People v. Lawrence CA3

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Filed 8/8/25 P. v. Lawrence CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101453

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 99F01033)

v.

REGINALD LAWRENCE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Reginald Lawrence appeals from a resentencing order made pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Lawrence argues the trial court was required to dismiss
two prior serious felony enhancements pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)
and (C). In the course of our review of the record, it was discovered that the trial court

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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failed to recalculate Lawrence’s custody credits. We will remand the matter for the trial
court to recalculate Lawrence’s custody credits and otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We rely on the probation report in summarizing the facts, as did the trial court. On
January 29, 1999, Lawrence argued with his ex-wife (the victim) and threatened to kill
her. It was not the first time he had threatened her. The day after the argument, a fire
broke out in the victim’s apartment. A fire investigator determined that lighter fluid had
been poured throughout the apartment and three independent fires had been set. The
victim, who was not at home at the time of the incident, told investigating police officers
that Lawrence had set the fires.
In 2001, a jury found Lawrence guilty of arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451,
subd. (b)) and residential first degree burglary (§ 459). In bifurcated proceedings, the
trial court also found true that Lawrence had two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)),
two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and three prior prison terms
(former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Lawrence to prison for 38 years to life, as follows: 25
years to life for the arson count, 25 years to life concurrent for the burglary count, five
years consecutive for each of the two prior serious felony enhancements (or 10 years
total), and one year consecutive for each of the three prior prison term enhancements (or
three years total).
In Lawrence’s original appeal, this court found that there was insufficient evidence
to support one of the prior strikes, remanded the matter for resentencing or retrial on that
prior conviction, and otherwise affirmed. (People v. Lawrence (Oct. 29, 2002, C038251)
[nonpub. opn.].) During retrial on remand, the trial court in 2003 again found the prior
strike true and sentenced Lawrence to prison for 38 years to life. (People v. Lawrence
(May 5, 2004, C044738) [nonpub. opn.].) This court directed the trial court to prepare an

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amended abstract of judgment that correctly reflected the sentence imposed but otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
The trial court subsequently received notice from the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation that Lawrence was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. In
August 2023, the trial court appointed counsel and ordered briefing.
Lawrence filed a brief asking the trial court to strike the prior prison term
enhancements, dismiss one or all of his prior strikes, and stay the punishment for the
prior serious felony enhancements. Lawrence urged the court to consider postconviction
factors, arguing he had participated in prison work, education, and rehabilitation
programs. Lawrence was also 64 years old and therefore posed less of a risk of future
crime or violence. Lawrence further argued he had been in custody continuously since
2001 (or 23 years), and it was no longer in the interest of justice to incarcerate him.
Lawrence also argued the enhancements should be dismissed under section 1385
because multiple enhancements had been alleged in a single case, and the enhancement
was based on a prior conviction more than five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (H)
[2024 version, operative at time of resentencing].)
The prosecution filed a reply arguing the trial court should strike the prior prison
term enhancements but otherwise leave the sentence unchanged. According to the
prosecution, it would be against the interests of justice to strike the prior serious felony
enhancements or the prior strikes. Lawrence had “terrorized” the victim and had an
extensive criminal history, including being “habitually and brutally violent towards
women when out of custody.”
During the June 2024 resentencing hearing, Lawrence argued he was entitled to
relief because he had done a “significant amount” of rehabilitation prior to the enactment
of section 1172.75. In addition, one of his prior strikes was based on a 1977 conviction,
which was more than 46 years ago. The prosecution argued Lawrence was a threat to
public safety.

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Turning to Lawrence’s Romero2 motion, the court declined to strike any of
Lawrence’s prior strikes finding that he did not fall outside the spirit of the “Three
Strikes” law. Even though Lawrence’s first strike was from 1977, he had continued
engaging in criminal conduct that was “very serious, brutal, threatening, [and] harmful.”
Although Lawrence had recently started to address his issues, his rehabilitation efforts
fell “far short of ensuring that he will not at this point pose a danger to the public.” There
were also “numerous” aggravating factors present: the crime involved great violence
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); the manner of the crime indicated planning or
sophistication (id., rule 4.421(a)(8)); Lawrence had engaged in violent conduct indicating
a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)); Lawrence had numerous prior
convictions increasing in seriousness (id., rule 4.421(b)(2)); and he had a prior prison
term (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)). For the same reasons, the court declined to strike any of the
prior serious felony enhancements.
The trial court then dismissed the prior prison term enhancements and sentenced
Lawrence to prison for 35 years to life. The court suspended mandatory fees and waived
any nonmandatory fees. Turning to custody credits, the court noted that Lawrence had
been awarded 1,839 days of custody credit when he was resentenced in 2003 and stated
that the “Department of Corrections will be able to calculate any credits that he is entitled
to since that date.” The abstract of judgment lists the same amount of custody credits as
originally awarded in 2003 (1,839 days total). Lawrence timely appealed in June 2024.
His opening brief was filed in February 2025, and this case became fully briefed on
April 29, 2025.

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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DISCUSSION
I
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 1385 to add subdivision (c), which states, “Notwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) In exercising its discretion, “the court shall consider
and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Two of the mitigating circumstances are: “Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case,” in which case “all enhancements beyond a
single enhancement shall be dismissed” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); and the “application of
an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years,” in which case “the
enhancement shall be dismissed” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)). A trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss a sentence enhancement under section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.)
According to Lawrence, the trial court erred because the “shall be dismissed”
language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C) is mandatory and required the
trial court to dismiss the two prior serious felony enhancements because they (1) resulted
in a sentence exceeding 20 years and (2) resulted in imposition of more than one
enhancement. As the People argue in their brief, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does
not apply here because the trial court had already imposed a sentence greater than 20
years when it sentenced Lawrence to 25 years to life on the principal count.

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As our Supreme Court recently explained, the plain text of section 1385,
subdivision (c) “does not ‘presume’ [citation] an enhancement should be dismissed
whenever an enumerated mitigating circumstance is present.” (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033.) Instead, section 1385, subdivision (c) requires the trial court to
consider “ ‘whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement.’ ”
(Walker, at p. 1033.) In other words, “notwithstanding the presence” of any of the
mitigating circumstances set out in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “trial courts retain
their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed
essential to the “furtherance of justice” inquiry.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1033.) Given the
conclusion in Walker that section 1385, subdivision (c) does not create a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement, we find no merit to Lawrence’s
claim that the trial court erred because dismissal is required in every case where an
enhancement results in a sentence exceeding 20 years or results in the imposition of more
than one enhancement.
II
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court erroneously failed to
recalculate Lawrence’s custody credits. When a trial court resentences a defendant who
is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days he spent in
custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including his time in custody after the
original sentencing. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37.) We will remand
the matter for the trial court to recalculate credits.

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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of recalculating the days of
custody credit for which Lawrence is eligible on his resentencing. The trial court is
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment setting forth the modified credits
and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

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