Jacobowitz v. Hawthorne CA2/4

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Filed 8/22/25 Jacobowitz v. Hawthorne CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

IRWIN JACOBOWITZ et al., B338172

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CHCV01973)
v.

RICK HAWTHORNE et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Affirmed.
Irwin Jacobowitz, Pearl H. Jacobowitz, Dakota Jacobowitz,
Arizona Jacobowitz, and Montana Jacobowitz, in pro. per., for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
This action arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute.
Plaintiffs Irwin Jacobowitz, Pearl H. Jacobowitz, Dakota
Jacobowitz, Arizona Jacobowitz, and Montana Jacobowitz
(collectively, plaintiffs) sued defendants Rick Hawthorne, Larry
Thornton, and Valley View Vaulters, Inc. (collectively,
defendants) for allegedly harassing plaintiffs during their
tenancy. Plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in
misconduct, including calling the police to report plaintiffs as
squatters and filing an unlawful detainer action against them.
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendants’
special motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ first amended
complaint (FAC) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16
(the anti-SLAPP statute). We conclude plaintiffs have not
carried their burden on appeal and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the FAC, plaintiffs sought housing through
the Supportive Services for Veteran Families (SSVF) Program (38
C.F.R. § 62.1). Hawthorne agreed to participate in the SSVF
Program as a landlord and approved of plaintiffs moving into a
house in Sylmar. Plaintiffs moved into the home in December
2021.
Issues immediately arose between plaintiffs and
defendants. Among other things, defendants allegedly called to
have the “[p]olice [ ] escort the [p]laintiffs off the premises by
telling the police that the family w[as] homeless and squatters.”
Defendants also allegedly called the “LA County [M]ental Health
hotline [to] say that [plaintiffs] [were] crazy people that had to be
put away in order to have them removed from the house.”

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Further, according to the FAC, defendants served a 30-day
notice to vacate on plaintiffs in January 2022, stating “[n]o
cause . . . as required by SSVF.” In March 2022, defendants
served plaintiffs with a summons and unlawful detainer
complaint. Plaintiffs alleged defendants “[p]rematurely applied”
to the unlawful detainer court for a clerk’s “Writ of Possession for
Real Property” and “[p]rematurely caused” the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department to issue a notice to vacate the
property. Plaintiffs then filed this action and their FAC alleging
20 causes of action based on defendants’ conduct concerning the
tenancy.
In August 2023, defendants filed a special motion to strike
portions of the FAC under the anti-SLAPP statute. In particular,
defendants sought to strike the first through fourth, sixth
through tenth, 13th to 16th, and 18th to 20th causes of action.
Defendants argued the claims arose from protected activity,
including defendants’ prosecution of the unlawful detainer action,
defendants contacting the police and an investigative agency, and
communications made in anticipation of litigation. Defendants
asserted plaintiffs could not demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits because the conduct complained of in
these causes of action was “absolutely privileged” under the
litigation privilege embodied in Civil Code section 47.
Plaintiffs filed a “combined opposition” to defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion and a demurrer defendants had concurrently filed
with the motion.1 Plaintiffs attached multiple exhibits to their
opposition. Defendants filed a reply to plaintiffs’ opposition and
objections to all the attached exhibits.

1 The demurrer was set for hearing for the month following the
hearing on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.

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The trial court sustained all the objections to plaintiffs’
exhibits and granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court
found defendants met their burden of establishing that the
challenged claims arose from protected activity. The court then
determined that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
establishing a probability of prevailing on the claims. The court
found that defendants’ conduct was protected by the litigation
privilege and plaintiffs’ argument that the litigation privilege
was somehow preempted by federal law was without merit. This
appeal timely followed.2

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance
of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there

2 After appellate briefing was complete, plaintiffs filed a “motion
for request for oral argument, filing of further evidence, issuance of
subpoenas, and default against respondents.” Plaintiffs’ request for
oral argument is moot. Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to
request oral argument and did so. Similarly, the request for default is
moot, as plaintiffs were informed in May 2025 that defendants are in
default because they failed to file a respondents’ brief. Plaintiffs’
motion is denied as to the remaining requests. Plaintiffs do not
provide any authority for their request to subpoena numerous
individuals. Nor do they identify what additional evidence they wish
to submit on appeal. To the extent they meant to reference the
matters in their separately filed request for judicial notice of 38 items
and more than 500 pages of documents, the request for judicial notice
is denied. Plaintiffs do not show that it is appropriate to take judicial
notice of these documents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2).)

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is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster Energy Co.
v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Anti-SLAPP motions are
evaluated through a two-step process. “First, the defendant must
establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected
by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the
required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability
of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Though
we review a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, the
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error, as we shall
discuss further. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)

B. Fundamental Appellate Principles
The following principles govern all appeals: A judgment or
order of the lower court is “presumed correct,” and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564.) The appellant has the “burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error by citing applicable law and showing where in
the record the error occurred.” (Br. C. v. Be. C. (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 259, 264; Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 (Slone).)
“Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court
requires all appellate briefs to ‘[s]upport any reference to a
matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number
of the record where the matter appears.’” (Conservatorship of
Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253.) “An appellant who
fails to cite accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument
on appeal that is presented without the record reference.” (Alki
Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574,

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589; Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172 [appellants forfeit
contentions not supported by citations to relevant portions of the
record].) Self-represented litigants are held to the same
standards as attorneys and must follow the rules of appellate
procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–
985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536,
543.)

