Gomez v. Super. Ct.

CourtListener 10654951Calctapp15 de ago. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 8/6/25 Certified for Publication 8/15/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

MAYRA GOMEZ, C102211

Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE014787)

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO
COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE

Real Party in Interest.

Petitioner Mayra Gomez seeks a petition for writ of mandate directing the trial
court to vacate its order denying her application for mental health diversion (motion)
under Penal Code1 section 1001.36, filed in her pending criminal case for second degree

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
robbery. The trial court denied the motion on three grounds. First, the trial court found
Gomez ineligible for diversion because the prosecution rebutted the presumption that her
mental health disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the robbery.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Second, the court found Gomez unsuitable for diversion
because she poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Finally, the court exercised its residual discretion
to deny the motion, even assuming Gomez satisfied the eligibility and suitability criteria,
based on the nature of the offense and the injuries sustained by the victim.
Gomez asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion. We
agree. Accordingly, we issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its
order denying mental health diversion and to enter a new order granting the motion.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Effective June 27, 2018, the Legislature added sections 1001.35 and 1001.36,
which promote and authorize trial courts to grant “pretrial diversion” to defendants
diagnosed with qualifying mental disorders. (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.) In this context,
“ ‘[p]retrial diversion’ means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or
permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment,
subject to [certain requirements].” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) “The stated purpose of this
legislation is to keep people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the
criminal justice system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in
developing and implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to
provide mental health rehabilitative services. [Citation.] The Legislature intended the
mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.” (People v. Whitmill
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 (Whitmill).)

2
Effective January 1, 2023, section 1001.36 was amended by Senate Bill No. 1223
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1).2 As amended, section 1001.36,
subdivision (a) permits a trial court, after considering the parties’ positions, to “grant
pretrial diversion to a defendant pursuant to this section if the defendant satisfies the
eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court
determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in
subdivision (c).”
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b) sets forth two requirements that must be satisfied
for a defendant to be eligible for mental health diversion. First, the defendant must have
been “diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, including, but not limited to . . .
post-traumatic stress disorder . . . . Evidence of the defendant’s mental disorder shall be
provided by the defense and shall include a diagnosis or treatment for a diagnosed mental
disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert.” (§ 1001.36, subd.
(b)(1).)
Second, the defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a
mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense. A court may consider any relevant and credible
evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider,
medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the

2 The statute was amended again in 2024 and 2025; those amendments are not relevant
here.

3
defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the
time of the offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
If the defendant satisfies the statutory eligibility requirements, the court must next
consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion under the four criteria set
forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c), all of which must be met. Subdivision (c)(1)
requires that “[i]n the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment.” Subdivision (c)(2) requires that the
defendant consent to diversion and waive the right to a speedy trial or meet other
requirements not pertinent here. Subdivision (c)(3) requires that the defendant agree to
comply with treatment as a condition of diversion or meet other requirements not
pertinent here. Finally, subdivision (c)(4) requires that the “defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in
the community.”
An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18,
subdivision (c), means “an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new
violent felony” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which
felonies are “colloquially referred to as ‘super strikes.’ ” (Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) “Those super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation
to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a
weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against
minors under the age of 14.” (Id. at pp. 1150-1151.) In making the unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety determination, the court “may consider the opinions of the district
attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the
defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current

4
charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).)
Even when the defendant makes a prima facie showing of meeting the statutory
eligibility and suitability criteria, the court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to deny
diversion. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892 (Sarmiento).)
“But, this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised ‘ “consistent with the principles and
purpose of the governing law.” ’ [Citations.] That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such
treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where the court chooses
to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should
reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion
would not meet those goals.” (Id. at pp. 892-893.)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I
The Robbery
Gomez is charged with one count of second degree robbery. The following facts
regarding the robbery are taken from Exhibit 1, labeled as the prosecution’s “Electronic
File,” and Exhibit 2, labeled as “Underlying police report(s),” both of which were
attached to the prosecution’s opposition to Gomez’s motion.
The victim was walking on the side of the road when a Hispanic female and a
Black male emerged from behind bushes yelling, “Gimme your shit.” The male grabbed
at the victim’s backpack and a third person, a Hispanic male, hit the victim over the back
of the head with what the victim believed to be a metal object. The prosecution’s
electronic file and the police reports diverge on what happened next.
The prosecution’s electronic file states the Hispanic male hit the victim again,
causing him to fall to the ground. The victim was able to get up and run away but
believed “they were going to kill him” because the female said, “get his ass, kill his ass.”

