CourtListener 10656696•People v. Ricks CA4/1
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Filed 8/19/25 P. v. Ricks CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085921
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. BAF1701368)
RONALD RICKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
James Stafford Hawkins, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Sup. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina, Melissa Mandel and Anne Spitzberg, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Ronald Ricks appeals the judgment and sentence imposed
following his jury trial conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187,
subd. (a)) with true findings on a firearm enhancement for personal and
intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and a “drive-by” special
circumstance for murder perpetrated by discharge of a firearm from a motor
vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)).
Ricks raises multiple issues on appeal. First, Ricks argues that a text
message sent to his girlfriend was improperly admitted into evidence, and
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object. The text message,
however, was properly admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of impeaching
his girlfriend’s testimony. Additionally, any error was harmless.
Second, Ricks asserts the trial court improperly included the “witness
certainty” factor in CALCRIM No. 315 regarding eyewitness identification
evidence. Ricks, however, requested the instruction be given without
modification, including the certainty factor. The trial court committed no
error by giving the instruction as requested by Ricks. Moreover, any error
would be harmless because no eyewitness identified Ricks or expressed any
certainty about the identification.
Third, Ricks claims the People violated their discovery obligations
through the mid-trial disclosure of a witness cooperation agreement. There
was no violation under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) or
section 1054.1 because the evidence was immaterial, disclosed and presented
at trial, and there is no reasonable probability of a different result if it had
been disclosed earlier.
1 Unless specified, further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Fourth, Ricks contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting gang-related testimony in violation of the court’s pretrial ruling
excluding such evidence. Ricks, however, forfeited this argument because he
failed to object at trial. Moreover, there was no prosecutorial error because
the testimony in question did not violate the court’s order.
Fifth, Ricks asserts the drive-by special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)) was overbroad on its face and as applied. He forfeited the as-
applied challenge and we reject the facial challenge. Additionally, we
conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Finally, Ricks claims the trial court lacked informed discretion when it
imposed but stayed the firearm discharge enhancement. The Attorney
General concedes this point. We agree and accept the concession. Because
full resentencing is necessary under People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1015 (McDavid), Ricks’s other resentencing arguments are moot.
We remand for resentencing but otherwise affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2017, Michael Gordon was fatally shot in a drive-by
shooting outside the residence he shared with his fiancé Ashley Phillips.
Shortly before the shooting, as she was leaving their residence, Phillips
saw a white truck nearby drive slowly at first, then speed up and drive away.
A little while later, Gordon walked out of the residence with an acquaintance.
He was helping the acquaintance put her dogs in her vehicle when a white
truck approached slowly, and gunshots rang out. The acquaintance ducked
until the gunfire stopped, and then she got up, went to the other side of her
vehicle and saw people pointing toward a white Dodge truck. She could not
see the truck’s driver but saw Gordon standing behind her vehicle, bleeding
and looking scared. He asked her to take him to the hospital and then he fell
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to the ground and stopped moving. By the time officers arrived, Gordon was
face down in a pool of blood, was not breathing, and was not responsive to
verbal commands. He was pronounced dead at the scene.
Multiple witnesses described the driver of the white Dodge truck as a
White or Hispanic male. Surveillance video also captured the white Dodge
truck travelling on the street, stopping, and then speeding away.
At the time of the murder, Ricks was driving a white Dodge rental
truck he borrowed from his girlfriend Salena Holmes. After the murder,
police investigators found the rental truck outside the home of Ricks’s best
friend’s mother. Ricks went there shortly after the murder, asked to use her
phone and said he needed a ride. Police investigators found gunshot residue
on the driver’s window frame and the steering wheel of the truck.
Forensic analysis of Holmes’s phones revealed text messages indicating
Ricks wanted to harm Gordon. Ricks had broken up with Holmes about a
week before the murder because he believed Holmes and Gordon, who were
good friends and had previously dated, had recently been together. A couple
days before the murder, Ricks texted Holmes, “I know you were with
[Gordon].” “Is there a guy with you? If so, I would like to beat them up.”
“Bring [Gordon] and get it, please.” Holmes responded, “I ain’t with [Gordon],
so I don’t know what you mean.”
The messages continued until the day before the murder, with Ricks
texting Holmes, “I want you to tell all your friends that if you’re at that house
with any guy, friend, whatever, I’m going to take―fight them.” “That you can
take to the bank.” “You have no choice. This is what you wanted me to care.
Well, now I don’t care and I’m going to show you when shit you don’t deserve
the respect I gave you. So yes, I felt that you think you can do and act how
because consequences don’t affect you while your choices have put someone
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on the block and you know in your heart. Goodbye.” “It’s about time you
make a decision for yourself, and I do promise you this will not be the last
time you talk to me. Tomorrow when I get your bitch, because you can
believe this is worth dying for, so, yes, you are worth killing for.”
