Yang v. Lee CA2/8

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Filed 8/14/25 Yang v. Lee CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JEAN S. YANG, B339572

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21TRCV00693
v.

DEUK LEE,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
Trustable Law, Gi Nam Lee for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Richard Keavney, Richard P. Keavney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
____________________
Jean Yang sued to quiet title to her real property, which
Deuk Lee had encumbered with a trust deed. Lee had obtained a
money judgment a year earlier for the debt secured by the trust
deed. Yang moved for summary judgment, arguing Lee could not
obtain a money judgment and then separately enforce the trust
deed. The trial court correctly granted Yang’s motion. Citations
are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I
In 2009, Yang’s then husband Mark Yang borrowed
$150,000 from Lee. Mark Yang is not a party to this appeal. For
clarity and to differentiate him from Jean Yang, we refer to him
simply as the debtor.
In 2012, the debtor signed a note memorializing his
$150,000 debt to Lee. On the same day, the debtor and Yang
executed a trust deed in Lee’s favor on a property belonging
solely to Yang. They signed the trust deed as “trustors.”
Four years later, the debtor signed another note, revising
the amount owed to Lee to $200,000, which included $50,000 in
interest that had accrued. Yang did not sign the first or second
note.
Yang and the debtor divorced in 2018. Their divorce
judgment assigned the entirety of the Lee debt to the debtor, and
confirmed the real property was Yang’s sole and separate
property.
In 2019, Lee sued the debtor based only on the 2016 note.
The debtor defaulted and the court granted Lee a judgment in the
amount of $240,162.21.
Yang later realized the trust deed was clouding her title.
Her counsel wrote to Lee’s attorney, explaining this and asking
Lee to remove the trust deed recording. He did not.
II
Yang sued Lee for quiet title, cancellation of cloud on title,
and declaratory relief.

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Ten months after Yang filed her case, she moved for
summary judgment. The trial court reviewed the moving and
responsive papers and both parties’ supplemental briefing and
heard argument after continuing the hearing once; the court held
this hearing six months after Yang filed her motion.
Lee argued to the trial court, as he does here, that there
were questions of fact remaining to be determined, including 1)
whether Yang was obligated under either note; 2) whether the
debtor had ever possessed any interest in the property; 3)
whether Yang owned the property and had properly transferred
it to her trust; 4) what was meant by striking out the words
“power of sale” on the trust deed; and 5) whether the deed of trust
secured the 2016 note or only the 2012 note. He asked for more
time for discovery.
The trial court found section 726, commonly referred to as
the “one form of action” rule, prevented Lee from pursuing any
recovery against the property because he had already chosen and
obtained a remedy: a money judgment against the debtor. Lee’s
supposed issues of fact were not relevant.
The court granted summary judgment to Yang and ordered
the trust deed extinguished as of March 11, 2020, the date Lee
obtained the money judgment against the debtor. Lee appealed.
III
We independently review an order granting or denying
summary judgment. We review the entire record and consider all
evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except any
to which an objection has been made and sustained. We liberally
construe evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment
and resolve any doubts about the evidence in favor of the party

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opposing the motion. (Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
Once the relevant facts are established, whether a
particular code section applies to them is a question of law. (See
McKee v. Orange Unified School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
1310, 1316.) The pertinent portion of section 726 is subsection
(a), which says: “There can be but one form of action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by
mortgage upon real property or an estate for years therein, which
action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”
The trial court was right: none of the facts Lee disputes is
relevant to an analysis under section 726, subdivision (a). The
parties agree upon, or concede, all relevant facts.
As judicially construed, section 726 is both a “security-first”
and a “one-action” rule. It compels secured creditors, in a single
action, to exhaust their security judicially before they may obtain
a monetary judgment against the debtor. (Bank of America, N.A
v. Roberts (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1397.)
Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729 (Walker)
guides us. In Walker, a creditor holding both a chattel mortgage
and a trust deed on real property chose to foreclose on the chattel
mortgage first, and then to attempt a separate, later proceeding
based on the trust deed. (Id. at pp. 732–733.) When the new
owner of the real property sued to quiet title, the court found
creditors who obtain a monetary judgment in contravention of the
security-first rules of section 726 will be deemed to have forfeited
their right to further pursue their security interest. (Id. at p.
733.)
O’Neil v. General Security Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 587
(O’Neil) reached the same result in a case involving three

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separate parties: a group of creditors, a group of debtors, and a
group of “refinancers.” This is like the three-party situation here.
The O’Neil creditors first chased the debtors and reached a
settlement granting a personal judgment and purporting to
retain all other rights. (Id. at pp. 593.)
But when the creditors then pursued the refinancers, their
suit was barred. (O’Neil, supra, at pp. 598–599.) The O’Neil
court referenced Walker in reaching its conclusion: “[W]hen the
creditor obtains a personal deficiency judgment without first
pursuing judicial foreclosure on the real property, ‘… he thereby
loses his security interest in the real property as against all
parties even though the debtor does not raise [section 726] as an
affirmative defense in the judicial … proceedings.” (Id. at p. 598,
italics added.) This is the correct result.
When Lee loaned money to the debtor in 2012, he obtained
both a note and a trust deed to secure the loan. The 2016 note
merely memorialized the addition of interest accruing in the
intervening years. Lee sued on the note and obtained a personal
judgment. He is thus barred from pursuing a separate action
against the real property collateral.
Lee analogizes the situation to those described in Murphy
v. Hellman Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank (1919) 43 Cal.App.
579, Nuetzel v. Mackie (1927) 80 Cal.App. 768, and Carson v.
Reid (1902) 137 Cal. 253. He argues based on these venerable
cases that section 726 applies only to situations where the sole
debtor is liable on both the note and the trust deed.
These cases are inapposite. They do not address O’Neil’s
clear rule that, even in three-party situations, the creditor who
chooses a personal judgment first is held to that decision.

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Lee says this outcome would allow mischief, arguing
property owners will escape liabilities by simply having non-
owners sign notes and then waiting for unsuspecting creditors to
chase the wrong debtor. Not so. Creditors must pursue all
parties and property answerable for a debt in one suit, as Lee
should have done here if he believed Yang’s property was also
liable for this debt.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order and award costs to Yang.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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