5
The Black male ran after the victim until the victim got to an overpass. The two other
individuals “stayed in the same spot.”
The police reports state the victim gave a statement after being transported to the
hospital and said that, after he was hit over the head by the Hispanic male, the Hispanic
female said, “get his ass, kill his ass.” The victim responded, “don’t kill me, you can take
my stuff.” The victim “was afraid they were going to kill [him].” The Hispanic male
then hit the victim again with what the victim believed to be a metal object. After losing
consciousness “for maybe a minute,” the victim woke up and ran away. The Black male
ran after the victim until the victim ran down an embankment and across the freeway,
while the other two individuals stayed where they were.
The victim sustained a puncture wound to his left shoulder, a two-inch laceration
to the back of the head with major swelling, and a three-inch laceration to his left wrist.
The lacerations required five staples to the victim’s left wrist and nine staples to the back
of his head. The police later located suspects matching the descriptions given by the
victim. Gomez was identified as the Hispanic female and charged with robbery.
II
The Motion
Gomez filed a pretrial motion seeking mental health diversion. The motion states
Gomez was an unhoused woman who had experienced sexual abuse and witnessed
domestic violence and substance abuse as a child. She was placed in foster care at age 13
and lived in group homes. She began experimenting with drugs around that time, which
increased in severity into and throughout adulthood. As an adult, Gomez has experienced
physical and emotional abuse, including sexual abuse. She “is particularly susceptible to
manipulation by those around her” and “has a history of suicidal ideations and suicide
attempts.”
Gomez attached two documents to her motion—a crisis assessment completed by
a senior mental health counselor at the Sacramento County Department of Behavioral

6
Health and a Brief Questionnaire for Initial Placement form (questionnaire). The
questionnaire discusses Gomez’s alcohol and drug abuse and identifies an initial
placement recommendation for treatment in an intensive outpatient setting. As to
recommendations for additional services, the questionnaire states “[c]o-occurring
disorders/mental health evaluation is recommended” and “[r]ecovery environment
support service needs should be evaluated (i.e., recovery residences, transitional housing,
sober living environment [SLE]).”
The following statements are taken from the crisis assessment completed by the
counselor. Gomez has a history of alcohol and drug abuse, including use of fentanyl,
cocaine, Ecstasy, and ketamine. She is “experiencing symptoms of depression, does not
want to get out of bed, social withdrawal, past suicide ideations, anxiety, and taking
unnecessary risks that put her in danger” and “demonstrates impaired functioning in areas
of transportation, housing, [and] familial/interpersonal, parenting and social functioning.”
Gomez exhibits thoughts of harm without a plan but has no recent history of elevated risk
factors. She does, however, “have a history of suicide attempts, violence, or threats,
which may be associated with a disorganized mental state or substance abuse.” Her
symptoms and history indicate a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, major
depressive disorder, and polysubstance use disorder.
Gomez self-disclosed that she was taking a psychotropic medication. The
counselor prescribed her two additional medications to adjust for “anxiety/depressed
mood” and noted that Gomez “endorses involvement in substance use treatment” and “is
motivated to address her substance use and mental health in order to be reunified with her
2 children.” Gomez agreed to intensive outpatient or residential substance use and
prevention, as needed. In the safety plan and next steps portion of the crisis assessment,
the counselor set forth Gomez’s full diagnosis and stated Gomez “is being referred to
mental health services at [a specified facility] which is the appropriate level of care.”

7
III
The Opposition
The prosecution opposed mental health diversion on the ground that there was a
lack of nexus between the robbery and Gomez’s mental health disorders. The
prosecution relied on the police reports and argued there was no indication that Gomez
was suffering from any symptoms of her mental disorders when the robbery occurred.
The prosecution further argued that Gomez was unsuitable for diversion because she
poses an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community based on the
circumstances of the robbery and the injuries sustained by the victim. The only exhibits
attached to the prosecution’s opposition were the prosecution’s electronic file and the
police reports.
IV
The Hearing and Ruling
On August 13, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Defense counsel
argued Gomez had no criminal record and the crime occurred almost one year prior when
Gomez was unhoused and living in a tent in the bushes where the robbery occurred.
Since then, Gomez had moved in with her mother, had made contact with a treatment
program, and was trying “to get her act together.” Counsel explained Gomez was
suffering from depression, substance abuse disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder,
had a history of being in abusive relationships with men, and started using drugs around
the time she was placed in foster care at age 13. Counsel further asserted Gomez had a
substance abuse problem and was suffering symptoms of depression at the time of the
robbery, and she “was on drugs that day.” As to the robbery, counsel argued Gomez had
a “very small, if any, part in” the offense, Gomez never touched the victim, and the
victim reported Gomez only said, “ ‘Get him, kill him,’ which no one was trying to do.”
Regarding that statement, counsel indicated that Gomez denied saying those words and
pointed out the victim did not report the statement attributed to Gomez in his first