An investigator from the district attorney’s office testified the phrase
“put someone on the block” was “short for chopping block” and meant “either
to hurt someone significantly or to kill them.”
Holmes also exchanged text messages with Gordon. Two days before
the murder, Holmes wrote to Gordon, “One of my so-called friends told
[Ricks] I was with you on Sunday, and he just broke up with me.” Gordon
responded, “I’m going to smash [the person who snitched on us].” The day
before the murder, Holmes wrote to Gordon, “[Ricks] said he’s going to fight
anyone . . . in my truck and at my house.” Gordon responded, “He wants to
fight me?” Holmes wrote, “Yeah, he does. You and any guy I’m going to roll
with. . . . He don’t care anymore, he said.”
Shortly after Gordon was shot, Holmes received a text message from a
person identified as “Leanna” that said, “Answer the call from James’s phone.
It’s [Ricks] calling and it’s an emergency. [Holmes], answer it.” There were
several incoming and outgoing calls between Holmes and a phone belonging
to someone named James L. Holmes wrote back saying she was on her way.
Shortly after the murder, Holmes was in police custody. An inmate
informed police Holmes, while in custody, talked about a murder where the
victim was her friend, and the shooter was her boyfriend who told her it was
as easy as killing or skinning a cat.
In June 2018, the district attorney filed an information charging Ricks
with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). In connection with the murder charge, the
information alleged that Ricks personally and intentionally discharged a
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firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that
the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict death (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)). In addition, the information alleged two prison priors (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)), a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a strike prior (§§ 667,
subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
In August 2023, a jury found Ricks guilty of first degree murder and
found the special circumstance and the gun enhancement to be true. Ricks
admitted the prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced him to
life without the possibility of parole plus a stayed indeterminate sentence of
25 years to life for the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I.
Whether Text Message Was Properly Admitted
Ricks argues the trial court improperly admitted hearsay in the form of
a text message from Leanna to Holmes urging her to answer her phone,
telling her that it was Ricks calling from James’s phone and stating that it
was an emergency. He contends there is no applicable hearsay exception and
that Holmes’s state of mind in response to the text was not relevant to any
disputed issue in the case. He further contends it was prejudicial given its
timing, its reference to an emergency involving Ricks and the inference it
raised that he was involved.
A. Additional Factual Background
On direct examination by the prosecutor, Holmes denied Ricks
admitted to her he killed Gordon. She also claimed to remember almost
nothing about the circumstances leading up to and following Gordon’s
murder, including the following: telling police that Ricks was the last driver
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of the rental truck; that there were text messages between her and Ricks
about Gordon before he was killed; that she received text messages from
Ricks’s phone that he was angry or jealous; that she texted Gordon that Ricks
was angry after seeing them together; and that Ricks texted her that he was
going to have to put someone on the block and that Holmes was worth killing
for.
On redirect examination of Holmes, the following exchange occurred:
“Q: Do you remember . . . minutes after [Gordon] was
killed, Leanna . . . sent you a text saying, “Answer the call
from James’s phone. It’s [Ricks] calling.”?
“A: No.
“Q: Do you remember her sending a second text: “It’s an
emergency, [Holmes]. Answer it.”
“A: No.
“Q: Do you remember shortly after that text from Leanna,
you received an incoming call from James . . . ?
“A: No.
“Q: So you get a text from Leanna . . . saying, “Answer the
call from James’s phone. It’s [Ricks] calling,” and then
immediately after that, you get a call from James . . . ?
“[Defense counsel]: Objection. Misstates the evidence.
“The Court: Well, you don’t remember that; right?
“The Witness: No.
“The Court: So overruled.
“Q: Do you remember making an outgoing call to
James . . . shortly after this text from [Leanna]?
“A: No.
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“Q: Do you remember right after that outgoing call texting
James’s phone, saying, “I’m on my way right now”?
“A: No.
“Q: About a half hour after that, . . . do you remember
texting [your friend]?
A: No.”
The prosecution then called the district attorney’s investigator to
impeach Holmes. He was asked, “And did you see a text message on
[Holmes’s] phone from the data that you extracted where . . . she sends a text
to this person Leanna―so this would have been approximately 12 minutes
after the shooting―Leanna sends a text saying―.” Defense counsel objected
on hearsay and relevance grounds. The court initially sustained the objection
but reversed after the prosecutor argued he was “offering it for impeachment”
and to explain Holmes’s “state of mind and subsequent conduct” because
Holmes denied receiving the message. After reviewing Holmes’s testimony,
the court overruled the objection.
The district attorney’s investigator then testified there was a message
from a person labeled “Leanna” to Holmes shortly after the shooting that
said, “Answer the call from James’s phone. It’s [Ricks] calling and it’s an
emergency. [Holmes], answer it.” There were several incoming calls from a
phone identified as James, and outgoing calls from Holmes to James’s phone,
and a message from Holmes to James’s phone asking where he was, and
saying she was on her way. Defense counsel objected on multiple grounds
including lack of foundation, hearsay, speculation, and confrontation clause.
