P. v, Baeza CA2/6

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Filed 8/19/25 P. v, Baeza CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B341149
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, F000274308001)
(San Luis Obispo County)
v.

ISMAEL CHAMONICA BAEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Ismael Chamonica Baeza appeals the denial of his motion
under Penal Code1 section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction for
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)). We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 3, 1998, a complaint charged appellant with
felony stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor resisting a
peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The following day, appellant
pleaded no contest to the stalking charge pursuant to a plea
agreement. The resisting a peace officer charge was dismissed.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant was to receive probation and serve 180 days in county
jail imposed in two prior misdemeanor cases for which he was
already on probation.
The prosecutor stated that “if [appellant] were to return to
this country illegally, he would violate the terms and conditions
of his felony case.” During the plea colloquy, the court advised
appellant: “If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are
hereby advised that your conviction of the offense to which you
are pleading no contest will result in your deportation, exclusion
from admission to the United States and denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States? Do you understand
that?” Appellant replied: “Oh, yes.”
A Notice of Custody Determination dated September 23,
1998 provided appellant would be detained by Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Appellant acknowledged receipt on
November 30, 1998. On December 31, 1998, an immigration
judge denied appellant’s application for voluntary departure and
ordered him removed to Mexico.
On March 19, 2002, the court revoked probation and
sentenced appellant to 16 months in prison. The appellate record
does not contain a transcript of the proceeding. The docket shows
appellant admitted the probation violation. The minute order is
silent as to any immigration advisement.
In 2024, appellant filed a motion to vacate conviction
pursuant to section 1473.7. The motion included a declaration by
appellant, which was later amended, and several exhibits,
including character reference letters.
The court denied the motion. The court concluded
appellant had not shown the stalking conviction was currently
causing or had the potential to cause adverse immigration

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consequences. It stated the record indicated appellant was
subject to a deportation order prior to his 1998 plea. The court
quoted the presentence report2: “‘In addition, the defendant
cannot legally reside in California. He, therefore, will be
deported at the completion of his sentence. This defendant had
previously been deported and has returned to the United States.
The defendant was also informed that if he was to return
illegally, it would be recommended that the defendant serve a
long period of time in custody for the violation of probation. The
defendant claims he understands, and that once deported, he
plans to return to his family in Mexico.’” The court also found
appellant “was adequately advised” and unable “to meet his
burden for relief under the statute.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises multiple issues, including failure to (1)
inform him immigration consequences were “mandatory and for
life”; and (2) advise him “of the immigration consequences of his
admitting his violation of probation . . . .” We conclude appellant
has not shown prejudice as to his 1998 plea. Furthermore, by
failing to provide an adequate record, he has forfeited on appeal
any claim based on the probation violation admission. Thus, we
will affirm the section 1473.7 denial.
Legal Principles
Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a person no
longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction
or sentence that is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging [their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.”

2 The report is not part of the appellate record.

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“A successful section 1473.7 motion requires a showing, by
a preponderance of the evidence, of a prejudicial error that
affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the
actual or potential immigration consequences of a plea.” (People
v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 517.) “‘[P]rejudical error . . .
means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant
would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly
understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.’”
(People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza); Vivar,
at pp. 529-530.)
To assess prejudicial error, “courts must ‘consider the
totality of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘Factors particularly
relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United
States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding
deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain,
and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-
neutral negotiated disposition was possible. [Citations.] Also
relevant are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more
favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the
difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if
he were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 320.) “A defendant must provide ‘“‘objective evidence’”’ to
corroborate factual assertions.” (Id. at p. 321.)
“We apply independent review to evaluate whether a
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he
would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its
immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 319.) Under that standard, “‘“an appellate court exercises its
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the
rules of law.”’” (Id. at pp. 319-320.) When “the trial court’s

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findings ‘derive entirely from written declarations and other
documents,’ the trial court and the reviewing court ‘“are in the
same position,”’ and no deference is owed.” (Id. at p. 320.)
Appellant’s Plea
Appellant has not shown prejudice.
Appellant lacked strong ties to the United States when he
pleaded no contest. Appellant came to the country in 1990 at age
17. His declaration does not discuss any family living in the
country. He has never been married and has no children.
Although appellant includes several character references, none
appear to have known him at the time of his 1998 plea.
Appellant’s tenuous ties to the country present a stark departure
from cases in which “a defendant’s strong community ties . . .
provide compelling evidence in support of a finding of prejudicial
error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322 [defendant’s wife
and five children were United States citizens, and his parents
and siblings lived in the United States].)
Appellant did not place importance on avoiding deportation
when he pleaded. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) On the
contrary, the record indicates appellant knew he would be
deported and would risk imprisonment if he returned illegally.
Consistent with his lack of strong United States ties, appellant
ostensibly “‘plan[ned] to return to his family in Mexico’” once
deported. An advisal his plea would carry certain mandatory and
lifetime consequences had little prospect of changing his calculus.
Appellant was also already on probation in two
misdemeanor cases when he pleaded no contest to stalking.
Appellant faced up to three years in prison for that charge.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant instead received 180
days in jail and a grant of probation. Even if a probation

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violation and prison sentence would later create mandatory,
lifetime immigration consequences, appellant was unlikely to
obtain a more favorable outcome at the time of his plea. He does
not offer, for example, an immigration attorney’s declaration
identifying a better—yet still plausible—option. Appellant has
failed to show any immigration misunderstanding “constituted
prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.)
Appellant’s Probation Violation
Appellant contends he was not advised of immigration
consequences before admitting his probation violation. The
record is inadequate to permit review of his contention.
“‘“A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown . . . .”’” (People v. Wiley (1995) 9
Cal.4th 580, 592, fn. 7.) Accordingly, “[i]t is axiomatic that it is
the burden of the appellant to provide an adequate record to
permit review of a claimed error, and failure to do so may be
deemed a waiver of the issue on appeal.” (People v. Akins (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385; see also People v. Whalen (2013) 56
Cal.4th 1, 84-85, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 44, fn. 17.)
The appellate record lacks a transcript of the 2002
probation revocation hearing. The docket indicates the court
reporter filed a transcript of that hearing. There is no
declaration from appellant’s counsel or the court reporter
regarding any efforts to produce that transcript. That transcript
would be integral to our independent review. By failing to
provide an adequate record to permit review, appellant has

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forfeited on appeal any claim based on the probation violation
admission.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Rita B. Federman, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________

Angelica Maria Gutierrez Diaz for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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