People v. Valenzuela CA2/4

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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. Valenzuela CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337893

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA130283)
v.

SYMON VALENZUELA,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Symon Valenzuela and Leslie
Serrano (Serrano) formed a plan to steal cars. Serrano would use
an online dating platform to attract victims, and Valenzuela
would take the victims’ cars at gunpoint. The plan resulted in
the death of one victim and the kidnapping and robbery of
another. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 two counts of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)),
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), and
second degree robbery (§ 211). In this direct appeal, he argues:
(1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law
during closing argument; (2) multiple sentences were improper
under section 654; and (3) the kidnapping for robbery sentence
was not permitted by statute. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We limit our factual background to facts relevant to
defendant’s contentions and to provide necessary context.

A. The Carjacking and Murder of Javier Rodriguez
Serrano testified that in June 2020 defendant and she
formed a plan: she would set up a profile on Chispa, an online
dating platform, meet up with men who responded, and
defendant would steal the men’s cars. On the morning of June
27, 2020, defendant showed her a revolver he was carrying in his
waistband.
Serrano testified that Javier Rodriguez (Rodriguez)
responded to her Chispa profile. They agreed to meet on June 27,
2020, and inhale nitrous oxide together. Serrano notified

1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Penal Code.

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defendant by text message that Rodriguez would be picking her
up, and she confirmed the plan to “kick him off the mountain and
take off with his car.” “Mountain” referred to Turnbull Canyon,
an area between Hacienda Heights and Whittier they knew to be
dark and remote. Defendant wrote, “We are gonna rob that n[-----
] for his car . . . .”
Serrano testified that Rodriguez arrived in a black Nissan.
She falsely told Rodriguez that defendant was her cousin and the
owner of the nitrous oxide tank, and based on this
representation, Rodriguez permitted both of them to enter his
car. During the drive, defendant sent texts to Serrano and a
friend, Javier Diaz, indicating that he was going to “pop” or
“smoke” the driver and take his keys.
Serrano described the events that followed. Rodriguez
drove to Turnbull Canyon and parked, and the group smoked
marijuana outside the car. As she reached into the car to retrieve
her backpack, she heard two “pops.” Rodriguez reentered the car
and drove away. Serrano and defendant found the car a short
distance away, crashed into the mountainside. After pulling
Rodriguez from the car, defendant drove the car with Serrano to
Diaz’s home. On the morning of June 28, 2020, Serrano posted a
video on Instagram showing defendant driving the car.
Motorists who had been driving in Turnbull Canyon around
12:30 a.m. on June 28, 2020 testified that they encountered a
black Nissan Altima that had crashed into the hillside. They saw
a Hispanic male with a tattoo on the right side of his face2 and a

2 Photographs of defendant showed he had a tattoo of a cross on
his cheek near his right eye.

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Hispanic female in the car. The car sped away, and they found
Rodriguez’s body lying face down in dirt.
An autopsy showed Rodriguez died from two gunshot
wounds to his back. Law enforcement found DNA likely
belonging to defendant in the Nissan’s interior, including on the
steering wheel. Photos of the car were found on defendant’s
phone, and a photo of the car bearing a caption indicating it was
for sale appeared on his Instagram account.

B. The Kidnapping, Robbery, and Carjacking of Angel
Salinas
Messages retrieved from Serrano’s Instagram account
showed that she arranged to meet Angel Salinas3 (Salinas) on
June 28, 2020. At trial, Serrano testified she did not recall
meeting Salinas or the events that followed, attributing her lack
of memory to ingesting alcohol and what she thought was Xanax
earlier that day. She testified that she was later admitted to a
psychiatric hospital and released on July 6, 2020.
A security camera at the Budget Inn Motel in El Monte
captured the arrival of Salinas, driving a red Honda Accord,
shortly before 10:00 p.m. on June 28, 2020. The motel’s records
indicated that he checked into room 210, where he was joined by
Serrano. Serrano identified herself in a video taken by the
security camera.
Serrano texted the room number to defendant. Security
video showed defendant and an associate, Rudolfo Lujan, walking
toward the room. In a text to Serrano, defendant stated, “We

3 Salinas did not testify at trial.

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taking his car,” confirmed he was outside the door, and directed
her to open it.
Video from a security camera at a Wells Fargo branch in
Rosemead, about four miles from the motel, showed Salinas’s car
arriving. Images from the ATM’s camera showed Salinas with
defendant standing close behind him. Around the same time,
Wells Fargo sent an email to Salinas alerting him to unusual
account activity.
A bystander who was near the ATM around 11:30 p.m.
testified to his encounter with Salinas. He described Salinas as
“frantic” and said Salinas asked to use his phone. Salinas told
him that his car and phone had been stolen and that he wanted
to leave the area, fearing the thieves would return. Salinas’s call
to the 911 operator was played for the jury. He reported that two
Hispanic men in their early 20s armed with guns forced him to
drive his car from the Budget Inn to the ATM. One of them, he
said, had a cross tattoo below his right eye. Salinas also reported
that he was unable to withdraw funds, the men threatened to kill
him if he called the police, and they took his car and cell phone.