B. Legal Principles
Ricks argues on appeal that Leanna’s text message to Holmes should
have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as an out-of-
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court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within the
statement. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Hearsay is inadmissible unless an
exception applies. (Id., subd. (b).) Out of court statements that are not
offered to prove the matter asserted in them are not hearsay. (Jazayeri v.
Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 316.)
We apply “ ‘the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by
a trial court on the admissibility of evidence, including one that turns on the
hearsay nature of the evidence in question [citations].’ ” (People v. Zavala
(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 242, 249.) “ ‘ “[A] trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 249, citing
People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
C. Analysis
The Attorney General argues Ricks forfeited his hearsay argument
“because he did not object when the prosecutor asked Holmes about Leanna’s
text message.” We disagree. Holmes testified she had no recollection of the
text messages, so no evidence of any out-of-court statement made by Leanna
was admitted during the prosecutor’s redirect examination of Holmes. The
substance of Leanna’s text was not admitted into evidence until later when
the investigator was called to the stand to impeach Holmes. Defense counsel
then made a timely hearsay objection. Accordingly, the issue was not
forfeited.
On the merits, we find no error. Contrary to the Attorney General’s
argument, however, Leanna’s text message to Holmes was not a prior
inconsistent statement under Evidence Code section 1235 because it was not
9
a prior statement by Holmes.2 Instead, as the trial court necessarily
determined in overruling Ricks’s objection, the challenged text message was
admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of impeaching Holmes’s testimony and
not for its truth. “A statement not offered for its truth is, definitionally, not
hearsay.” (People v. Superior Court (Couthren) (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001,
1019.)
There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that
Holmes was deliberately untruthful and evasive in her trial testimony. As
noted, she denied remembering critical facts about the events surrounding
the murder. As the court cautioned her, her testimony was “hard to believe.
Both attorneys asked you a bunch of questions and basically you said, ‘I don’t
remember anything.’ ” The court asked, “Weren’t you shocked that Mr.
Gordon was killed?” Holmes responded that she was. Yet she purported not
to remember key facts. Regardless of the truth of the text message from
Leanna, the fact that it was in fact sent to Holmes was relevant to impeach
her testimony that she did not recall receiving it, and inferentially, that she
did not recall other key facts either. It was thus admissible for the
nonhearsay purpose of demonstrating that she received it and impeaching
her claimed lack of memory. (See People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161,
170 [evidence of statements witness heard was “nonhearsay, probative of the
officer’s state of mind relating to the reasonableness of his conduct under the
circumstances and consequently admissible for impeachment purposes”];
People v. Kohn (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 368, 376 [evidence of telephone calls
2 Evidence Code section 1235 provides, “Evidence of a statement made by
a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is
inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance
with Section 770.”
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not hearsay when offered to prove calls were made, not to prove truth of
anything caller said].)
Moreover, any error was harmless. The text message from Leanna
said, “Answer the call from James’s phone. It’s [Ricks] calling and it’s an
emergency.” Although the fact that Ricks contacted Holmes regarding an
emergency shortly after the murder was incriminating to him, it did not
identify him as the shooter. Other circumstantial evidence that Ricks was
the shooter was far more damaging. In the days preceding the murder, Ricks
and Holmes broke up because he believed Holmes had been with Gordon.
Ricks texted Holmes about his jealousy and anger, stating his desire to harm
Gordon and telling Holmes she was worth killing for. Holmes let Ricks use
the white Dodge truck and he was the last person to drive it before the
shooting. The shooter was the driver and sole occupant of the truck,
matching Ricks’s description as a White or Hispanic male. Shortly after the
shooting, Ricks showed up at his friend’s mother’s house, about a mile away.
He seemed rushed, asked to use her phone, said he needed a ride, and then
was gone. Police found the truck abandoned across the street from her house
with gunshot residue on the driver’s side window frame and steering wheel.
Even assuming any error in the admission of Leanna’s text, therefore, we
would find it to be harmless because there is no reasonable probability the
jury would have reached a more favorable result without it.3 (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835–838 (Watson).)
3 On appeal, Ricks does not assert that the admission of this evidence
violated his confrontation rights under the federal or state Constitutions.
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II.
Witness Certainty Factor in CALCRIM No. 315
Relying on People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke), Ricks
contends the trial court committed reversible error by including witness
certainty among the factors listed in CALCRIM No. 315 that juries should
consider in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identification. He also
argues this was a violation of due process because empirical studies have
shown there is no correlation between eyewitness confidence and the
accuracy of identification.
A. Additional Factual Background
Phillips testified the driver of the white truck was either White or
Mexican and wearing a black shirt. Because of the distance, she could not
give a better description.
