CourtListener 10658086•Pritikin v. LG Electronics CA4/3
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Filed 8/21/25 Pritikin v. LG Electronics CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DAVID LEE PRITIKIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G063695
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-01330252)
LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed.
Kevin Michael Faulk for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Kevin E. Whelan, and Don
Willenburg for Defendant and Respondent.
David Lee Pritikin appeals from an order of the superior court
reducing the fees he requested pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
1
sections 1281.98 and 1281.99. Pritikin argues the trial court did not
adequately articulate the reasons for the reduction in the fees requested. As
discussed below, we conclude the court adequately explained the reduction
was due to the excessive fees requested. Moreover, the court’s excessiveness
finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, we
affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 19, 2023, Pritikin filed a motion to compel LG
Electronics U.S.A., Inc., (LG) to pay his arbitration fees and costs, and to
award sanctions pursuant to sections 1281.98 and 1281.99. Pritikin argued
he was entitled to fees and costs because LG failed to pay certain arbitration
fees within 30 days of the due dates of December 14, 2022 and February 16,
2023. He sought: (1) $14,475 for “fees incurred in arbitration” “on the grounds
that [LG], as the drafting party of a consumer sale contract containing an
arbitration clause, materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing
to pay the fees and costs required to continue the arbitration”; and (2) fees
and costs of $3,178.50 for bringing the instant motion.
Attorney Kevin Michael Faulk submitted a declaration
supporting the request for $3,178.50 in fees and costs associated with
bringing the motion. Faulk stated Pritikin incurred $1,693.50 in fees and
costs for preparing and filing the motion, which represents 3.3 hours at
Faulk’s firm’s 2023 hourly rate of $495. Faulk also anticipated additional fees
1
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure, unless stated otherwise.
2
of $1,485, consisting of three additional hours at the same rate to prepare a
reply, prepare for oral argument and telephonically attend the hearing on the
motion.
Attorney Martin Anderson submitted a declaration in support of
the request for $14,475 in fees. He stated his hourly rate was $750, which
was within the range of $500 to $1,000 hourly rates charged by other lawyers
in the field. He attached time records detailing his work in the case before
Faulk took over the matter and filed the motion. The time records showed
Anderson’s work from the beginning of the court case, including sending a
demand letter to LG, negotiating a settlement, filing an arbitration claim
with American Arbitration Association (AAA), disqualifying the first
arbitrator and withdrawing from arbitration once LG failed to pay the
arbitrator’s fees.
LG opposed the motion on two grounds. First, it argued the
claims in the subject arbitration and lawsuit were barred by res judicata.
Specifically, Pritikin was a member of a national class action lawsuit against
LG, which was subsequently settled. “He filed a written claim, received a
settlement payment, and cashed his settlement check . . . well before his
demand for arbitration.” Second, LG argued the requested fees were not
reasonable and/or not a result of a material breach of the arbitration
agreement. LG asserted the requested fees include “duplicate billing entries”
and fees relating to his attorney’s “pre-arbitration demand letter, settlement
negotiations, etc.” LG attached copies of the class action, complaint, the
global settlement, and Pritikin’s claim form and cashed settlement check.
In reply, Pritikin argued the applicable statutes specifically bar
(1) consideration of the merits of the underlying action or arbitration; and
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(2) waiver of his claims against LG. Pritikin did not dispute section 1281.99
limits the attorney fees and costs only to those which are the result of the
material breach, but argued Anderson’s fees are recoverable under section
1281.98, subdivision (c)(1). He further argued that Faulk’s fees relating to the
motion are recoverable under section 1281.99.
Following a hearing, the trial court partially granted Pritikin’s
motion. As an initial matter, it held that although LG asserted Pritikin’s
claims are barred by res judicata, it could not consider that assertion because
section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1) states that fees shall be awarded “without
regard to any findings on the merits in the underlying action or arbitration.”
The court found the amount of fees requested to be excessive. “According to
the documents before this court, not much was done in arbitration. The court
further notes that Plaintiff seeks an award of fees that covers conduct before
arbitration was commenced and/or conduct unrelated to arbitration. The
court finds that $2,060,00 (5 hours at $400/hour plus filing fee of $60) is the
reasonable amount of fees incurred as a result of defendant’s material breach,
which includes an award for having filed the instant motion.” It ordered LG
to pay Pritikin $2,060 within 30 days.
Pritikin appealed the sanctions order under the collateral order
doctrine because it is (1) “a final determination (2) of a collateral matter
(3) and direct[s] the payment of money or performance of an act.” (Apex LLC
v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 (Apex).)
