CourtListener 10656744•In re H.E. CA4/1
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Filed 8/19/25 In re H.E. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re H.E. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D085316
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. NJ16004A&B)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.E.,
Defendant and Respondent;
H.E. et al.,
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Dismissed.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant
H.E.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant S.E.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Evangelina Woo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Respondent L.E.
Children H.E. and S.E. appeal the juvenile court’s orders dismissing
juvenile dependency petitions filed on their behalf by the San Diego County
Health and Human Services Agency under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(C). The children assert the juvenile court
erred by declining to sustain the petitions as pled or to amend the petitions to
conform to proof.
L.E., the children’s grandmother and legal guardian, moves to dismiss
the appeal because the juvenile court declared the children dependents of the
court in subsequent petitions. Resolving this matter by memorandum
opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we
dismiss this appeal as moot and decline to exercise our inherent discretion to
consider its merits.
I.
The Agency’s petitions alleged the grandmother willfully or negligently
failed to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment,
causing a substantial risk of physical harm or illness, under
section 300(b)(1)(C). This was based on the grandmother “express[ing] an
unwillingness and inability to care for the child[ren] . . . , including at least
five times in front of the child[ren].” These incidents included the
grandmother requesting law enforcement remove the children from her care
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and threatening to abandon them. The Agency received six referrals
regarding the family between April and August 2024.
At the contested jurisdiction hearing, the court received evidence that
the grandmother: (1) physically and verbally abused S.E., (2) stated she no
longer wanted to care for one or both of the children on multiple occasions,
and (3) appeared to lack the ability to care for the children. Nonetheless, the
court found the evidence insufficient to make true findings on the petitions as
pled. The court determined the evidence did not establish the grandmother
failed to provide the children adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment as required by section 300(b)(1)(C). Although the court believed
the grandmother was “not equipped to care for” the children “any longer,” it
determined the Agency had improperly pled the case under
section 300(b)(1)(C). The court declined to amend the pleadings to conform to
the evidence, finding that doing so would violate the grandmother’s due
process rights.
In this appeal, the children argue substantial evidence supported the
petitions, or, alternatively, the court abused its discretion by failing to
conform the petitions to proof. The Agency filed a joinder to the children’s
appeals, agreeing the court erred by declining to conform the evidence to
proof. The Agency also requested appointment of appellate counsel for the
grandmother as a respondent. We previously granted that request.
After filing new dependency petitions on behalf of the children in early
2025, the Agency requested we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
minute orders from the detention hearings. In the requests for judicial
notice, the Agency explained the juvenile court’s decisions “may render [the
children’s] appeal[s] moot if a true finding is made and [they are] adjudicated
. . . dependent[s].” We grant the Agency’s requests. (Evid. Code, §§ 452(d),
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459(a); In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58–59.) At the hearings, the
court found the Agency made a prima facie showing for initial detention
under section 300(c) as to S.E. and section 300(g) as to H.E.
The grandmother then filed a request for judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s July 9, 2025, minute orders from the contested adjudication and
disposition hearings on the new petitions. We grant that request. (§§ 452(d),
459(a); In re N.S., 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58–59.) At that hearing, the court
made true findings on the petitions, finding jurisdiction over S.E. under
section 300(c), finding jurisdiction over H.E. under section 300(g), and
declaring the children dependents of the court. Based on those orders, the
grandmother also moves to dismiss this appeal as moot.
S.E. filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, which H.E. joined.
The Agency does not oppose the motion.
II.
We agree with the grandmother that the juvenile court’s July 9, 2025,
orders taking jurisdiction over the children and declaring them dependents of
the court render this appeal moot. We decline to exercise our inherent
discretion to consider the merits of the appeal.
A.
An appeal is moot when subsequent events prevent the court from
being able to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276.) Effective relief exists where there is ongoing harm “redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) The
existence of “a specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided
upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings is what determines whether the
case is moot.” (Id. at p. 283.) An appellant cannot use speculative future
harm to avoid a finding of mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)
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Here, there is no ongoing harm because the court has taken jurisdiction
over the children, and they have been declared dependents of the court and
removed from the grandmother’s custody. The children rely on speculative
future harm in arguing the appeal is not moot. S.E.’s opposition states a
“continuing controversy” exists because “the same situation could reoccur
again in the future if” he is returned to the grandmother. Thus “S.E. wants
to know” if the court committed error “to protect him in the future.” S.E.
seeks clarification whether, if the grandmother “continually threaten[s]
abandonment of S.E. in the future,” he can only obtain protection of the
juvenile court under the “heightened emotional abuse” standard of
section 300(c), not under section 300(b). This scenario involves speculative
harm, which would reoccur only if (1) the juvenile court’s current jurisdiction
terminates, (2) the children return to the grandmother’s custody, (3) the
Agency files a new petition under section 300(b)(1)(C) based on the
grandmother’s continuing to threaten to abandon the children, and (4) the
court dismisses that petition.
The children do not point to any specific consequences they would avoid
by obtaining relief. The circumstances here are unlike in the cases cited by
S.E. for the proposition that orders that have negative consequences in the
same or another proceeding are not moot. (In re Dylan T. (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [order refusing parent visitation during her
incarceration subjected her relationship with child to erosion and might affect
her ability to reunify]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548
[jurisdictional order litigated issues that would result in collateral estoppel in
subsequent family law proceeding].) These cases involved specific, existing
consequences, not future uncertainties.
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B.
Despite the appeal being moot, we have inherent discretion to reach the
merits of the case. (In re D.P., 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Courts of appeal
generally exercise this discretion “when ‘the case presents an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur’” or “‘when there may be a recurrence of
the controversy between the parties.’” (Ibid.) We decline to do so here for two
reasons. First, this case involves the narrow, fact-specific issues whether
threats of abandonment amount to the inadequate provision of food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment, and if not, whether the court should have
amended the petitions to conform to proof based on the case-specific evidence
provided at the contested hearing. Second, those issues are unlikely to
reemerge in this case because the Agency subsequently brought petitions
based on different subdivisions and the court made true findings on those
petitions.
The issues here do not appear to be broad matters of public interest like
those in In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 964. There, the court
determined “the standard applicable to emergency removal of minors” should
be addressed despite the order being moot “because it is an issue capable of
repetition yet evading review” and “there are no published cases discussing
the prima facie showing necessary for the detention of a minor under
section 319.” (Id. at pp. 967, 970.) This case does not involve so broad of
issues as the standard for the prima facie showing to support initial
detention, which applies in every juvenile dependency petition. The
section 300(b)(1)(C) issue presented here would be repeated only if the parent
or guardian engages in threats of abandonment and if the Agency chooses to
bring a petition under that section specifically. And the issue would only
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evade review, as here, when the court has subsequently taken jurisdiction;
however, under this scenario the children will remain protected.
Contrary to S.E.’s assertion, even without an opinion on the merits,
section 300(b) is not entirely unavailable if a third set of petitions becomes
necessary. For example, based on the allegations in the first set of petitions,
the Agency might still allege inadequate supervision or protection.
(§ 300(b)(1)(A).) Nor does S.E. cite to any authority to support the proposition
that jurisdiction is more difficult to prove under section 300(c) than under
section 300(b). As he acknowledges, the Agency has obtained a section 300(c)
jurisdictional finding as to S.E.
III.
We dismiss this appeal as moot.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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