C. Investigation and Defendant’s Arrest
On July 2, 2020, defendant was arrested during a traffic
stop of Salinas’s car. In the car, law enforcement found
documents bearing defendant’s name, including a diploma, a
DMV vehicle transfer and reassignment form, and a certificate of
title. They also recovered a red fanny pack that, according to
Rodriguez’s mother, belonged to her son.

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D. Interview of Serrano
On July 6, 2020, Serrano was interviewed by a police
detective who was investigating the Salinas robbery. The
detective was then unaware of her involvement in a homicide.
Serrano told him she had witnessed a shooting at Turnbull
Canyon. The same day, she was interviewed by homicide
detectives without a promise of immunity or leniency. A
recording of the interview was played for the jury. Serrano
provided her phone and passcode to the detectives and described
substantially the same events that she testified to at trial. She
also shared an Instagram video that she shot after the shooting,
which showed defendant driving Rodriguez’s car.
Serrano, then a minor, was charged with murder and
robbery in the juvenile court. In December 2022, she entered into
an agreement with the district attorney. She agreed to plead
guilty to murder and robbery and testify truthfully in court, and
upon fulfillment of the agreement’s conditions, would be
sentenced to “home on probation.”

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By a second amended information, defendant was charged
with the murder of Rodriguez (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1);
kidnapping Salinas to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1), count
3); first degree residential robbery of Salinas (§ 211, count 4);
and carjacking of Rodriguez and Salinas (§ 215, subd. (a),
counts 2 and 5).
The case was tried in January 2023. The defense did not
present evidence at trial. The jury convicted defendant as
charged and found the murder of Rodriguez to be of the first

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degree. As to all counts, the jury found that defendant personally
used a handgun.
Defendant was sentenced as follows: on count 1, life
imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years, plus 10 years
for the firearm enhancement; on count 2, nine years plus 10 years
for the firearm enhancement, stayed pursuant to section 654; on
count 3, a consecutive life term with a seven-year minimum
parole eligibility, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement; on
count 4, one year plus three years and four months for the
firearm enhancement; and on count 5, five years plus 10 years for
the firearm enhancement.

DISCUSSION
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct – Counts One and Two
Defendant argues that the murder and related carjacking
convictions should be reversed because the prosecutor misstated
the law during closing argument. First, he argues the prosecutor
misled jurors by “telling them they ‘must’ accept ‘reasonable’
interpretations of circumstantial evidence.” Second, he argues
that the convictions “rested on Serrano’s questionable testimony
and the prosecutor told jurors that, under CALCRIM 224, they
must accept her testimony as true, although she was deceptive
and an accomplice, because there was a reasonable explanation
for her mendacity.”

1. Additional Background
The jury was instructed on the definitions of
“circumstantial” and “direct” evidence and was told that both
could prove or disprove the elements of an offense. Relevant to
this appeal, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 224 as follows:

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“Before you may rely on circumstantial
evidence to conclude a fact necessary to find the
defendant guilty has been proved, you must be
convinced the People have proved each fact
essential to that conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt.

“Also, before you may rely on circumstantial
evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must
be convinced that the only reasonable
conclusion supported by the circumstantial
evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you
can draw two or more reasonable conclusions
from the circumstantial evidence, and one of
those reasonable conclusions points to
innocence and another to guilt, you must accept
the one that points to innocence. However,
when considering circumstantial evidence, you
must accept only reasonable conclusions and
reject any that are unreasonable.” (Italics
added.)