8
interview with the police. Counsel further noted that none of the stolen property was
found in Gomez’s tent shortly after the robbery.
The prosecution first addressed the dangerousness criteria, arguing “[i]t is
incredibly dangerous to be involved in a violent robbery where this victim is suffering
significant injuries” and then say, “ ‘Kill him’ ”—“[t]hat is a danger.” The prosecution
argued Gomez’s posttraumatic stress disorder was not a nexus to the crime because
Gomez was not reacting to what she perceived as a danger, rather “she [wa]s the danger.”
As to Gomez’s “[m]ajor depressive disorder,” the prosecution argued that “the hallmarks
of that, having no joy in life, having trouble functioning, fatigue” did not correlate to
“someone who is jumping out of bushes to attack another human being with a group that
is incredibly violent.”
The trial court asked the prosecution how the court should weigh that Gomez had
been out of custody for one year in terms of the risk she posed if treated in the
community. The prosecution acknowledged it was something for the court to consider
but stated it “doesn’t mean she doesn’t have a propensity to be involved in more violent
actions again.”
In rebuttal, defense counsel responded that the prosecution did not address
Gomez’s substance abuse disorder, which was the mental health condition at issue when
she was “living in a tent . . . with an abusive man who uses drugs himself.” Counsel
further pointed to the recommendations in the questionnaire as evidence that the mental
health professionals “understand [substance abuse] is the problem.”
The trial court explained it was presumed that Gomez’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the robbery and the prosecution had the burden to
show by clear and convincing evidence that her mental disorders were not a motivating,
causal, or contributing factor in the commission of the robbery. After detailing the
evidence and factors that may be considered by the court in that regard, the trial court
ruled: “The Court, after reviewing both the filings which include some of the discovery

9
and the initial police report in this case, facts and circumstances of the case, find that the
Prosecution has met [its] burden of clear and convincing evidence that the mental health
disorder was not a motivating factor or causal factor or contributing factor in the
commission of the charged offense.
“There is no indication that she was suffering from a disorder at the time. The
facts and circumstances, at least listed in the police report, and, again, this is not a
preliminary hearing nor a trial, but indicate that the statements attributed to her was to kill
the individual. The victim had to run across a freeway to stay away [and] was almost
struck by a vehicle. [¶] The scene appeared to be a coordinated effort amongst numerous
individuals. He suffered injuries. Laceration to the back of the head requiring nine
staples, laceration to his left wrist requiring five staples, and a puncture wound to his
shoulder.”3
The trial court next considered whether Gomez would pose an unreasonable risk to
public safety as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the community. After detailing
the evidence and factors that may be considered by the court in that regard, the trial court
noted that Gomez has no known criminal history, and there was no evidence that she had
committed any offense while living in the community since the robbery. The trial court,
however, did not find those factors dispositive and ruled: “The Court, considering the
facts that we’ve talked about before, the nature of this robbery, the fact that the -- he
suffered those types of injuries, felt that he was in such danger that he had to run away
across a freeway from these people and that she was -- is a listed co-defendant amongst

3 Although the trial court verbally ruled that it denied mental health diversion because
Gomez lacked eligibility under the significant factor criteria, the minute order states the
court found Gomez eligible but not suitable for mental health diversion. It is further
unclear what the trial court meant by its consideration of discovery included in the
filings, because Gomez only produced the crisis assessment and questionnaire, and the
prosecution only produced its own electronic file and the police reports.