A neighbor testified he did not see the driver of the truck. He only got
a glance and did not notice any distinguishing characteristics. He testified he
was not paying much attention because he was washing his car, and he did
not identify anyone in the photo lineup. Another neighbor testified the sole
occupant of the car was the driver, a White or Hispanic male. She only saw
him for a few seconds and could not tell if he had any hair or facial markings.
She was unable to provide any further description.
An officer testified the girl who was with Gordon when he was shot told
him she was unable to see the driver.
Ricks requested CALCRIM No. 315 in its entirety. At the close of
evidence, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, which stated
that it could consider 14 specified factors when evaluating eyewitness
identification testimony. Relevant here, the court instructed the jury as
follows: “You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the Defendant.
12
As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave
truthful and accurate testimony. [¶] In evaluating identification testimony,
consider the following questions: [¶] . . . [¶] How certain was the witness
when he or she made an identification?”
Acknowledging the absence of eyewitness testimony regarding the
identity of the driver or shooter, the prosecution argued this was a
circumstantial evidence case. Defense counsel emphasized that although
many of the witnesses knew Ricks, “[n]one of them are able to identify that
driver behind the vehicle as Mr. Ricks, none of them, then all the way
through now.” Defense counsel argued none of the witnesses were able to
identify the driver. “Again, all through this time, nobody identifies Mr. Ricks
as the driver behind that wheel, and nobody identifies him as the shooter
behind that wheel. Nobody.” “The evidence that I heard, Mr. Ricks was
never identified as the shooter. Mr. Ricks was never identified in that truck.”
During deliberations, the jury requested rereading of testimony regarding the
two neighbors’ descriptions of the driver.
B. Legal Principles
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Thomas
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382; People v. Marquez (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1212,
1218.) “When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the
challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.) We also presume jurors understand and follow
the court’s instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)
13
C. Analysis
In Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th 644, our Supreme Court evaluated
CALCRIM No. 315 and expressed concern that allowing jurors to consider the
eyewitness’s level of certainty reinforced a common misconception that an
“identification is more likely to be reliable when the witness has expressed
certainty.” (Lemcke, at p. 647.) Consequently, the court concluded a
“reevaluation of the certainty instruction [in CALCRIM No. 315] is
warranted,” citing to the “near unanimity in the empirical research that
‘eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy.’ ”
(Lemcke, at p. 647.) The court referred the matter to the Judicial Council and
its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions “to evaluate whether
or how the instruction might be modified to avoid juror confusion regarding
the correlation between certainty and accuracy.” (Ibid.) Until such an
evaluation could be completed, the Supreme Court directed trial courts to
“omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 unless the defendant
requests otherwise.” (Id. at pp. 647–648, italics added.)
Here, Ricks requested CALCRIM No. 315 be given without
modification, including the certainty factor. Consistent with Lemcke, there
was no error because Ricks requested the instruction. (Lemcke, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 647–648.)
Further, Lemcke explained that any potentially misleading effect of the
witness certainty factor in CALCRIM No. 315 is not present when a witness
has expressed doubt, rather than confidence, about the accuracy of the
identification. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 669, fn. 19 [“The misleading
effect we are concerned with here—that the jury is prompted to believe there
is a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy despite empirical
research showing just the opposite—is not present when a witness has
14
expressed doubt regarding the identification.”].) Here, no witness identified
Ricks as the shooter. None of them identified him before or during trial, and
one failed to identify his picture in a photo lineup. Regarding identifying
features of the driver of the white truck, several of the witnesses wavered,
failed to recall details, and provided explanations for their lack of confidence
in their descriptions. Thus, none expressed certainty about an identification
and the potentially misleading effect of the instruction was not present in
this case. If anything, the inclusion of this factor in the instruction favored
Ricks because it supported his argument to the jury that none of the
witnesses made an identification, let alone one with any certainty. Under
Lemcke, there was no violation of Ricks’s rights and no conceivable prejudice.
We also reject Ricks’s contention that the instruction lessened the
prosecution’s burden of proof. As in Lemcke, the jury here was instructed on
the burden of proof and evaluating witness credibility. The court’s
instructions as a whole ensured the jury understood the prosecution had the
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ricks was the person who
committed the crime. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error in the court’s
inclusion of the witness certainty factor in CALCRIM No. 315.
III.
Discovery of the Inmate’s Cooperation Agreement
Ricks asserts the prosecutor’s untimely disclosure of the inmate’s
cooperation agreement and interview in her own case violated his
constitutional and statutory rights because it “deprived counsel of the ability
to interview [her], her counsel and potentially her co-defendants” and
prevented counsel from investigating the specifics of the murder itself.
15
A. Additional Factual Background
At trial, Holmes denied that Ricks told her killing Gordon was like
skinning a cat.