In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that
Serrano lied to investigators and the men she met online.
Counsel also argued that Serrano faced serious criminal charges
but received immunity or leniency in exchange for her testimony
and that her lack of recollection concerning events at the motel
was not believable.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: “[T]he defense wants
you to believe that [Serrano was] not being honest because she
says she didn’t remember anything about the Budget Inn
incident, but think about it in the logical way, common sense,
that’s what we want you to use, common sense. Does it make
sense that she would be brought in [for an interview] about only a

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kidnapping and robbery and say I don’t remember anything
about it even though it’s on video? She identifies herself in that
video. Says that’s definitely me, definitely me, but let me tell you
about another incident that’s way more serious than this I had
complete full involvement in. Does that make sense that she
would do that just to protect herself on the less serious incident?
Doesn’t make sense. [¶] Now, there’s an instruction that’s pretty
important here. Duty to be reasonable. It says ‘you must accept
the reasonable and reject the unreasonable.’ So when you’re
thinking about all of this evidence, ask yourself is it reasonable or
is it unreasonable.” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor misstated the
law. The objection was overruled. After arguments concluded,
the defense moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel argued that
the prosecutor displayed a writing using a projector titled “‘duty
to be reasonable,’” which cited CALCRIM No. 224 and stated “‘if
one interpretation of the evidence appears to be reasonable and
the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the
reasonable and reject the unreasonable.’” Counsel argued that
this instruction applied to circumstantial evidence, and it was a
misstatement of law to display it while discussing Serrano’s
testimony and direct evidence. The trial court denied the motion.

2. Governing Law
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct implicate different
standards under federal and state law. (People v. Wallace (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1032, 1070.) Under the federal Constitution, a
prosecutor commits reversible misconduct only if the conduct
infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process. (People v. Davis (2009)

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46 Cal.4th 539, 612.) Under state law, reversal is required when
a prosecutor uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade
the jury, and it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the
misconduct. (Ibid.)
“Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the
legal and factual merits of a case during argument.” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666 (Centeno).) Where, as here,
the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury,
this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law,
and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or
applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper or erroneous
manner. (People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340
(Collins).) The challenged remarks must be considered in the
context of the whole argument and the instructions. (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) We shall not “‘lightly infer that a
prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most
damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations.’” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1225, fn. 21.)
While claims of misconduct are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, we independently examine the law and objectively
examine how a reasonable juror would interpret the prosecutor’s
remarks. (Collins, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 340.) The denial
of a motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 210.)

10
3. Analysis
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor misstated the
law by telling the jury that it “‘must’” accept “‘reasonable’”
interpretations of circumstantial evidence. We disagree. The
prosecutor’s paraphrasing was based upon the language of
CALCRIM No. 224, which instructed the jury that it must accept
only reasonable conclusions drawn from circumstantial evidence.
The court provided the jury with CALCRIM No. 224, making it
aware of the instruction’s precise requirements. Further, the
court provided the jury with CALCRIM No. 200, which instructed
it to follow the law as the court explained it, and if it believed an
attorney’s comments on the law conflicted with the court’s
instructions, it must follow the court’s instructions. We presume
that the jury understood and followed this instruction, and that it
treated the paraphrasing as words spoken by an advocate.
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 (Cortes).)
Defendant’s second argument is that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when “she misused [CALCRIM No. 224] to
tell jurors to do the opposite of what the law requires: not give
accomplice testimony the benefit of the doubt . . . .” We disagree.
When argument is made in rebuttal to defense counsel’s
arguments, “‘the prosecutor “cannot be charged with misconduct
if [her] comments only spill over somewhat into a forbidden area;
the departure from propriety must be a substantial one.”
[Citation.]’” (People v. Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924, 954.)
While misstating the law is improper, the prosecutor is “‘justified
in making comments in rebuttal, perhaps otherwise improper,
which are fairly responsive to argument of defense counsel and
are based on the record.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

11
Defense counsel attacked Serrano’s credibility in his closing
argument. A rebuttal argument urging the jury to accept
reasonable interpretations of the testimony and reject
unreasonable ones did not misstate the law. It was consistent
with the court’s instructions that jurors use “common sense” to
decide whether testimony is true and accurate (CALCRIM
No. 226), that they may consider “anything that reasonably tends
to prove or disprove” the truth and accuracy of testimony (ibid.),
and that they were free to disregard any part of nonexpert
opinion testimony that they found “unreasonable” (CALCRIM
No. 333).
The trial court, moreover, gave instructions that
specifically addressed accomplice testimony. The jury was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 335, which forbade it from
convicting defendant “based on the statement or testimony of an
accomplice alone” and stated that accomplice testimony or
statements that incriminated defendant could be used only if
supported by independent evidence that tended to connect
defendant to the commission of the crimes. We presume the jury
understood and followed this instruction. (Cortes, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 205.)
After the challenged remarks, the prosecutor reminded the
jury of other evidence of defendant’s guilt, such as his
incriminating texts, the video showing defendant driving
Rodriguez’s car, and his listing the car for sale. Serrano’s
testimony, the prosecutor argued, was “supported by other
physical evidence. That is how you determine her credibility.
We’re not just asking you to take her story and believe it. We’re
asking you to take her story and believe it because all of this
evidence tells you that what she told us was true and that’s it.”