C. Plaintiffs Have Not Met Their Burden on Appeal
Here, virtually all the factual assertions in plaintiffs’ brief
are unsupported by citations to the record on appeal, and the
contentions are unsupported by sufficient legal authority and
reasoned argument. Plaintiffs’ “STATEMENT OF FACTS”
(boldface omitted) does not contain a single citation to the
appellate record. The “ARGUMENT” (boldface omitted) section
contains record citations in only one of three sections, and those
citations are inadequate. Consequently, plaintiffs’ contentions on
appeal are forfeited. (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal
Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070
(LNSU #1) [“It is not our role as an appellate court independently
to review the record for error . . .”].)
When we attempt to consider plaintiffs’ arguments, we
conclude they are deficient. Plaintiffs offer no argument as to
why the trial court erred in finding that defendants satisfied the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and thus have forfeited any
challenge to the finding that plaintiffs’ claims arise from
protected activity. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 659, 685.) Plaintiffs focus on the second step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis. However, they are unable to show that the

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trial court erred in finding they did not demonstrate a probability
of success on the merits.
The first argument section in plaintiffs’ brief is entitled,
“Whether The State Litigation Privilege/ Anti-Slapp (sic) Protects
a Landlord In Government Contracted Housing Who Violates
Constitutional Due Process Requirements, Such as Good Cause
Under The 14TH (sic) Amendment Of The U.S. Constitution?” In
this section of their brief, plaintiffs cite cases that describe the
litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47. The
litigation privilege embodied in Civil Code section 47 is “‘relevant
to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may
present a substantive defense the plaintiff must overcome to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.) However, plaintiffs’ discussion stops
abruptly at the definition of the privilege. Plaintiffs do not
provide any argument or citations to the record to show how the
litigation privilege was applied or misapplied in their case. They
do not discuss the constitutional issues raised in the title of this
section of their brief. They do not meet their burden to
affirmatively demonstrate the trial court erred.
Plaintiffs’ second argument is entitled, “WHETHER THE
SSVF ACT PREEMPT EACH ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS
CLAIMS UNDER THE SSVF REGULATIONS 38 CFR PART 62,
38 U.S.C. 2044, & DUE PROCESS?” (Sic.) In this section of
their brief, plaintiffs do not address the question posed in its title,
and as the court did not rule on the preemption of plaintiffs’
claims, the import of the question is unclear. Instead, plaintiffs
provide a general discussion of federal preemption of state law
and imply that defendants could not evict them or invoke the
litigation privilege because plaintiffs were participants in the

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SSVF Program, which is a federal program. They go through
many of their causes of action,3 describing alleged conduct by
defendants that violated the SSVF Program rules and policies,
again omitting needed citations to the record and pertinent cases.
A “party who claims that a state statute is preempted by federal
law bears the burden of demonstrating preemption.” (Bronco
Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 956; see Peatros v. Bank
of America (2000) 22 Cal.4th 147, 157 [“Whether federal law
preempts state law is fundamentally a question whether
Congress has intended such a result. . . . [¶] The ‘starting
presumption’ is that Congress has not so intended”].) Absent
citations to the record and legal authority, plaintiffs do not meet
their burden. They do not show the trial court erred in finding
their preemption argument lacked merit.
In the third and final argument section of their brief,
plaintiffs ask, “WHETHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THIS
CASE IS PROTECTED BY THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE?”
Plaintiffs argue the litigation privilege does not protect
defendants’ crimes or fraud, which consists of the following
alleged acts: (1) false statements made by Hawthorne in
unlawful detainer pleadings; (2) prematurely obtaining a default
judgment against plaintiffs; (3) holding a meeting to discuss how
to get plaintiffs out of the house; (4) unclear actions related to
rent and security deposit checks sent to Hawthorne, which were
cashed, torn up, or not properly documented; and (5) reporting
plaintiffs as squatters to the police. However, plaintiffs do not

3 In going through their causes of action, plaintiffs do not address
multiple claims that were subject to defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion
and go through two claims not subject to the motion.

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provide any citations to the record or legal authority to support
their argument. “Such a factually and legally unsupported claim
of error does not satisfy appellants’ burden on appeal.” (LNSU
#1, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070; Slone, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.)
Moreover, “[t]he principal purpose of the litigation privilege
is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access
to the courts without fear of harassment in subsequent derivative
actions.” (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1031.)
“‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some
connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The privilege is broad and has been applied in numerous cases
involving fraudulent communication or perjured testimony.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) It “protects even
communication made with an intent to harm, so long as the
communication is made in ‘relation’ to a pending/ongoing or
genuinely contemplated judicial or other official proceeding.”
(Geragos, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031–1032, citing Civ.
Code, § 47, subd. (b).) Communications made to report
misconduct to the police or other official investigative agencies
are similarly privileged, as liability for such communications
would deter citizens from reporting concerns. (Hagberg v.
California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 364–365; Wang v.
Heck (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 677, 684.)
Plaintiffs do not show that the actions related to the
unlawful detainer proceeding or the reports to official
investigative agencies fall outside the protection of Civil Code

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section 47. They do not explain how the alleged misconduct
identified, even if proven and not privileged, would entitle them
to succeed on their claims against defendants. In sum, plaintiffs
do not demonstrate that the trial court erred in finding they did
not establish a probability of success on the merits.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Because respondents did not appear
on appeal, neither party shall recover costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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