People v. Daniels CA3

CourtListener 10650486Calctapp8 de ago. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 8/8/25 P. v. Daniels CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099927

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE004616)

v.

MICHAEL LAMONT DANIELS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Michael Lamont Daniels of attempted murder,
aggravated mayhem, and mayhem. On appeal defendant claims there is insufficient
evidence of (1) deliberation and premeditation, as to the attempted murder charge, and
(2) specific intent to maim, as to the aggravated mayhem charge. We conclude that
substantial evidence supports both convictions. Alternatively, defendant claims the
conviction for mayhem should be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of
aggravated mayhem. The People concede the conviction for mayhem should be reversed.
We agree that the convictions for both aggravated mayhem and mayhem were improper
and therefore reverse the mayhem conviction. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

1
BACKGROUND
Defendant was at a gas station convenience store when he began arguing and
fighting with the victim. The fight stopped temporarily, but shortly after the victim left
the convenience store defendant followed him to an adjacent auto body shop, where he
slashed the victim’s face with a machete and repeatedly punched him. Security cameras
in the convenience store, outside the gas station, and at the auto body shop captured the
entire incident.
The security camera footage showed the victim, K.W.,1 and defendant exchange
heated words while defendant waited in line to check out at the convenience store. K.W.
approached defendant as the two continued to talk. While standing face-to-face
defendant threw a punch at the victim, and they began to fight.
The convenience store clerk did not hear what defendant and K.W. said to each
other, but observed that they appeared to be mutually aggressive. The convenience store
clerk told them to leave the store. While outside, the two separated, and defendant
walked to his car. K.W. returned to the convenience store. Defendant looked back at the
convenience store, took off his jacket, and drove away after less than a minute as K.W.
left the store.
K.W. left the convenience store and walked to an adjacent auto body shop parking
lot when defendant’s car appeared and stopped. Defendant got out of his car with two
machetes. Defendant swung the machetes at K.W.’s head and chased him. As defendant
gave chase, he dropped one of his machetes, and K.W. fell to the ground. Defendant
stood over K.W. and struck him 11 times with the machete as the victim lay on the
ground. Defendant admitted at trial that he struck the victim multiple times with the
machete. Defendant also admitted he punched and kicked the victim. After the attack,

1 To protect his privacy, we refer to the victim by his initials. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90 (b)(4).)

2
defendant ran back to his car, picked up the second machete from the ground, and fled the
scene.
An ambulance transported the victim to a hospital. K.W.’s nose was almost
entirely severed. He suffered multiple cuts on his face and head that required stitches;
several cuts and broken bones on his left hand, arm, and shoulder; and a cut on his right
arm.
Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy Marcus Ziegler interviewed K.W. at the
hospital. He said the victim explained that he and defendant had argued and fought in the
convenience store, but K.W. did not remember what caused the fight. K.W. told Deputy
Ziegler he was planning to climb the fence of the auto body shop parking lot to get to his
girlfriend’s house, when a white car approached him in the parking lot. After attacking
K.W., the victim told Deputy Ziegler defendant said, “[t]hat’s what you get for fucking
with a killer.” K.W. was able to identify defendant in a photo lineup.
Five days later, Roseville Police Officer Chase Fathy received a notification
defendant’s car was entering Roseville. When Officer Fathy located defendant’s car,
defendant was sitting inside. Officer Fathy arrested defendant and turned the vehicle
over to the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.
Defendant testified that the victim instigated the fight by asking defendant “[D]o
you know who the fuck I am?” and “don’t be running up on me. I’ll beat your ass.” He
admitted to punching the victim and stated he did so because he was scared K.W. was
going to hit him. Once outside of the convenience store, defendant said K.W. threatened
to kill him. After he and K.W. separated, defendant walked to his car and took off his
jacket because he was “hot” from the fight inside the convenience store.
Defendant testified that he decided to exit the gas station through the auto body
shop parking lot because it allowed him to make a left turn toward his house, which the
main exit from the gas station prevented. Upon driving through the parking lot K.W.
“popped up in front” of defendant’s car. Defendant testified that he “blacked out,” from