The prosecutor then called an inmate who testified she and Holmes
were housed together in jail in February 2017. The inmate testified Holmes
said her boyfriend murdered someone, that the victim was her friend who
was “set up to go outside,” and that her boyfriend told her that “it was as easy
as skinning a cat.” The inmate further testified there were no promises made
in exchange for her testimony.
An officer testified that he interviewed the inmate after they learned
she may have relevant information. He confirmed no promises were made to
the inmate, no benefits were provided, and she did not ask for anything in
exchange for her cooperation.
Defense counsel complained he did not receive discovery about the
inmate’s case. He claimed the inmate may have received a benefit in
exchange for her testimony about what Holmes told her in custody.
The court agreed Ricks was entitled to know if the inmate got a deal.
The trial prosecutor conferred with the prosecutor who handled the inmate’s
plea and informed the court that the district attorney’s office had agreed to a
reduced charge and lighter sentence because of the inmate’s agreement to
provide information on her own case related to the more culpable
codefendants. She completed an interview and entered into a plea agreement
on her own case. It had nothing to do with the information she provided
about her conversation with Holmes.
The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury. The officer
who interviewed the inmate for this case testified he knew nothing about her
agreement with the district attorney. When he spoke with her about Ricks’s
16
case, he told her he did not want to speak about her case, he was not making
any promises, and they did not discuss any benefit she would receive.
The prosecutor offered to have the inmate’s agreement entered as an
exhibit and said he had no objection to the defense exploring the subject with
the officer, who was still on the stand on cross-examination. The prosecutor
said he would search the transcript of the inmate’s cooperation agreement
and interview for any reference to Rick’s case, “Then at that point, I feel like
the People have exhausted all their options. We have given all the
information to defense to give them the ability to do a thorough
impeachment, thorough cross-examinations, and I think the record is clear in
that regard.”
The court stated, “Okay. That all sounds good. Also, [defense attorney]
you can have [your investigator] talk to [the prosecutor on the informant’s
case] or serve her a subpoena if you want. But, you know, it’s about all we
can do now.” The court also offered, “It’s up to you if you want to ask him
about that in front of the jury or if you just want to argue coincidence.”
Defense counsel replied it was “not the focal point” of his examination.
The prosecutor confirmed there was no mention of Holmes or Ricks in
the transcript of the inmate’s cooperation agreement or interview transcript.
He provided the information to defense counsel and stated, “And, again, the
People’s position is that there’s no evidence, no information whatsoever, that
[the inmate] received any sort of compensation or leniency with the district
attorney’s office for the information that she gave up on this case.”
Defense counsel argued the inmate had to embellish and make things
up during the interview about Holmes “[b]ecause I’ve got to make sure the
[district attorney] knows I’m on board. I’m a cooperator. I’m not here to
cause any problems.”
17
The court responded, “I think, as [the prosecutor] said, you’re
speculating. You’re finding the boogeyman under the bed. You had a chance
to cross-examine her, and she is still subject to recall. And he had no
obligation, that I can tell, under [section] 1054 to provide you with any of the
things that he already had.” The court confirmed the inmate was available
and could be in court again later that day.
Defense counsel said he did not want to call the inmate and if he could
be given the inmate’s initial statement and plea agreement, he was “prepared
to move forward on those issues without having people come back in and
testify or talk or all that stuff.” “My understanding or perception is that the
agreement regarding meeting and the plea agreement, both documents
pertaining to [the inmate], that the copies of the originals would be submitted
into evidence. . . . that’s the extent of the evidence I intend to present, Your
Honor.”
The informant’s plea agreement and cooperation agreement were
admitted into evidence. The court concluded, “I don’t find any discovery
violations. You don’t want to talk to [the inmate]. You don’t want to talk to
[the district attorney].”
B. Legal Principles
Under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny, “the prosecution has
a constitutional duty to disclose to the defense material exculpatory evidence,
including potential impeaching evidence.” (People v. Superior Court
(Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709.)
“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”
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(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281–282 (Strickler).) “Prejudice, in
this context, focuses on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt
and innocence.’ [Citations.] Materiality, in turn, requires more than a
showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation],
that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more likely’
[citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness’s
testimony ‘might have changed the outcome of the trial’ [citation]. A
defendant instead ‘must show a “reasonable probability of a different
result.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043.)
On appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to show a Brady violation.
(Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 289.) We independently review the record in
determining whether there was a Brady violation but, in so doing, give great
weight to trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1067.)
“Section 1054.1 provides that the prosecuting attorney ‘shall disclose’ to
the defendant certain materials and information listed in subdivisions (a)
through (f) of that section,” including exculpatory and real evidence.
(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1242; § 1054.1,
subds. (c), (e).) “These statutes do not specify the means by which the parties
must ‘disclose’ discoverable information to each other, or specify that the
party making disclosure must produce a copy of the discoverable item for the
benefit of the opposing party.” (Schaffer, at p. 1242.) Thus, so long as
appellant was given an opportunity to access the information, there was no
disclosure violation under section 1054.1. (Schaffer, at pp. 1242–1243
[enactment of section 1054 et seq. did not alter the prosecution’s duty to
make discovery available, i.e., making the information available for
inspection and copying].)
