be stricken.”]; People v. Castellano (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 485, 490 [“If the trial court determines a defendant is unable to
pay, the fees and assessments cannot be imposed . . . .”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to vacate its order denying the motion to
suppress and conduct a renewed suppression hearing, consistent with this
opinion, to resolve the issue of whether Ruiz voluntarily consented to the
patdown search. If the court finds Ruiz voluntarily consented to the patdown

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search, and on this basis again denies the motion to suppress, it shall
reinstate the judgment. (Edgerrin J., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) So
reinstated, the judgment shall be modified to stay the $300 restitution fine
and strike the $30 conviction assessment fee and $40 court operations fee.
The trial court then is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
If the trial court finds Ruiz did not voluntarily consent to the search,
and on this basis grants Ruiz’s motion to suppress, it shall afford him an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. (Edgerrin J., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th
at p. 770.) Should the matter thereafter proceed to a new judgment, the trial
court must reconsider application of any contemplated fines and fees
consistent with this decision.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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