In re J.S. CA3

CourtListener 10652375Calctapp12 de ago. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 8/12/25 In re J.S. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

In re J.S. et al., Minors. C102615

C.S., (Super. Ct. Nos. 23AD00182,
23AD00183)
Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Objector and Appellant.

J.B. (mother) appeals from family court orders terminating her parental rights and
declaring J.S. and K.S. (collectively, minors) free from her parental control on the basis
of abandonment under Family Code section 7822.1 Mother contends: (1) the orders
must be conditionally reversed due to lack of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

1
Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law, and (2) the evidence
was insufficient to support the family court’s finding that she abandoned minors within
the meaning of section 7822. We conclude a limited remand to comply with ICWA and
related California law is necessary.
I. BACKGROUND
J.S. and K.S. were born in 2016 and 2018, respectively. D.S. (father) and mother
never married, but they lived together until the end of 2019. Father sought custody of
minors in early 2020 after mother overdosed on drugs while watching minors. At the end
of 2021, mother’s supervised visits with minors were terminated after she failed a drug
test. As relevant to this proceeding, in August 2022, Amador County Superior Court
granted father full legal and physical custody of minors. Mother was ordered to not have
any contact or visitation with them. The court ordered, “If [mother] wishes to make any
changes to child custody, she must undergo a full psychological evaluation by a licensed
doctor and have an established treatment plan in place.”
Father married C.S. (stepmother) in September 2023. Later that year, stepmother
filed stepparent adoption requests and petitions to declare minors free from mother’s
parental custody and control for stepparent adoption due to abandonment under section
7822. The petitions alleged mother had not had any contact with minors since December
2021. Father consented in writing to the petitions and completed parental notification of
Indian status (ICWA-020) forms indicating minors had no Indian ancestry. Stepmother
also submitted ICWA-010(A) attachments indicating she had inquired of a sister and an
aunt to minors, and these inquiries gave her no reason to believe minors had Indian
ancestry. The record indicates an ICWA-020 form was not filled out for mother because
she could not be located.
A court investigator conducted an investigation regarding stepmother’s petition.
The investigator did not have any contact information for mother, and therefore did not

2
interview her. The probate investigator’s report recommended granting stepmother’s
petition. The report did not address ICWA.
Following a trial in which father, mother, and the probate investigator testified, the
family court granted stepmother’s petition on the basis that for the statutory period of one
year mother intended to abandon and did in fact abandon minors and provided no
support. The court found that for more than a year, mother had no communication with
minors.2 The court explained that mother did not follow the clear path that had been
paved for her to reestablish visitation with her children. The court also found “she never
made any attempt whatsoever to actually follow the Amador County court’s order.” The
court did not agree with mother that she made best efforts to satisfy the conditions.
Further, the court found mother did not move to reconsider or modify the order. The
court also found no evidence of any attempt to stop the drug use that resulted in mother’s
supervised visits being suspended or to treat any mental health issues.
The family court entered orders terminating mother’s parental rights, and mother
filed this appeal. Neither the orders nor the court’s oral ruling mentioned ICWA.
II. DISCUSSION
A. ICWA
Mother contends the orders terminating her parental rights must be conditionally
reversed due to lack of compliance with ICWA and related state law. We agree.
Congress enacted ICWA to protect Indian children and “to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families” by establishing minimum standards regarding
the removal of Indian children from their families. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129.) “[Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 224.2 codifies
and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian child.

2 Father testified mother had not had any contact with minors since at least March 2022.

3
Agencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every
dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child. ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 224.2, subd. (a).)” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, at pp. 1131-1132, fn. omitted; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) This
includes a petition pursuant to section 7822. (Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
537, 541.) A court must determine a minor’s Indian status before freeing the child from a
parent’s custody or control pursuant to either section 7820 or 7822. (Adoption of M.R.,
supra, at p. 541.)
Rule 5.481 of the California Rules of Court provides that where, as here, a party is
seeking a declaration freeing the minor from the custody or control of at least one of the
parents, or termination of a parent’s parental rights, or a subsequent adoption, that party
“must ask . . . the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, . . . whether the child is or may be an
Indian child” and “must complete the Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (form ICWA-
010(A)) and attach it to the petition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) Further,
the court must, at the first appearance by a parent, ask whether he or she knows or has
reason to know the child is an Indian child, instruct the parties to inform the court of any
subsequently received information that provides a reason to know the child is an Indian
child, and order the parent to complete an ICWA-020 form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(2)(A)-(C).)
Mother argues the court and the probate investigator failed to comply with the
inquiry requirements under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 and California
Rules of Court, rule 5.481. She argues there is no evidence that the court or the probate
investigator interviewed mother, adequately interviewed father, or interviewed extended
family members, including the maternal grandmother who was present at trial. Mother
notes the court made no findings under ICWA and contends the record does not support
an implied finding.

