CourtListener 10658928•Li v. Tzen CA2/4
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Filed 8/22/25 Li v. Tzen CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
CHANGJIAO LI et al., B333693
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22AHCV00125
SHIRLEY TZEN et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Margaret L. Oldendorf, Judge. Affirmed.
Changjiao Li and Haibo Zhou, in pro per., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Shirley Tzen, in pro per., for Defendants and Respondents.
Appellants and plaintiffs Changjiao Li and her son, Haibou
Zhou, sued their landlord, Shirley Tzen (Tzen) for breach of
contract. They also asserted an intentional tort cause of action
against Tzen, her husband, Michael Tzen, and her son, Leo
Wang.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment
for defendants, finding plaintiffs failed to prove the essential
elements of their asserted claims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs live in the back unit of a dwelling located at 8508
Fransden Street in San Gabriel. Zhou testified that they rented
the unit from Tzen for $1,000 per month, which included utilities.
Until April 2021, Tzen lived in the front unit at the same
address.
Plaintiffs’ complaint catalogues a long list of grievances
against defendants. In their breach of contract cause of action,
they allege Tzen breached a lease by removing a gate they used,
blocking their unit’s exit and parking spaces, threatening to
shut off their power, refusing to pay for their internet service,
and failing to repair their washing machine. In their intentional
tort cause of action, they allege defendants harassed them in
various ways, which resulted in “great mental stress” causing
their “health conditions . . . [to] deteriorate[ ] sharply.” For
example, Li claims that the harassment caused her body to
“exhale quite unpleasant smell.”
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court ruled in
defendants’ favor. With respect to their breach of contract claim,
1 Xiangrui Zhou, Haibo Zhou’s father, is also named as a
plaintiff in the complaint. Before the trial, he died and was
dismissed by the trial court.
2
the court found that plaintiffs failed to prove the elements of the
existence of a contract and breach of contract. As to their
intentional tort claim, the trial court found plaintiffs did not meet
their burden of showing any action by defendants “caused any
personal injury to either plaintiff.” The court noted that
plaintiffs “sought to offer into evidence some information about
[their] medical conditions and problems,” but determined that,
“[i]n the absence of some competent medical or other expert
testimony, the court [wa]s unable to draw any conclusions that
any of th[e] . . . problems at the premises caused any personal
injuries.”
Following entry of judgment against them, plaintiffs
timely2 appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
After a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo and
the trial court’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
Where, as here, an appellant challenges the trial court’s
determination that the appellant failed to carry his or her burden
of proof at trial, “the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant
as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted
and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to
leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient
2 Tzen’s motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely is denied.
3
to support a finding.’ ” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170
Cal.App.4th 229, 279 (Shaw).)
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Violations
Plaintiffs first argue that the judgment must be reversed
because the trial court failed to consider whether defendants
violated certain provisions of the Civil Code, as well as various
Los Angeles County resolutions, ordinances, and regulations. We
reject this argument. The trial court was not required to address
those issues, as they were immaterial to defendants’ liability for
breach of contract and intentional tort, the sole causes of action
asserted in the complaint. (See Committee on Children’s
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–
212 [“The complaint in a civil action . . . serves to frame and limit
the issues”].)
B. Breach of Contract
“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
Plaintiffs contend they should have prevailed on their
breach of contract claim because, contrary to the trial court’s
findings, they presented sufficient evidence demonstrating:
(1) the existence of a contract between the parties; and (2) Tzen’s
breach of the contract’s express and implied terms, including the
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and the implied warranty of
habitability.
4
We first reject plaintiffs’ contention that they “presented
evidence of . . . a written agreement” via a document titled
“Simple Lease Matters.” Although a document with that title
was attached as an exhibit to the complaint, it was not offered,
let alone admitted, into evidence at the trial. Nor did plaintiffs
present any testimony relating to the document. Plaintiffs
therefore cannot rely on the “Simple Lease Matters” document
to argue that they satisfied their burden of proving the parties
had entered into a written contract.3 (See Evid. Code, § 115
[“ ‘Burden of proof’ means the obligation of a party to establish by
evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind
of the trier of fact or the court” (italics added)].)
Assuming plaintiffs proved that the parties had an oral or
implied-in-fact contract, they have not shown reversible error
with respect to the element of breach. “One of the essential rules
of appellate law is that ‘[a] judgment . . . of a lower court is
presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] It is the duty of the appellant to present
an adequate record to the court from which prejudicial error is
shown.” (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853,
865 (Kurinij).) Accordingly, plaintiffs were required to furnish an
adequate record enabling us to review whether they presented
“evidence compel[ling] a finding in [their] favor . . . as a matter of
law” on the element of breach. (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at
p. 279; Kurinij, at p. 865.)