12
Along with the instructions given, this argument rendered it
unlikely that the jury applied an incorrect standard to accomplice
testimony or understood that it was required to believe Serrano’s
testimony.
Thus, defendant has demonstrated neither prosecutorial
misconduct, nor that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial.

B. Multiple Punishment Under Section 654
The trial court imposed separate sentences for counts
3 through 5 for the kidnapping, robbery, and carjacking of
Salinas. Defendant did not argue below that section 654
precluded multiple punishments.4 On appeal, he contends we
must stay the sentences imposed on two counts pursuant to
section 654 because all three crimes were undertaken with a
single objective, namely “stealing items of value from Salinas.”

1. Additional Background
Before instructing the jury, the trial court asked the
prosecutor about the robbery theory the People intended to
pursue, given that count 4 of the operative information alleged a
charge for first degree residential robbery. The court observed
that Salinas’s phone was taken from him before he arrived at the
ATM, returned to him at the ATM, and then was taken back,
suggesting a “completed robbery of the cell phone” and a
“potential separate robbery” of money. After some discussion, the
prosecutor proposed, and defense counsel agreed, to amend count

4 Errors in the application of section 654 may be corrected on
appeal even in the absence of an objection to the trial court. (People v.
Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549, fn. 3 (Perez).)

13
4 to a charge of “second degree robbery for the phone,” and “the
attempted robbery at the ATM [would be treated as] the intent
for the kidnap for robbery” (count 3), and on count 4, the jury
would be instructed on second degree robbery.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that
count 4 was for robbery of the phone. She also argued that
defendant’s intent to commit a robbery during the kidnapping
was established by his luring Salinas to the motel with the
purpose of taking his car to “go to an ATM to rob him of all his
money.” With respect to carjacking, the prosecutor argued that
defendant took Salinas’s car while using a gun and threatening to
kill him. The jury returned convictions and found he used a
handgun for each crime.

2. Governing Law
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” The starting point of a section 654 analysis is to
determine whether the different crimes were completed by a
single physical act. (People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
776, 795 (Washington).) If so, the defendant may not be punished
more than once for that act, regardless of his intent and objective.
(Ibid.) If not, we consider whether a course of conduct reflected a
single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives.
(Ibid.) Defendant does not contend that a single physical act
completed the three offenses, so we turn to whether he had
multiple intents and objectives.

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“‘The proscription against double punishment in section
654 is applicable where there is a course of conduct which . . .
comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than
one statute. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d
112, 162.) “The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon
the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any
one of them but not for more than one.” (Ibid.) If the defendant
had multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and not
just incidental to each other, then he may be punished for each
crime committed in pursuit of each objective. This is so even if
the crimes shared common acts or were part of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Jones (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) A defendant’s intent and objective is a
question of fact for the trial court, which has broad latitude in
making its determination. (Ibid.)
Where the trial court makes no express findings under
section 654, we presume it impliedly found a separate objective
for each offense. (In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 43.) We
review this finding for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)

3. Analysis
Defendant and the People each cite opinions in which
defendants were convicted and sentenced for robbery and
kidnapping for robbery after forcing victims to drive to ATMs to
withdraw money.
Defendant relies primarily on People v. Barrios (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 176 (Barrios). Barrios, displaying a gun, took the
cash from the victim’s wallet. He forced the victim to drive to an
ATM and took the funds the victim withdrew. (Id. at p. 178.) A