10
the others, I’m not sure what her physical acts were . . . but the fact that she was part of
this robbery, the Court does find that she does pose an unreasonable risk to public safety
as defined in the Section 1170.18 even if treated in the community.”
Finally, the trial court said it “would exercise [its] residual discretion” and “would
find it inappropriate to grant her Mental Health Diversion under the facts and
circumstances of this case.” The trial court explained it understood the court was “not
permitted to redefine public safety in a manner inconsistent with the Legislature’s
expressed intent, however, this person, through some period of time, had to suffer
through this robbery where he was hit in the back of the head numerous times, again,
having to get treatment for -- that included getting staples to his head, his left wrist, and
was in such fear of his life was willing to risk his own safety by running across a freeway
and almost getting hit by a vehicle.” The trial court ruled that, “for those reasons,” “even
if all other factors were met, [the court] would still exercise [its] residual discretion to
deny Mental Health Diversion for this applicant . . . at this time.”
V
The Petition for Writ of Mandate and Subsequent Procedural Background
On October 14, 2024, Gomez filed a petition in this court seeking a peremptory
writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of mental health diversion and
either enter an order granting the motion or show cause why the motion should not be
granted. We requested that the Attorney General file a preliminary opposition to the
petition, which he did. After we issued an order to show cause, the Attorney General
filed a written return, and Gomez filed a reply brief. We now consider the merits of
Gomez’s petition.
DISCUSSION
To qualify for mental health diversion, Gomez must meet the two eligibility
criteria under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), and the four suitability criteria set forth in
subdivision (c) of that section. It is undisputed that Gomez meets the eligibility criterion

11
in subdivision (b)(1), relating to a diagnosis of a qualifying mental disorder, and the
suitability criteria in subdivision (c)(2) and (c)(3), relating to her consent to diversion,
waiver of her right to a speedy trial, and agreement to comply with treatment as a
condition of diversion.
On appeal, Gomez challenges the trial court’s findings that she does not meet the
significant factor eligibility criterion under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), and the
public safety suitability criterion under subdivision (c)(4). The People contend the trial
court did not err in finding Gomez ineligible and unsuitable for diversion under those
criteria and further, albeit confusingly, assert that Gomez cannot demonstrate the court
erred in finding she failed to meet the treatment suitability criterion under subdivision
(c)(1)—a criterion not expressly addressed by the trial court or raised by the prosecution.
The People also argue that, even if Gomez satisfies the eligibility and suitability criteria
for mental health diversion, the trial court’s exercise of its residual discretion to deny the
motion should be upheld.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Initially,
however, we reject the People’s argument that Gomez’s petition is not properly before us
for consideration on mandamus.
I
Mandamus Review is Appropriate Under the Circumstances Presented
A writ of mandate “must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.)
“ ‘ “ ‘The question whether there is a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law,” within the meaning of the statute, is one of fact, depending upon the
circumstances of each particular case, and the determination of it is a matter largely
within the sound discretion of the court.’ ” ’ ” (Flores v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 206.)

12
The People argue mandamus is inappropriate because the decision whether to
grant diversion was a discretionary and not a ministerial act. (See § 1001.36, subd. (a)
[“court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and
prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant”].) Gomez disagrees with this
assertion and further argues mandamus review is appropriate because waiting to appeal
the ruling following her potential conviction is an inadequate remedy. We conclude
mandamus review is appropriate under the circumstances presented.
It is true, as the People assert, that mandamus “is not available to compel the
exercise of discretion on the part of a public official.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian
Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326.) But mandamus is
“available to correct an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) That is because an abuse of
discretion is not an exercise of discretion, but rather “ ‘ “is action beyond the limits of
discretion, and it is settled that [a] writ will issue to correct such abuse if the facts
otherwise justify its issuance.” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Meraz) (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 28, 46.) Because Gomez contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied her motion, mandate is available to correct that abuse, if such an abuse occurred.
Further, where, as here, “an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon
appeal from a subsequent judgment, various factors, such as expense of proceeding with
a trial and prejudice resulting from delay, may operate to make that remedy inadequate.”
(Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370.) The purposes of mental health
diversion include “[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate
the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public
safety” and to provide persons with mental disorders diversion that meets their treatment
and support needs. (§ 1001.35, subds. (a), (c).) Pretrial diversion allows for
postponement of prosecution to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment
and dismissal of the criminal charges if the defendant performs satisfactorily in diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subds. (f)(1), (h).) Thus, section 1001.36 offers persons with a qualifying