19
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining if a party has violated
the discovery statutes and whether to impose sanctions for any such
violation. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299; People v. Curl (2009)
46 Cal.4th 339, 357.) Upon a showing of a party’s failure to comply with
informal discovery procedures, a trial court “may make any order necessary
to enforce the provisions” of the statute, “including, but not limited to,
immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, . . . continuance of the matter,
or any other lawful order.” (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) “The court shall not dismiss
a charge pursuant to subdivision (b) unless required to do so by the
Constitution of the United States.” (Id., subd. (c).) “Section 1054.5,
subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady
violation.” (People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352, citing
People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1214 [federal Constitution did
not require dismissal of the case where there was no Brady violation].)
C. Analysis
The court determined Ricks did not have his discovery rights violated
by the late disclosure of the cooperation agreement. We agree. The
agreement was for the inmate to provide information on the codefendants in
her own case in exchange for a reduced charge and sentence. There is no
evidence the inmate received any additional benefit for providing evidence
about the statements Holmes made to her while the two were in custody
together. Ultimately, the materiality inquiry is whether “ ‘the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S.
at p. 290.) Because all the evidence pertaining to the inmate was ultimately
disclosed during trial and presented to the jury, we see no basis to conclude
20
that the failure to disclose it any earlier put the case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
“Evidence actually presented at trial is not considered suppressed for
Brady purposes, even if that evidence had not been previously disclosed
during discovery. [Citations.]” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th
442, 467.) Ricks made full use of the inmate’s agreement at trial. Not only
was the evidence admitted, but both parties discussed it extensively during
argument. Defense counsel urged the jury to look at the agreement and
argued that her potential exposure of 25 years to life plus two years was
hanging over her head, and she wanted to take advantage of the deal to
obtain a more favorable sentence.
For similar reasons, we reject Ricks’s contention that the prosecution
violated section 1054.1, which requires the prosecutor to disclose, among
other things, “[a]ll relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the
investigation of the offenses charged” that is “in the possession of the
prosecuting attorney” or known by the prosecuting attorney “to be in the
possession of the investigating agencies.” (§ 1054.1, subd. (c).) The evidence
in question—the informant’s cooperation agreement in her own case—was
not seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged
against Ricks. And even if Ricks could demonstrate a violation of
section 1054.1, it would be subject to the harmless-error standard set forth in
Watson, supra, at page 836. (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280.)
Under Watson, an error is prejudicial only if “it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.) Because the jury heard all the
evidence, there is no reasonable probability of a different result and any
section 1054.1 error by the prosecution would be harmless.
21
We conclude the trial court correctly determined there was no violation
of Ricks’s constitutional or statutory discovery rights.
IV.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Ricks contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting gang-
related testimony in violation of the court’s pretrial ruling excluding such
evidence.
A. Additional Factual Background
Before trial, the court granted Ricks’s motion to exclude evidence
related to gang affiliation or involvement. No evidence was presented about
gang affiliation, but there were several references to gang units, teams,
detectives and task forces during the trial.
For example, in response to defense counsel’s questions about a vehicle
in a photograph, an officer responded that the car was a police department
“Detective Bureau Crown Victoria, possibly the gang detail.” Similarly, a
district attorney investigator testified he “reached out to the district
attorney’s office gang impact team to assist” his efforts to secure witness
Holmes for her appearance in court. Another officer testified that it was
common for a gang detective to help with a homicide investigation because of
their level of experience as a police officer in general. He testified that
Holmes was a person of interest and she was known to him because he had
previous contacts with Holmes as a gang detective. He arrested Ricks with
the assistance of the gang impact team and the Hemet Police Department.
He and the gang team checked front and back yards near where they were
looking for Holmes and Ricks.
Ricks did not object, move to strike the evidence or request a curative
instruction. Later, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the officer’s
22
references to gangs. The court denied the motion, pointing out the context in
which gangs were mentioned was limited to evidence that the gang impact
team and another police department were called in to assist. Ricks filed a
motion for a new trial based in part on the eliciting of “gang evidence” by the
prosecution. Defense counsel filed a declaration citing the jury’s post-verdict
safety concerns as evidence that the jurors were concerned about gang
affiliation. The motion was denied.
B. Analysis
“ ‘[T]o preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, “ ‘ “a
criminal defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the
trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety.” ’ [Citation.]
The lack of a timely objection and request for admonition will be excused only
if either would have been futile or if an admonition would not have cured the
harm.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Lima (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 468, 478.) Here,
Ricks “failed to object and request an admonition regarding [the prosecution’s
closing] comments at trial. Nothing in the record suggests that an objection
would have been futile or that an admonition would have failed to cure any
harm. We conclude, therefore, that defendant forfeited his challenges to
these comments.” (People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 575.)