3
anger, grabbed the machetes, and ran after the victim. He said, “at first” he intended to
merely scare the victim, but conceded he was in a rage and “completely out of control” as
he swung “blindly” and “wildly” at the victim. Defendant claimed that he never intended
to kill K.W. or cut his nose off, but admitted he was “just trying to hit him anywhere
towards the body.” He testified that he did not “really know what really happened until
[he had] seen the video, because [he] was just so mad and enraged.” He further testified
he was in a fit of rage and “didn’t really know what [he] was doing” because he didn’t
have control of himself.
In 2023, an amended information charged defendant with attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 664/187, subd. (a)—count one),
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)—count two), aggravated mayhem
(§ 205—count three), and mayhem (§ 203—count four). It further alleged defendant
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), as to the attempted murder and assault
counts.
The jury found defendant guilty of all counts and found true the enhancement that
defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon and inflicted great bodily
injury on the victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of life
plus four years on the attempted murder count. Pursuant to section 654, the trial court
imposed and stayed terms on the remaining counts.
DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions
for attempted murder and aggravated mayhem.

2 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

4
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) We do not reweigh the
evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, but rather presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.
(Ibid.) A judgment will be reversed only if no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Campbell (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 463, 484.) Under this standard, the defendant bears an “enormous
burden” in demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
(People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
B. Attempted Murder
Defendant argues there is not sufficient evidence of premeditation and
deliberation, as to the attempted murder charge.
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, our Supreme Court identified
three categories of evidence that are typically sufficient to sustain a finding of
premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning evidence; (2) motive evidence; and (3) a
manner of killing from which the jury could reasonably infer a deliberate intent to kill.
These factors need not be present in “some special combination” or “accorded a
particular weight” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247), and “it is not essential
that there be evidence of each category to sustain a conviction” (People v. Gonzalez
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 875, 887; see also People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174,
202 [“[T]he Anderson factors are simply an aid for the reviewing court, and an
‘[u]nreflective reliance’ on People v. Anderson is inappropriate”]). That said, “[w]hen

5
the record discloses evidence in all three categories, the verdict generally will be
sustained.” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529.)
Premeditation and deliberation do not require an extended period of time. (People
v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216.) “ ‘The true test . . . is the extent of the
reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[U]se of a lethal weapon with lethal
force’ against the victim, if otherwise legally unexcused, will itself give rise to an
inference of intent to kill.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 742.)
Applying these principles to the facts, and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, presuming the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment, we conclude the evidence is
sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of the attempted murder of K.W.
Regarding planning, after defendant and K.W. separated in the parking lot of the
gas station, defendant waited by his car for nearly a minute and looked back at the
convenience store where K.W. had returned. When K.W. walked out of the convenience
store defendant got into his car without purchasing gas and drove to the adjacent
autobody shop parking lot, pulling right in front of the victim. Both machetes were in the
backseat of defendant’s car and within defendant’s reach. A reasonable jury could infer
defendant had ample time to plan as he watched the victim leave the convenience store
and pursued the victim to the adjacent autobody shop, before grabbing both machetes and
exiting the car to attack the victim.
The jury could have construed defendant’s motive to kill from the fight that
occurred with the victim minutes before defendant’s violent attack. (People v. Anderson,
supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.) It was plausible for the jury to infer defendant’s motive
because of the escalation of his actions. In the convenience store, he verbally confronted
the victim while waiting in line, and he started the initial fight. About a minute after the
fight, defendant followed the victim in his car before grabbing his machetes, chasing