13
mental health disorder “ ‘ “dramatically different and more lenient treatment.” ’ ”
(People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.)
Requiring Gomez to wait until resolution of an appeal following her potential
conviction to correct the trial court’s alleged abuse of discretion would be contrary to the
purposes of section 1001.36 and preclude Gomez from receiving the timely mental health
treatment intended by the Legislature. It could further entail a waste of time and funds
through trial should she perform satisfactorily in diversion. Accordingly, in light of the
statutory aims of the mental health diversion statute and the potential prejudice Gomez
may suffer in the absence of prompt resolution of her claim, we conclude mandamus
review is appropriate.
II
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Mental Health Diversion
A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, and the court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.
(People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) “A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 449.) A trial court further abuses its
discretion if its decision “is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

A. The Finding That the Prosecution Rebutted the Significant Factor
Presumption Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
Gomez argues the trial court misapplied the significant factor presumption under
section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2) by finding, “without any mental health expert opinion
to support its conclusions, that the facts and circumstances presented in the police reports
did not tend to show that Gomez was suffering from a mental health illness when the
offense occurred.” Gomez asserts the trial court accordingly improperly shifted the

14
burden to her to prove her mental health disorders contributed to the offense. The People
argue the trial court’s finding is supported by the police reports and it was reasonable for
the trial court to view Gomez’s “actions as rooted in a violent, dangerous, clear-thinking
and criminal mindset, rather than a result of her mental health disorders.” We find no
substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding.
To rebut the presumption that a defendant’s mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense, the prosecution must produce “clear and
convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing
factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence,
the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
“[W]e view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Id. at p. 996.)
The trial court found the prosecution met its burden to rebut the presumption
based on the facts and circumstances of the robbery detailed in the police reports, the
statement attributed to Gomez by the victim, the victim’s significant injuries, and that the
“scene appeared to be a coordinated effort amongst numerous individuals.” But nothing
in the police reports indicates that Gomez was not suffering symptoms or that her mental
health disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the commission
of the robbery. And nothing in the police reports indicates that Gomez planned or
coordinated the robbery or that she was making “logical decisions” with a “clear-
thinking” mindset, as the People contend. In contrast, the crisis assessment states that her

15
history of violence and threats “may be associated with a disorganized mental state or
substance abuse.”
At bottom, the trial court’s finding that the prosecution rebutted the presumption
was based on a lack of “indication [in the police reports] that she was suffering from a
disorder at the time” of the robbery. As this court, however, recently explained, “the
absence of evidence proving that [a] petitioner’s mental disorder was a factor in the
commission of the offenses is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that [the] petitioner’s mental disorder was not a factor in the
commission of the offenses.” (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391,
404.) “By finding that the statutory presumption had been overcome by the mere
absence of evidence demonstrating that [a] petitioner’s mental illness was a factor in the
alleged offenses, [a trial court] effectively shift[s] the burden to [the petitioner] to
affirmatively prove that [his, her, or their] mental disorder contributed to the offenses.”
(Ibid., first italics added.)
Because no substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the
statutory presumption had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence, the denial of
Gomez’s motion was an abuse of discretion.
B. Gomez Meets the Treatment Response Criteria
The People argue Gomez cannot demonstrate that “the trial court erred in finding
that she failed to prove that she was ‘suitable’ for diversion under section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(1).” The People’s argument is confusing because the prosecution did not
challenge Gomez’s motion on that basis, the trial court made no such finding, and Gomez
made no such argument in her petition. To the extent the People assert the criteria are
unmet given the trial court’s significant factor ruling, the argument lacks merit because
that ruling is reversed, as explained ante. To the extent the People assert that, even if we
agree with Gomez as to the arguments set forth in her petition, we nevertheless should

16
affirm because Gomez did not establish suitability under section 1001.36, subdivision
(c)(1), we disagree.
Section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1), provides a defendant is suitable for pretrial
diversion if, in addition to three other factors, “[i]n the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to,
or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment.” (Italics
added.) In the crisis assessment attached to Gomez’s motion, the counselor noted that
Gomez self-disclosed that she was taking a psychotropic medication and the counselor
prescribed additional medication to adjust for “anxiety/depressed mood.” In the safety
plan and next steps portion of the crisis assessment, the counselor further set forth
Gomez’s full diagnosis and stated Gomez “is being referred to mental health services at
[a specified facility] which is the appropriate level of care.” The crisis assessment thus
shows the counselor identified and recommended a plan to treat Gomez’s symptoms of
posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and polysubstance use
disorder—the mental disorders establishing Gomez’s eligibility for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36, subdivision (b). The criteria under section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(1), were thus satisfied.