Were we to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject the claim on the
merits. “ ‘ “It is, of course, misconduct for a prosecutor to ‘intentionally elicit
inadmissible testimony’ ” ’ ” (People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 248), but
such misconduct is not always prejudicial (id. at p. 249). Here, some of the
challenged evidence was elicited by defense counsel, and the passing
references to law enforcement’s specialized gang assignments did not violate
the court’s order excluding evidence of gang affiliation. The prosecutor did
not elicit evidence of gang involvement or affiliation by Ricks or anyone else
23
in violation of the trial court’s ruling. The pretrial order did not forbid any
and all references to the word “gang” or the gang impact team or gang
detectives. No testimony was presented regarding gangs, gang colors, or
gang activities by Ricks or any other witness. The isolated references to the
gang impact team or gang detectives therefore did not constitute misconduct
and did not demonstrate “an egregious pattern of conduct that rendered the
trial fundamentally unfair in denial of [Ricks’s] federal constitutional right to
due process of law.”4 (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 961.)
V.
Constitutionality of the “Drive-By” Special Circumstance
Ricks challenges the constitutional validity of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(21), otherwise known as the “drive-by” special circumstance
for murder, as overinclusive on its face and as applied in this case.5 The
jury’s true finding on this special circumstance resulted in a sentence of life
without possibility of parole. In particular, Ricks argues the provision
4 Because we find no misconduct, we also reject Ricks’s related claim that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the alleged misconduct.
5 The drive-by special circumstance provides:
“(a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in
the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following
special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be
true:
[¶] . . . [¶]
“(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at
another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to
inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, ‘motor vehicle’
means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.”
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21).)
24
violates substantive due process because it reaches conduct that does not
rationally relate to the purpose of the statutory provision and it is
overinclusive. He further argues it runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment
because it includes conduct such as spontaneous and unpremeditated murder
that does not warrant eligibility for death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. In his view, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21) penalizes
a factual characteristic of an offense, being in a vehicle, which is not
necessarily related to culpability, resulting in more severe punishment for
what might otherwise be treated as second-degree murder.
He also challenges this special circumstance as unconstitutionally
vague because it fails to distinguish between a shooting from a vehicle that
results in first degree murder (§ 189) and the type of discharge of a firearm
from a vehicle that qualifies a defendant for death or life without the
possibility of parole, thereby risking arbitrary and prejudicial enforcement.
A. Forfeiture
Ricks did not challenge the drive-by special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)) in the trial court. Ordinarily, a defendant who does not raise a
claim in the trial court forfeits their right to assert the claim on appeal. (In
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881.) An exception to the rule,
however, allows consideration of a defendant’s assertion that a statute is
facially unconstitutional as a purely legal issue that does not require review
of the trial record. (Id. at p. 889; People v. Navarro (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1336, 1347, fn. 9 [“Notwithstanding this rule of forfeiture, courts generally
consider constitutional challenges to penal statutes for the first time on
appeal where, as here, the arguments are legal, based on undisputed
evidence, and center on review of abstract and generalized legal concepts”].)
Accordingly, we will consider only Ricks’s facial challenges to the
25
constitutionality of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21), as failure to object
forfeits any as-applied challenge. (Sheena K., at pp. 887–889.)
B. Overbreadth
Ricks contends the drive-by special circumstance is overinclusive and
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
These same constitutional challenges were exhaustively discussed and
rejected 27 years ago in People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157,
166–181. No court has questioned Rodriguez or the constitutional validity of
this special circumstance in the intervening decades. We agree with
Rodriguez and adopt its reasoning and holding as our own.
C. Vagueness
Alternatively, Ricks mounts a facial attack on section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(21) on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague. He
contends section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21) is impermissibly vague because it
results in a sentence of death or life without parole for conduct that is
indistinguishable from the statutory theory of first-degree murder for a
killing “perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
26
death” (§ 189, subd. (a)),6 which carries a life sentence with the possibility of
parole. Absent any meaningful distinction between the criteria necessary to
satisfy the drive-by special circumstance and the parallel theory of first
degree drive-by murder, Ricks argues the special circumstance statute risks
arbitrary and prejudicial imposition of death or life without the possibility of
parole.
In his opening brief, Ricks acknowledges that we “rejected a similar
vagueness challenge to the felony-murder special circumstance in the case of
People v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70.” That case involved a fatal
stabbing in a parking lot resulting in a judgment convicting Andreasen of
first degree murder, with a special circumstance finding of murder during the
commission of the attempted robbery. (Id. at pp. 73–74.) Andreasen was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at p. 79.) On appeal,
Andreasen argued the special circumstance enhancement was
unconstitutionally vague because, “as applied to the actual perpetrator of the
killing (who need not have the intent to kill), the special circumstance [was]
indistinguishable from the felony-murder offense, which imposes a life
sentence with the possibility of parole when there is no special circumstance
finding.” (Ibid.) As a result, he “posit[ed] this create[d] a constitutional
6 Section 189 provides: “(a) All murder that is perpetrated by means of a
destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train
wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or
former Section 288a, or murder that is perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189,
subd. (a).)