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jury convicted him of robbery and kidnapping for robbery. On
appeal, the majority opinion concluded the offenses were not
separately punishable, reasoning that robbery could not be
broken apart from kidnapping for robbery “absent some event or
occurrence that, midstream, marks a transition and redirects the
perpetrator to embark on a new criminal objective.” (Id. at
p. 180.) The record did not reflect an epiphany or a change of
plans; rather, he “kept doing what he set out to do: commandeer
[the victim’s] car for a robbery,” with the aim of “rob[bing] [the
victim] of as much cash as he could.” (Id. at pp. 180–181.)
The People rely primarily on People v. Porter (1987) 194
Cal.App.3d 34 (Porter). Porter took the victim’s wallet after
entering the victim’s car and holding a knife to his throat. In the
wallet, defendant found less than $10, but he also found an ATM
card. He forced the victim to drive to an ATM to withdraw funds,
but the victim escaped. (Id. at pp. 36–37.) Porter was convicted
of robbery and kidnapping for robbery. (Id. at p. 37.) The Court
of Appeal affirmed concurrent prison terms for each offense,
reasoning that “the record suggests that appellant was convicted
of the robbery of the victim’s wallet and of kidnapping for the
purpose of a different robbery involving the compelled
withdrawal of funds from an automated teller, which was
unsuccessful. This is not, therefore, a case of punishing appellant
for kidnapping for the purpose of robbery and for committing
‘that very robbery.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 38.) “What began as an
ordinary robbery turned into something new and qualitatively
very different. No longer satisfied with simply taking the
contents of the victim’s wallet, appellant decided to forcibly
compel the victim to drive numerous city blocks to a bank where,
only with the victim’s compelled assistance, could appellant

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achieve a greater reward. The trial court could reasonably treat
this as a new and independent criminal objective, not merely
incidental to the original objective and not a continuation of an
indivisible course of conduct.” (Id. at pp. 38–39.)
Here, as in Porter, defendant was not separately punished
for kidnapping Salinas for the purpose of robbing him of his
money and for committing “‘that very robbery.’” (Porter, supra,
194 Cal.App.3d at p. 38.) The robbery count was predicated on
the taking of Salinas’s phone, while the kidnapping count was
predicated on an attempted robbery of money from an ATM.
Barrios is distinguishable for the same reason.
We disagree with defendant’s contention that the crimes
shared one objective—stealing Salinas’s property. “Such an
intent and objective is much too broad and amorphous to
determine the applicability of section 654.” (Perez, supra, 23
Cal.3d at p. 552 [rejecting argument that defendant’s sole intent
and objective was “to obtain sexual gratification,” precluding
sentences for oral copulation and sodomy when he had been
convicted of rape].) It “is akin to an assertion of a desire for
wealth as the sole intent and objective in committing a series of
separate thefts.” (Ibid.) “To accept such a broad, overriding
intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly
separate offenses would violate the statute’s purpose to insure
that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.” (Ibid.)
Here, by convicting defendant of carjacking, the jury
necessarily believed that defendant harbored the objective of
taking Salinas’s car while in the victim’s immediate presence.
(CALCRIM No. 1650.) However, the jury’s convictions reflect he
formed other distinct objectives as well. Defendant robbed

17
Salinas of his phone. (CALCRIM No. 1600.) Then, he moved
Salinas to the ATM to rob him of money. (CALCRIM No. 1203.)
In imposing separate punishments, the trial court could
reasonably infer that what was planned as a carjacking turned
into “new and qualitatively very different” crimes. (Porter, supra,
194 Cal.App.3d at p. 38.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in separately punishing each offense.

C. Invalid Sentence for Kidnapping for Robbery –
Count 3
On count 3, kidnapping for robbery, defendant was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of “7 years to life” plus
10 years based on defendant’s personal use of a handgun
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), ordered to run consecutively with all other
counts. Defendant argues that this sentence was improper
because section 209 does not require a minimum term of seven
years or prescribe a penalty of seven years to life.
Defendant’s challenge to the sentence presents a question
of law that may be raised for the first time on appeal (People v.
Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852) and is subject to de novo
review (People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1140).
Defendant is correct that, under section 209, subdivision
(b), the punishment for kidnapping for robbery is “imprisonment
in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.”
However, he cannot be paroled until he has served “at least seven
calendar years” in prison for this conviction. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1)
[“An inmate imprisoned under a life sentence shall not be paroled
until he or she has served the greater of the following: [¶] (1) A
term of at least seven calendar years.”]; see People v. Jefferson
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 96 (Jefferson).)

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In Jefferson, our high court approved the trial court’s
articulation of the minimum prison term when pronouncing the
defendant’s indeterminate life sentence. “By including the
minimum term of imprisonment in its sentence, a trial court
gives guidance to the Board of Prison Terms regarding the
appropriate minimum term to apply, and it informs victims
attending the sentencing hearing of the minimum period the
defendant will have to serve before becoming eligible for parole.
Thus, when the trial court here pronounced defendants’
sentences, it properly included their minimum terms. . . .”
(Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 101, fn. 3.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it articulated
this seven-year period as a minimum sentence.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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