C. The Unreasonable Risk of Danger Finding Is Not Supported by Substantial
Evidence
Gomez argues there is no substantial evidence that she will pose an unreasonable
risk of danger if treated in the community because she has no criminal record, and her
conduct was significantly less egregious than the defendant’s conduct in Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th 1138, in which such a finding was reversed. The People argue the trial
court’s ruling “was hardly irrational” given the police reports showed Gomez “personally
engaged in violent conduct.” The relevant question is whether there is substantial
evidence to support a finding that Gomez is likely to commit a super-strike offense if
treated in the community. (People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310; see

17
People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450 [“a trial court necessarily must find the
defendant is ‘likely to commit a super-strike offense’ ” to deny diversion on this ground;
in other words, “the risk of danger is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant
will commit a limited subset of violent felonies”].) We conclude the answer is “no.”
First, Gomez has no criminal history and hence there is no evidence she has a prior
super-strike conviction. (People v. Hoffman, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1310 [finding
the record did not support a finding of dangerousness under § 1170.18, subd. (c) where
the defendant had no prior criminal history].) There is also no evidence that Gomez has
previously been charged with a super-strike offense. Second, the pending robbery charge
is not a super-strike offense. Although the victim stated he was afraid that Gomez and
her codefendants would kill him, there was no evidence (or argument presented) that
Gomez ever touched the victim or attempted to commit a super-strike offense during the
commission of the robbery. Finally, at the time of the hearing, Gomez had been out in
the community for approximately one year and there is no evidence that any new charges
had been filed against her for committing another offense. There accordingly is no
evidence to support a finding that Gomez was likely to commit a super-strike offense if
treated in the community and the trial court abused its discretion.

D. The Trial Court’s Exercise of Its Residual Discretion Is Inconsistent With
the Principles and Purposes of the Mental Health Diversion Statute
The People argue that, even if we were to find that Gomez meets the eligibility
and suitability criteria for diversion, Gomez would not be entitled to pretrial diversion
because the trial court exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion based on “the
violent nature of her crime, and the serious injuries she and her co-defendants caused to
the victim.” Gomez correctly points out, however, that “ ‘[w]here the court chooses to
exercise [its] residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect
consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would

18
not meet those goals.’ ” (Citing Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) The trial
court’s statement of reasons reflects no such consideration or explanation.
“A trial court’s denial of mental health diversion using its residual discretion
should be limited to those situations where the purposes of the statute would not be
achieved.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 138.) The stated
purpose of mental health diversion “ ‘is to keep people with mental disorders from
entering and reentering the criminal justice system while protecting public safety, to give
counties discretion in developing and implementing diversion across a continuum of care
settings, and to provide mental health rehabilitative services.’ ” (Ibid.) “That purpose
includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because
of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892-893.)
Here, instead of focusing on the purpose of the diversion statute and explaining
why diversion would not meet those goals, the trial court denied diversion under its
residual discretion based solely on the facts and circumstances of the robbery, including
the injuries sustained by the victim. The facts and circumstances of the robbery were,
however, considered under the unreasonable risk of dangerousness criteria of the statute.
The trial court cannot invoke its residual discretion to create a lower standard for finding
that the facts and circumstances of the robbery indicate diversion would not protect
public safety. (See Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 [“In the guise of
exercising its ‘residual’ discretion, a court is not permitted to redefine public safety in a
manner inconsistent with the Legislature’s expressed intent”]; id. at p. 897 [“Expanding
the reasons to deny diversion would also be inconsistent with the legislative purposes
sought to be achieved in enacting sections 1001.35 and 1001.36”].) Although the trial
court noted that it was “not permitted to redefine public safety in a manner inconsistent
with the Legislature’s expressed intent,” that is in essence what the trial court did. The
trial court thus abused its discretion.

19
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate its
order denying the application for mental health diversion and to enter a new order
granting the application.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

20
Filed 8/15/2025
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

MAYRA GOMEZ, C102211

Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE014787)

v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO OPINION FOR
COUNTY, PUBLICATION

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Petition granted.

Gina C. Teddington for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J.
Rench and Jamie A. Scheidegger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

1
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on August 6, 2025, was not certified
for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears the opinion should
be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

2

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.