27
infirmity because the prosecutor had ‘unfettered discretion’ to select the
charge, and defendant had no way of anticipating whether he would be
subjected to the possibility of death or life in prison without the possibility of
parole, rather than life with the possibility of parole.” (Ibid.)
In rejecting this vagueness argument, we reasoned that the statutes
“provided [the] defendant with notice that if he commits a statutorily-
specified felony and kills someone during that felony, he could be subjected to
a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, life without parole,
or death. [The d]efendant had notice as to the proscribed conduct and
potential punishment. The mere fact that the prosecution has discretion to
select which punishment it will seek does not render a statute
unconstitutionally vague or create an improper risk of arbitrary enforcement
of a criminal statute.”7 (Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 80; accord
People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1028 (Montelongo).)
In People v. Superior Court (Bradway) (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 297, the
defendant likewise challenged the lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(15)) as unconstitutionally vague because it was similar to the lying-
in-wait theory of first degree murder (§ 189, subd. (a)). (Bradway, at
pp. 306–311.) In rejecting the challenge, Bradway explained: “Generally,
there are two separate and distinct legal theories for challenging a statute on
7 As an additional ground for our holding in Andreasen, we
concluded “even assuming arguendo that constitutional due process requires
a distinction between the felony-murder offense and the felony-murder
special circumstance [citations], there is such a distinction” because “the
felony-murder offense is established merely upon a showing that the
defendant killed during the commission or attempted commission of the
felony, whereas the felony-murder special circumstance requires an
additional showing that the intent to commit the felony was independent of
the killing.” (People v. Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 80
(Andreasen).)
28
vagueness grounds, depending on the interests at stake. [Citation.] A person
challenging aggravating circumstance statutes in death penalty cases bring
such under the Eighth Amendment, asserting ‘the challenged provision fails
adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty
and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with . . . open-ended
discretion . . . .’ [Citation.] In noncapital cases, the challenge comes under
the due process clause and ‘rest[s] on the lack of notice, and hence may be
overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that
their conduct is at risk.’ ” (Id. at p. 309.)
Similar to Andreasen, the first degree murder and drive-by special
circumstance statutes at issue here provide noncapital defendants with fair
notice that if they intentionally discharge a firearm from a motor vehicle with
the intent to kill a person outside the vehicle, resulting in death, they could
be subjected to a sentence of either 25 years to life with the possibility of
parole or life without the possibility of parole. These provisions
“unambiguously specify the activity proscribed and the penalties available
upon conviction. . . . So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define
the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice
requirements of the Due Process Clause are satisfied.” (United States v.
Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114, 123.) In the noncapital context at least, the
fact that prosecutors have discretion to select which form of life
imprisonment to seek for a drive-by murder does not render the statutory
scheme unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary. (See Montelongo, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028; see also Batchelder, at pp. 122–126 [no due process
or equal protection violation arising from prosecutor’s discretion to charge the
defendant under a statute imposing a penalty that was harsher than that
imposed by another statute proscribing precisely the same conduct].) We
29
therefore reject Ricks’s vagueness challenge to the drive-by special
circumstance.
VI.
Remand for Resentencing
Ricks contends the matter should be remanded to give the court an
opportunity to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement and
impose a lesser firearm enhancement. We agree.
In McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015, the California Supreme Court held
that:
[W]hen a court has exercised its discretion under
subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement
and finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is
appropriate, the second sentence of subdivision (j) is
inapplicable and does not bar the court from imposing a
lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other
than section 12022.53. The court thus has discretion to
impose such an enhancement if it is supported by facts that
have been alleged and found true.
(McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030, citing People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 699 (Tirado).)
“ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise
of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have
been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424 (Salazar).) “ ‘In
such circumstances, . . . the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached
the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is
30
deemed to have abused it.” (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1023, citing
Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 694.)
Ricks was sentenced before the Supreme Court filed its decision in
McDavid. Consequently, the trial court did not have the benefit of McDavid’s
clarification of the law and its holding that lower courts have the discretion to
impose “a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than
section 12022.53.” (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.) In this
circumstance, remand is required unless the record clearly indicates the court
would have reached the same decision even if it had been aware of its
discretion. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.) The record here lacks any
such indication. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for resentencing
so that the court can exercise informed discretion. We express no view how
the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand.
As a result, we need not address Ricks’s other sentencing arguments.
These issues are rendered moot under the full sentencing rule and are not
appropriate for appellate resolution at this time. (People v. Valenzuela (2019)
7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425.)
31
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
32
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