4
Although father completed ICWA-020 forms indicating minors had no Indian
ancestry, there is no evidence in the record that mother was asked at any time about
possible Indian heritage or that she received or completed an ICWA-020 form. We
conclude that, at a minimum, the failure to make any inquiry of mother when she
appeared at trial requires conditional reversal. (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
1136.) We are unpersuaded by stepmother’s suggestion that we may reject mother’s
argument for lack of prejudice because she did not assert on appeal that she has any
Indian heritage. (See id. at pp. 1136-1145 [explaining that assessing juvenile court’s
implied ICWA finding for prejudice by requiring appealing parent to make a proffer to
the Court of Appeal of extra-record evidence would improperly shift the burden of proof
to parents].) Our reversal is conditional because, as we explain next, mother’s challenges
to the family court’s determination of abandonment are without merit.
B. Abandonment
Mother contends stepmother failed to meet her burden under section 7822 to show
mother abandoned minors.
“Under section 7822, a court may declare a child free from a parent’s custody and
control if the parent has abandoned the child.” (Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1010.) Abandonment occurs when “[o]ne parent has left the child in
the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for
the child’s support, or without communication from the parent, with the intent on the part
of the parent to abandon the child.” (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).) Abandonment and intent are
questions of fact for the trial judge. (Allison C., supra, at p. 1011.) The relevant findings
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 7821.)
Mother argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding that she
“left” minors or that she intended to abandon them.
We “must account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing
a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard. When

5
reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the
fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)
1. Mother Left Minors
Mother argues she did not leave minors in the care and custody of father because
they were taken from her by court order. “In determining the threshold issue of whether a
parent has ‘left’ . . . her child, the focus of the law is ‘on the voluntary nature of a parent’s
abandonment of the parental role rather than on physical desertion by the parent.’
[Citations.] [¶] Thus, this court has held that a parent will not be found to have
voluntarily left a child in the care and custody of another where the child is effectively
‘taken’ from the parent by court order [citation]; however, the parent’s later voluntary
inaction may constitute a leaving with intent to abandon the child [citation]. [¶]
Numerous appellate decisions have long agreed that the leaving-with-intent-to-abandon-
the-child requirement of section 7822 can be established by evidence of a parent’s
voluntary inaction after an order granting primary care and custody to the other parent.
[Citations.] [¶] Simply stated, ‘nonaction of the parent after a judicial decree removing
the child may convert a [judicial] “taking” into a “leaving” [of a child by the parent].’ ”
(In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 491, 504.) This is what the
family court found in this proceeding. Mother argues she wanted to regain custody of
minors, and her only pathway to communication with them was a “futile path since she
lacked the financial means to pay for a private evaluation and she was unsuccessful,
despite repeated efforts, to find a doctor who was willing to accept her insurance.”

6
Mother’s arguments fail because they depend on her testimony, which the trial court did
not credit. (See Adoption of Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 [explaining
court was entitled to disbelieve or discount father’s testimony that he tried to send minor
letters and the court apparently did so because it expressly found father made inadequate
efforts to communicate by letters].) The court expressed skepticism that mother ever
went to any doctor, and found that if she did, she did so in bad faith. Mother testified she
“did have letters written, but I guess maybe that it wasn’t considered an evaluation.”
Further, she testified she saw a psychiatrist for more than a year and she “would get
letters saying that [she] was mentally stable and able to care for [her] kids.” The court in
its ruling observed mother “never presented a letter to the court from that assessment
stating that she has no problems and she is capable of maintaining a relationship with her
kids.” Ultimately, the court concluded mother did not make any attempt “whatsoever to
actually follow the Amador County court’s order.” Substantial evidence supported this
conclusion. Further, “[t]his inaction is substantial evidence that [mother] voluntarily
surrendered [her] parental role and left the minors within the meaning of section 7822.”
(In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D., supra, at p. 506.)
2. Mother Intended to Abandon Minors
“The failure to provide . . . support, or failure to communicate is presumptive
evidence of the intent to abandon. If the parent . . . ha[s] made only token efforts to
support or communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by the
parent.” (§ 7822, subd. (b).) It is undisputed that mother did not communicate with
minors for more than a year. Whether the presumption of abandonment has been
overcome satisfactorily is a question of fact for resolution by the trial court. (In re
Marriage of Jill & Victor D., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) Additionally, “[i]n
determining a parent’s intent to abandon, the superior court must objectively measure the
parent’s conduct, ‘consider[ing] not only the number and frequency of his or her efforts to
communicate with the child, but the genuineness of’ the parent’s efforts.” (Adoption of

7
A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 923.) “The parent need not intend to abandon the child
permanently; rather, it is sufficient that the parent had the intent to abandon the child
during the statutory period.” (In re Amy A. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 63, 68.) Again,
mother argues she made the efforts she was capable of making to obtain a psychological
evaluation. Mother’s argument is unavailing because the family court did not credit her
testimony and concluded that she did not make any genuine efforts to comply with the
Amador County order. (See In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D., supra, at p. 506 [“Here,
the trial court was not required to believe father’s testimony regarding his intent and, in
light of the other evidence, father’s testimony did not overcome the presumption of
abandonment”].) She also argues she attempted to open a new case or court dates in
Amador County. The trial court found that mother made no motions to modify the order.
The trial court’s finding that mother intended to abandon minors is supported by
sufficient evidence.

8
III. DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally reversed and remanded for
the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and the California implementing
provisions, including the court’s entry of findings related to ICWA at the conclusion of
the inquiry. If, after proper and complete inquiry, minors are found not to be Indian
children falling within the provisions of the ICWA, the orders shall be reinstated.
However, if the court concludes that ICWA applies, the court is ordered to conduct a new
trial and proceed in accordance with ICWA and California implementing provisions.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

FEINBERG, J.

9

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.