6
down, and brutally attacking the victim. After the attack, defendant told the victim,
“[t]hat’s what you get for fucking with a killer,” further implying a murderous intent.
The evidence of the manner of the attack also supports a finding of premeditation
and deliberation. Defendant took off his jacket, presumably to prepare for the attack.
Defendant watched the victim leave the convenience store, followed him in his car, and
ambushed him in an empty parking lot. Defendant began his attack by swinging the
machetes at K.W.’s head. Once the victim was on the ground, defendant struck and
slashed K.W.’s face, shoulder, arms, and hands several times with the machete. He also
punched the victim in the head and then continued to slash him with the machete. The
violent nature of the attack, which targeted a vulnerable body part, the head, supports a
reasonable inference of a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill. We conclude a
reasonable jury could have returned a guilty verdict on a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing theory of attempted murder.
C. Aggravated Mayhem
Defendant also argues that defendant’s attack on the victim was indiscriminate,
and that no reasonable juror could have found defendant acted with the specific intent to
maim the victim. We disagree. Defendant contends he cannot harbor both the intent to
maim and to kill, citing to Justice Werdegar’s dissent in People v. Manibusan (2013)
58 Cal.4th 40, 104 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.). We are bound to follow the
majority in Manibusan, which held that the defendant’s act of shooting a victim in the
head could support an “intent to kill” and “an intent to cause permanent disability or
disfigurement.” (Id. at p. 88.)
An aggravated mayhem conviction requires proof that a defendant “intentionally
and unlawfully caused another person to sustain permanent disability or disfigurement.”
(§ 205; People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 833.) Aggravated mayhem is “a
specific intent crime” (People v. Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 44), which requires
“the specific intent to cause the maiming injury. [Citations.] ‘Evidence that shows no

7
more than an “indiscriminate attack” is insufficient to prove the required specific intent.’
[Citations.] . . . ‘Furthermore, specific intent to maim may not be inferred solely from
evidence that the injury inflicted actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be
other facts and circumstances which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to
attack indiscriminately.’ ” (People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 195.)
“[E]vidence of a ‘controlled and directed’ attack or an attack of ‘focused or limited
scope’ may provide substantial evidence of such specific intent.” (People v. Quintero,
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Poisson
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 121.)
Defendant initially swung both machetes at K.W.’s head, dropped one machete,
and chased the victim until he fell to the ground. While K.W. was on the ground,
defendant repeatedly slashed the victim’s face and head with the machete. It was
reasonable for the jury to infer a specific intent to maim, based on the attack being aimed
at K.W.’s head. (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 69 [an attack aimed at the
head infers a limited scope attack with intent to maim]; People v. Campbell (1987)
193 Cal.App.3d 1653 [same].) When K.W. tried to block defendant’s blows, defendant
punched him several times in the head, causing K.W. to lower the arm that he used to
attempt to block defendant’s machete strikes. This allowed defendant to slash the
victim’s face with the machete. (Park, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 [“When [the
victim] tried to defend himself by holding his arm in front of his face, defendant did not
strike other portions of [the victim’s] body but instead first hit [the victim’s] arm several
times to break through this defense and then hit [the victim] in the mouth”].)
Contrary to defendant’s argument that this was an indiscriminate attack, the
evidence reflects that he deliberately attacked K.W. Defendant and K.W. fought,
defendant waited for K.W. to leave the convenience store, and then attacked him with a
machete. As K.W. tried to block the blows from the machete, defendant hit K.W. to
lower his defenses and then continued to slash his face with the machete. When he was

8
done, he told K.W. “[t]hat’s what you get for fucking with a killer.” It is reasonable for
the jury to infer from those facts that this was a deliberate attack against K.W., not an
indiscriminate one. The record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the specific intent to
maim.
D. Mayhem Conviction
The parties agree that defendant’s mayhem conviction must be reversed because it
is a necessarily included lesser offense of the aggravated mayhem count. We concur.
Defendant cannot receive multiple convictions based on necessarily included
offenses. (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034; accord, People v. Aranda
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1089.) If “a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a
necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and
the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling,
and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.” (People v. Sanders (2012)
55 Cal.4th 731, 736.)
Here, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated mayhem and mayhem, which is
the lesser included offense. This was improper. As such, the conviction for mayhem
must be reversed.

9
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s mayhem conviction is reversed, in all other aspects, the judgment is
affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the
reversal of the mayhem conviction and to forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.

\s\ ,
Krause, J.

We concur:

\s\ ,
Earl, P. J.

\s\ ,
Mesiwala, J.

10

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.