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DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Section 1281.98 Governs This Matter
Pritikin challenges the trial court sanctions order, which awarded
him attorney fees and costs in an amount less than requested. He contends
this court should “make a de novo assessment as to whether the Superior
Court employed the appropriate legal standard in determining the fee and
cost award.” Thus, as an initial matter, we must determine what is “the
appropriate legal standard.” Stated differently, we must determine whether
section 1281.98 applies, or whether, as LG argues on appeal, section 1281.97
applies. Our resolution of this legal issue is required even though LG did not
file a cross-appeal because the trial court cannot award attorney fees and
costs as sanctions unless authorized by statute or by the agreement of the
parties. (See Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804,
809 [“[T]rial courts may not award attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct
unless they do so pursuant to statutory authority or an agreement of the
parties”].)
In determining which statute applies, we employ a de novo
standard of review. (See Apex, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016–1017 [“The
issue of a party’s entitlement to attorney fees is a legal issue subject to de
novo review”]; Carmel Development Co., Inc. v. Anderson (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 492, 503 [“We review a trial court’s interpretation and
application of statutes de novo”].) “As in any case involving statutory
interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 136, 142.) “[W]e must look first to the words of the statute because
5
they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the
statute governs. [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.)
“If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction,
we may consider ‘a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects
to be achieved’” and the statute’s legislative history. (People v. Sinohui (2002)
28 Cal.4th 205, 211.) For example, in this case, “[o]ne of the Legislature’s
main objectives [for enacting sections 1281.97 and 1281.98] was to deter
employers from strategically withholding payment of arbitration fees so that
they could no longer stymie the ability of employees to assert their legal
rights.” (Doe v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 346, 357.)
“Sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 ‘largely parallel’ each other.
[Citation.] Whereas section 1281.97 concerns a failure to timely pay ‘the fees
or costs to initiate’ an arbitration proceeding (§ 1281.97, subd. (a)(1), italics
added), section 1281.98 concerns a failure to timely pay ‘the fees or costs
required to continue’ an arbitration proceeding (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1), italics
added).” (De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 740, 750.) Both
sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 provide that as a result of the drafting party’s
failure to pay arbitration fees and costs, the consumer may unilaterally
“[w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate
jurisdiction.” (§§ 1281.97, subd. (b)(1), 1281.98, subd. (b)(1).) In cases where
the drafting party failed to pay the arbitration initiation fees and costs, “[i]f
the employee or consumer proceeds with an action in a court of appropriate
jurisdiction, the court shall impose sanctions on the drafting party in
accordance with [s]ection 1281.99.” (§1281.97, subd. (d).) However, in cases
where the drafting party fails to pay fees to continue the arbitration,“[i]f the
. . . consumer withdraws the claim from arbitration and proceeds in a court of
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appropriate jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b), both of
the following apply: [¶] (1) The employee or consumer may bring a motion, or
a separate action, to recover all attorney’s fees and all costs associated with
the abandoned arbitration proceeding. The recovery of arbitration fees,
interest, and related attorney’s fees shall be without regard to any findings
on the merits in the underlying action or arbitration. [¶] (2) The court shall
impose sanctions on the drafting party in accordance with [s]ection 1281.99.”
(§ 1281.98, subd. (c).) Section 1281.99, subdivision (a) provides: “The court
shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially
breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to subdivision (a) of [s]ection
1281.97 or subdivision (a) of [s]ection 1281.98, by ordering the drafting party
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred
by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.”
Here, after a de novo review of the record, we conclude section
1281.98 applies because the fees LG failed to pay are not arbitration
initiation fees, despite an errant claim by Pritikin in his appellate opening
brief. Section 1281.97 provides that the arbitration initiation fee must be set
forth in an invoice provided by the arbitration provider. (See § 1281.97, subd.
(a)(2) [“After an employee or consumer meets the filing requirements
necessary to initiate an arbitration, the arbitration provider shall
immediately provide an invoice for any fees and costs required before the
arbitration can proceed . . .”].) Anderson’s billing records reflect the
arbitration provider here, AAA, sent an invoice to LG for a $500
administrative filing fee, which LG paid.
Additionally, the parties’ arbitration agreement provides that
arbitration must be initiated by a written demand for arbitration and in
accordance with the AAA’s consumer arbitration rules. Under rule 4 of those
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rules, “[a]rbitration under an arbitration agreement naming the AAA shall be
initiated by the initiating party (referred to as the “claimant”) filing with the
AAA a Demand for Arbitration, the administrative filing fee, and a copy of
2
the applicable arbitration agreement.” The record shows these requirements
were met. Thus, arbitration had been initiated, and the fees LG failed to pay
later were those “fees and costs required for the arbitration proceeding to
continue.” (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(2).) In sum, the applicable statute is section
1281.98.
As stated above, under section 1281.98, if the drafting party
materially breaches the arbitration agreement, the trial court “shall impose
sanctions on the drafting party in accordance with [s]ection 1281.99.”
(§ 1281.98, subd. (c)(2).) In addition, the “consumer may bring a motion, or a
separate action, to recover all attorney’s fees and all costs associated with the
abandoned arbitration proceeding. The recovery of arbitration fees, interest,
and related attorney’s fees shall be without regard to any findings on the
merits in the underlying action or arbitration.” (§ 1281.98, subd. (c)(1).)
