People v. Jace CA2/3

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Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Jace CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337672

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XCNBA424932
v.

MICHAEL ANDREW JACE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael Andrew Jace, in pro. per.; Allen G. Weinberg,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review this appeal of an order denying a petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND2
On May 19, 2014, Michael Andrew Jace shot and killed
his wife April. Their sons, then ages eight and five, were in
the home at the time. The eight-year-old testified at trial that
he saw Jace pull April by her arm into the hallway, where
she fell to the floor. The child continued, “ ‘And then my dad
said, “If you like running,[3] then run to heaven.” And then
he shot her.’ ” April died of multiple gunshot wounds. One
bullet entered her middle back and came out on the right side
of her chest. (Jace I.)
The People charged Jace with April’s murder. The People
also alleged Jace had personally discharged a firearm causing
April’s death. A jury convicted Jace of second degree murder and
found the firearm enhancement allegation true. The trial court
sentenced Jace to 40 years to life in the state prison. Another
panel of this court affirmed Jace’s conviction. (Jace I.)
In October 2023, the trial court received a petition
from Jace for resentencing under section 1172.6. The petition
consisted of a one-page check-the-box form. The court appointed

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 We take our procedural history and factual background
from the opinion on direct appeal from Jace’s conviction, People
v. Jace (Jan. 11, 2019, B276074) [nonpub. opn.] (Jace I). We
summarize the facts only for context. We do not rely on them
in resolving this appeal.
3 April was a runner. (Jace I.)

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counsel for Jace. The prosecution filed an opposition to Jace’s
petition, stating he was the actual killer and therefore ineligible
for relief. Jace’s counsel filed a reply.
On April 24, 2024, the court conducted a hearing to
determine if Jace had made a prima facie case for relief. After
hearing from counsel, the court found Jace had not made the
requisite prima facie showing. Accordingly, the court denied
Jace’s petition.
Jace appealed and we appointed counsel to represent him.
After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief
raising no issues and asking this court to “exercise its discretion
and review the record for any arguable issues in accord with
Delgadillo.” Counsel stated he had written to Jace “explaining
[counsel’s] views regarding the case and [his] filing” of the
Delgadillo brief. Counsel also had sent Jace copies of his
brief and of the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts on appeal.
In addition, counsel had informed Jace of his right to file
a supplemental brief.
Jace filed a supplemental brief. In his brief, Jace does
not deny having shot April. Nor does he make any mention of
any accomplice, or of some other perpetrator. Jace asserts the
jury instructions given at his trial were inadequate to explain
implied malice. He also contends there “are a number of disputed
facts” in his case. Jace says, “At the time the gun was being
fired, appellant hadn’t formed a conscious thought.” He also
attaches a transcript page from his interview with detectives
in which he stated, “I don’t know what the hell I was thinking.”
“I just wanted her to feel some pain.”

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DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437)
limited the scope of the felony murder rule and eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for murder
liability. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The intent of SB 1437 is “to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not
act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f); Lewis, at p. 967.) Effective
January 2022, the Legislature extended resentencing eligibility
to individuals convicted of murder on any “other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2(a).)
The amendments to the Penal Code did not invalidate
murder convictions based on the theory the defendant was the
actual killer or intended to kill. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707; People v. Mares
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166.) And, while SB 1437
eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for
second degree murder based on imputed malice, implied malice
remains a valid theory of second degree murder liability. (§ 188,
subd. (a); People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850; People v. Vizcarra (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
Petitions for resentencing under section 1172.6 allow
defendants to seek review of convictions where the defendant
was not the killer but was held vicariously liable on one of
several theories of liability identified in the statute. If the

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record establishes ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of
law, the trial court may deny the petition. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.) However, the petition and the record
must establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
The prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “It is not, however, simply duplicative of
the facial inquiry.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549,
562.) In assessing whether a defendant has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the trial court is entitled
to review the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at pp. 971–972.
See Patton, at p. 563 [“after the appointment of counsel, a court
looks beyond the face of the petition”]; People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) “Conclusory allegations, such as the
checkbox ones offered here, are particularly subject to refutation
by the record of conviction.” (Patton, at p. 564.)
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court clarified the procedures
required in an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition
where counsel finds no arguable issues: (1) “counsel should
file a brief informing the court of that determination, including
a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the
petition”; and (2) the defendant should be notified of his right
to file a supplemental brief. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 231–232.) If the defendant then files a supplemental
brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.
The filing of a supplemental brief . . . does not compel an

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independent review of the entire record to identify unraised
issues.” (Id. at p. 232 [it is “wholly within the court’s discretion”
whether to conduct an independent review of the entire record].)
Our standard of review is de novo. (People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238.)
Nowhere in the record has Jace denied having killed April.
Nothing in the record of conviction suggests there was any other
perpetrator. The People charged Jace as the sole and actual
killer and the record contains no allegations of accomplice
liability. In short, the record of conviction establishes Jace
is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v.
Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1201–1204; People v. Harden
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 53–55. Cf. Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 233 [defendant not entitled to resentencing because
he “was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].)
Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled Jace did not establish
a prima facie case for relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.)

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Michael Andrew Jace’s
petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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