They have not done so. In arguing that they presented
evidence illustrating how Tzen breached the terms of their
3 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice of Rental Agreement
is denied as irrelevant.
5
contract with her, plaintiffs refer extensively to their trial
exhibits. Although plaintiffs designated those exhibits for
inclusion in the clerk’s transcript, the record does not reflect
that they took the steps required under California Rules of
Court, rules 8.224(a)(1) and (b)(2) to ensure the exhibits were
transmitted to this court. By failing to facilitate our receipt
of the trial exhibits on which their arguments rest, plaintiffs
“[f]ail[ed] to provide an adequate record on [the breach]
issue . . . .” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502; Sherwood v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 183, 187 [“Whenever the consideration of an
exhibit is necessary for a complete understanding of the case, a
copy thereof must also be furnished”].) “Where exhibits are
missing we will not presume they would undermine the
judgment.” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 278, 291.) We therefore have no basis to
conclude that Tzen breached any contract she had with
plaintiffs.4
C. Intentional Tort
Causation is an essential element of a tort cause of action.
(Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 696.)
Whether there is a causal link between the defendant’s tortious
conduct and the plaintiff’s damages is a question of reasonable
probability: Was it more likely than not that the plaintiff’s injury
was a result of the defendant’s act or omission? (Beebe v.
4 Having reached this conclusion, we need not address
plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred by finding Tzen
sold the property in October 2021, rather than April 2021.
6
Wonderful Pistachios & Almonds LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 351,
370.)
Expert testimony is required to establish the causation
element in a personal injury action.5 (Jones v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 [“The law
is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be
proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon
competent expert testimony”]; Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions,
Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1572 [same].) Here, at trial,
the only evidence of damages plaintiffs introduced related to their
purported physical injuries they attributed to defendants’ alleged
harassment. The trial court correctly ruled that plaintiffs needed
expert testimony to prove that there was a causal link between
defendants’ alleged harassment and the various physical injuries
they allegedly suffered. This failure of proof is fatal to plaintiff’s
intentional tort cause of action. For this reason, plaintiffs have
not shown that reversal is required on their tort claim.6
5 Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d
916, cited in plaintiffs’ opening brief, is inapposite. There, our
Supreme Court recognized the viability of a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at pp. 918−919.) The court
did not address the issue before us, namely, whether expert
testimony was required to prove causation for purposes of a
personal injury claim. (See ibid.)
6 We therefore do not reach the issue of whether the trial
court erred by excluding evidence related to the prior lawsuits
between the parties, which plaintiffs offered to demonstrate how
defendants have harassed them. Likewise, we deny as irrelevant
plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice of Two Temporary
Restraining Orders, as well as their Motion for Judicial Notice of
7
D. Other Contentions
Plaintiffs assert a host of other contentions in vague,
conclusory fashion. For example, they claim that the trial court
failed to provide a “Safe and Accessible Courtroom.” But
plaintiffs do not provide the court with a coherent legal theory or
argument based on this assertion.
An appellant “ ‘must do more than assert error and leave it
to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to
test his claim.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619.)
“ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of [its]
correctness.’ ” (Id. at p. 620.) Accordingly, when an appellant
raises a point but “ ‘fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority,’ ” we treat the point as forfeited.
(Ibid.) Applying these principles, we treat all but one of
plaintiffs’ remaining arguments as forfeited. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs argue that the court improperly “exhibited a
strict adherence to evidentiary rules without providing [them] the
necessary guidance . . . .” As self-represented litigants, plaintiffs
argue, they were entitled to “leniency” and extra assistance from
the trial court as they presented their evidence. We disagree. “A
party proceeding in propria persona ‘is to be treated like any
other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ [Citation.]
Indeed, ‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held to the same
Documents Demonstrating Uninhabitable Conditions, Landlord
Misrepresentations, and Wrongful Eviction Attempts.
8
restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” ’ ” (First American
Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P.J.
MORI, J.
7 The two cases cited in plaintiffs’ opening brief, Gamet v.
Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276 and In re Marriage of
James & Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, do not hold
otherwise. In neither case did the appellate court impose upon
trial courts the duty to assist self-represented litigants with their
presentation of evidence, or require trial courts to relax the
application of evidentiary rules to self-represented litigants. (See
In re Marriage of James & Christine C., at pp. 1264–1265
[reversing trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to continue
trial in marital dissolution action because the ruling rested on
improper grounds]; see also Gamet v. Blanchard, at pp. 1279,
1283−1285 [holding that, based on the unique facts presented,
the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
to vacate judgment entered against her].)
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