Section 1281.99 provides that the monetary sanctions consist of “reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs,” but those fees and costs must
be “incurred by the . . . consumer as a result of the material breach.”
(§ 1281.99, subd. (a).) Generally, these would be fees and costs incurred after
2
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the applicable
version of the AAA rules, effective September 1, 2018, available on the AAA
website: (<https://www.adr.org/rules-forms-and-
fees/fetch?Category=Consumer, Consumer Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures, 05/01/25> [as of Aug. 5, 2025], archived at:
<https://perma.cc/78UT>.) (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a); see
Emerald Aero, LLC v. Kaplan (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1132, fn. 5 [AAA
rules are subject to judicial notice].)
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the material breach. Thus, to recover other fees, such as those incurred before
the material breach, a consumer must bring a motion under section 1281.98,
subdivision (c)(1).
Both sections 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1) and 1281.99, subdivision
(a) address the scope of the trial court’s discretion in determining whether
and how much attorney fees and costs should be awarded. Under section
1281.99, subdivision (a), the court has no discretion in awarding reasonable
fees and costs. It must award those reasonable expenses. However, because
the statute does not set forth any mechanism on how to determine the
amount of reasonable expenses, the court retains its discretion to determine
that amount. (Cf. Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare
REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 791 [“The principle of reasonableness
means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs
requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award”].) In
contrast, section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1) has no mandatory language.
Thus, the court has discretion to grant or deny the motion for attorney fees
and costs. Additionally, if it decides to award fees and costs, it has discretion
to determine the amount of fees and costs awarded.
B. Standard of Review
Because the trial court awarded sanctions, the only remaining
issues concern the court’s discretionary determinations. Accordingly, we
review the amount of sanctions awarded, and whether to grant additional
attorney fees and costs, and if so, in what amount, for an abuse of discretion.
(See Apex, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 [“The determination of the
amount of fees awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion”]; Tedesco v. White
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1097 [an order awarding monetary sanctions is
reviewed for abuse of discretion].) “[A] trial court’s exercise of discretion will
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not be disturbed unless the record establishes it exceeded the bounds of
reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow
proper procedure in reaching its decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal
standard to the determination [citation].” (Conservatorship of Scharles (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1340.)
Moreover, the trial court here reduced the requested amount of
fees based on its finding that the requested fees were excessive. “A fee
request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance
permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”
(Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano); accord, Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1137 (Ketchum).) A court must have discretion
to deny an unreasonable fee altogether because “‘[i]f . . . the Court were
required to award a reasonable fee when an outrageously unreasonable one
has been asked for, claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable
demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct
would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked in the first
place. To discourage such greed, a severer reaction is needful. . . .’” (Serrano,
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 635, quoting Brown v. Stackler (7th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d
1057, 1059.)
Finally,“[t]he normal rules of appellate review apply to an order
granting or denying attorney fees; i.e., the order is presumed correct, all
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the order, conflicts in
the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial court’s
resolution of factual disputes is conclusive.” (Apex, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1017.)
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II.
ANALYSIS
Pritikin contends the trial court did not adequately explain its
reasons for cutting the requested fees. We disagree. The court does not have
to explain the basis for a reduced fee award. “Where, as here, the trial court
severely curtails the number of compensable hours in a fee award, we
presume the court concluded the fee request was padded.” (Christian
Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325 (Alnor).) In any
event, the court here adequately explained its decision when it stated its
belief the fees requested were excessive.
Next, Pritikin argues the trial court’s excessiveness finding was
not supported by the record. He argues counsel’s sworn declarations attesting
to hourly rates and time records are presumed accurate in the absence of
contrary evidence. But as a prior panel of this court has explained: “An
attorney’s chief asset in submitting a fee request is his or her credibility, and
where vague, blockbilled time entries inflated with noncompensable hours
destroy an attorney’s credibility with the trial court, we have no power on
appeal to restore it. (See Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 524
[‘The trial court is not bound by an attorney’s evidence in support of his
requested fee’].)” (Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1325–1326.) Thus, a
lack of credibility destroys any presumption of accuracy. Here, the court
explained its finding of excessive fees was based on requests for fees incurred
“before arbitration was commenced and/or conduct unrelated to arbitration.”
Substantial evidence supports these findings. For example, Anderson
submitted billing records for work performed before the arbitration was
initiated, such as 1.4 hours for the initial meeting with the client, 2.8 hours
for reviewing documents that Pritikin submitted regarding the claim, and 3.7
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hours for settlement negotiations with LG. Given that the court could have
denied all fees due to the inflated fee request, Pritikin has not shown
awarding $2,060 in fees and costs constituted an abuse of discretion. (See
Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1137 [“A fee request that appears
unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to
reduce the award or deny one altogether”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order awarding $2,060 in fees and costs is
affirmed. LG is entitled to its cost on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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